Good

[Zoot]

The occasional arguments about whether or not there is objective morality are generally misplaced. The disagreement is usually between two positions: "morality is subjective, and varies from person to person" and "morality is objective, and variation is attributable to different perspectives on the same objective reality".

This is a waste of time, because even by engaging in such a debate, both parties have implicitly agreed to the intelligibility of each other's notions, especially that of "objective morality". This implies a lack of clear understanding regarding the nature of the very concept of morality. If the concept was properly understood, the subjective moralitist would not say, "Morality is subjective rather than objective." He would instead say, "Objective morality is an incoherent, internally inconsistent non-concept. It doesn't just not exist, it can't exist - it's not even conceivable."

The reason for this misunderstanding is the fundamentalness of the concept of "good". It is a very old notion, and millennia of human beings have grown up in environments saturated by the notion, and surrounded by people who take its coherence for granted.

What is this notion, then, of "good"? What does it mean to say that an action is good? For the majority of people, the concept is too fundamental to bear any further analysis. "Everyone knows what good means," they say. "It means good. There's no other word for it."

When you ask someone "what does 'good' mean?", they will often reply with a list of things they describe as good, or the criteria for determining whether or not something is good. For example, "good is whatever God wants," or "good is whatever makes people happy," or "loving people and not hurting people is good." Each answer leaves us none the wiser as to what "good" means, if we pretend to have never come across the notion before.

In response to the answers that consist of criteria for determining goodness, it is illuminating to ask, "So when I call something 'good', I'm saying nothing more than that it... <insert criteria>." For example, when someone tells me that good is whatever God wants, I ask, "So when I call something 'good', I'm saying nothing more than that God wants it?" I'm sure most will agree that this is contrary to the concept of goodness with which we have grown up. There is something more to it.

It seems to me that when one says that an action is "good", one is saying nothing more than that it is preferable. The preferability of an action is usually for some reason, and when one enquires into these reasons, one hits a kind of base, bare fact of preferability that can be explained no further in the context of a subjective decider. I'll explain.

Eating chocolate is preferable to me. It has an amount of preferability, which can be explained in terms of how much pleasure it gives me. That pleasure is preferable is just a bare fact of my subjective existence, and I can go no further in explaining it without stepping out of the context of the deciding subject and instead treating myself as an object of scientific enquiry. At that point I can say, "Well, I want pleasure because I am human and humans evolved to seek pleasure."

So there are two kinds of explanations of preferability, one in the context of a deciding subject, and the other in the context of a deciding object. As a subject, my preferance for sensual pleasure is a bare fact of my existence and I can go no further in explaining it. As an object, my preference for sensual pleasure is attributable to prior causes, but in my experience, my evolutionary biological make-up is not my reason for preferring pleasure; to me, I just want it.

So one hits these bare facts of preferability when analysing reasons for acting in particular ways. I just plain want pleasure. I just plain want to continue to live - another thing explicable in terms of evolutionary biology, but experienced as just a bare fact of my existence. More complex motivations are reducible to these, and other, bare preferences.

So where does "good" fit in? Goodness is also a bare preference. When an option is perceived as good, the option is more preferable to the decider. And that preferability is not reducible to any other motivation. In other words, the notion of good, by its very nature, is not dependent on another motivation to explain it. It's not "preferable because such-and-such is preferable". It's just plain preferable, for no further reason.

How does this all mean that objective morality is meaningless? Firstly, if goodness amounts to preferability, it must be preferable to someone. There is no such thing as preferability outside the context of a deciding subject, and so there cannot be goodness outside of the context of a deciding subject.

But more importantly, if "good" means nothing more than "preferable for no reason", then it is inherently arbitrary. The position of the objective moralitist is that "good" is not an arbitrary notion at all.

[seebs]

I don't think I buy the notion that it's "arbitrary". I don't consider mathematics and physics to be "arbitrary", even though they are the way they are for no reason I can perceive other than just "this is how things are".

[Zoot]

Well, consider this - is it good to feed hungry people? Is there a reason it's good?

[seebs]

Well, consider this - is it good to feed hungry people? Is there a reason it's good?

I don't know that the question gives enough information to reach an unqualified answer. As to a reason... I don't know. This strikes me as asking whether there's a reason that some numbers have non-rational square roots. I'm not sure whether the question has an approachable or meaningful answer, even if I can show the result to be conclusively true.

[Zoot]

You're saying "things are good cos they just are"?

[seebs]

You're saying "things are good cos they just are"?

Maybe. However, I don't think that makes it meaningless. I could say "some integers have non-integer square roots just because they do", but that doesn't make the non-integerness illusory or meaningless!

Also, I don't necessarily think "things" can be good or ungood in and of themselves. I am not a deontological ethicist, and I do not subscribe to the List Of Forbidden Verbs model of morality.

But... I tend to see morality as a quality about like mathematics and physics, inherent in the structure of things, but not necessarily directly observed or correctly comprehended.

The problem with the term "arbitrary" is that it implies that some entity went through making decisions without rational basis... But that's not quite right. The laws of physics are not "arbitrary" in this sense, I don't think. They appear to be inherent in the structure of universes similar to this one. (Well, from our limited sample space.) We don't know why they're the way they are, but they seem to be that way nonetheless.

[Zoot]

Okay, let's say the term is meaningful.

What is its meaning? What does it mean to say that an action is "good"?

[seebs]

What is its meaning? What does it mean to say that an action is "good"?

I am not sure actions are "good". :) Morality is the study of "ought", as opposed to most science, which is the study of "is".

Ought I to apologize? This is a moral question. "Will apologizing yield this result?" That's a scientific question. "What results should I try to produce?" That's a moral question.

I am not sure that it is "actions" which are good or evil. I tend to be a virtues ethicist. Rather than saying "giving to charity is good", I say "being generous is good". How does one apply generosity? There are many ways. I don't know of a way to decide between them. But I think that the underlying nature of "being generous" can be understood, and is "good".

[Zoot]

Right, then. We have two words that mean nothing to me for you to explain the meaning of:

"good"

and

"ought".

[seebs]

Right, then. We have two words that mean nothing to me for you to explain the meaning of:

"good"

and

"ought".

I think "ought" is well enough defined.

ought1 Audio pronunciation of "ought" ( P ) Pronunciation Key (ôt)
aux.v.

1. Used to indicate obligation or duty: You ought to work harder than that.
2. Used to indicate advisability or prudence: You ought to wear a raincoat.
3. Used to indicate desirability: You ought to have been there; it was great fun.
4. Used to indicate probability or likelihood: She ought to finish by next week.

"obligation, duty, desirability, advisability, prudence".

I don't think it makes much sense to deny that this word has meaning. It's pretty clear what it means.

Here's the problem. I'm trying to explain three-space, and you're saying "yes, but how do you define z in terms of x and y?"

This is a properly basic concept. It isn't reducible to non-moral claims. If it were, then it wouldn't really be a moral claim, but some combination of non-moral claims.

So, just treat it as the assertion that there is another dimension. You can argue whether or not it exists, but demanding that it be defined in terms of existing dimensions is silly.

[Zoot]

I don't think it makes much sense to deny that this word has meaning. It's pretty clear what it means.

Here's the problem. I'm trying to explain three-space, and you're saying "yes, but how do you define z in terms of x and y?"

This is a properly basic concept. It isn't reducible to non-moral claims. If it were, then it wouldn't really be a moral claim, but some combination of non-moral claims.

So, just treat it as the assertion that there is another dimension. You can argue whether or not it exists, but demanding that it be defined in terms of existing dimensions is silly.

I'm only asking you explain them in terms of other words and notions. "Ought" means nothing to me, but perhaps you can explain what it means to you, rather than essentially saying, "You know perfectly well what it means, so no, I won't."

Tell me what a moral claim is.

Tell me what it means to say that something (someone?) is good.

[seebs]

I'm only asking you explain them in terms of other words and notions. "Ought" means nothing to me, but perhaps you can explain what it means to you, rather than essentially saying, "You know perfectly well what it means, so no, I won't."

Tell me what a moral claim is.

Tell me what it means to say that something (someone?) is good.

I don't know that there are any other words and concepts for these that aren't defined in terms of them.

Basically... Here's my problem. I have no obvious reason to believe that you have any words or concepts that you accept as meaningful which can be used to explain these correctly.

Furthermore, it seems very odd to me that anyone could not know what these words mean. I can understand people arguing that the thing they mean isn't real, but I can't understand not having any idea of what they mean. These are foundational concepts in all discussions of ethics.

What does "ought" mean? If you "ought" to behave in a given way, it means that the world that results if you do is objectively better than the world that results if you don't. What's "better"? A value judgment. Period. It's just there. It's not "in terms of X", or "in terms of Y"; it's the hypothesized underlying absolute value judgment.

You may not believe that such a thing exists, but I'd think the concept would be straightforward enough.

[Zoot]

Furthermore, it seems very odd to me that anyone could not know what these words mean. I can understand people arguing that the thing they mean isn't real, but I can't understand not having any idea of what they mean. These are foundational concepts in all discussions of ethics.

Well, I'm not one to think that just because many people dedicate a lot of time and effort to something, and have done for many years, that it necessarily makes any sense. After all, look at theism.


What does "ought" mean? If you "ought" to behave in a given way, it means that the world that results if you do is objectively better than the world that results if you don't. What's "better"? A value judgment. Period. It's just there. It's not "in terms of X", or "in terms of Y"; it's the hypothesized underlying absolute value judgment.

"What you ought to do is the option that makes the world better." "Better is a value judgement." I'm not sure you're explaining anything so much as rewording with synonyms. Very little of that sheds any light on what it means to say that one possibility is "better" (more good) than another. I think your definition of "ought" says something, though. Unfortunately, though, what it says points back to the term that has yet to be explained: good (whether in the form of "better" or "value").


You may not believe that such a thing exists, but I'd think the concept would be straightforward enough.

I think that when seen clearly, the concept is exposed as meaningless and nonsensical. However, that can't be demonstrated until "good" is defined. In order to be slightly less infuriating, here is my suggestion, and you can tell me where you differ from it, if at all:

"Good" means "irreducibly preferable for no reason".

[seebs]

Well, I'm not one to think that just because many people dedicate a lot of time and effort to something, and have done for many years, that it necessarily makes any sense. After all, look at theism.

I think theism makes sense. I just think that you're presupposing a metaphysical naturalist worldview with no values, and then demanding that everything be explained within this worldview. It doesn't work.

"What you ought to do is the option that makes the world better." "Better is a value judgement." I'm not sure you're explaining anything so much as rewording with synonyms.

Indeed.

Because, of course, you don't believe in any of these words, all of which are related.

You're right, I can't explain negative motion on the Z axis in terms of X and Y, only in terms of its relationship to positive motion on the Z axis.

Very little of that sheds any light on what it means to say that one possibility is "better" (more good) than another. I think your definition of "ought" says something, though. Unfortunately, though, what it says points back to the term that has yet to be explained: good (whether in the form of "better" or "value").

Right.

The notion of value is pretty straightforward. We know what it means to say that one thing is better than another within a context. The word "good", without such qualifiers, implies reference to a hypothesized universal frame of reference for values.

I think that when seen clearly, the concept is exposed as meaningless and nonsensical. However, that can't be demonstrated until "good" is defined. In order to be slightly less infuriating, here is my suggestion, and you can tell me where you differ from it, if at all:

"Good" means "irreducibly preferable for no reason".

Where I differ from it is that "for no reason" implies pure arbitrariness.

Okay, let's try a related word. "True". I claim that a proposition is "true" if it describes the world correctly. Let's imagine for the sake of argument that the force of gravity really does remain constant over time. We can then make claims like "the pull of gravity on the earth's surface is roughly 9.8 meters per second squared".

Now, you can ask "why", and we get back to density, mass, and the gravitational constant.

Now, when you ask why that constant is what it is, well, we may not know. But the claim "the gravitational constant is N" is true for one N, and false for all other N. Why? Because that's what the gravitational constant actually is.

This is not "for no reason". This is "because it corresponds to the physics of the universe".

So.

"Good" means "irreducibly preferable because that is the way the universe is". It's not arbitrary. You can't just swap in different things, and say "well, actually, now this is good". Some things are, some things aren't. The preference is as inherent in the structure of things as the irrational roots of some numbers.

Would you say that the square root of 2 is irrational "for no reason"? I wouldn't.

[HelenM]

Zoot, you're claiming that "good" simply means "preferable to me".

In these statements it doesn't:

"It would be good to help my friend move, but I'd prefer not to."

"It would be good to exercise today but I'd prefer not to."

Are the statements misusing the word "good" or the word "prefer"? If not then aren't they counter-examples disproving your claim?

Helen

[Zoot]

Zoot, you're claiming that "good" simply means "preferable to me".

In these statements it doesn't:

"It would be good to help my friend move, but I'd prefer not to."

"It would be good to exercise today but I'd prefer not to."

Are the statements misusing the word "good" or the word "prefer"? If not then aren't they counter-examples disproving your claim?

Good question. I don't think I was clear enough about these distinctions.

In making a decision, a number of preferences come into play. For example, helping my friend move. I want to lie in the sun and read a book instead. I want to make my friend happy. I want to hang out at my friend's place in case his roommate, whom I find very attractive, is home. I want to avoid aggravating a back injury I'm hoping to get over before rugby season.

So there's no single "prefer to" or "prefer not to". There's a number of "prefer to because" and "prefer not to because". Each of those preferences is reducible to some other preference, and ultimately to some irreducible preference.

I want to lie in the sun and read a book instead. Preference for sensual pleasure.
I want to make my friend happy. Preference for friend's happiness.
I want to hang out at my friend's place in case his roommate, whom I find very attractive, is home.Preference for sexual/romantic pleasure.
I want to avoid aggravating a back injury I'm hoping to get over before rugby season. Preference for... well... rugby.

The point is that for each of these influences on my decision, I can state a reason behind them, a reason for that being preferable to me, a reason that is reducible to a foundationless preference - something I just want, whether it's sensual pleasure or my friend's happiness. (some would go further and reduce each of those wants to the desire for personal pleasure... it doesn't really alter my point.)

Now, the difference between those preferences and the preference we call "good" is that those preferences are reducible to reasons, where as "good" is its own irreducible preferability. When we say something is preferable, we could mean for any number of reasons. However, when we say something is "good", we are saying that it is preferable for no reason.

That's what I meant by good meaning simply preferable.

So, again, in the examples you gave:

"It would be good to help my friend move, but I'd prefer not to." What you're saying here is that you have conflicting preferences, as almost any decision has, between "good" and whatever reasons you have for preferring not to (perhaps similar to the suggestions I made). But while you can give reasons for preferring not to, you can give no reasons for the preference that conflicts with them, no reason beyond "it is good to", which is tautologous. Because "good" means nothing more than "preferable", saying "I have a preference for that option because it is good" amounts to saying "I have a preference for that option because I prefer it".

Is that clearer? It probably isn't. Tell me what's unclear and I'll try again.

[Zoot]

I think theism makes sense. I just think that you're presupposing a metaphysical naturalist worldview with no values, and then demanding that everything be explained within this worldview. It doesn't work.

I'm not asking you to define "good" in naturalist terms. I'm asking you to define "good" in English.


The notion of value is pretty straightforward. We know what it means to say that one thing is better than another within a context. The word "good", without such qualifiers, implies reference to a hypothesized universal frame of reference for values.

So does the word "red". But while people can explain what "red" means, no one seems willing or able to explain what "good" means.


Where I differ from it is that "for no reason" implies pure arbitrariness.

Okay, let's try a related word. "True". I claim that a proposition is "true" if it describes the world correctly. Let's imagine for the sake of argument that the force of gravity really does remain constant over time. We can then make claims like "the pull of gravity on the earth's surface is roughly 9.8 meters per second squared".

Now, you can ask "why", and we get back to density, mass, and the gravitational constant.

Now, when you ask why that constant is what it is, well, we may not know. But the claim "the gravitational constant is N" is true for one N, and false for all other N. Why? Because that's what the gravitational constant actually is.

This is not "for no reason". This is "because it corresponds to the physics of the universe".

So.

"Good" means "irreducibly preferable because that is the way the universe is". It's not arbitrary. You can't just swap in different things, and say "well, actually, now this is good". Some things are, some things aren't. The preference is as inherent in the structure of things as the irrational roots of some numbers.

You still haven't told me what it means. When I prefer something, it's for a reason. I prefer eating chocolate because it is pleasurable. I prefer pleasure. I prefer to avoid car accidents because I prefer to stay alive. I prefer life. I prefer to buy presents for friends because I prefer to make them happy. I prefer their happiness.

Can you follow that same pattern with "good"? Because if it is, as you and I seem to agree, "just preferable", the pattern would look something like this: I prefer to condemn homosexuality because it is good (preferable) to condemn homosexuality. I prefer preferability.

I prefer to fly planes into buildings because it is good (preferable) to kill the infidels. I prefer preferability.

[seebs]

I think theism makes sense. I just think that you're presupposing a metaphysical naturalist worldview with no values, and then demanding that everything be explained within this worldview. It doesn't work.

I'm not asking you to define "good" in naturalist terms. I'm asking you to define "good" in English.

Ahh, but I did. And then you said "but this definition is self-referential". And yes, it is.

Let us retreat again to Cartesian space. I cannot define "z" except by saying "it's a dimension which is neither x nor y". I can't tell you which "direction" it's in, using only words that do not involve z.

So does the word "red". But while people can explain what "red" means, no one seems willing or able to explain what "good" means.

The explanation of red, however, presupposes a lot of words and concepts which, it turns out, you can't use if you haven't first accepted the thing which the word "red" refers to.

If you accept the notion of inherent value, then you will find that all the words referring to inherent value make sense. If you don't, they are of course impossible to define.

"Good" means "irreducibly preferable because that is the way the universe is". It's not arbitrary. You can't just swap in different things, and say "well, actually, now this is good". Some things are, some things aren't. The preference is as inherent in the structure of things as the irrational roots of some numbers.

You still haven't told me what it means.

Sure I have. Right there. "Irrudicibly preferable because that is the way the universe is."

Can you follow that same pattern with "good"?

Ultimately, no. It's the ultimate frame of reference, so it can't be defined in terms of any other frame of reference.

Because if it is, as you and I seem to agree, "just preferable", the pattern would look something like this: I prefer to condemn homosexuality because it is good (preferable) to condemn homosexuality. I prefer preferability.

I prefer to fly planes into buildings because it is good (preferable) to kill the infidels. I prefer preferability.

The problem, I think, is that many people adopt a naive model of preferability which assigns it to very specific things without their context, and this results in all sorts of crazy talk. It's as though we theorized that, instead of consistent gravity affecting things of different masses, each thing had its own unique gravitational constant.

Why is gravity? Because it is.

Anyway, you seem to have demonstrated here an ability to use the concept. What we have now is agreement that the concept has meaning, but that we are unsure how to determine whether a given thing is "good" or not. That's fine. It's a tough question. That doesn't mean it has no answer, only that we haven't answered it yet.

[Zoot]

I'm afraid I have been unclear in my definition. Or maybe you're unclear in what preferability is. Preferability has no meaning outside of the context of someone to whom it is preferable. So when I say that good is experienced as bare preferability, it demonstrates that "good" has no meaning outside of the context of someone who experiences it as good. Preferability is always preferable-to-someone, and is unintelligible without a subject.

So it similarly nonsensical to talk about "determining whether something is good", because it is nonsensical to talk about "determining whether something is preferable". You don't determine things as being preferable or non-preferable; you experience them as preferable or non-preferable.

I should qualify that. The only time when "determining" might come into things is when you are working out whether a particular option will result in an outcome you experience as preferable. For example, if I'm working out whether or not it's preferable to help my friend move, what I'm doing is working out whether or not helping my friend move will result in an outcome I experience as preferable. The preferability of that outcome, however, is not the result of determination - it is experienced.

The nearest analogy is that of beauty. You don't determine whether or not something is beautiful. You either experience it as being beautiful or you experience it as being not beautiful. When you experience something as beautiful and say, "That is beautiful," it's not something you can be wrong about. You're expressing an experience.

[seebs]

I'm afraid I have been unclear in my definition. Or maybe you're unclear in what preferability is. Preferability has no meaning outside of the context of someone to whom it is preferable. So when I say that good is experienced as bare preferability, it demonstrates that "good" has no meaning outside of the context of someone who experiences it as good. Preferability is always preferable-to-someone, and is unintelligible without a subject.

Ahh, that's the thing!

"Good" implies a kind of "correct" preferability; that some things are inherently preferable.

In short, the concept here is that there exist objective value judgments.

That's it. Just imagine a non-subjective preferability.

The nearest analogy is that of beauty. You don't determine whether or not something is beautiful. You either experience it as being beautiful or you experience it as being not beautiful. When you experience something as beautiful and say, "That is beautiful," it's not something you can be wrong about. You're expressing an experience.

I don't know that I agree. I think some aesthetic judgments exist independent of our personal tastes. In short, I may dislike something while recognizing that it is objectively beautiful art.

[Zoot]

Ahh, that's the thing!

"Good" implies a kind of "correct" preferability; that some things are inherently preferable.

In short, the concept here is that there exist objective value judgments.

That's it. Just imagine a non-subjective preferability.

Preferability only has meaning in the context of a subject. What is preferability without a subject to prefer it? Meaningless, nonsense. Can you describe this "non-subjective preferability" you claim to be able to conceive of?

[seebs]

Preferability only has meaning in the context of a subject.

Sez you.

What is preferability without a subject to prefer it?

A standard for what a correctly-perceiving subject will prefer.

Can you describe this "non-subjective preferability" you claim to be able to conceive of?

Our experience of color is such that people may misperceive certain colors. Our experience of color is subjective, but we have learned that the color is objective, and we can tell (within reason) whether a given person's perceptions are "correct" or not.

Our experience of value is subjective, but it is possible to describe a set of values such that, if your values do not align with these, your perception of value is incorrect; you are not perceiving the actual inherent value judgments, but making erroneous ones.

This isn't meaningless. You may not buy into the notion that such a thing exists, but I don't think it's right to just handwave it off.

[Zoot]

Our experience of color is such that people may misperceive certain colors. Our experience of color is subjective, but we have learned that the color is objective, and we can tell (within reason) whether a given person's perceptions are "correct" or not.

Actually, colour as we experience it is subjective. There is no such thing as what we call colour outside of the context of an observer, possibly outside of the context of a human observer. And even then it varies.


Our experience of value is subjective, but it is possible to describe a set of values such that, if your values do not align with these, your perception of value is incorrect; you are not perceiving the actual inherent value judgments, but making erroneous ones.

This isn't meaningless. You may not buy into the notion that such a thing exists, but I don't think it's right to just handwave it off.

Oh, I seriously do handwave it off. I maintain that "objective value" is as meaningless as the notion of a square circle. My problem is just explaining this in terms that make it clear. I'm currently doing a bad job of it. I'm going to read through some of my previous explanations and see if I can't work out where I went right in those.

But while I'm doing that, riddle me this. You concur that when you say something is good, you are saying that it is preferable for no reason. Just preferable. Not preferable because of this or that, but just preferable. Answer a few questions:

1. If no one in the world existed, would those things still be preferable?
2. If no one in the world preferred those things, would those things still be preferable?
3. If everyone preferred things that weren't preferable, are those things still not preferable, even though they're preferred by everyone?

[wade-w]

Actually, colour as we experience it is subjective. There is no such thing as what we call colour outside of the context of an observer, possibly outside of the context of a human observer. And even then it varies.


One word: wavelength.

[Zoot]

One word: wavelength.

That's fine, but colour is not wavelength. Colour is the experience of the wavelength, and the experience of the wavelength can't arise without the human eye and the mind behind it.

[Zoot]

To add to that, consider the rainbow. It doesn't exist anywhere in particular. It arises from the arrangement of the sun, the moisture in the air, and human observer. If any one of those three things were gone, the rainbow would not arise. The rainbow's position moves when the sun moves, and also when the observer moves.

[seebs]

Actually, colour as we experience it is subjective. There is no such thing as what we call colour outside of the context of an observer, possibly outside of the context of a human observer. And even then it varies.

And yet, we can measure things, and say "if you don't see these two things as being the same color, something is wrong with your eyes".

Oh, I seriously do handwave it off. I maintain that "objective value" is as meaningless as the notion of a square circle.

So?

You could also maintain that "objective gravity" is meaningless. Doesn't change anything.

But while I'm doing that, riddle me this. You concur that when you say something is good, you are saying that it is preferable for no reason. Just preferable. Not preferable because of this or that, but just preferable.

No, any more than I concur that the gravitational constant is what it is "for no reason".

Answer a few questions:

1. If no one in the world existed, would those things still be preferable?

Well, yes, although many of them wouldn't exist to be preferred.

2. If no one in the world preferred those things, would those things still be preferable?

Yes.

3. If everyone preferred things that weren't preferable, are those things still not preferable, even though they're preferred by everyone?

Yes.

In short, yes, you can have evil people, or evil societies, which oppose or fail to accept the genuine inherent value judgments, just as you can have ignorant people or societies which oppose or fail to accept the genuine inherent laws of physics.

[Zoot]

You hear what you're saying? That something can be preferable even if they are preferable to no one?

Going back to your agreement that "good" means "irreducibly preferable for no reason", can you give me a good reason to do those things you say are "good"?

[seebs]

You hear what you're saying? That something can be preferable even if they are preferable to no one?

Yes.

Just as I maintain that the sun is "hot" even without anyone to make that determination.

I believe in a world external to me. It has qualities, and it has them whether or not I perceive them.

When I was about 6 months old, I formed the theory that things continue to exist when I can't see them. I'm sticking with it.

Going back to your agreement that "good" means "irreducibly preferable for no reason", can you give me a good reason to do those things you say are "good"?

What I'm telling you is that, in fact, every reason you could possibly have that is actually a "good reason" will come back to this irreducible original value judgment.

[Zoot]

Just as I maintain that the sun is "hot" even without anyone to make that determination.

I believe in a world external to me. It has qualities, and it has them whether or not I perceive them.

When I was about 6 months old, I formed the theory that things continue to exist when I can't see them. I'm sticking with it.

So, do you like blue cheese? How preferable is blue cheese after you leave the room?


What I'm telling you is that, in fact, every reason you could possibly have that is actually a "good reason" will come back to this irreducible original value judgment.

I'm asking for an example. Why would I prefer those things you say are preferable?

[seebs]

So, do you like blue cheese? How preferable is blue cheese after you leave the room?

Non-comparable. Moral preferability is not the same as matters of taste.

I'm asking for an example. Why would I prefer those things you say are preferable?

Well, the individual things would tend to lead towards an overall state which is inherently more preferable. Why? I don't know that the question means anything. Why does gravity tend to lead towards a state where things are "closer"? Because that's what gravity does.

[Zoot]

Non-comparable. Moral preferability is not the same as matters of taste.

But you said that the sun is still hot without anyone to make that determination, and that certain actions are still preferable without anyone to make that determination. Now you're saying that blue cheese isn't still preferable without anyone to make that determination? That's hardly consistent.


Well, the individual things would tend to lead towards an overall state which is inherently more preferable. Why? I don't know that the question means anything. Why does gravity tend to lead towards a state where things are "closer"? Because that's what gravity does.

What does "preferable" mean to you?

[viscousmemories]

Going back to your agreement that "good" means "irreducibly preferable for no reason", can you give me a good reason to do those things you say are "good"?
Actually he didn't agree to that. He rephrased it as "irreducibly preferable because that's the way the universe is", and as far as I can tell you haven't explained why that definition is insufficient.

[seebs]

Non-comparable. Moral preferability is not the same as matters of taste.

But you said that the sun is still hot without anyone to make that determination, and that certain actions are still preferable without anyone to make that determination. Now you're saying that blue cheese isn't still preferable without anyone to make that determination? That's hardly consistent.

Sure it is. Hasty generalization; not all kinds of preferability are the same.

Aesthetics and taste are not morality.

Well, the individual things would tend to lead towards an overall state which is inherently more preferable. Why? I don't know that the question means anything. Why does gravity tend to lead towards a state where things are "closer"? Because that's what gravity does.

What does "preferable" mean to you?

A number of different things, and I'm not entirely convinced that it's quite the right term for morality.

I think I prefer "ought to behave in a certain way" to "ought to prefer a thing"; you've demonstrated that if we talk about "things" being moral or immoral, we open the door to confusion about the moral qualities of inanimate objects.

Morality, while I believe it is inherent and objective, is nonetheless only applicable to moral agents. Not all decisions have moral implications (although I think a very, very, large number of them do.)

[HelenM]

Zoot, you're claiming that "good" simply means "preferable to me".

In these statements it doesn't:

"It would be good to help my friend move, but I'd prefer not to."

"It would be good to exercise today but I'd prefer not to."

Are the statements misusing the word "good" or the word "prefer"? If not then aren't they counter-examples disproving your claim?

Good question. I don't think I was clear enough about these distinctions.

In making a decision, a number of preferences come into play. For example, helping my friend move. I want to lie in the sun and read a book instead. I want to make my friend happy. I want to hang out at my friend's place in case his roommate, whom I find very attractive, is home. I want to avoid aggravating a back injury I'm hoping to get over before rugby season.

So there's no single "prefer to" or "prefer not to". There's a number of "prefer to because" and "prefer not to because". Each of those preferences is reducible to some other preference, and ultimately to some irreducible preference.

I want to lie in the sun and read a book instead. Preference for sensual pleasure.
I want to make my friend happy. Preference for friend's happiness.
I want to hang out at my friend's place in case his roommate, whom I find very attractive, is home.Preference for sexual/romantic pleasure.
I want to avoid aggravating a back injury I'm hoping to get over before rugby season. Preference for... well... rugby.

The point is that for each of these influences on my decision, I can state a reason behind them, a reason for that being preferable to me, a reason that is reducible to a foundationless preference - something I just want, whether it's sensual pleasure or my friend's happiness. (some would go further and reduce each of those wants to the desire for personal pleasure... it doesn't really alter my point.)

Now, the difference between those preferences and the preference we call "good" is that those preferences are reducible to reasons, where as "good" is its own irreducible preferability. When we say something is preferable, we could mean for any number of reasons. However, when we say something is "good", we are saying that it is preferable for no reason.

That's what I meant by good meaning simply preferable.

So, again, in the examples you gave:

"It would be good to help my friend move, but I'd prefer not to." What you're saying here is that you have conflicting preferences, as almost any decision has, between "good" and whatever reasons you have for preferring not to (perhaps similar to the suggestions I made). But while you can give reasons for preferring not to, you can give no reasons for the preference that conflicts with them, no reason beyond "it is good to", which is tautologous.

But you already gave a reason yourself why a person might prefer to help the friend - you said, to make the friend happy. If you can give that reason I can too!

Because "good" means nothing more than "preferable", saying "I have a preference for that option because it is good" amounts to saying "I have a preference for that option because I prefer it".

In the case above, the person didn't prefer it [overall], so I'm not sure why you're still saying "it is good" equates to "I prefer it".

Is that clearer? It probably isn't. Tell me what's unclear and I'll try again.

I don't think you're being unclear but I do think a) you contradicted yourself over whether there was a reason why a person might in some sense prefer to help his friend - the 'good' option b) you continue to be wrong in claiming that "it is good" equates to "I prefer it" because in my counter-example, the person did not [overall] prefer what he/she considered to be the 'good' option.

If people used "good" to mean "I prefer it" then you'd be right; but in my experience what they consider "good" is one set of things and what they prefer is another; there may be overlap between them, so that sometimes what is good is what they prefer. But the two sets are not identical; they have things they prefer that they don't consider "good" (unless they've defined "good" to mean what they prefer, which is not what people do, in my experience) and they have things they consider "good" which they don't do because they don't prefer to do them.

Helen

[Dingfod]

To my way of thinking "good" is that which is beneficial, if not just to the pleasure centers of the individual's brain, then beneficial for the individual's body, for their financial well-being, to their neighborhood, for society, or for humankind. Good is different for each individual, but in groups we've decided what is good for the group, which may run contrary to what the individual deems good. Good doesn't necessarily mean "I prefer..." because individual preferences, or that which pleases the pleasure centers in the brain, can run contrary to what is good for everything else I have mentioned. A person can prefer to smoke cigarettes or overeat and deem that good for themselves because it is their preference, but to the contrary, it may not be good for their body, their financial well-being, or even for society as a whole. One might even be well aware that what they prefer is detrimental to their own physical health, is that good? Not really, but it is what they prefer.

But, really every human behavior is only motivated by two things, a desire to seek pleasure (good) and a desire to avoid pain (bad). When both are involved, decisions made always weigh the relative pleasure or pain derived from the consequence. Helping my friend move, may in fact lead to lower back pain and I may be aware that it might, but my desire to seek pleasure overrides that. The pleasure I might derive is seeing my friend happy. Or, maybe it is just weighing the relative pain that might be experienced because seeing my friend unhappy causes me pain, emotional pain, which may be worse than the potential physical pain. I may later regret that choice, but perhaps I derive enough pleasure from the endorphins that will kick in later that it becomes worth it and is a reminder of the pleasure my friend got in my helping, which gives me emotional pleasure as well, win-win. But, the person that will play video games instead of lending a hand, just decides the pleasure they gain from playing the games is better than the pleasure they might get from making someone else happy. Or, maybe they are thinking only of pain avoidance, moving heavy shit equals pain, no thanks.

[Zoot]

But you already gave a reason yourself why a person might prefer to help the friend - you said, to make the friend happy. If you can give that reason I can too!

Yes, but that reason is distinct from the reason of "it is good to do this".


Quote:
In the case above, the person didn't prefer it [overall], so I'm not sure why you're still saying "it is good" equates to "I prefer it".

Yeah, that's what I'm being unclear about. Hopefully this will clarify things: by "good", I don't mean preferring it overall. I just mean a single preference that impacts that overall preferance. The reason I am distinguishing it from other preferences is that other single preferences have reasons, whereas this one is a single preference for no reason.

[Zoot]

Sure it is. Hasty generalization; not all kinds of preferability are the same.

Aesthetics and taste are not morality.

Seebs, you said your reason for believing in preference independent of people to prefer it was that when you were six months old you got the notion that things exist without you perceiving them. Now you're saying that this same reason doesn't apply to all your experiences. So, back to preferability, why do you think it can persist outside of the context of someone who prefers, since apparently the reason you gave earlier (six months old thing) isn't really a rule in your life.

[Zoot]

Actually he didn't agree to that. He rephrased it as "irreducibly preferable because that's the way the universe is", and as far as I can tell you haven't explained why that definition is insufficient.

It's insufficient because preferability is meaningless outside the context of a preferrer. Apart from that, his definition isn't different from mine. When I say "for no reason", I mean "no further reason in the subjective context". As I explained in the first post, preferences may be further reducible in an objective context - appealing to physiology and evolution and suchlike - but in the subjective context, they go no further.

[Godfather]

This is the longest I have seen people argue at cross purposes. Seebs, no one here has questioned your position that there are inherent principles by which universes like ours operate. You are clearly intelligent and knowledgable enough to demonstrate that position to the satisfaction of any reasonable doubter. But Zoot is merely attempting to demonstrate the falsehood of your contention that morality is one of these inherent principles. So far, to any intelligent, reasonable observer, I'm afraid he is winning.

While a less scientifically well-informed person might hypothetically disagree with you about existence of three spacial dimensions, the temperature of the surface of the sun, or the speed of light, that person can be proved to be wrong by virtue of the fact that the numbers are on your side. And you are stating that moral goodness (not to mention aesthetic beauty) is similarly inherent, and expecting that to be enough. Prove it, and you win. Provide a single reason, beyond mere instinct, for supposing that morality operates as an inherent universal principle, equivalent to mathematics or physics. How should good be measured? You can use mathemathics to express as a ratio the difference between the distances the Earth and the sun and moon, respectively. If you can you do the same thing for moral principles, I'll be convinced. Calculate for me, as an example, how many more times more 'good' it is to save the life of a 6-year-old child than it is to give a 60-year-old homeless man $2 for a cup of coffee.

Alternatively, give us an example of something that is unarguably 'good'. By unarguably, I mean that it must be clear that any person who disagreed with the goodness of the proposition could be shown to be mistaken.

[viscousmemories]

But Zoot is merely attempting to demonstrate the falsehood of your contention that morality is one of these inherent principles. So far, to any intelligent, reasonable observer, I'm afraid he is winning.
It might be that I'm not intelligent or reasonable enough to understand this discussion either, but in my layman opinion Zoot has not sufficiently proven that objective morality is impossible. Not that I hold it against him that he hasn't resolved an ethical dilemma philosophers have wrestled with for ages.

I will say this is the first discussion of objective vs. subjective morality I've read in months that makes no mention at all of intersubjective morality...

[wade-w]

I will say this is the first discussion of objective vs. subjective morality I've read in months that makes no mention at all of intersubjective morality...

He didn't use the words, but I think that's the idea that warrenly was getting at.

[Zoot]

It might be that I'm not intelligent or reasonable enough to understand this discussion either, but in my layman opinion Zoot has not sufficiently proven that objective morality is impossible. Not that I hold it against him that he hasn't resolved an ethical dilemma philosophers have wrestled with for ages.

Okay, I'll likely do better at explaining this if I ask you a series of questions to get you to see yourself.

First question: what do you mean by morality?

[Dingfod]

I will say this is the first discussion of objective vs. subjective morality I've read in months that makes no mention at all of intersubjective morality...

He didn't use the words, but I think that's the idea that warrenly was getting at.I don't know, I'm too ignorant to know what I was getting at. I don't even know what intersubjective morality is. I barely understand objective and subjective. I'm just not good enough.

[Zoot]

I don't know, I'm too ignorant to know what I was getting at. I don't even know what intersubjective morality is. I barely understand objective and subjective. I'm just not good enough.

Intersubjective morality is conventional morality - morality by convention, by agreement, shared morality. It's like, "Obviously it's not objectively evil to rape, but is certainly something we all agree is wrong," or more accurately, "it is certainly something we all experience as wrong-to-us." It's morality analogous to the worth of money or the location of borders between countries. They don't exist outside our collective minds, but there's still a consensus on what the (conventional) truth of the matter is.

[Dingfod]

Thank you. And that is what I was getting at, sort of, in my usual disorganized rambling way.

[Adora]

And yet, we can measure things, and say "if you don't see these two things as being the same color, something is wrong with your eyes".


Well, only if you have two people from very similar backgrounds, and with similar DNA and genetics. Because, y'know, women see twice the number of shades of red and all that (has to do with the X chromasone), and sometimes people have one bad eye and one good eye, and then there's the power of suggestion etc etc etc yadda yadda yadda.

[Zoot]

Plus, as Godfather points out a lot, we experience light red as "pink" but light blue as "light blue" for purely linguistic, cultural reasons. And that's an actual experiential difference.

[seebs]

This is the longest I have seen people argue at cross purposes. Seebs, no one here has questioned your position that there are inherent principles by which universes like ours operate. You are clearly intelligent and knowledgable enough to demonstrate that position to the satisfaction of any reasonable doubter. But Zoot is merely attempting to demonstrate the falsehood of your contention that morality is one of these inherent principles. So far, to any intelligent, reasonable observer, I'm afraid he is winning.

In that case, we must be arguing at cross purposes.

I'm not trying to prove that morality is one of these inherent principles: Merely that it's not incoherent to discuss that possibility. In short, I'm arguing for the coherence of the concept, not its truth.

And you are stating that moral goodness (not to mention aesthetic beauty) is similarly inherent, and expecting that to be enough.

Enough to say "this is what is meant by the concept", yes.

I'm not trying to prove it right, just to explain what people mean when they use phrases like "objective morality".

Alternatively, give us an example of something that is unarguably 'good'. By unarguably, I mean that it must be clear that any person who disagreed with the goodness of the proposition could be shown to be mistaken.

I am not convinced that good is something we can easily measure. But I'd like to separate out the question of whether objective morality exists from the question of whether the words even mean anything.

[seebs]

And yet, we can measure things, and say "if you don't see these two things as being the same color, something is wrong with your eyes".


Well, only if you have two people from very similar backgrounds, and with similar DNA and genetics. Because, y'know, women see twice the number of shades of red and all that (has to do with the X chromasone), and sometimes people have one bad eye and one good eye, and then there's the power of suggestion etc etc etc yadda yadda yadda.

Actually, no. Imagine that we have two exactly identical photographs of the same thing, and measure them using spectral analysis and the whole nine yards, and find them to be identical.

At that point, if you don't think they're the same, something is wrong!

I'm not saying that, for instance, you should agree that a bluish 1994 Subaru and a bluish 1990 Accura are "the same color, which is blue", when some people might legitimately think one green. But if you have two adjacent bits of paint on a uniformly-colored surface, we can assert that, while we might disagree about what color they are, they are the same color.

[viscousmemories]

Okay, I'll likely do better at explaining this if I ask you a series of questions to get you to see yourself.

First question: what do you mean by morality?
Actually I'm not really interested in debating the essence of morality here and now, I only meant to point out - as seebs' eloquently explains in his response to Godfather - that your argument appears to be circular. You appear to be asserting that objective morality is an incoherent, internally inconsistent non-concept because it cannot be the case that an objective morality exists. However if the former is true, the latter is impossible to demonstrate. In other words if "objective morality" is a meaningless, non-existent concept, how can you show that it can't occur?

[Godfather]

I'm not trying to prove that morality is one of these inherent principles: Merely that it's not incoherent to discuss that possibility. In short, I'm arguing for the coherence of the concept, not its truth.
If that is the case, then I must admit you had me completely fooled. Actually, I'm not sure it is even possible to argue one without arguing the other.

I'm not trying to prove it right, just to explain what people mean when they use phrases like "objective morality".
And you are doing a better job than most people. But it is unnecessary, since the concept is all too familiar - it has pervaded all conventional modes of thinking for most of human history.

I am not convinced that good is something we can easily measure.
Not just 'easily' - it can't be measured at all. The concept of good and the concept of non-relative measurement are incompatible. If they weren't, good would be objective.

But I'd like to separate out the question of whether objective morality exists from the question of whether the words even mean anything.
It's not that they don't mean anything, it's that their meanings cannot go together. Morality occurs within the mind of an agent. Objectivity is that which is independent of an agent. Linguistically, they are practically antonymous. To apply one to the other requires you to wholly change the meaning of at least one of the terms. So they are incoherent.

[Godfather]

Actually I'm not really interested in debating the essence of morality here and now, I only meant to point out - as seebs' eloquently explains in his response to Godfather - that your argument appears to be circular. You appear to be asserting that objective morality is an incoherent, internally inconsistent non-concept because it cannot be the case that an objective morality exists. However if the former is true, the latter is impossible to demonstrate. In other words if "objective morality" is a meaningless, non-existent concept, how can you show that it can't occur?
You have it a bit backwards. You have Zoot saying, 'X cannot exist because X does not exist.' Try reversing that - 'X does not exist because X cannot exist.' Does that still seem circular?

[viscousmemories]

You have it a bit backwards. You have Zoot saying, 'X cannot exist because X does not exist.' Try reversing that - 'X does not exist because X cannot exist.' Does that still seem circular?
Actually unless I've completely misunderstood him, he's saying "X is a meaningless concept because X cannot exist". If X is a meaningless concept, the claim that it cannot exist is nonsensical.

[viscousmemories]

I'm not trying to prove that morality is one of these inherent principles: Merely that it's not incoherent to discuss that possibility. In short, I'm arguing for the coherence of the concept, not its truth.
If that is the case, then I must admit you had me completely fooled. Actually, I'm not sure it is even possible to argue one without arguing the other.
You appear to be contradicting the part of Zoot's OP where he said "objective morality is an incoherent, internally inconsistent non-concept." As you seem to agree, it would seem impossible for us to debate the existence of an incoherent non-concept, so 'objective morality' must be a coherent concept.

[Adora]

Actually, no. Imagine that we have two exactly identical photographs of the same thing, and measure them using spectral analysis and the whole nine yards, and find them to be identical.

But we're not talking about machines measuring things which are absolutely identical. We're talking about subjective human constructions of morality and "goodness" which not only differ from culture to culture but individual to indvidual. Also, the things which can all be judged "good" are wide and diverse, even if they are the same kind of "good" because of all the infinite specifics that go into making them.

[Godfather]

Actually unless I've completely misunderstood him, he's saying "X is a meaningless concept because X cannot exist". If X is a meaningless concept, the claim that it cannot exist is nonsensical.
I'm afraid that you and logic have parted company. If X is a meaningless concept, the claim that X cannot exist is true. We must be operating with different notions of what a meaningless concept is. Why don't I try to explain my notion a bit more clearly?

You appear to be contradicting the part of Zoot's OP where he said "objective morality is an incoherent, internally inconsistent non-concept." As you seem to agree, it would seem impossible for us to debate the existence of an incoherent non-concept, so 'objective morality' must be a coherent concept.
I'm sorry if I seemed. I didn't mean to seem, because I don't agree with that at all. Discussability does not require coherence. I could propose a new theory of thermodynamics which relies at its core on the concept of a 'pressurised vacuum'. You could debate the specifics of the theory with me at length, and I'm sure people would, but it would be enough to simply show that the phrase 'pressurised vacuum' is meaningless. It's not meaningless in the same way as 'harpy dongwich florit boogestain damphammer nurble' is meaningless, no. But it is meaningless in the sense that under no real or imaginary circumstances could a thing exist to which both 'pressurised' and 'vacuum' correctly apply. The definition of one word must be changed for that phrase to refer not only to something real, or even to something possible, but to something conceivable. And even if my thermodynamic theory was very convincing, and people started to believe it, and it became an integral part of how physicists percieved the universe, and it remained so for thousands of years, it would still be broken and false and deceptive because of the mistake at its core. I imagine anyone who saw through the mistake would feel as strongly about it as Zoot and I do.

You know what? I think if I had to restate Zoot's OP in my own words, I would replace 'incoherent, internally inconsistent non-concept' with 'oxymoron'. I think that would have avoided several misunderstandings.

[Zoot]

Actually I'm not really interested in debating the essence of morality here and now, I only meant to point out - as seebs' eloquently explains in his response to Godfather - that your argument appears to be circular.

Right, and you suggested it may appear that way to you because you don't understand what I'm saying, and I agree with you on that. I don't think you understand what I'm saying. I think it's because I haven't explained it well enough. Of course, I can't explain it if you're "actually not really interested", but if you do become interested, then please give it a go. Till then, don't waste time telling me what I have or have not achieved.


You appear to be asserting that objective morality is an incoherent, internally inconsistent non-concept because it cannot be the case that an objective morality exists. However if the former is true, the latter is impossible to demonstrate. In other words if "objective morality" is a meaningless, non-existent concept, how can you show that it can't occur?

The same way I show that "square circles" cannot exist, because they are meaningless, non-existent non-concepts. Godfather suggests I say "oxymoron", and maybe that would have been a better plan. So yes. Objective morality is oxymoronic. Morality is essentially, by definition subjective, contextual and foundationless. It's not immediately obvious to people because the notion of "good" remains this unexamined tight bundle of meaning that people take for granted.

The problem is that its actual definition, what it actually means to a person to call something morally good, is so taken for granted in our language that few people possess the inclination to really examine it and understand it. It's just, "Oh, everyone knows what good means. It means good. Duh."

[Zoot]

And you are doing a better job than most people. But it is unnecessary, since the concept is all too familiar - it has pervaded all conventional modes of thinking for most of human history.

I agree that Seebs is doing a better job than most people. Few make it as far as realising that "good" does mean "irreducibly preferable". And I think it is necessary to examine it, precisely because the concept is all too familiar. My only problem now is explaining clearly that preferability is utterly meaningless outside the context of someone who prefers it; that preferability is an experience, rather than a quality.

[viscousmemories]

The same way I show that "square circles" cannot exist, because they are meaningless, non-existent non-concepts. Godfather suggests I say "oxymoron", and maybe that would have been a better plan. So yes. Objective morality is oxymoronic. Morality is essentially, by definition subjective, contextual and foundationless.
It doesn't matter what word you use, I understood your point. You believe that morality is by definition subjective, and that the term 'objective morality' is therefore oxymoronic. Your arguments have been unpersuasive, and your insistence (both of you) that the only possible explanation for this is that I can't recognize your brilliance is insulting and tiresome. Give me a link to the peer reviewed philosophical journal where your article demolishing the concept of objective morality is published and I'll give you both mad props. Until then I will stick to conversing with people who offer me the same respect I offer them.

[Zoot]

It doesn't matter what word you use, I understood your point. You believe that morality is by definition subjective, and that the term 'objective morality' is therefore oxymoronic.

Yes, and I believe that everyone else believes morality is by definition subjective, by virtue of the implicit definition assumed in their use of terms like "good". I make it explicit. Of course, I can only show it explicitly if someone is willing to put the effort in to examining it.


Your arguments have been unpersuasive,

You have clearly stated that you cannot be bothered putting in the effort required to understand my argument. Once you do, once you actually see what my argument is, then you're in a position to call it unpersuasive. Currently, to you, it is simply unexamined.


and your insistence (both of you) that the only possible explanation for this is that I can't recognize your brilliance is insulting and tiresome.

As I said, it's a lack of inclination on your part that prevents you from understanding, not a lack of capacity. I'm sure that if you chose to participate in dialogue, you'd get it. But you've explicitly stated that you don't care to participate.


Give me a link to the peer reviewed philosophical journal where your article demolishing the concept of objective morality is published and I'll give you both mad props. Until then I will stick to conversing with people who offer me the same respect I offer them.

If your idea of respect is to respond to an offer of explanation with, "Actually I'm not really interested in debating the essence of morality here and now," and then go on to say that, without bothering to understand my points regarding the essence of morality, they are unpersuasive, then I'll somehow live with you withholding it.

[Zoot]

So, again, if you're interested:

What do you mean by morality?

[Clutch Munny]

But Zoot is merely attempting to demonstrate the falsehood of your contention that morality is one of these inherent principles. So far, to any intelligent, reasonable observer, I'm afraid he is winning.
It might be that I'm not intelligent or reasonable enough to understand this discussion either, but in my layman opinion Zoot has not sufficiently proven that objective morality is impossible. Not that I hold it against him that he hasn't resolved an ethical dilemma philosophers have wrestled with for ages.

I will say this is the first discussion of objective vs. subjective morality I've read in months that makes no mention at all of intersubjective morality...


Agreed on every count.

[seebs]

And you are doing a better job than most people. But it is unnecessary, since the concept is all too familiar - it has pervaded all conventional modes of thinking for most of human history.

I agree that Seebs is doing a better job than most people. Few make it as far as realising that "good" does mean "irreducibly preferable". And I think it is necessary to examine it, precisely because the concept is all too familiar. My only problem now is explaining clearly that preferability is utterly meaningless outside the context of someone who prefers it; that preferability is an experience, rather than a quality.

Hmm. I am beginning to think that "preferable", however, is not quite the right concept, simply because of the confusing overlap with other kinds of preference. "Better" is a very special kind of "preferable".

[seebs]

If that is the case, then I must admit you had me completely fooled. Actually, I'm not sure it is even possible to argue one without arguing the other.

I don't see why not. I can describe the concept of what it would mean to say that there is a universal frame of reference, without arguing that it's true. I can also explain a non-relativistic world.

And you are doing a better job than most people. But it is unnecessary, since the concept is all too familiar - it has pervaded all conventional modes of thinking for most of human history.

It is obviously necessary, since we have someone arguing that he has no definition of the concept that means anything.

Not just 'easily' - it can't be measured at all. The concept of good and the concept of non-relative measurement are incompatible. If they weren't, good would be objective.

I am not persuaded of this at all.

It's not that they don't mean anything, it's that their meanings cannot go together. Morality occurs within the mind of an agent. Objectivity is that which is independent of an agent. Linguistically, they are practically antonymous. To apply one to the other requires you to wholly change the meaning of at least one of the terms. So they are incoherent.

Okay, that's a good way of putting at least one of the arguments.

Here's my thinking, though: The map is not the territory. My experience of moral judgment is not the same as the moral judgment it is a model of.

I guess... To a certain extent, yes, morality is a question of what happened in the mind of an agent. However, I believe that "what happened in the mind of an agent" can (theoretically, anyway) be judged on an objective scale. I don't think we know what that scale is, but I think it could exist.

[seebs]

But we're not talking about machines measuring things which are absolutely identical. We're talking about subjective human constructions of morality and "goodness" which not only differ from culture to culture but individual to indvidual. Also, the things which can all be judged "good" are wide and diverse, even if they are the same kind of "good" because of all the infinite specifics that go into making them.

Here's the thing, though: We have subjective experience of color, and we can argue for months or years over whether that particular shade is "blue" or "green", and different cultures will predispose people to answer this question differently... But it turns out that objective machines can, in fact, measure color.

I don't know whether a machine could be built to measure morality, but I still have the same mental distinction between "human experience of morality" and "whatever morality is inherent in the structure of things", just as I distinguish between "human experience of color" and "whatever color is inherent in the structure of things".

[Clutch Munny]

Actually unless I've completely misunderstood him, he's saying "X is a meaningless concept because X cannot exist". If X is a meaningless concept, the claim that it cannot exist is nonsensical.


Not quite. He's defining 'good' in terms of individuals' preferences and then observing that, by this definition, the idea of goodness independent of individuals' preferences is incoherent.

Well, sure. And if the Queen had nuts, she'd be King -- as my old granddad used to say.

Seebs and vm and Warrenly and, most elegantly, Helen have all observed that this is (i) a stipulative definition that does not seem to respect the way we actually use the word 'good'; (ii) based on the assumption that industrial-strength observer-independent objectivity and personally idiosyncratic arbitrary subjectivity exhaust the options for characterizing moral discourse, when in fact colour discourse (and there are others) seems to demonstrate a perfectly coherent middle ground recovering much or most of what the notion of objectivity is supposed to convey; and (iii) shored up by an Argument from the Infinite Iterability of 'Why?', when in fact the options of circularity or regress attend upon many notions that we don't take to be meaningless or nonsense. (Consider time for instance. We can play "Define this in English" all day with that one, and never run out of opportunities to reply, "Okay, now define that.")

The history of philosophy is littered with the wrecks of positions purporting to show that some apparently coherent way of speaking is actually meaningless. There's also a fair bit of work on this whole "good" thing. Aristotle argued that there is no domain-general notion of goodness; that there are only domain-specific notions like "a good horse", "a good shovel", "a good man". (Women, not so much.) That might be a place to start looking. I don't have time to summarize all the positions, but reading up on the history of good might be a way to avoid reinventing the wheel. Especially with four corners.

[Adora]

I don't know whether a machine could be built to measure morality, but I still have the same mental distinction between "human experience of morality" and "whatever morality is inherent in the structure of things", just as I distinguish between "human experience of color" and "whatever color is inherent in the structure of things".

*nods* Understandable if you do believe in some sort of inherent morality. But again, if you don't... *shrugs*

[Zoot]

I don't know whether a machine could be built to measure morality, but I still have the same mental distinction between "human experience of morality" and "whatever morality is inherent in the structure of things", just as I distinguish between "human experience of color" and "whatever color is inherent in the structure of things".

And yet when it comes to "human experience of tastiness" and "whatever tastiness is inherent in the structure of things", suddenly everything's different?

[Zoot]

I don't have time to summarize all the positions, but reading up on the history of good might be a way to avoid reinventing the wheel. Especially with four corners.

I bought AC Grayling's history of good yesterday. I'll let you know if it's any... good.

[Desert Dweller]

Hey Zoot, that's a good OP and theme!

[seebs]

I don't know whether a machine could be built to measure morality, but I still have the same mental distinction between "human experience of morality" and "whatever morality is inherent in the structure of things", just as I distinguish between "human experience of color" and "whatever color is inherent in the structure of things".

And yet when it comes to "human experience of tastiness" and "whatever tastiness is inherent in the structure of things", suddenly everything's different?

I think so, because tastiness is inherently stated as a matter of preference, not preferability.

I guess... I think this is a case where the words have overlapping but distinct meanings, and there's a subtle fallacy of equivocation involved.

I have no reason, at this time, to believe that there are things whose tastiness is inherent in them, and a great deal of reason to suspect that it's a biological thing.

I think that morality is closer in style to mathematics than to biology, however.

[Desert Dweller]

The occasional arguments about whether or not there is objective morality are generally misplaced.
I agree. Morality is a social construct. In that sense it is like light; it lies in the perception of the beholder. However it is also different form light in that it cannot be reduced to a measurable description, viz wavelength.
Morality is also a tool used by the ruling class to supress the underclass.
It's immoral to (say) have sex before 16, or out of wedlock, or with a whore. These are all contols and have no basis in biology.

Good is as difficult to define as 'better', because of the relativity of both terms.

The distinction between what we "experience" and what can be objectively measured is useful. It contains the present division between mechanical thinking (current paradigm) and experiential thinking (emerging paradigm).

"Good" as an objective entity can only exist in a context of (say) god, where good means close to god. So it relies on a context which not everyone is willing/able/capable/ of embracing.

Now I am left with universal taboos like not killing people...and just now I can't fit them into the discussion. but I know they belong here.

[seebs]

Now I am left with universal taboos like not killing people...and just now I can't fit them into the discussion. but I know they belong here.

Note that some cultures tolerate killing as long as it follows certain rules. For instance, you can call someone out, and duel.

[Zoot]

I think so, because tastiness is inherently stated as a matter of preference, not preferability.

In both cases, taste and morality, you experience one option as preferable to the other. In both cases, they're unintelligible when removed from the context of the preferrer.


I think that morality is closer in style to mathematics than to biology, however.

Why do you think that?

[seebs]

In both cases, taste and morality, you experience one option as preferable to the other. In both cases, they're unintelligible when removed from the context of the preferrer.

I disagree. Quite simply, you can have discussions of morality in which someone is convinced that his existing position is wrong through argumentation alone. You cannot convince someone about whether food is tasty or not.

I think that morality is closer in style to mathematics than to biology, however.

Why do you think that?

Because it's clearly a field of reasoning from principles. Food can taste good or bad in ways I cannot connect to basic principles; morality, however, seems to be amenable to considered analysis.

[Zoot]

I disagree. Quite simply, you can have discussions of morality in which someone is convinced that his existing position is wrong through argumentation alone. You cannot convince someone about whether food is tasty or not.

Can you translate "his existing position is wrong" into the language you agreed to when you said that "good" means "preferable for no further reason"?

[Godfather]

In both cases, taste and morality, you experience one option as preferable to the other. In both cases, they're unintelligible when removed from the context of the preferrer.

I disagree. Quite simply, you can have discussions of morality in which someone is convinced that his existing position is wrong through argumentation alone. You cannot convince someone about whether food is tasty or not.
Yes, you absolutely can change someone's mind about how tasty food is. Don't believe me? See if your delicious seafood chowder is still quite as delicious after I inform you (truthfully or otherwise) about its semen content.

Anyway, I don't quite see your point. Surely the fact that moral positions are malleable enough that they can be altered by mere 'argumentation' tends to harm your argument more than support it. Rhetoric can't quash a mathematical certainty, can it? Exactly how is morality similar to mathematics, again?

Because it's clearly a field of reasoning from principles. Food can taste good or bad in ways I cannot connect to basic principles; morality, however, seems to be amenable to considered analysis.
Just because you can't articulate all of the reasons for experiencing the taste of strawberries to be more pleasant than dog faeces, that doesn't mean there aren't reasons. In the same way, you might not be able to articulate why you feel it is better to help a sick person than to hit them with a rock, but there are reasons why you think that. Neither case generally requires or even necessarily allows 'reasoning from principles' - that is not how the human mind works. Experience forms neural pathways which inform how the brain interprets and reacts to incoming stimuli.

[seebs]

I disagree. Quite simply, you can have discussions of morality in which someone is convinced that his existing position is wrong through argumentation alone. You cannot convince someone about whether food is tasty or not.

Can you translate "his existing position is wrong" into the language you agreed to when you said that "good" means "preferable for no further reason"?

"He preferred a thing which was actually not preferable."

Sort of like "he believed the square root of two could be represented as the ratio of two integers". It's a possible belief, but it's a wrong one, and when you understand why it's wrong, you change your position.

And yes, you may think it's odd to speak of preferring a non-preferable thing, but we can believe things which are unbelievable, so it's no great stretch. People are wrong sometimes.

[seebs]

Yes, you absolutely can change someone's mind about how tasty food is. Don't believe me? See if your delicious seafood chowder is still quite as delicious after I inform you (truthfully or otherwise) about its semen content.

Anyway, I don't quite see your point. Surely the fact that moral positions are malleable enough that they can be altered by mere 'argumentation' tends to harm your argument more than support it. Rhetoric can't quash a mathematical certainty, can it? Exactly how is morality similar to mathematics, again?

Rhetoric can certainly change someone's mind about mathematical claims; consider the difficulty many people had accepting Goedel's results.

Just because you can't articulate all of the reasons for experiencing the taste of strawberries to be more pleasant than dog faeces, that doesn't mean there aren't reasons. In the same way, you might not be able to articulate why you feel it is better to help a sick person than to hit them with a rock, but there are reasons why you think that. Neither case generally requires or even necessarily allows 'reasoning from principles' - that is not how the human mind works. Experience forms neural pathways which inform how the brain interprets and reacts to incoming stimuli.

It may not be how the mind works, but so what? The human mind does not determine the laws of physics, and no matter how much we tend to habituation from experience, we eventually find some things to be preexistant and independent of our opinions.

I think it makes sense to consider morality to be in this class; I can't prove that it's true, but it's coherent and provides a basis for interacting with moral claims. Good enough for me.

[Zoot]

"He preferred a thing which was actually not preferable."

Sort of like "he believed the square root of two could be represented as the ratio of two integers". It's a possible belief, but it's a wrong one, and when you understand why it's wrong, you change your position.

And yes, you may think it's odd to speak of preferring a non-preferable thing, but we can believe things which are unbelievable, so it's no great stretch. People are wrong sometimes.

We can't actually believe things which are unbelievable. It's not just odd to speak of preferring a non-preferable thing; it's completely meaningless to speak of something being preferable or non-preferable outside of the context of a person who does or does not prefer it.

"He preferred a thing which was actually not preferable." If he preferred it, then obviously it was preferable to him.

[David Gould]

An interesting exercise to go through is an examination of the way you make moral decisions. This can be difficult, as many such decisions are made purely instinctively/reflexively. However, slowing down the whole thing down is worthwhile.

When you examine the decision making process, ask yourself the following questions:

1.) Is it ever possible for you to do what in your opinion is the worst option? This is a bit of a tricky question, actually.

Stepping away from morality for a moment, imagine that in front of me is a plate of mushroom flavoured ice-cream and a plate of chocolate flavoured ice-cream. I hate mushrooms and I love chocolate.

Is it possible for me to choose to eat the mushroom flavoured ice-cream? Yes.
Is it possible for me to choose what is in my opinion the worst option?
Didn't I just say it was? No, I didn't.

You see, I can choose the mushroom plate. But if I did it would not be because I still thought it was the worst option. It would be because I thought is was the best option.

For example, what if I wanted to prove to someone that I could choose what was in my opinion the worst option? If that want was strong enough to overcome my hatred of mushrooms then I would eat the mushrooms. But if I had thought more carefully I would realise that that would not prove that I could choose what was in my opinion the worst option.


2.) Go back up the list of reasons for doing something. For example, you give money to a guy on the street who asked for a bus fare. Why did you do that?

It could be that you did so because you believe people who ask for help should be given it.

But why do you think that people who ask for help should be given it?

I will not give my thoughts on what your ultimate reason might be but an interesting point is this: at some point there will be a reason that has no reasons. In other words, there will be a foundation axiom upon which your decision-making in any particular instance is based. Note that you may well have more than one foundation axiom.

This is Zoot's 'preference held for no reason'. It is inescapable, by the way.

Now, how does that relate to the notion of objective morality being unintelligible? Well, objective morality also has to be for no reason. (I will not use the word arbitrary as I think that seebs is correct when he says that that suggests that there is someone randomly selecting them somehow and who could change them, although I disagree with him that it necessarily says that).

The reason that I say objective morality has to have no reasons is that any so-called objective morality has to either be a set of axioms or be based on a set of axioms. And axioms can have no reasons, by definition. Axioms are the things that reasoning is based on.

In other words, there is no reason to declare any set of moral values 'true'. They are only 'true' if the axioms are accepted. And there is no reason to accept the axioms, which makes the objective morality not objective at all, as if you reject the axioms the arguments that say objective morality is the right one collapse into nothingness.


People might try to argue with this on these grounds:

1.) Some axioms have to be accepted in order for humans to function at all.
2.) The axioms upon which an objective morality may well be these types of axioms.
3.) Thus, we have no choice but to accept them.

Do you see some problems with this argument? Think about it. And think up other arguments against my position.

[Godfather]

"He preferred a thing which was actually not preferable."

Sort of like "he believed the square root of two could be represented as the ratio of two integers".
Not 'sort of like' at all - not unless you expand it to, 'He prefered a thing which, with a fuller understanding of the circumstances, he would not have preferred.' 'Not preferable' is a pretty big statement to try and make. The essence of the subjectivist view is (or should be) that any conceivable option could, in some set of circumstances, be preferable.

And yes, you may think it's odd to speak of preferring a non-preferable thing, but we can believe things which are unbelievable, so it's no great stretch. People are wrong sometimes.
If someone can believe something, it is not literally unbelievable. You can call it unbelievable if you like, but in doing so you will mean something other than, 'it is not possible for a person to believe this.' You might mean that it is shocking, or horrible, or drastically counter-intuitive to normal people, but you probably don't mean, 'Anyone who claims to believe this is lying, because it is not possible for a human to believe this.'

So, yes, you can talk of preferring an unpreferable thing, but in doing so you introduce two incompatible meanings for the same term. Is this a bad thing? Yes, I think it is. It leads to situations where people believe things which they would not believe if the simultaneous multiple meanings were not present. To put it another way, please don't break my language - I'm still using it.

Something which is preferable under the given circumstances may not be preferable under different circumstances, but it cannot be both preferable and not preferable under the same circumstances. Feel free to reply to the contrary, if you like, but I'm going to have to ask you to either explain how or to give an example.

[seebs]

We can't actually believe things which are unbelievable. It's not just odd to speak of preferring a non-preferable thing; it's completely meaningless to speak of something being preferable or non-preferable outside of the context of a person who does or does not prefer it.

"He preferred a thing which was actually not preferable." If he preferred it, then obviously it was preferable to him.

Fair enough. This exposes, I think, the underlying reason for which I am so uncomfortable with your use of the word "preferable". Really, I don't think preferable is the right word; certainly, it seems to lend itself to harmful equivocation.

So, given this apparent confusion, I'm going to assert that the replacement of "good" with "preferable" is in fact an error; I think there are meanings of "preferable" for which it would be correct, but the meaning you're using is clearly not one of them.

I think you can believe something which, with perfect knowledge, you would find "unbelievable".

Hmm. Still not sure where to go with this.

Let's try a totally different tack. The claim that "objective morality exists" is essentially the claim that claims about morality can be judged "true" or "false" with perfect knowledge. This gets us into the same bin as any other kind of truth claim.

So, we can spend a while debating on whether, given the traditional assumptions of mathematics, 2+2 is 4 or 5, we end up with one answer being "true". Same with morality; there may exist true answers, such that other answers are false.

In short, I'm sticking with my correspondence theory of truth. :)

[seebs]

In other words, there is no reason to declare any set of moral values 'true'.

I disagree. When we are using the word "objective", we are appealing to the notion of a world external to us. This world has the interesting quality that some sets of axioms can describe it correctly, and others cannot.

They are only 'true' if the axioms are accepted. And there is no reason to accept the axioms, which makes the objective morality not objective at all, as if you reject the axioms the arguments that say objective morality is the right one collapse into nothingness.

I disagree. There is no "reason" to accept the laws of physics as axioms, but this doesn't make them any less objective.

1.) Some axioms have to be accepted in order for humans to function at all.
2.) The axioms upon which an objective morality may well be these types of axioms.
3.) Thus, we have no choice but to accept them.

Do you see some problems with this argument? Think about it. And think up other arguments against my position.

This is a pragmatic argument for accepting a position, not an argument for its truth. It is probably necessary in some cases (e.g., this is the only argument I've ever seen for accepting the reality of sensory experience).

But I think you're conflating two things. One is the question of whether or not we have a reason to accept an axiom; the other is the question of whether or not the axiom is in fact true.

Let's borrow an example from geometry. Take a line, and a point not on that line. How many lines parallel to the first line go through the point? We can answer this in three different ways that seem to work. We have "no reason" to accept one axiom over another; none can be proved from our other axioms.

However, if we start applying our models to real-world objects, it turns out that some objects have properties such that one, or another, of these answers turns out to be the only true one for that object.

Other mathematical principles seem to be sufficiently universal that we cannot find any real-world cases where they don't apply.

In short, we discover that some of our mathematical axioms, although we have no "reason" for them in the sense of proof, are sensibly adopted because of correlation to the external world. (Which, admittedly, we simply assume to exist.)

I think it is coherent (though not necessarily provably correct, or even correct at all) to speak of moral axioms which have the same quality; it turns out that attempts to describe the universe using other axioms don't work.

Now, there's one thing that's difficult here, which is that everything else we study in the world is questions of what the world is, and morality is the question of what it ought to be. But... That means it could be different, not that it necessarily is.

[Zoot]

Let's try a totally different tack. The claim that "objective morality exists" is essentially the claim that claims about morality can be judged "true" or "false" with perfect knowledge.

The thing is, that's fine until you really examine what the terms in those claims mean.

For example, at first glance, it seems a simple thing to say that "homosexuality is wrong" is either true or false. But when we really examine what we mean by "wrong", we expose its essential meaning as "unpreferable for no further reason". Then we look again - "homosexuality is unpreferable for no further reason" - and find two things:

1. It has no meaning outside of the context of a preferrer.
2. It seems to conflict with our standard notion of "good", which includes some kind of notion of "for some kind of reason".

[Zoot]

Another thing.

If an action is good, it is simply preferable.

What does that mean to the objective-moralist? It means "you should prefer it."

What does that mean? It means "It's good to prefer it."

Which means "it's preferable to prefer it."

Which means, "you should prefer to prefer it."
Which means, "it's good to prefer to prefer it."
Which means, "it's preferable to prefer to prefer it."

[viscousmemories]

So, given this apparent confusion, I'm going to assert that the replacement of "good" with "preferable" is in fact an error; I think there are meanings of "preferable" for which it would be correct, but the meaning you're using is clearly not one of them.
This has been my biggest problem with the Zoot's arguments in this thread, and which was covered - along with most of the other objections that were raised by several of us - in this post (http://www.freethought-forum.com/forum/showthread.php?p=27963#post27963) by Clutch. Until those fundamental problems with the argument are worked out it seems a fairly pointless exercise to proceed as if they were never raised.

[Zoot]

I've clearly demonstrated that "good" means "preferable for no further reason". If you can see a flaw in the demonstration in the OP, then please point it out, rather than simply declaring that there is a flaw somewhere in it.

[Zoot]

Sorry about not responding to Clutch's post. I skimmed it too quickly and read the end, assumed it was merely affirming my position and didn't want to complicate things by posting in response to things that were agreeing with me. Let's see.

Not quite. He's defining 'good' in terms of individuals' preferences and then observing that, by this definition, the idea of goodness independent of individuals' preferences is incoherent.

Well, sure. And if the Queen had nuts, she'd be King -- as my old granddad used to say.

Seebs and vm and Warrenly and, most elegantly, Helen have all observed that this is (i) a stipulative definition that does not seem to respect the way we actually use the word 'good';

It was derived from the way that we actually use the word 'good', and Seebs has also agreed to it. I am very open to alternative definitions of "good" in regular usage.


(ii) based on the assumption that industrial-strength observer-independent objectivity and personally idiosyncratic arbitrary subjectivity exhaust the options for characterizing moral discourse, when in fact colour discourse (and there are others) seems to demonstrate a perfectly coherent middle ground recovering much or most of what the notion of objectivity is supposed to convey;

Then by all means, post some of these alternatives.


and (iii) shored up by an Argument from the Infinite Iterability of 'Why?', when in fact the options of circularity or regress attend upon many notions that we don't take to be meaningless or nonsense. (Consider time for instance. We can play "Define this in English" all day with that one, and never run out of opportunities to reply, "Okay, now define that.")

Quite right. But no one's claiming language is an absolute, I hope. Meanwhile, the regress of values just demonstrates an inherent quality of values - that they are essentially, by definition, foundationless.


The history of philosophy is littered with the wrecks of positions purporting to show that some apparently coherent way of speaking is actually meaningless. There's also a fair bit of work on this whole "good" thing. Aristotle argued that there is no domain-general notion of goodness; that there are only domain-specific notions like "a good horse", "a good shovel", "a good man". (Women, not so much.) That might be a place to start looking. I don't have time to summarize all the positions, but reading up on the history of good might be a way to avoid reinventing the wheel. Especially with four corners.

I find that a lot of historical philosophical thought was not in a position to really take into consideration the impact language has on thought and philosophical problems. I've read a fair amount on free will, for example, and find that almost without exception, both sides of discussions take for granted the meanings of terms which I find quite empty when I take a good look at them.

When it comes to examining concepts we use every day, with which we're all familiar, and examining them using simple questioning tools we all possess, I don't think it's necessary to go searching through past writings. No doubt there is some stuff that is relevant, and I'm looking for it, but in the meantime, I'd really enjoy someone addressing my argument rather than my conclusions. Seebs has done so, but most others in this thread have said, "You're wrong. You haven't convinced me," and then refused to explain why.

So if you have another definition of "good", I'd like to hear it, especially if you can find a definition that fits our usage of the term that avoids foundationlessness and subjectivity.

[viscousmemories]

I've clearly demonstrated that "good" means "preferable for no further reason". If you can see a flaw in the demonstration in the OP, then please point it out, rather than simply declaring that there is a flaw somewhere in it.
As Clutch pointed out you didn't demonstrate in your OP that 'good' means "preferable for no further reason", you stipulated it. You said:
It seems to me that when one says that an action is "good", one is saying nothing more than that it is preferable.

And therein lies the problem. If it doesn't seem to me that 'good' (in the moral sense) means "preferable for no further reason" (and it doesn't), then the rest of your argument doesn't work either.

Then again I'm no professional philosopher, I only participate in these kinds of threads because I enjoy the intellectual challenge and I like to learn. As I alluded to earlier I get the distinct impression that you and Godfather are more interested in intellectual competition.

That fundamental difference in our approach is why I haven't taken much time to clarify my disagreement sooner, and why I'm not likely to do so in the future. I would much rather spend my time in a cooperative effort to learn than competing with someone intent on promoting his own beliefs.

[Zoot]

I can't do anything about giving you the impression I'm more interested in intellectual competition. I don't propose to be able to tell what people's intentions are, which is why I stick to the rules of argument as much as possible, addressing points rather than people. Please don't mistake me not fucking around as me only being interested in "winning". The only way to really put my ideas through the wringer is to argue them against people who are willing to argue back. And ideas that can't be put through the wringer aren't much use.

My reasoning behind that definition of good may not have been clear. I'll try again.

In making a decision, options are evaluated in terms of criteria set by various interacting values. Values are those criteria for evaluating possible options in making a decision. For any decision, if it is intelligible as a decision, one can ask, "Why did you do that?" The answer is in the form of reference to those values that were the criteria for evaluating the various options.

Ignoring previous usage of the term "preferability" in this thread, I'm going to use the word "preferability" to refer to the common quality possessed to various degrees by the different options in a given decision.

As an example, I value pleasure. If an option will provide me pleasure, such as eating chocolate, that option will be evaluated as having more preferability than an option that provides me pain, such as eating a battery. Of course, there are far more than just one value involved in my decisions. I also value my own health, and for that reason I might value spirulina over chocolate. If my choice is between spirulina and chocolate, both options are evaluated in terms of the criteria of my value for both pleasure and health.

If, at the time of decision, I valued pleasure more than health, or the pleasure of the chocolate outweighed the health of the spirulina, I would choose the chocolate. When asked of the decision, "Why did you do that?", I could respond, "Because it was pleasurable."

In light of these observations about decision-making, I look at the notion of "good".

When I ask people what "good" means, different people give me different answers. The utilitarian tells me "whatever causes the most happiness for the most people" or whatever. The Christian tells me "what God wants". Someone else tells me "whatever is motivated by love". Etc.

Each one is telling me, "This is what is good." But my question was, "What does 'good' mean?" In other words, what am I being told about "whatever causes happiness" when the utilitarian tells me, "It is good"? What am I being told about "whatever God wants" when the Christian tells me "it is good"?

Given that decisions are the realm of moral good, the question is "what are we saying about a potential option in a decision when we say that this option is good?" What impact does it have on the decision-making process? When I think that something is good, whether it's making people happy or doing what God wants, what does it mean?

The impact of me thinking that an option is good is that it makes me more likely to choose that option than if I didn't think it was good. In the absence of any other values, any other motivations, given a choice between something I thought was good and something I thought was bad, I would choose good.

Of course, we have many values, morality being just one of them, and my valuing things as good has to compete with my valuing things as pleasurable, valuing things as healthy, etc. What I think is good has an impact on the preferability of an option, as do those many other values.

The difference is that the impact provided by other values can be explained in terms of those values. I prefer to act in ways I find pleasurable because I value pleasure. I prefer to act in ways that contribute to my health because I value health. I prefer to act in ways that protect my life because I value my life. I prefer to act in ways that make people happy because I value happiness. With "good", I can't do that. There's no further reason.

I first went into this line of thinking when I was talking to a Christian about homosexuality. I was arguing that it doesn't hurt anyone, so it's fine. He was saying that just because it makes people happy and doesn't hurt anyone, doesn't mean it's good. I realised that while I had in the past assumed that Christians more or less thought "do unto others" was the essence of goodness (make others happy), it was actually entirely incidental that many things Christians considered good were things that made people happy. They would stop short of saying "they're good because they make people happy", because they believed that some things that make people happy were evil.

In other words, there was nothing necessary about the connection between making people happy and the guy's notion of "good". It was more or less dumb luck, from a happiness perspective, when someone thought that feeding the hungry was good and flying planes into buildings was bad.

While I can say that I value an action because it makes people happy (and so can the majority of Christians), the Christian who believes that homosexuality is wrong can't say "it's wrong because..." anything further. They are forced to say, "It's just wrong."

I have to go. I'll follow this up with another post later.

[Clutch Munny]

Ignoring previous usage of the term "preferability" in this thread, I'm going to use the word "preferability" to refer to the common quality possessed to various degrees by the different options in a given decision.


There are innumerable such qualities. (E.g., recentness with which you've thought of X will be one; you may find it an interesting exercise to construct others.) In short, the cult of foundational definition isn't something that one can pop in and out of. If starting with well-defined terms is a prerequisite for meaningful use in argument, we can stop right here with "preferable".

And if it isn't, then it isn't for "good" either.

If you want to do this seriously, here is what you need to clarify:

Is 'good' meaningless according to your view? You sometimes seem to suggest this. At the same time, you have from the outset stipulated (not argued) what you take the meaning of 'good' to be. So -- clearly, directly -- what exactly is your meaninglessness claim with respect to 'good'?

What exactly do you mean by 'subjective'? By 'foundationless'? Perhaps you could give some examples of terms or concepts you believe to be "foundational"; this might help reveal what you think 'good' (and 'time') are lacking.

Do you claim there's an argument from "subjectivity" -- in whatever clearly defined sense you intend -- and "foundationlessness" to meaninglessness? If so, what is that argument?

Please be explicit on your views about colour discourse: Do you believe an utterance of "This tomato is red" can be true? Do you believe that colour is in some respect subjective? What might this say about the prospects of an argument from subjectivity to non-truth-aptness?

Thanks in advance.

[viscousmemories]

I can't do anything about giving you the impression I'm more interested in intellectual competition.
Actually you could do something about it, but you'd have to want to. I'm not trying to judge your character, I'm referring to admittedly subtle but pervasive nuances in your language.

For example when seebs agreed with an assertion you made you characterized his agreement as 'recognizing' the truth of the assertion, and when others have disagreed with some of your assertions you have concluded - almost invariably - that whomever it was must have 'misunderstood' you and you have proceeded to reassert your original argument at length, albeit with modification.

Even your statement that you only skimmed Clutch's post and assumed that he was affirming everything you had said - when in fact he had done the opposite - reveals that you don't appear to be very interested in a critical examination of your own preconceptions.

It's a matter of personal style, I suppose. I just don't personally enjoy a philosophical exploration that starts with a conclusion such as "free will is unintelligible" or "objective morality is an oxymoron". Honestly I'm not inclined to spend any more time in a discussion with someone who does so than I would with someone who starts with "there is an omni-God", which is why I generally avoid religious debates altogether.

Anyway sorry for the derail...

[Zoot]

For example when seebs agreed with an assertion you made you characterized his agreement as 'recognizing' the truth of the assertion, and when others have disagreed with some of your assertions you have concluded - almost invariably - that whomever it was must have 'misunderstood' you and you have proceeded to reassert your original argument at length, albeit with modification.

At this point, if I ask anyone in this thread (with the exceptions of Godfather and David Gould), "What is my argument?", I honestly don't think anyone would be able to tell me. When people misunderstand me, it's my fault, not theirs. I need to be very clear. What I'm trying to say is not easy to get across. But I will try to avoid the word "recognise" in future. As for misunderstanding me, I'm afraid that's just a plain fact about this discussion. Again, that's my fault, for not wording things clearly enough.


Even your statement that you only skimmed Clutch's post and assumed that he was affirming everything you had said - when in fact he had done the opposite - reveals that you don't appear to be very interested in a critical examination of your own preconceptions.

I skipped over it because I'm only interested in a critical examination of my own preconceptions. Because I thought it was agreeing with me, and there were a few posts to read through, I more thoroughly read the ones I thought were disagreeing with me.


It's a matter of personal style, I suppose. I just don't personally enjoy a philosophical exploration that starts with a conclusion such as "free will is unintelligible" or "objective morality is an oxymoron".

Then it's entirely beyond me why you'd participate in a thread dedicated to that very topic.


Honestly I'm not inclined to spend any more time in a discussion with someone who does so than I would with someone who starts with "there is an omni-God", which is why I generally avoid religious debates altogether.

Anyway sorry for the derail...

Okay, well, this is the second time you've said you're no longer participating in this thread. Next time I start a thread, I'll be sure to add a disclaimer: "This thread only for people who want to discuss the topic of this thread."

[Zoot]

There are innumerable such qualities. (E.g., recentness with which you've thought of X will be one; you may find it an interesting exercise to construct others.) In short, the cult of foundational definition isn't something that one can pop in and out of. If starting with well-defined terms is a prerequisite for meaningful use in argument, we can stop right here with "preferable".

To some extent I'm assuming a familiarity with my arguments about free will, mainly because this has ended up being a discussion with Seebs, and he's well aware of my views and definition when it comes to decisions. I'm not pulling that definition out of a hat.

Briefly summarising, it seems to me that "to decide", in regular usage, means "to act on one option, from a number of possible options, for reasons". I have yet to find someone provide an alternative, but I'm open to them. The options are prioritised, and one is acted on. In order to prioritise them, they must be ascribed varying degrees of a common quality. The degree to which an option possesses quality is influenced only by those things we call reasons for acting the way we act.

It's not like an actual quality. Just a conventional way to express what we mean by "to decide".

Godfather has helpfully suggested I add that I am not imposing definitions of these terms and saying that others should adopt them. I am claiming that they have already implicitly agreed to my definitions in their regular usage of the terms, and I am making those definitions explicit.


And if it isn't, then it isn't for "good" either.

If you want to do this seriously, here is what you need to clarify:

Is 'good' meaningless according to your view? You sometimes seem to suggest this. At the same time, you have from the outset stipulated (not argued) what you take the meaning of 'good' to be. So -- clearly, directly -- what exactly is your meaninglessness claim with respect to 'good'?

I take our experience of the concept good, examine it and find it fundamentally subjective and arbitrary. Then looking at the usual definition of objective moral goodness, I find that it includes "objective" and "not arbitrary" in the usual meaning. It's the notion of objective morality, absolute morality, that I find contradictory. Not just untrue, but contradictory. And that's because it seems to me that people agree to a meaning of the terms implicitly which when made explicit demonstrates their inconsistency.


What exactly do you mean by 'subjective'? By 'foundationless'? Perhaps you could give some examples of terms or concepts you believe to be "foundational"; this might help reveal what you think 'good' (and 'time') are lacking.

By subjective, in this sense, I mean that "good" only has meaning in the context of a preferring subject. By foundationless, in this sense, I mean that analysis of values inevitably reaches a point where the value is arbitrary and cannot itself be evaluated as greater or lesser than any other value. That's a clumsy definition, and I'm giving thought to a better one.

As for something that is foundationful, I'm not sure. I'll give that some thought too.


Do you claim there's an argument from "subjectivity" -- in whatever clearly defined sense you intend -- and "foundationlessness" to meaninglessness? If so, what is that argument?

Well, that depends on what you mean by meaningless. (Not being pedantic, it really does.) What do you mean by meaningless?


Please be explicit on your views about colour discourse: Do you believe an utterance of "This tomato is red" can be true? Do you believe that colour is in some respect subjective? What might this say about the prospects of an argument from subjectivity to non-truth-aptness?

I think that the truth of any utterance can be determined only within the confines of the context of the utterance. The criteria for truth and falsehood are determined by the context of the utterance. There are linguistic structures that provide a context for our experience of the tomato and our experience of the utterance. There are physiological structures that contribute to that context. The colour-blind person may mean something entirely different by the utterance, or it may mean nothing at all to someone who has been blind since birth. Similarly, when you say "this tomato", it's through a shared context that we both understand you to mean just the skin on the outside of the tomato, rather than the whole thing including the seeds inside, which are white. Etc.

So yes, it can be true or false, but truthhood and falsehood are determined by criteria set by the context.

As for what I said earlier in this thread about colour, it seems to me that the experience of colour arises out of the interaction of the human mind, body, object and light, and that it has no meaning outside of the context of this interaction. Until a human, who is not colourblind, who has a linguistic structure similar to our own, interacts with light and the object, nothing resembling "colour" arises.

[viscousmemories]

At this point, if I ask anyone in this thread (with the exceptions of Godfather and David Gould), "What is my argument?", I honestly don't think anyone would be able to tell me. When people misunderstand me, it's my fault, not theirs. I need to be very clear.
Yeah that's definitely one possible interpretation. Another is that I'm a complete ignoramus, and yet another is that you are explaining yourself adequately but don't understand the criticisms that some of us have raised.

I skipped over it because I'm only interested in a critical examination of my own preconceptions. Because I thought it was agreeing with me, and there were a few posts to read through, I more thoroughly read the ones I thought were disagreeing with me.
Okay fair enough.

It's a matter of personal style, I suppose. I just don't personally enjoy a philosophical exploration that starts with a conclusion such as "free will is unintelligible" or "objective morality is an oxymoron".
Then it's entirely beyond me why you'd participate in a thread dedicated to that very topic.
Had either of those assumptions been stated at the outset, I probably wouldn't have.

Okay, well, this is the second time you've said you're no longer participating in this thread. Next time I start a thread, I'll be sure to add a disclaimer: "This thread only for people who want to discuss the topic of this thread."
Actually I haven't said I'm no longer participating in this thread, though I can see why you might have thought I had. I'm just responding to your claim that I haven't addressed the meat of your argument by explaining that it would be pointless for me to do so since I disagree with some of your starting assumptions. If we don't both agree that the sky is blue, debating why it's blue is not going to be very productive.

At any rate I apologize again for the derail.

[Zoot]

Viscous,

Sorry for being abrasive.

The main thrust of my argument here, and I haven't been clear about that either, is that people have already implicitly agreed to the definitions I make explicit, simply by their usage of the terms. That's why it's probably more helpful for me to go through by asking questions about what people mean by these terms in order to make clear the explicit definitions.

[viscousmemories]

Viscous,

Sorry for being abrasive.
Hey no worries, Zoot. I apologize if my comments have been too personal.

The main thrust of my argument here, and I haven't been clear about that either, is that people have already implicitly agreed to the definitions I make explicit, simply by their usage of the terms. That's why it's probably more helpful for me to go through by asking questions about what people mean by these terms in order to make clear the explicit definitions.
I'm afraid I might still be missing something... Are you suggesting that all terms have a single explicit definition independent of usage or context? That the use of 'good' in a discussion of morality has implicit, specific connotations regardless of the speakers intent?

[Desert Dweller]

Hi Zoot, the thread is peppered with variants of and I haven't been clear about that either,
I took your challenge to see if I know what you've been talking about. To me it seems to be that (a) there is no objective goodness and (b) goodness only exists in a context of preference.

Perhaps you can disclose what's behind your exploration. If it exists then it can be described...and all that.

[David Gould]

I disagree. There is no "reason" to accept the laws of physics as axioms, but this doesn't make them any less objective.



Yes, there is: evidence that they are in fact true. In fact, the laws of physics are not axioms at all.



This is a pragmatic argument for accepting a position, not an argument for its truth. It is probably necessary in some cases (e.g., this is the only argument I've ever seen for accepting the reality of sensory experience).

But I think you're conflating two things. One is the question of whether or not we have a reason to accept an axiom; the other is the question of whether or not the axiom is in fact true.

Let's borrow an example from geometry. Take a line, and a point not on that line. How many lines parallel to the first line go through the point? We can answer this in three different ways that seem to work. We have "no reason" to accept one axiom over another; none can be proved from our other axioms.

However, if we start applying our models to real-world objects, it turns out that some objects have properties such that one, or another, of these answers turns out to be the only true one for that object.

Other mathematical principles seem to be sufficiently universal that we cannot find any real-world cases where they don't apply.

In short, we discover that some of our mathematical axioms, although we have no "reason" for them in the sense of proof, are sensibly adopted because of correlation to the external world. (Which, admittedly, we simply assume to exist.)



Again, evidence that they are true. Which means they are not axioms.



I think it is coherent (though not necessarily provably correct, or even correct at all) to speak of moral axioms which have the same quality; it turns out that attempts to describe the universe using other axioms don't work.

Now, there's one thing that's difficult here, which is that everything else we study in the world is questions of what the world is, and morality is the question of what it ought to be. But... That means it could be different, not that it necessarily is.

But the problem here is that if we are talking about axioms, it could well be that the axiom that 'all humans should be treated with respect' (just an example) is true. But if there is no reason to accept this - which is the definition of an axiom - then it is 'preferable for no reason'.

In other words, you cannot make a logical argument in favour of this idea, simply because logical arguments are based on axioms; they do not prove them.

[seebs]

Yes, there is: evidence that they are in fact true. In fact, the laws of physics are not axioms at all.

Ahh, but if I'm allowed to accept observations as evidence for primary principles, then I can use moral judgment as evidence for moral principles.

But note that our evidence that the laws of physics are true isn't why they're true. There's a difference between "why X is true" and "why we should believe X".



[quote]Again, evidence that they are true. Which means they are not axioms.

They are used as axioms in mathematical systems.

But the problem here is that if we are talking about axioms, it could well be that the axiom that 'all humans should be treated with respect' (just an example) is true. But if there is no reason to accept this - which is the definition of an axiom - then it is 'preferable for no reason'.

I think you've got a couple of different senses of "reason to accept X" confused. There is no proof of an axiom; axioms are the things from which you prove other things. However, there are reasons to prefer one set of axioms over another; for instance, the usability of their results.

But, as a general rule, any time your definition of "an axiom" is such that it does not include the things we refer to as "axioms" when talking about Euclidean geometry, your definition is probably useless.

In other words, you cannot make a logical argument in favour of this idea, simply because logical arguments are based on axioms; they do not prove them.

Well, in that case, if the question of objective morality is treated as a question of axioms, it's unassailable, because you can't argue against it; it's an axiom, and not subject to debate of that sort! :)

[David Gould]

Yes, there is: evidence that they are in fact true. In fact, the laws of physics are not axioms at all.

Ahh, but if I'm allowed to accept observations as evidence for primary principles, then I can use moral judgment as evidence for moral principles.

But note that our evidence that the laws of physics are true isn't why they're true. There's a difference between "why X is true" and "why we should believe X".



[quote]Again, evidence that they are true. Which means they are not axioms.

They are used as axioms in mathematical systems.

But the problem here is that if we are talking about axioms, it could well be that the axiom that 'all humans should be treated with respect' (just an example) is true. But if there is no reason to accept this - which is the definition of an axiom - then it is 'preferable for no reason'.

I think you've got a couple of different senses of "reason to accept X" confused. There is no proof of an axiom; axioms are the things from which you prove other things. However, there are reasons to prefer one set of axioms over another; for instance, the usability of their results.

But, as a general rule, any time your definition of "an axiom" is such that it does not include the things we refer to as "axioms" when talking about Euclidean geometry, your definition is probably useless.

In other words, you cannot make a logical argument in favour of this idea, simply because logical arguments are based on axioms; they do not prove them.

Well, in that case, if the question of objective morality is treated as a question of axioms, it's unassailable, because you can't argue against it; it's an axiom, and not subject to debate of that sort! :)

I think I do need to rethink some things here. But I have no objection to the objective morality as an axiom idea, because I think that proves the point I am trying to make - we arbitrarily accept certain things as axioms.

But I think I am a little confused by the whole 'reason to accept something as true' and 'reason it is true'.

However, if there was a reason something was true, wouldn't that simply be pushing things a step further back? In other words, either something is true because of X and Y or it is true simply because.

And the second one falls outside any real evaluation of truth in the first place, in my opinion.

[Zoot]

I'm afraid I might still be missing something... Are you suggesting that all terms have a single explicit definition independent of usage or context? That the use of 'good' in a discussion of morality has implicit, specific connotations regardless of the speakers intent?

Okay, two things. Two, I think the meaning of "good" in the "objectively morally good" sense has a single agreed notion that implicitly includes all kinds of things that aren't so pretty when made explicit. So, I'd ask you, vicious memoires, how would you define "good" in the objective moral sense?

[Zoot]

Few things are more pleasant than reading David Gould's posts in a wine-induced haze.

[Clutch Munny]

There are innumerable such qualities. (E.g., recentness with which you've thought of X will be one; you may find it an interesting exercise to construct others.) In short, the cult of foundational definition isn't something that one can pop in and out of. If starting with well-defined terms is a prerequisite for meaningful use in argument, we can stop right here with "preferable".

To some extent I'm assuming a familiarity with my arguments about free will, mainly because this has ended up being a discussion with Seebs, and he's well aware of my views and definition when it comes to decisions. I'm not pulling that definition out of a hat.

Briefly summarising, it seems to me that "to decide", in regular usage, means "to act on one option, from a number of possible options, for reasons". I have yet to find someone provide an alternative, but I'm open to them.

Again, the problem is not necessarily the need for an alternative, but for precision. A suitably imprecise definition is guaranteed to be correct, so far as it goes. (In the limit: Water is a thing.) I'm not entirely sure why your views on free will bear immediately on the question of the definition of preferability, but in any case, the concepts of "option", "possible" and "for reasons" are no clearer than anything you're attempting to define with them.

Godfather has helpfully suggested I add that I am not imposing definitions of these terms and saying that others should adopt them. I am claiming that they have already implicitly agreed to my definitions in their regular usage of the terms, and I am making those definitions explicit.

How is this helpful? One cannot magic a missing argument into existence by assuring others that they agree; what's then needed is some argument for this conclusion!

You asserted early in this thread, for instance, that "when we say something is "good", we are saying that it is preferable for no reason". I can't see any grounds for thinking this is correct of my use of the expression 'good', nor of the usage I typically see from others. Is there an argument for this conclusion?


Is 'good' meaningless according to your view? You sometimes seem to suggest this. At the same time, you have from the outset stipulated (not argued) what you take the meaning of 'good' to be. So -- clearly, directly -- what exactly is your meaninglessness claim with respect to 'good'?

I take our experience of the concept good, examine it and find it fundamentally subjective and arbitrary.

Whoa, now. Subjective and arbitrary? Or arbitrary because subjective? Or what? Arbitrariness is an extremely powerful notion: it amounts to having no distinguishing principle. This quick move, from an unexplained invocation of the polysemous notion 'subjectivity', to the very strong charge of arbitrariness, is precisely where we should have careful and clear argument.

Then looking at the usual definition of objective moral goodness, I find that it includes "objective" and "not arbitrary" in the usual meaning.

Well, "objective anything" typically has objective built into its meaning. What is "objective good", and how did we get from discussing "good" -- which might require some difficult and subtle argument regarding its commitments to subjectivity, intersubjectivity, or objectivity -- to "objective good", which succumbs to the slightest hint of subjectivity as a matter of dictionary definition? Argument by Webster's is rarely worthwhile; the philosophy had better be a bit more subtle.

It's the notion of objective morality, absolute morality, that I find contradictory. Not just untrue, but contradictory. And that's because it seems to me that people agree to a meaning of the terms implicitly which when made explicit demonstrates their inconsistency.

Why should objective morality, whatever that means, be absolute morality, whatever thatmeans? What role are these terms playing, and how do they get stuck back to 'good', simpliciter, at the end of the day? Maybe this is all clear in your head, but my very strong suspicion is that you're thinking of all these concepts as a syndrome, a clutch of ideas, if I may call it that, that hang together just because one often hears those words concatenated: absolute, objective, foundational, certain... you know... all that stuff... And similarly for subjective, arbitrary, conventional, personal, and so forth. But these words are all importantly different; conclusions attaching to one concept may not attach to others, so careless traffic between them is a recipe for arguments that magically slingshot from innocuous observations to heady, but rationally unrecoverable, conclusions.

What exactly do you mean by 'subjective'? By 'foundationless'? Perhaps you could give some examples of terms or concepts you believe to be "foundational"; this might help reveal what you think 'good' (and 'time') are lacking.

By subjective, in this sense, I mean that "good" only has meaning in the context of a preferring subject. By foundationless, in this sense, I mean that analysis of values inevitably reaches a point where the value is arbitrary and cannot itself be evaluated as greater or lesser than any other value. That's a clumsy definition, and I'm giving thought to a better one.

I don't understand this construction. Do mean something like that there will always be a point at which someone justifying a value judgement is forced to say, "Look, either you get it or you don't!"?

If that's what you mean, it strikes me as pretty plausible.

It also seems to a common feature of discussions about, e.g., the evidence for evolutionary theory.

Again, what's going to matter for your argument is making your observations about 'good' not just clear and accurate, but moreover having their accurate interpretation, when extended, preserve some asymmetry with discourses we take to be uncontroversially truth-apt. If "Some acts are wrong" turns out to be no worse off than "Ripe tomatoes are red", still less "Evolutionary theory is warranted", then it's hard to see why anyone who ever conceived of morality as objective should be bothered by your conclusions.

Do you claim there's an argument from "subjectivity" -- in whatever clearly defined sense you intend -- and "foundationlessness" to meaninglessness? If so, what is that argument?

Well, that depends on what you mean by meaningless. (Not being pedantic, it really does.) What do you mean by meaningless?

Eh? I didn't introduce the term here. I'm trying to figure out what you mean by it. From your OP: "How does this all mean that objective morality is meaningless?"

Good question; I'm trying to elucidate an answer.

Please be explicit on your views about colour discourse: Do you believe an utterance of "This tomato is red" can be true? Do you believe that colour is in some respect subjective? What might this say about the prospects of an argument from subjectivity to non-truth-aptness?

I think that the truth of any utterance can be determined only within the confines of the context of the utterance. The criteria for truth and falsehood are determined by the context of the utterance. There are linguistic structures that provide a context for our experience of the tomato and our experience of the utterance. There are physiological structures that contribute to that context. The colour-blind person may mean something entirely different by the utterance, or it may mean nothing at all to someone who has been blind since birth. Similarly, when you say "this tomato", it's through a shared context that we both understand you to mean just the skin on the outside of the tomato, rather than the whole thing including the seeds inside, which are white. Etc.

So yes, it can be true or false, but truthhood and falsehood are determined by criteria set by the context.

As for what I said earlier in this thread about colour, it seems to me that the experience of colour arises out of the interaction of the human mind, body, object and light, and that it has no meaning outside of the context of this interaction. Until a human, who is not colourblind, who has a linguistic structure similar to our own, interacts with light and the object, nothing resembling "colour" arises.

I'm not entirely sure, but your answers seemed to be, Yes, statements about the colours of objects can be true, and Yes, judgements about colour are subjective in some important sense.

Okay. Now, what makes you think that the common moral-theoretic applications of 'good' must amount to something more than the view that moral evaluations can be straightforwardly true?

[David Gould]

When we say something is good, we usually mean that it meets some criteria.

For example, saving someone's live is considered good because life is considered valuable.

But is considering life valuable good? Why?

At some point we must come to a point where our reasons stop.

So in effect we have this:

good < reason < reason < reason < reason < reason < reason < no reason

Now, seebs is suggesting that while this may be true in terms of our evaluation of what is good - in other words, it might well be true that we have no reason for adopting any particular starting point over another - one particular starting point is going to be true anyway.

My counter to this is that if there are no reasons for adopting a starting point, in what sense can it be called 'true'?

[Zoot]

Disclaimer: wine.

Again, the problem is not necessarily the need for an alternative, but for precision. A suitably imprecise definition is guaranteed to be correct, so far as it goes. (In the limit: Water is a thing.) I'm not entirely sure why your views on free will bear immediately on the question of the definition of preferability, but in any case, the concepts of "option", "possible" and "for reasons" are no clearer than anything you're attempting to define with them.

Then offer me your alternatives. Tell me what's unclear.


Godfather has helpfully suggested I add that I am not imposing definitions of these terms and saying that others should adopt them. I am claiming that they have already implicitly agreed to my definitions in their regular usage of the terms, and I am making those definitions explicit.


How is this helpful? One cannot magic a missing argument into existence by assuring others that they agree; what's then needed is some argument for this conclusion!

You asserted early in this thread, for instance, that "when we say something is "good", we are saying that it is preferable for no reason". I can't see any grounds for thinking this is correct of my use of the expression 'good', nor of the usage I typically see from others. Is there an argument for this conclusion?

Yes, but it begins with me asking: what do you think is meant by "morally good"?


I take our experience of the concept good, examine it and find it fundamentally subjective and arbitrary.


Whoa, now. Subjective and arbitrary? Or arbitrary because subjective? Or what? Arbitrariness is an extremely powerful notion: it amounts to having no distinguishing principle. This quick move, from an unexplained invocation of the polysemous notion 'subjectivity', to the very strong charge of arbitrariness, is precisely where we should have careful and clear argument.

It lacks any absolute foundation, by definition, which renders it meaningless to those who believe in and require an absolute meaning. It's arbitrary in that it has no other value to which it may appeal.


Well, "objective anything" typically has objective built into its meaning. What is "objective good", and how did we get from discussing "good" -- which might require some difficult and subtle argument regarding its commitments to subjectivity, intersubjectivity, or objectivity -- to "objective good", which succumbs to the slightest hint of subjectivity as a matter of dictionary definition? Argument by Webster's is rarely worthwhile; the philosophy had better be a bit more subtle.

Again, I have far more luck in these discussions when I begin by asking someone, "What do you mean by morally good?"


Why should objective morality, whatever that means, be absolute morality, whatever thatmeans? What role are these terms playing, and how do they get stuck back to 'good', simpliciter, at the end of the day? Maybe this is all clear in your head, but my very strong suspicion is that you're thinking of all these concepts as a syndrome, a clutch of ideas, if I may call it that, that hang together just because one often hears those words concatenated: absolute, objective, foundational, certain... you know... all that stuff... And similarly for subjective, arbitrary, conventional, personal, and so forth. But these words are all importantly different; conclusions attaching to one concept may not attach to others, so careless traffic between them is a recipe for arguments that magically slingshot from innocuous observations to heady, but rationally unrecoverable, conclusions.

Which, again, is why I ask people what they mean by "morally good".


I don't understand this construction. Do mean something like that there will always be a point at which someone justifying a value judgement is forced to say, "Look, either you get it or you don't!"?

If that's what you mean, it strikes me as pretty plausible.

Not quite. It's not a matter of "getting it" or not. These values are not "understood" or "not understood". They're either adopted or not adopted. And that's generally not up to the subject in question. What I mean is, there's nothing that makes one value "objectively" more valuable thn another value.


It also seems to a common feature of discussions about, e.g., the evidence for evolutionary theory.

Again, what's going to matter for your argument is making your observations about 'good' not just clear and accurate, but moreover having their accurate interpretation, when extended, preserve some asymmetry with discourses we take to be uncontroversially truth-apt. If "Some acts are wrong" turns out to be no worse off than "Ripe tomatoes are red", still less "Evolutionary theory is warranted", then it's hard to see why anyone who ever conceived of morality as objective should be bothered by your conclusions.

It's because ultimately "some acts are wrong" is not an utterance, not a proposition, but a reflection of experience. Someone who believes in objective morality experiences some acts as wrong, and what that experience entails is my focus here.


Eh? I didn't introduce the term here. I'm trying to figure out what you mean by it. From your OP: "How does this all mean that objective morality is meaningless?"

Good question; I'm trying to elucidate an answer.

I mean, in that context, that objective morality is unintelligible. Because morality is inherently arbitrary and objectivity is inherently not arbitrary.


I'm not entirely sure, but your answers seemed to be, Yes, statements about the colours of objects can be true, and Yes, judgements about colour are subjective in some important sense.

Okay. Now, what makes you think that the common moral-theoretic applications of 'good' must amount to something more than the view that moral evaluations can be straightforwardly true?

If it comes down to it, I reject the notion of "straightforwardly true", assuming by "straightfowardly true" you mean "just plain true, regardless of context." But I don't think it's necessary to reach that level and that realm of argumentation in demonstrating that what people mean by "morally good" by regular usage of the term in the English language is inherently and essentially arbitrary and subjective, and that trying to combine the concept with any notion of "objectivity" or "absolutism", which exclude the possibility of subjectivity and arbitrariness, is essentially inconsistent and contradictory.

So, what do YOU mean by "morally good" in the common usage. What does "good" mean to you in a moral sense? Can you define it for me, as you have inherited it?

[Zoot]

i eat food

[seebs]

I think I do need to rethink some things here. But I have no objection to the objective morality as an axiom idea, because I think that proves the point I am trying to make - we arbitrarily accept certain things as axioms.

Well, there's two layers. In some cases, we accept something as an axiom because it appears to lead to a good model of the world. Then we reason from it, and when we are reasoning from it, we treat it as purely an axiom, but we do acknowledge that our axioms could be "wrong" in the sense that the resulting model is not an accurate model of the world.

But I think I am a little confused by the whole 'reason to accept something as true' and 'reason it is true'.

Well, for instance... I have lots of reasons to accept the theory that objects attract each other with force proportional to the product of their masses, but inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them.

But I have no idea at all why it's true. Thus, I have reasons to accept it, but those aren't causing it to be so; they are caused by it being so. Does that help at all? Probably not.

Hmm.

Okay, let's give another example. If I put my hand in ice-cold water, it will start to hurt. This is because I'm a warm-blooded creature, and it's a survival trait for me to experience harmful conditions (excessive cold, for instance) as pain. But the reason for me to accept this as true is not the theoretical explanation, it's that I can do it and get the same result any time I want.

However, if there was a reason something was true, wouldn't that simply be pushing things a step further back? In other words, either something is true because of X and Y or it is true simply because.

Perhaps. But there's still a difference between arbitrary ("because X said so") and we-don't-know-why ("because that is the way things are"). Bad parents conflate these.

In other words... There's a difference between "bedtime is 8PM", which is arbitrary, and "the faster you run, the more it will hurt if you hit the wall", which is arguably arbitrary (I am unaware of any "reason" for inertia to work the way it does) but clearly not "arbitrary" in the same sense.

And the second one falls outside any real evaluation of truth in the first place, in my opinion.

I'm not sure. It's a tough call. I mean, what do we make of inertia? It's just like that! That's how it is; mass, velocity, force, inertia. We don't know why, really. But... I wouldn't call it arbitrary.

I think arbitrary carries the implication that it could change. Maybe someone could change it. Maybe it just changes from time to time. I tend to call laws of physics "inherent" rather than "arbitrary".

I think arbitrary "objective" morality implies that it's not really objective, because whatever agent "chose" it could simply choose different morality next week. So, outside that perspective, it's not constant, it's just the opinion of, in conventional theology, the most-powerful entity.

I think for morality to be objective, it must be inherent. The interesting question is whether inherent things are really inherent, or whether they are set by fiat.

This leaves us with the question of whether, for instance, omnipotence would extend to changing inherent qualities. Could God create a universe in which pi was exactly 3? I have no idea. I am not sure the concept is well-enough defined to be meaningful. It may be that there are limits on what kinds of universes can be made.

In other words, it may be that the divine authority over morality is not a question of divine omnipotence, but of divine omniscience; that God perceives the morality inherent in the nature of the question "what is moral", rather than determining it.

[Zoot]

It's interesting, talking about the unintelligibility of something that is sort of assumed as intelligible for the purpose of making the assertion of unintelligibility. ie., "If objective morality is meaningless, what are you saying is meaningless?"

I have the same problem with "free will". I'm forced to say "what you think of as free will is actually unintelligible", which is what I'm also forced to say about "objective morality".

With free will, I've found it's clearer to say "all decisions are determined by factors outside of the control of the decider, by definition", and then more or less "free will" as the negation of that statement.

So I'll try to find something like that to say about objective morality.

Um.

"When we experience an option as objectively good, we experience it as preferable for no reason, by definition."

And "objective morality" would be a negation of that statement.

[Zoot]

I'll try starting from scratch.

What does it mean to believe that an action is morally good? What impact does it have? Its immediate impact seems to me to be on decision-making. When we perceive an action as morally good, we feel some degree of compulsion to act in that way. In the absence of other compulsions, we would act that way.

I won't go any further than that right now. Any thoughts on the above paragraph?

[justaman]

Peeeeeeeteeeeeer whaaaaat's happening?????

HA my name is HA my name is HA my name is flicki flicki Slim J-man

I like this place. Colours are a little more drab than CF. Sort of feel like I'm on the Grey Planet.

"All I know is my gut is telling me "maybe"."

Aight, something else to get out of the way:

fuckety-fuckety-fuckety-fuckety-fuckety-fuuuck!

awesome.

Aight, I've made my entrance. Time to engage with ry-anne.

What does it mean to believe that an action is morally good? What impact does it have? Its immediate impact seems to me to be on decision-making. When we perceive an action as morally good, we feel some degree of compulsion to act in that way. In the absence of other compulsions, we would act that way.
I know you're really only meaning this for seebs but I have to say something and make this post half-way legit and not get my ass kicked out on the first post already.

I believe the perception in of an action we describe as being 'morally good' is the recognition that either we personally would enjoy the result of that particular action, or that someone would think "Oh what a great guy!" if they were watching. I.e, it is fulfilling a certain criteria which we have learnt through life. It's sort of like hitting a magic shot in tennis. Objectively a scorching backhand in the last two-inches of the back corner is as meaningless as a bunt into the net, but in the context of the game we think "That was friggen awesome." In the context of society, that very complex game we play, I would say the recognition of a morally good deed is analogous to the recognition of a friggen awesome backhand. We've done well according to the respective rules.

[livius drusus]

Drab?! Grey Planet?! I'm pretty sure comparing us negatively to that bastion of visual vulgarity known as CF is a ban on sight offense. Let me just check the rules...

Shit. It's not. Dammitall. :shakefist:

Oh well, I say get a nice, colorful avatar and check out some of the threads where the smilies are in full bloom. You'll soon learn to embrace the neutral pallette, I promise you. :yup:

Welcome to FF, justaman. :welcome2:

[wei yau]

I'm pretty sure comparing us negatively to that bastion of visual vulgarity known as CF is a ban on sight offense. Let me just check the rules...

Shit. It's not. Dammitall. :shakefist:

Well, it oughta be. CF hurts my eyes and my brain.

[Adam]

Hey, I have time to jump in. Isn't xmas great? :)

Here's the thing, though: We have subjective experience of color, and we can argue for months or years over whether that particular shade is "blue" or "green", and different cultures will predispose people to answer this question differently... But it turns out that objective machines can, in fact, measure color.

I'd argue that it's not quite accurate to say that machines (including biological ones, incidentally, such as the human eye) can objectively measure color, so much as that they can objectively measure the wavelength of reflected light. Color itself, as far as I can tell, is a subjective experience, albeit one that is closely linked, and partially determined, by the objective phenomenon of light being reflected from objects in differing wavelengths. If I may ramble, by way of illustration...

Different species, and sometimes different individuals within a species, have optical machinery that differs in the way it senses and interprets differing wavelengths of light. Most humans (and most primates) are trichromatic, using three different sorts of optical cell to distinguish between light in what we think of as the red, green, and blue wavelengths. Some humans, and most other mammals, are dichromatic, using only two sorts of optical cells to distinguish between light in the blue and the red/green wavelength and, tyhus, cannot distinguish between red and green light. Presumably, then, an elephant's subjective experience of a red apple in a green tree will be very different from mine. Many birds are tetrachromatic, using four different types of optical cells, although I'm not amateur biologist enough to know what the fourth color wavelength they are sensitve to is. Presumably, they would have yet a different subjective experience of the same scene, even though, the bird, the elephant, and I are all perceiving the same objective data. In the end, our subjective experience is determined by a combination of at least two factors: the objective fact of the presence of data, in the form of differing wavelengths of light, and the objective fact of the presence of our own individual sensory and interpretive machinery.

I don't know whether a machine could be built to measure morality, but I still have the same mental distinction between "human experience of morality" and "whatever morality is inherent in the structure of things", just as I distinguish between "human experience of color" and "whatever color is inherent in the structure of things".

I know you said "whatever morality is inherent in the structure of things", but I'm still hung up on the idea of "good", so I'm going to respond as though you had said "whatever goodness is inherent in the structure of things". I'm not trying to put words in your mouth, simply to pursue what I find to be the most interesting avenue of discussion. I think I understand that you're trying to switch to "morality" rather than "goodness" to avoid the accidental or intentional conflation of the sort of moral goodness you're talking about with the sort of preferable goodness zoot is talking about (note that I'm largely agreed with him that there is no meaningful distinction to be drawn between the two), but I'd like to switch back to goodness for a bit, as it's more comparable to color, IMO, and this better suited for a response to this post.

I'd say that the case with goodness is much like the case with color, in that it's a subjective experience that's tied to, and determined by, at least two objective factors: data and our sensing and interpretation of that data, although in the case of goodness, there's quite a bit more interpretation than sense, as compared to the case of color. Take a simple hypothetical: wolf A kills deer B for food while human C watches. The objective effect of the act on all three parties in uncontroversial. A is fed, B is deceased, and C is relatively unaffected, unless he happens to be shooting a documentary foe which he just got soem great footage, or some other unlikely reason. A, obviously, will regard the act as good (hypothetically, of course..I'm not going to get into whether or not wolves have the conceptual framework to regard anything as good in the same way that we do), B as bad, and C as neither. As in the case of light and color, whether any given individual experiences the act as good, bad, or beither depends on that individual's particular perspective. It's not that any given perspective is incorrect, just that they're necessarily different, for good objective reasons.

You could also, of course, go the other way with this, and state that, obviously, a bird's tetrachromatic eyes yield a truer subjective experience than our trichromatic eyes, and that an individual who had, say, ten different sorts of optical cells, would have a drastically truer experience than even the bird. You could then extend the metaphor to suggest that, if we had better "moral sensors" we'd have a truer subjective experience of goodness, and an individual with precsie enough "moral sensors", the god of your choice, perhaps, would have a heightened enough awareness to determine if wolves killing deer for food is really good, bad, or neither, but it doesn't seem to ring true to me that any one subjective experience can be truer than any other.

[Zoot]

I believe the perception in of an action we describe as being 'morally good' is the recognition that either we personally would enjoy the result of that particular action, or that someone would think "Oh what a great guy!" if they were watching. I.e, it is fulfilling a certain criteria which we have learnt through life. It's sort of like hitting a magic shot in tennis. Objectively a scorching backhand in the last two-inches of the back corner is as meaningless as a bunt into the net, but in the context of the game we think "That was friggen awesome." In the context of society, that very complex game we play, I would say the recognition of a morally good deed is analogous to the recognition of a friggen awesome backhand. We've done well according to the respective rules.

Do you think it's possible someone could feel that an option was morally good that no one would see and the outcome of which would be very unpleasant? It makes it a little harder that the only thing that comes to mind is, like, martyrdom, which is usually done with a certain Everpresent Witness in mind...

So you're saying that you experience an action's moral goodness as kind of scoring highly by the rules? I agree that society has provided those rules to us. How would you phrase this suggestion in the form of...

"When you say that an action is good, you're saying ............ about the action."

[Desert Dweller]

What's CF?

[Zoot]

Christian Forums.

[justaman]

Do you think it's possible someone could feel that an option was morally good that no one would see and the outcome of which would be very unpleasant? It makes it a little harder that the only thing that comes to mind is, like, martyrdom, which is usually done with a certain Everpresent Witness in mind...
I had initially written a big story to this, but now I think it's irrelevant after thinking about it a bit more.

The only thing I can think of is perhaps something like everyone in a society simultaneously recognising that we can't burn oil forever and subsequently switching to ethanol or whatever. No one really enjoys the action, no one feels better especially, but it is the 'right' thing to do.

I'm not sure if even this counts, however. This may be ethics rather than morality...or it may in fact be sheer logic without a moral or ethical standard whatever.

If no one is getting hurt, it probably has nothing to do with morality.

So you're saying that you experience an action's moral goodness as kind of scoring highly by the rules? I agree that society has provided those rules to us.
Absolutely, and also possibly by one's own experience of pain vs pleasure, which is really - I suppose - just another rule.

How would you phrase this suggestion in the form of...

"When you say that an action is good, you're saying ............ about the action."

I'll have to paraphrase a little to not butcher the grammer:

When you say that an action is good, you're saying the action reflects the elements of previous actions you have witnessed and experienced which lead to you personally, and/or others you have observed, to feeling good.

[Desert Dweller]

When you say that an action is good, you're saying the action reflects the elements of previous actions you have witnessed and experienced which lead to you personally, and/or others you have observed, to feeling good.
That's a fair enough statement however in terms of Zoot's position the statement still uses 'good' to define 'good'. So what else could you use instead of 'feeling good' ?

I hope it's scratched in stone somewhere on this thread that indeed morality is a social construct; usally constructed by the ruling elite.

[justaman]

When you say that an action is good, you're saying the action reflects the elements of previous actions you have witnessed and experienced which lead to you personally, and/or others you have observed, to feeling good.
That's a fair enough statement however in terms of Zoot's position the statement still uses 'good' to define 'good'. So what else could you use instead of 'feeling good' ?

Fair cop. I'll edit it to:
When you say that an action is good, you're saying the action reflects the elements of previous actions you have witnessed and experienced which lead to you personally, and/or others you have observed, to feeling pleasure.

[Zoot]

Right, that's tending more towards David's definition, which is (I think) that everyone is fundamentally driven by a desire for pleasure and an aversion for pain - a drive that is subordinated by the various values we inherit as we grow up. So we learn to derive pleasure from doing things we're taught are morally Good, and then have a desire to do them in order to get pleasure.

Which makes sense. I'm half-inclined to say that it's putting the cart before the horse. For example, rather than say "I value morality because it makes me happy", I say "morality makes me happy because I value it." Though I suspect I'm basically saying the same thing in a different way.

At the heart of it all is a simple bare fact of human subjectivity - man is a deciding creature, a valuing creature, a preferring creature, and "we do what we prefer" is part of the very definition of decision itself. Do we do what we prefer in order to gain happiness or are we happy because we've done what we preferred? I think these are flip sides of the same coin.

If we take it as tautologous that we do what we value, that we gain happiness from completing projects set by our values, and that we are motivated by a desire for happiness, we can still come back to my interest in this thread, which is what it means to say that something is Good.

If I value pleasure, I gain happiness from pleasure, I'm compelled to act in ways that give me pleasure (or happiness), and when I'm asked what it is that I like about a particular thing rated highly by that value, I can say, "It is pleasurable. Pleasure makes me happy."

If I value my continued existence, I gain happiness from continuing to exist, and I'm compelled to act in ways that secure further life (or the happiness derived from it), and when I'm asked what I like about a particular thing rated highly by that value, I can say, "It provides me continued existence. Continued existence makes me happy."

If I value creating art, I gain happiness from creating art, and I'm compelled to act in ways that create art (or the happiness derived from it), and when I'm asked what I like about a particular thing rated highly by that value, I can say, "It creates art. Creating art makes me happy."

But if I experience something as "morally Good", such as switching to ethanol for the well-being of... Well, I'm not sure I like that example, because I think it can come down to valuing the eco-system, rather than a matter of objective morality.

Let's say I think it's Good to execute murderers. Now, my value there is "Goodness". I gain happiness from being Good, I'm compelled to act rightly (or the happiness derived from it), and if someone asks me what I like about executing murderers, I can say... what? "It is Good. Doing Good makes me happy."

But while I know what I'm saying by "it is pleasurable", "it secures continued existence", and "it creates art", what am I saying by "it is good"?

I should note that once those first three values are adopted, I can refer to those things that rate highly by them as "good". ie, if I value pleasure, I can call pleasurable things "good", and the word "good" is referring back to the value of pleasure. The same goes for everything else. But when it comes to objective moral Goodness, it seems to amount to a kind of self-referential "it's good because it's Good", "it's preferable because it's preferable" kind of thing.

You see what I mean?

[Zoot]

Yeah, I understood your "feeling good" to mean something different from "moral goodness" in the context.

[Zoot]

I'll add that there are two meanings of "good" being used here. One is "rated highly by a value" and the other is "objectively morally good". I'll refer to the latter as Good with a capital G, in order to make things clearer. I'll edit the preceding post too.

[viscousmemories]

Of course as I (and others) have been trying to say all along there is no one universally accepted definition of 'good' in the objective moral sense, so any generalized conclusions drawn from an assumption that there is will be fallacious.

[Zoot]

Of course as I (and others) have been trying to say all along there is no one universally accepted definition of 'good' in the objective moral sense, so any generalized conclusions drawn from an assumption that there is will be fallacious.

And yet for everyone to understand what is meant by "morally good", there must be some shared understanding of the meaning of the term. That's what I'm looking for. Do you really think that the word "good", in the objective sense, is as arbitrary as describing something as "flibbob"?

I think that people understand what is meant by "right" and "wrong", "good" and "evil". There is disagreement on what is to be described as good, but I think there is shared understanding of what is meant by the term when it's applied to something.

[viscousmemories]

Of course as I (and others) have been trying to say all along there is no one universally accepted definition of 'good' in the objective moral sense, so any generalized conclusions drawn from an assumption that there is will be fallacious.

And yet for everyone to understand what is meant by "morally good", there must be some shared understanding of the meaning of the term.
That probably has a lot to do with why everyone doesn't understand what is meant by "morally good", and the terms have to be clearly defined at the start of any reasonable discussion of the subject.

[Zoot]

Another thing I want to add, especially in addition to my post to Justaman, is that I'm looking at these values phenomenologically, subjectively, experientially, rather than looking for their causes as objects of scientific enquiry. I agree that, when treated as the object of scientific enquiry, we can say that a person acquires their notions of morality from their cultural and linguistic experience growing up. Similarly, I agree that, when treated as the object of scientific enquiry, we can say that a person desires pleasure and avoids pain because that desire/aversion is an evolved mechanism to promote survival.

However, recognising that evolved mechanism as the cause of the aversion to pain doesn't necessarily shed light on the subjective experience of being afraid of pain. Similarly, recognising that society provides the rules doesn't necessarily shed light on what it feels like to be subject to the rules.

[Zoot]

That probably has a lot to do with why everyone doesn't understand what is meant by "morally good", and the terms have to be clearly defined at the start of any reasonable discussion of the subject.

Which is kind of why I've asked maybe five times in this thread for people to tell me what they mean by the term when they use it.

[justaman]

I do see what you mean now, thank you for clarifying.

I'm hella paraphrasing here - you'll be able to help me I think - but I believe it was Sartre who said something close to "Man will do good because when he considers an action, he does not consider it in the context of himself, but in the context of mankind as a whole. So if he decides to to a morally correct action, he is deciding on behalf of mankind to do a morally correct action".

I think this is important because I am fairly convinced that being 'good' is as much a definable paradigm as your examples of art, continued existence, etc.

I'll come back to this.
Right, that's tending more towards David's definition, which is (I think) that everyone is fundamentally driven by a desire for pleasure and an aversion for pain - a drive that is subordinated by the various values we inherit as we grow up. So we learn to derive pleasure from doing things we're taught are morally Good, and then have a desire to do them in order to get pleasure.
Absolutely. I've been fairly heavily influenced by David's arguments about pain vs pleasure being the fundamental fuel in everyone's furnace.

Which makes sense. I'm half-inclined to say that it's putting the cart before the horse. For example, rather than say "I value morality because it makes me happy", I say "morality makes me happy because I value it." Though I suspect I'm basically saying the same thing in a different way.
I'm not sure if 'morality' makes one happy per se. It's sort of like how the rules of a football game don't make one happy, the events within the bounds of those rules make one happy.

If I value pleasure, I gain happiness from pleasure, I'm compelled to act in ways that give me pleasure (or happiness), and when I'm asked what it is that I like about a particular thing rated highly by that value, I can say, "It is pleasurable. Pleasure makes me happy."
You will recollect, I'm sure, from our lengthy nihilism debate that I find this particular reasoning circular but difficult to refute. I am certainly happy with it in this context, and your subesequent two examples also make sense.

Let's say I think it's Good to execute murderers. Now, my value there is "Goodness". I gain happiness from being Good, I'm compelled to act rightly (or the happiness derived from it), and if someone asks me what I like about executing murderers, I can say... what? "It is Good. Doing Good makes me happy."

But while I know what I'm saying by "it is pleasurable", "it secures continued existence", and "it creates art", what am I saying by "it is good"?

I should note that once those first three values are adopted, I can refer to those things that rate highly by them as "good". ie, if I value pleasure, I can call pleasurable things "good", and the word "good" is referring back to the value of pleasure. The same goes for everything else. But when it comes to objective moral Goodness, it seems to amount to a kind of self-referential "it's good because it's Good", "it's preferable because it's preferable" kind of thing.
This is where, I think, the Sartre paraphrase comes in. When one is dealing with morality specifically - as opposed to simply a moral action - one is dealing with the framework of how we experience pain and pleasure in society. So while there is no actual pleasure as a result of an execution, it can be seen by the individual in favour of capital punishment as upholding the rule-structure which allows and enables more pleasure to be felt by the whole. He feels, in effect, the he is representing humanity in an administrative role.

It's sort of like the antithesis of the president pushing the button. He doesn't kill anyone himself, per se, but he is ultimately responsible and feels the weight of those deaths (or at least he should :P ).

In the morally righteous pro-death-sentence guy, he is not giving anyone pleasure per se, but he believes he has made a higher level decision whereby he has enabled more people to get pleasure in the future, because he has removed an element he views would be detrimental to that end. And that is why he feels good about it personally. He is representing the pleasure of the rest of the people, so it does come back to a pain vs pleasure consideration, but by a round-a-bout, administrative path. So I don't think it's a case of him feeling good because he's good, I think it's a case of him feeling good because he is doing something which reflects what he perceives as 'importance'.

So yes, I think being morally good is just as subordinate to pleasure as being artistic. Both deal with different elements of reality, but both have pleasure as the core for their respective motivations.

[justaman]

However, recognising that evolved mechanism as the cause of the aversion to pain doesn't necessarily shed light on the subjective experience of being afraid of pain. Similarly, recognising that society provides the rules doesn't necessarily shed light on what it feels like to be subject to the rules.
This is, I believe, one of Seebs' chief justifications for believing in God. I still haven't come up with a satisfactory response yet :P

[Zoot]

Are you sure you're not assuming a utilitarian framework for what's good and what's not? For example, you talk about representing the pleasure of people, people getting pleasure in the future, etc.

[viscousmemories]

That probably has a lot to do with why everyone doesn't understand what is meant by "morally good", and the terms have to be clearly defined at the start of any reasonable discussion of the subject.

Which is kind of why I've asked maybe five times in this thread for people to tell me what they mean by the term when they use it.
I'm sure, but what relevance does my definition have to your argument in the OP? Your whole argument in the OP is based on a presumption that objective morality has a particular definition which you stipulated. And when some of us said that definition doesn't resemble any usage we're familar with you ask us to define it?

That just doesn't make sense Zoot. The point is that there are likely to be as many definitions of 'objective morality' as there are people who subscribe to a belief in it. So making a broad, general argument against one possible definition based on a stipulated definition of 'good' that's every bit as arguable just doesn't really tell us anything.

Really Clutch has already said this at length and much more eloquently than I in the post you handwaved away with one and two line responses. If you're really interested in seriously tackling this subject you really should re-read and think about what he said. They don't pay him to teach philosophy 'cause of his handsome grin. He's actually really very good at it.

[Adam]

I think that people understand what is meant by "right" and "wrong", "good" and "evil". There is disagreement on what is to be described as good, but I think there is shared understanding of what is meant by the term when it's applied to something.

Isn't this at odds with your original statement that such terms are incoherent? How can people understand what they mean when the terms they use are incoherent? Or am I misunderstanding you somewhere?

[Zoot]

This is, I believe, one of Seebs' chief justifications for believing in God. I still haven't come up with a satisfactory response yet

How does he apply it to the existence of God?

[Zoot]

I'm sure, but what relevance does my definition have to your argument in the OP? Your whole argument in the OP is based on a presumption that objective morality has a particular definition which you stipulated. And when some of us said that definition doesn't resemble any usage we're familar with you ask us to define it?

That just doesn't make sense Zoot. The point is that there are likely to be as many definitions of 'objective morality' as there are people who subscribe to a belief in it. So making a broad, general argument against one possible definition based on a stipulated definition of 'good' that's every bit as arguable just doesn't really tell us anything.

My claim is that, when analysed hard enough, what people collectively understand as "objectively morally good" amounts to the definition I gave. I'm still waiting for alternatives to be provided by anyone but Seebs, who has given it a good go.


Really Clutch has already said this at length and much more eloquently than I in the post you handwaved away with one and two line responses. If you're really interested in seriously tackling this subject you really should re-read and think about what he said. They don't pay him to teach philosophy 'cause of his handsome grin. He's actually really very good at it.

I responded to him at length, and am waiting for his response. If I missed his response, let me know.

[justaman]

Are you sure you're not assuming a utilitarian framework for what's good and what's not? For example, you talk about representing the pleasure of people, people getting pleasure in the future, etc.
I think advocating capital punishment is entirely utilitarian, so it would follow that the pain vs pleasure sub-structure would be considered in this way.

I guess I'm not sure why assuming a utilitarian framework is objectionable...?

[Zoot]

Isn't this at odds with your original statement that such terms are incoherent? How can people understand what they mean when the terms they use are incoherent? Or am I misunderstanding you somewhere?

It has an air of coherence about it until examined closely. People mean a definite collection of things by the word, but those things, when the definition is made explicit, are seen to be incompatible. The only analogy I can think of is that of free will. I'll try to think of a better analogy.

[Zoot]

I think advocating capital punishment is entirely utilitarian, so it would follow that the pain vs pleasure sub-structure would be considered in this way.

I guess I'm not sure why assuming a utilitarian framework is objectionable...?

As I understand it, utilitarianism is saying that happiness is the ultimate Good. Not everyone would agree. I don't think certain Christian frameworks would.

[viscousmemories]

My claim is that, when analysed hard enough, what people collectively understand as "objectively morally good" amounts to the definition I gave. I'm still waiting for alternatives to be provided by anyone but Seebs, who has given it a good go.
And I disagree that any such "collectively understood" definition exists, so I don't have an alternative to offer you.

I responded to him at length, and am waiting for his response. If I missed his response, let me know.
Honestly I don't think you addressed much of the substance of his post, so I'd be fairly surprised if he bothered to respond at this point.

[justaman]

How does he apply it to the existence of God?
From what I understand it (I'm sure he'll kick me in the ass if I'm wrong anyhow :P ) it is that there is no possible measure of subjective experience. Nothing in science or indeed naturalism can explain why or even how one sees the colour red as being 'red'. Or, relating it back to your example, how one feels about their motivation to follow rules. It's the description of 'motivation' probably which empirical study is by definition unable to encroach, because of it's necessarily subjective interpretation.

He believes - I think - that since science cannot explain this element of reality, we require other tools. An analogy I remember him consistently using was that we don't use geometry to, say, write a concerto on the piano. So if the science is by definition unable to explain the subjective, there must be an alternative means of explanation. Enter theology.

[Zoot]

Spider Jerusalem,

Here's an attempt at an analogy. "Where is the universe?" This question seems coherent to begin with. It follows rules of grammar and uses words whose definitions are understood. It initially seems like there should be an answer, and it's not entirely inconceivable to imagine people arguing over the answer. But when you really think about it, the universe is the context for the meaning of location itself, and the question of location is inapplicable to the universe. So when you really think about it, the initial appearance of coherence melts away.

[Zoot]

And I disagree that any such "collectively understood" definition exists, so I don't have an alternative to offer you.

Do you ever use the term? Is it comprehensible to you when others do?

[Zoot]

From what I understand it (I'm sure he'll kick me in the ass if I'm wrong anyhow ) it is that there is no possible measure of subjective experience. Nothing in science or indeed naturalism can explain why or even how one sees the colour red as being 'red'. Or, relating it back to your example, how one feels about their motivation to follow rules. It's the description of 'motivation' probably which empirical study is by definition unable to encroach, because of it's necessarily subjective interpretation.

He believes - I think - that since science cannot explain this element of reality, we require other tools. An analogy I remember him consistently using was that we don't use geometry to, say, write a concerto on the piano. So if the science is by definition unable to explain the subjective, there must be an alternative means of explanation. Enter theology.

Interesting. The thing is, of course, that while we don't use geometry to write a concerto on the piano, we also do have music theory making geometric statements. What I mean is, enter theology to deal with the subjective? Okay... But then theology turns around and makes scientific claims, such as the existence of God.

[viscousmemories]

And I disagree that any such "collectively understood" definition exists, so I don't have an alternative to offer you.

Do you ever use the term? Is it comprehensible to you when others do?
I have not used the term "objectively morally good", no. I have discussed objective morality in contrast with subjective and intersubjective morality, but since I've only recently begun reading up on the philosophy of ethics I avoid making any definite statements about the meanings of these terms. And no, it's not really comprehensible to me when others use it, and even if I did have a reasonable opinion of what it means it wouldn't follow that my understanding of it correlates to anyone elses, much less theirs with each other.

It isn't like 'sky' or 'puppy' or even 'mind' or 'heart'. I have a pretty good idea what people mean when they say each of those words, despite the possibility of significant variance. But objective moral good? Not even close. Hell, I don't even know what most people mean by 'moral'. I don't know many people who have spent a lot of time seriously studying ethics.

[justaman]

Interesting. The thing is, of course, that while we don't use geometry to write a concerto on the piano, we also do have music theory making geometric statements. What I mean is, enter theology to deal with the subjective? Okay... But then theology turns around and makes scientific claims, such as the existence of God.
I agree with you. But then I do see the strength of Seebs' position. It's kind of like string theory. It provides an answer by introducing an element we have not considered in the rest of the field. We can't see or measure or in any prove this element exists, but the end result is the equation seems to fit reasonably well with observation (even though string theory sorta doesn't really...yet).

In devil's advocate mode, I'd argue that - like the string - we can't directly prove whether God exists or not, however if the equation is providing observably accurate answers we previously weren't getting, there's a strong case for that theory being worth considering.

What Seebs would have to do, however, is prove to me that - like quantum mechanics - there weren't elements of the purely natural world waiting to be discovered and described which behaved counter-intuitively enough to explain subjective experience.

He says we will never understand it through scientific means by definition, I agree. But I also agree that we will never understand quantum indeterminacy through scientific means by definition also, and I do not think that requires God to explain it.

[Zoot]

Clutch,

It's been suggested that you haven't replied to this post (http://www.freethought-forum.com/forum/showthread.php?p=29014#post29014) on account of how completely I missed your point. Please let me know if this is the case. I was relatively drunk when I wrote it, but reading back over it, and not remembering having written any of it, I'm still fairly okay with it. I'll quote the tail end of your post again:

I'm not entirely sure, but your answers seemed to be, Yes, statements about the colours of objects can be true, and Yes, judgements about colour are subjective in some important sense.

Okay. Now, what makes you think that the common moral-theoretic applications of 'good' must amount to something more than the view that moral evaluations can be straightforwardly true?

Common moral-theoretic applications of 'good' amount to little more than the view that moral evaluations can be straightforwardly true. It's that very common factor, that regardless of what the think is morally good, it's intelligible to speak of a moral evaluation being straightforwardly true, with which I disagree. Truth in moral statements is not straightforward, by definition - a definition that is not obvious until made explicit.

That idea of a moral statement being "just plain true" is the idea that people think makes sense, but upon reflection does not make sense. That's what I'm trying to say.

[justaman]

As I understand it, utilitarianism is saying that happiness is the ultimate Good. Not everyone would agree. I don't think certain Christian frameworks would.
Ah ok. Well if that's the case, it is most likely a simple matter of the individual "doing what God would want him to do" and feeling pleasure by that standard. I don't think this is any less utilitarian than any other consideration of pain vs pleasure, it is just simplified.

To boil what I've been saying down to a modicum, I'd say doing something which is described as morally good, is probably something without an immediate pleasure benefit, but which is designed to have an overall greater pleasure benefit for a larger amount of people.

[Zoot]

I have not used the term "objectively morally good", no. I have discussed objective morality in contrast with subjective and intersubjective morality, but since I've only recently begun reading up on the philosophy of ethics I avoid making any definite statements about the meanings of these terms. And no, it's not really comprehensible to me when others use it, and even if I did have a reasonable opinion of what it means it wouldn't follow that my understanding of it correlates to anyone elses, much less theirs with each other.

It isn't like 'sky' or 'puppy' or even 'mind' or 'heart'. I have a pretty good idea what people mean when they say each of those words, despite the possibility of significant variance. But objective moral good? Not even close. Hell, I don't even know what most people mean by 'moral'. I don't know many people who have spent a lot of time seriously studying ethics.

Doesn't mean much to me, either. But in my experience, when people explain what they mean, their explanations can be expanded upon to make it clear that what they think they mean is itself unintelligible. I think that was demonstrated to some extent with Seebs, except that we reached the point where he thought that "preferable" had some meaning outside of the context of a person preferring it, and I did not. That's the kind of experience I've had, though. That when someone tells me what they mean by it, it turns out to be inconsistent.

As I've said, I'm very interested to come across someone to whom the term does have meaning, who can give me the meaning, and have that meaning stand up to this scrutiny.

[Zoot]

Ah ok. Well if that's the case, it is most likely a simple matter of the individual "doing what God would want him to do" and feeling pleasure by that standard. I don't think this is any less utilitarian than any other consideration of pain vs pleasure, it is just simplified.

To boil what I've been saying down to a modicum, I'd say doing something which is described as morally good, is probably something without an immediate pleasure benefit, but which is designed to have an overall greater pleasure benefit for a larger amount of people.

That was my assumption until I got into discussions with LifeSaver about the death penalty, and Theresa about civil unions. Suddenly there were spots were pleasure/happiness was getting in the way of Good.

[justaman]

That was my assumption until I got into discussions with LifeSaver about the death penalty, and Theresa about civil unions. Suddenly there were spots were pleasure/happiness was getting in the way of Good.
Well I'd have to hear the arguments to comment, obviously.

Essentially I agree with all the usual complaints about the phrase 'objectively morally good'. I don't think there is a standard to which all can agree.

Having said that, however, since I am of the very firm opinion that all humans operate in precisely the same logical fashion, it is conceivable that something we define as being 'subjectively' morally good can be considered 'inter-subjectively morally good', which for all intents and purpose can amount to the same thing as 'objectively morally good'. Inter-subjectivity was something philosoft smashed me on a little while backl and it is probably as close to objective definitions as atheists are likely to get.

If we all agree in a society that - say - murder is wrong, this becomes an inter-subjective standard. Even if we don't all agree on that moral standard, there is nevertheless a standard set in concrete that is distinct from any one specific subjective standard. Basically, the laws of society don't agree with any one individuals take on the laws. We all stand below the law, below that standard.

The only reason one wouldn't call this an objective standard is that objectivity requires some kind of absolute grounding, where as inter-subjectivity is more of a statistical approximation, making it objectively arbitrary. But when you think about it, this is a fairly innocuous distinction. We are still faced with our own subjective view and the view of the law. One would have to be fairly pedantic to state the view of the law wasn't objective, but then, perhaps, in this context that is necessary.

[Zoot]

Oh, I absolutely agree. (Wokka wokka wokka!) For another thing, I spend an awful lot of time appealing to consistency as a value held by all, while recognising that there's nothing superior about valuing consistency.

Human life is a fairly common value, if not universal or universally to the same degree. Pleasure is, of course, a value made universal in human contexts because of evolutionary etc.

I think maybe that recognising the contextual nature of all of these values is a good step on the way to being able to have good dialogue between them. It's unhelpful when people think their values are "right" in a way that can't really be said.

[justaman]

Man I had some stuff to contribute, but fuck it, I'm drunk and it didn't really amke sense anyway I don't thin. Pme of my friends is a teacher and got with an ex-student of his. She was hot too. You gotta admit, that's pretty cool.

aight, merry christmas fuckers. I'm gunna have to wait until seebs says something, because you and me just seem to agree on everything zoot, mon cheri, and that's boring.

[Desert Dweller]

"right" and "wrong", "good" and "evil"
Perhaps you're closest with these polarities. There are many things which can only be defined by their opposite/complement. You know you're a boy because you are not a girl. You know you are Chinese because you're not Caucasian or Negroid. You know you are cold because you are not hot. You know you're gay because you're not heterosexual.

So maybe good can only be defined as not evil, and vice versa.

[Clutch Munny]

Zoot, I didn’t reply to your response for a few reasons, the first being that it didn’t seem really to engage what I'd written. You continued to pass freely from claims about the lack of objectivity of good-predications (with neither clear definition of the term nor clear argument for the conclusion) to claims of arbitrariness and incoherence. My point, framed with the greatest clarity I can muster, was that these moves are not free. They require an argument.

I was and remain at a bit of a loss for what more to say on the matter.

I should say that I also didn’t respond because you claimed to have been drunk when you wrote it. Of course there’s nothing wrong with PWI, but it can definitely increase the perception that the contents of the post are not entirely to be taken seriously. And finally, it’s been the holiday season, and I’ve been spending as much time as possible with my family.

Anyhow, let me just say, one last time, what I see as the key (missing) components in the sort of case you seem to wish to make.

1. A clear account of the contrast you purport to find between ‘good’ and some class of clearly unproblematic expressions or concepts. Sub-tasks here are:
-- 1.1. Explaining precisely what you mean by the foundationlessness of ‘good’
-- 1.2. Explaining how the lack of foundation raises some problem for good, and just what the problem amounts to.
-- 1.3. Showing how either other terms or concepts are not subject to the lack of foundations in questions, or that their being subject to it does not issue in whatever problem attaches to ‘good’, in your view.

Again, were everything you say about utterances of ‘That is good’ to apply also to utterances of ‘That is a table’, it would be hard to see how you’d shown anything that undermined the former sort of predication. (Notice, by the way, that I have carefully framed all such observations in terms of utterances, rather than sentence-types; in other words I have been allowing for the importance of context all along.) Whatever you wish to mean by ‘objectivity’, I submit that if goodness judgements are no worse off than table judgements, then it’s hard to see how goodness judgements are nonsense or arbitrary.

2. An argument for every time you move between any two predications like: foundationless; subjective; non-objective; nonsense; meaningless; contradictory; arbitrary… Indeed, between any two distinct predications. This much is basic, isn’t it? You don’t draw conclusions about mass and say that they’re about shape; you don’t argue that a man is tall and then pass immediately to the conclusion that he’s rich.

I completely understand if you don’t want to pursue this; certainly my own time is tight, and I have left other interesting threads hanging as well. (Sorry, vm!) I’m just sketching the dialectical terrain as I see it. Your view may differ, obviously. For my part, though, I can’t see your case taking a compelling shape without the components described above.

[Socratoad]

OK, allow me to put my two cents worth in here. I admit that I have not followed this thread from the beginning, mainly because I often get frustrated by such exchanges. Perhaps this aversion comes from following too many philosophical threads over at IIDB until I wanted to scream. Tis not that I am a philosophical babe in the woods so to speak. I have so many tons of philosophy books that my floors are in danger of collapsing into thr basement.

That said, there came a time in my life when I figured out a personal philosophy that I have chosen to live my by ( bad grammar I know). I mean moral philosophy, as that is the mother/father of all philosophy in my not so humble opinion.

So here ladies and gentleman is my take on what is "the good"

For want of a name I have temporarily borrowed the term "Reverence For Life" from the late Albert Schweitzer.

For me only life in all its sentient forms, all that supports, nourishes and enhances life on our one and only home, this planet are sacred and therefore worth of revering, honouring and protecting. Anything we do to uphold these principles is good. Anything we do to harm these principles is bad.

In short: I believe that in order to live the good life, and may I add to be content within my own skin is to follow the Golden Rule. However in my own case I extend the Golden Rule to all sentient beings and as mentioned above the entities that support life.

Interesting doncha think that every major and most minor religions as well as all ancient philosophies have a version of the golden rule embedded within their texts that differ only in wording mainly due I submit to language.

It has taken me seventy years to boil done this philosophy of life to a simple, but not simplistic code by which I judge, or if you prefer, measure every action by. And though I just tossed off this few short paragraphs off the top of my head it accurately summarizes my personal definitions of the bad and the good.

If anyone wishes to comment on this humble offering I would be honoured to exchange thoughts upon it. If however one wishes to nitpick which is unfortunately much of what passes for philosophy these days then I'm not the least bit interested. If one wishes not to comment at all and perhaps considers this little more than a blip intruding into an ongoing conversation, then that too is fine with me. I usually stay far away from these types of dialogues as I have in the past not found them to be very enlightening. However I sincerely mean no disrespect to those of you who do find such exercises helpful.

[Zoot]

Okay, Clutch. Let's see.

1. A clear account of the contrast you purport to find between ‘good’ and some class of clearly unproblematic expressions or concepts. Sub-tasks here are:
-- 1.1. Explaining precisely what you mean by the foundationlessness of ‘good’

Firstly, I note that all values judgements refer back to a set of criteria that itself cannot be evaluated in a manner that is not subject to the same criticism. All value judgements are foundationless in that sense.

It goes further with "objectively morally good", however. When working within the confines of an acknowledged value, "good" is evaluated in the terms of that value. For example, if I am evaluating an action in terms of happiness, I can evaluate giving gifts as good because they make people happy. If I am evaluating an action in terms of efficient business, I can evaluate firing superfluous workers as good because it makes the company more efficient. That's fine. The context is recognised and the context sets the criteria. In those circumstances, "good" means "a preferable action in achieving the goal/value", and that's the practical impact it has on decision-making - it makes one option more preferable/desirable than others.

When you talk about "good" without an acknowledged context - explicitly stating that it transcends context, in fact - you are left with the preferability/desirability that is inherent in the felt meaning of the word, but without any criteria by which to evaluate that preferability. Instead of being preferable for a reason, it becomes just preferable, for no reason.

So what I'm saying here is that while all value judgements are foundationless, (morally, objectively) Good is alone in being foundationless and contextless.


-- 1.2. Explaining how the lack of foundation raises some problem for good, and just what the problem amounts to.

The problem is that while Good means "preferable for no reason" (because it has no context), it is also commonly understood to mean "preferable for some reason", if not "the best reason". If you ask someone if saying that an action is Good means that it is preferable for no reason, they will likely object, because it is implicit in the use of the term that Good means preferable for a reason. In other words, the word implicitly contains two contradictory notions.


-- 1.3. Showing how either other terms or concepts are not subject to the lack of foundations in questions, or that their being subject to it does not issue in whatever problem attaches to ‘good’, in your view.

I hope I've covered that above.


Again, were everything you say about utterances of ‘That is good’ to apply also to utterances of ‘That is a table’, it would be hard to see how you’d shown anything that undermined the former sort of predication. (Notice, by the way, that I have carefully framed all such observations in terms of utterances, rather than sentence-types; in other words I have been allowing for the importance of context all along.) Whatever you wish to mean by ‘objectivity’, I submit that if goodness judgements are no worse off than table judgements, then it’s hard to see how goodness judgements are nonsense or arbitrary.

The differences between "that is good" and "that is a table". Well, firstly, "table" is a noun and "good" is an adjective. I'm not being flippant here. You can say "that is a table", but you can't say "that is a good". It has to be "that is a good... <something>". I could, for example, say that something is a good table, and in doing so I would be referring back to evaluative criteria set by the use of a table, etc.

If we turn to utterances about adjectives, there's far less difference. "That is good" and "that is green", for example. Both are skipping words, so let's make it more explicit. "That noun is good" and "that noun is green." In the latter, the context is clear. We are making an evaluation within the confines of the spectrum of visible light. If it's a table, the table is green as opposed to any other colour. It is not "green rather than hot" or "green rather than square". The context is clear, and the context provides the utterance with meaning. Something cannot be "just green" without the implied context of being green as opposed to any other colour.

In that sense, to say that something is green is just like saying that something is good within an acknowledged context. If we are evaluating an action in terms of business efficiency, we can say "firing superfluous workers is good". If we are evaluating a chair in terms of colour, we can say "the chair is green". Implied in both statements, however, is the context to which they refer for their meaning. Explicitly, the former statement is actually "firing superfluous workers is good in the context of business efficiency" and the latter is "the chair is green in the context of colour". It would not be meaningful to say that the chair is "just plain green" removed from any context, and it would similarly not be meaningful to say that firing superfluous workers is "just plain good" removed from any context.

The other difference, of course, is that the subject matter of "good" is options in decision-making, in the form of possible or actual actions. Experientially, the impact of thinking that an action is or is not good (contextually or contextlessly) is limited to the realm of decision-making. But I think the bulk of my thoughts on utterances and evaluations are covered in the paragraphs above.


2. An argument for every time you move between any two predications like: foundationless; subjective; non-objective; nonsense; meaningless; contradictory; arbitrary… Indeed, between any two distinct predications. This much is basic, isn’t it? You don’t draw conclusions about mass and say that they’re about shape; you don’t argue that a man is tall and then pass immediately to the conclusion that he’s rich.

I'll try to stick to using one term at a time. I forget which terms I've been using in the past. Above, in this post, I think I've kept fairly consistent. I was going to go through the words you just listed and write something about each one, but I think I'll just stick to what I've said in this post.

[Zoot]

Man I had some stuff to contribute, but fuck it, I'm drunk and it didn't really amke sense anyway I don't thin. Pme of my friends is a teacher and got with an ex-student of his. She was hot too. You gotta admit, that's pretty cool.

I admit it.

[Clutch Munny]

Firstly, I note that all values judgements refer back to a set of criteria that itself cannot be evaluated in a manner that is not subject to the same criticism. All value judgements are foundationless in that sense.

What “same criticism” is that?

How are analogous remarks not applicable to judgements about subatomic physical particles, tables, hammers, and fish?

Why should this be described as “foundationless”? One might just as well conclude, “…therefore, to talk of value judgements in non-value-theoretic terms is simply to change the subject.”

It goes further with "objectively morally good", however. When working within the confines of an acknowledged value, "good" is evaluated in the terms of that value.

Er… I don’t understand that – your own request to have ‘good’ defined in English ought to kick in here! -- but let’s see where it takes us anyhow.

For example, if I am evaluating an action in terms of happiness, I can evaluate giving gifts as good because they make people happy. If I am evaluating an action in terms of efficient business, I can evaluate firing superfluous workers as good because it makes the company more efficient. That's fine.

Notice that there are differences between each of:

(i) evaluating an action with respect to its resulting in X,

(ii) evaluating the extent or degree of some outcome X,

(iii) judging some action good on account of its resulting in X, and

(iv) judging some outcome X to be good.

You steamroll over these distinctions, moving freely between talk of evaluation, good, actions, and outcomes.

The context is recognised and the context sets the criteria.

Sometimes. Certainly not always.

In those circumstances, "good" means "a preferable action in achieving the goal/value", and that's the practical impact it has on decision-making - it makes one option more preferable/desirable than others.

Of course it doesn’t mean that. Not univocally, at least. Your are running basic “instrumental rationality” (evaluating the success of actions in achieving desired ends) together with the moral conception of a good end. Without argument.

When you talk about "good" without an acknowledged context - explicitly stating that it transcends context, in fact - you are left with the preferability/desirability that is inherent in the felt meaning of the word, but without any criteria by which to evaluate that preferability.

Eh? I simply can’t follow that.

Let me try to clarify: Suppose someone uses the notion of moral goodness to apply to humans and their well-being. Isn’t that the context for all their uses of the term, then? Or suppose one thought that good outcomes are those that reflect (their particular) god’s will. What context-free uses of this notion are you envisioning?

Instead of being preferable for a reason, it becomes just preferable, for no reason.

You haven’t given anything resembling an argument for this yet. (I promise I’m not being deliberately obtuse!)

So what I'm saying here is that while all value judgements are foundationless, (morally, objectively) Good is alone in being foundationless and contextless.

This is still more confusing. Whatever problem you think you’ve shown about ‘good’, you think it doesn’t apply to ‘right’, ‘fair’, or ‘just’? I really don’t get it.



-- 1.3. Showing how either other terms or concepts are not subject to the lack of foundations in questions, or that their being subject to it does not issue in whatever problem attaches to ‘good’, in your view.
I hope I've covered that above.

Where?!? I’m baffled that you think you’ve done so.

As I’ve said: Argument by the infinite iterability of “Now what about that concept?” can be applied rather widely. I’m still in the same boat: not knowing what the problem with good is supposed to be, and not knowing what it could be (consistent with your words) without applying to many or most concepts.


The differences between "that is good" and "that is a table". Well, firstly, "table" is a noun and "good" is an adjective. I'm not being flippant here. You can say "that is a table", but you can't say "that is a good". It has to be "that is a good... <something>".

Flippancy goes to motives. I accept that you’re not being flippant. But neither are you saying anything of much use here. Both statements are predicative judgements; both have logical forms implicating predicates. Something is good? ExGx. Something is a table? ExTx. So this is a triviality of surface grammar.

You manage to go on at length about the predicate ‘is green’, without ever engaging the substance of the point: this is the missing argument you claimed above to have provided still earlier, but never did. Try justifying in some foundational way the constitutive principles of table-ascription – for instance, in some way that does not ineluctably require reference to contingent biological, historical, psychological, and sociological traits, interests and practices of human beings. Really – it’s a useful exercise; give it a try.

Again, see the horns of the dilemma here: either table talk is as foundationless as good talk, in which case particular judgements like ‘X is good’ need be no more suspect than particular judgements like ‘X is a table’, in which case it’s hard to see why most people who ever thought that ‘good’ was objective should have been worried; or table talk is not foundationless, in which case you should feel free to explain the foundational bedrock of ascriptions of table-status to objects.

[Zoot]

Okay, a few things.

Firstly, please tell me, Clutch, what you mean by "morally good". How would you define it without using the term or its synonyms?

Notice that there are differences between each of:

(i) evaluating an action with respect to its resulting in X,

(ii) evaluating the extent or degree of some outcome X,

(iii) judging some action good on account of its resulting in X, and

(iv) judging some outcome X to be good.

Please tell me what you think the differences are between each of these, and explain whether or not you are using the same sense of the word "good" in each of them.

I'll respond to everything else in a separate post, because don't want my questions to you here to be lost amongst everything else.

[Zoot]

Firstly, I note that all values judgements refer back to a set of criteria that itself cannot be evaluated in a manner that is not subject to the same criticism. All value judgements are foundationless in that sense.

What “same criticism” is that?

That the evaluation of the evaluative criteria, being itself an evaluation, refers back to a set of evaluative criteria.


How are analogous remarks not applicable to judgements about subatomic physical particles, tables, hammers, and fish?

They are, in that the truth of an utterance about any of those things is itself given meaning by the context of the utterance. The utterance "the table is green" has meaning only within a certain context. There are criteria for evaluating the colour of the table, and those criteria give the utterance its meaning.

Perhaps criticism was a poorly chosen word. "Observation" might be more appropriate, since it's not derogatory to observe that values judgements are given meaning by their context. It's simply acknowledging the contextual nature of utterances and evaluations.


Why should this be described as “foundationless”?

All I am trying to get across by applying the word "foundationless" to value judgements is what I said above. That's why I said, "they are foundationless in this sense." If you can think of a better word to refer to the contextual nature of evaluation, use that.


One might just as well conclude, “…therefore, to talk of value judgements in non-value-theoretic terms is simply to change the subject.”

I would happily conclude, "...therefore, to talk of value judgements in non-contextual terms is simply to change the subject" away from value judgements entirely. That is my criticism of the notion of "objective moral goodness". It attempts to talk of value judgements in non-contextual terms.


It goes further with "objectively morally good", however. When working within the confines of an acknowledged value, "good" is evaluated in the terms of that value.

Er… I don’t understand that – your own request to have ‘good’ defined in English ought to kick in here! -- but let’s see where it takes us anyhow.

Three following paragraphs were intended to explain that initial statement, rather than just that one following sentence.


The context is recognised and the context sets the criteria.

Sometimes. Certainly not always.

In those circumstances, it always does. When one is evaluating possible actions consciously in terms of a value context (which is the type of evaluation to which this sentence refers), the context is recognised and the context sets the criteria.

If I am evaluating an action in terms of how much happiness it causes, then how much happiness it causes will determine my evaluation; the value of happiness is the context that sets the criteria for the evaluation. If I am evaluating an action in terms of business efficiency, then how efficient an action makes a business will determine my evaluation.


In those circumstances, "good" means "a preferable action in achieving the goal/value", and that's the practical impact it has on decision-making - it makes one option more preferable/desirable than others.

Of course it doesn’t mean that. Not univocally, at least. Your are running basic “instrumental rationality” (evaluating the success of actions in achieving desired ends) together with the moral conception of a good end. Without argument.

That's because at this point, I'm not talking about moral conception of a good end. I'm am explicitly referring to those situations where the success of actions are evaluated in terms of achieving desired (set by the context) ends.


When you talk about "good" without an acknowledged context - explicitly stating that it transcends context, in fact - you are left with the preferability/desirability that is inherent in the felt meaning of the word, but without any criteria by which to evaluate that preferability.

Eh? I simply can’t follow that.

Let me try to clarify: Suppose someone uses the notion of moral goodness to apply to humans and their well-being. Isn’t that the context for all their uses of the term, then? Or suppose one thought that good outcomes are those that reflect (their particular) god’s will. What context-free uses of this notion are you envisioning?

It would be the context for all their uses of the term. I'll temporarily distinguish between notions of objective morality and notions of contextual evaluations by referring to the former with a capital (Good) and the latter with a lower-case letter (good).

I think that there is a distinction between evaluating the preferability of an action in terms of a consciously acknowledged context and evaluating the Goodness of an action. Using your example of humans and their well-being (and assuming that what constitutes their "well-being" is uncontentious), we have two different possible statements here:

1. Feeding hungry people is good in terms of the well-being of humans.
2. Feeding hungry people is Good, because the well-being of humans is Good.

The the first statement, the context is acknowledged and provides the criteria for evaluating the action of feeding hungry people. In the second statement, there is no acknowledged context.

You asked, "Suppose someone uses the notion of moral goodness to apply to humans and their well-being. Isn’t that the context for all their uses of the term, then?" It seems to me that what you're asking here is, "Isn't it more or less the same thing to evaluate goodness in terms of human welfare as it is to evaluate human welfare as good?" I don't think it is, because I think "good" is used slightly differently in the two situations, one contextual and one non-contextual.

In one, something is good because it aids human welfare. In the other, human welfare is good, because... <???>


Instead of being preferable for a reason, it becomes just preferable, for no reason.

You haven’t given anything resembling an argument for this yet. (I promise I’m not being deliberately obtuse!)

Okay. The word "good", in both the contextual sense (which you more or less correctly identified as evaluating the preferability of an action in terms of achieving ends that are set by the context) and the non-contextual sense (objective moral goodness, where an action's preferability is evaluated without reference to ends set by a context), there is a meaning common to both senses: preferability. To feel that an action is good, in either sense, is to be more inclined to act in that manner. That's the practical impact of experiencing an option as being good.

In the contextual sense, one only experiences the option as good if one has adopted the contextual value, and thus is only inclined to act in that manner if one has adopted the contextual value. For example, if I value the happiness of other people, then I'll experience actions that I expect will create happiness as good, and will be inclined to act in those ways. In the absence of any other influencing factors or values, I would act in that way.

In the non-contextual sense, one experiences an option as good, and the practical impact is that one is inclined to act in that manner. In the absence of any other influencing factors, I would act in that way.

In both senses, experiencing something as good is to be inclined to act in that way.


So what I'm saying here is that while all value judgements are foundationless, (morally, objectively) Good is alone in being foundationless and contextless.

This is still more confusing. Whatever problem you think you’ve shown about ‘good’, you think it doesn’t apply to ‘right’, ‘fair’, or ‘just’? I really don’t get it.

I think many more people are conscious of the contextual nature of those values than of the contextual nature of goodness. But I think most people would have trouble defining those terms without referring back to goodness, probably objective goodness, and that's where the same problem would kick in. In my experience, people tend to define "justice" as "what should happen" ("should" referencing "good") or "the right consequences" ("right" referencing "good").

All evaluations return a value ranging from "good" to "bad". Moral goodness is alone in being an evaluation that returns values that refer back to itself - moral goodness. I'll think of a less clumsy way to word this.


You manage to go on at length about the predicate ‘is green’, without ever engaging the substance of the point: this is the missing argument you claimed above to have provided still earlier, but never did. Try justifying in some foundational way the constitutive principles of table-ascription – for instance, in some way that does not ineluctably require reference to contingent biological, historical, psychological, and sociological traits, interests and practices of human beings. Really – it’s a useful exercise; give it a try.

Human meaning itself ineluctably requires reference to traits, interests and practices of human beings.


Again, see the horns of the dilemma here: either table talk is as foundationless as good talk, in which case particular judgements like ‘X is good’ need be no more suspect than particular judgements like ‘X is a table’, in which case it’s hard to see why most people who ever thought that ‘good’ was objective should have been worried; or table talk is not foundationless, in which case you should feel free to explain the foundational bedrock of ascriptions of table-status to objects.

We're getting further away from my point here. I know you think this is relevant, but I'm not saying what you think I'm saying. I think you might think I'm saying that these evaluations are rendered meaningless because they are foundationless in the sense of being contextual. They're not rendered meaningless. They derive their meaning from their contextual nature. What is contradictory and meaningless is a concept that combines both an evaluation that is necessarily contextual and a notion of it being without context.

For what it's worth, if by "foundationless" you mean "contextual", then yes, table talk is as foundationless as good talk. The thing is, everyone can tell me what they mean by "table". Let's hear what they mean by "good".

[Zoot]

Also, Clutch, when I experience a particular food as tasting good, is that any different from experiencing a particular table as green?

[Clutch Munny]

Again, see the horns of the dilemma here: either table talk is as foundationless as good talk, in which case particular judgements like ‘X is good’ need be no more suspect than particular judgements like ‘X is a table’, in which case it’s hard to see why most people who ever thought that ‘good’ was objective should have been worried; or table talk is not foundationless, in which case you should feel free to explain the foundational bedrock of ascriptions of table-status to objects.

We're getting further away from my point here. I know you think this is relevant, but I'm not saying what you think I'm saying. I think you might think I'm saying that these evaluations are rendered meaningless because they are foundationless in the sense of being contextual. They're not rendered meaningless. They derive their meaning from their contextual nature. What is contradictory and meaningless is a concept that combines both an evaluation that is necessarily contextual and a notion of it being without context.

Your remarks about context are, so far, wholly impenetrable. I can't reconstruct an argument out of them. Maybe you could just give the argument in a form that makes both its validity and the content of its premises transparent? But if you think that it's irrelevant for you to show how the claimed problem-making features of 'good', whatever they are, do not upon reflection apply quite broadly to discourse that seems quite unproblematic, then I can't fathom what your case might be.

For what it's worth, if by "foundationless" you mean "contextual", then yes, table talk is as foundationless as good talk. The thing is, everyone can tell me what they mean by "table". Let's hear what they mean by "good".

No, actually, they can't. Not if "tell me what they mean by 'table'" means "give me a foundational definition of necessary and sufficient conditions, in terms that are not themselves inherently personal or subject to the same constitutive principles as table-individuation".

What you seem to mean is that people armed with a particular (no doubt widely partially shared) conception of tablehood can point with confidence at instances of tablehood, and at instances of non-tablehood. They can say,
This counts, that doesn't count... but of course what they can't do is provide you with some final non-"arbitrary" answer to the series of questions starting, "But why should that count as a table?" "And why should that be the feature that determines something's counting as a table?"... and so forth.

Obviously exactly parallel remarks apply to 'good'. If all you want are people who can tell instances of good and bad when they see it, then goodness is no worse off than tablehood. If what you require is foundational definition, then goodness is no worse off than tablehood.

What, then, is your argument supposed to be?

[Zoot]

This counts, that doesn't count... but of course what they can't do is provide you with some final non-"arbitrary" answer to the series of questions starting, "But why should that count as a table?" "And why should that be the feature that determines something's counting as a table?"... and so forth.

Exactly. Because the utterance "that is a table" refers back to table criteria. There's no such thing as a table outside of the context of human language and context.

If I wasn't clear in saying it before, I'll say it again: there is no such thing as what really counts as a table. The criteria for table-status will vary from person to person, with no criteria being able to claim a privileged status in making such evaluations.

The same goes for moral goodness, yet people insist on talking as if one person's criteria for evaluating what is and is not Good can itself be evaluated as more "correct" than another.


Obviously exactly parallel remarks apply to 'good'. If all you want are people who can tell instances of good and bad when they see it, then goodness is no worse off than tablehood. If what you require is foundational definition, then goodness is no worse off than tablehood.

Perhaps we actually agree more than we think. I don't require a foundational definition. I agree that goodness and tablehood are both arbitrarily drawn lines, that there is no such thing as what is "really" a table or "really" good. My problem is with those who say there is such a thing as "really" good - a meaning of good that is not lines drawn in the sand that don't refer back to anything foundational.


This is still getting away from what I really want to say. What we're agreeing on here is what I was calling the foundationlessness of all value judgements. Objective moral goodness is a singular type of value judgement, in a way that I'm having trouble conveying, but I expect that will become easier when you give me your definition of objective moral goodness.

I would dearly love to hear how you would word the differences between the following:

Notice that there are differences between each of:

(i) evaluating an action with respect to its resulting in X,

(ii) evaluating the extent or degree of some outcome X,

(iii) judging some action good on account of its resulting in X, and

(iv) judging some outcome X to be good.

I agree that there are differences. I would like to see the words you use for them, so that I may adopt your words for those differences.

[Zoot]

By the way, Clutch, thanks for continuing this discussion. You may not realise it, but I'm getting a lot out of it in terms of refining my own thoughts on the matter.

[justaman]

clutch
Sorry, I can't help jumping in!

One of the points you made in your initial post in this thread - and the one which you seem to have most expounded from my quick look through - was that you argued Zoot's position was making an 'Infinite Iterability' argument (catchy, I like it :P ).

I immediately disagree with this because the notion that objective morality is impossible is not circular nor infinitely regressive. Rather it arrives at a logical impossibility between two chains of definition. A square triangle, if you will.

The first chain begins with 'objective'. The second begins with 'morality'.

My take on it:

Objective -> True in all instances, an absolute* value ->
Absolute value -> Necessary paradigm in the construction of the universe, can never be violated
Can never be violated -> Is inflexible


Morality -> Rules dictating acceptable behaviour within a society
Society -> A group of individuals whose survival is acheived by working towards commonality rather than individuality
Commonality -> The collective goals the individuals work towards
Collective goals -> An approximation of agreement amongst the individuals which differ among societies
Difference among socieites -> flexibility

That came out pretty rough, but what I'm trying to demonstrate is that you have one element possessing the criteria of 'inflexibility' and another element possessing the criteria of 'flexibility'. So in a way, objective morality is like saying inflexible flexibility.

That is I think what Zoot means when he says it is a nonsensical phrase. Certainly it is how I envision it, and why I don't think it is particularly useful.



*I understand one usually avoids equating the objective with the absolute, but I think it is necessary in this instance in order to distinguish objective morality from intersubjective morality.

[Zoot]

Justaman,

That's the kind of nonsensicality I mean - contradictory notions combined into a single notion - but the flexibility thing isn't the kind of contradiction I mean.

Out of curiosity, Just, riddle me this. When one person says that what is good is whatever produces the most happiness and another person says that what is good is whatever produces the most freedom and another person says that what is good is whatever God wills...

What would you say is the agreed meaning of "good" amongst all this disagreement of what constitutes it? They're all using the same concept. They're not defining "good" differently; they are disagreeing what is good.

You're pretty good at analysing concepts like that. It was you who showed me that "should" means "would if". I'd like to hear your take.

[Dragar]

Whoo! Here's where all you guys are hanging out!

(As an aside, I adore the greek characters all over the place here! The little 'psi' symbol that appears on the thread icons...I don't know what it means yet, but a physicist feels right at home!)

I noticed seebs statement, and I'm almost certain I can see where the confusion is arising.


Seebs said that on matters of taste, like beauty and preference for foods, it's impossible to change someone's position through reason alone. You can't convince someone curry is tasty. In fact, I'll quote him:

I disagree. Quite simply, you can have discussions of morality in which someone is convinced that his existing position is wrong through argumentation alone. You cannot convince someone about whether food is tasty or not.

I'm going to argue that, actually, the same for morality is true for beauty or how tasty food is. It's just more complicated, because is about actions, and actions are causally linked with one another - unlike beauty and how tasty things are.

There are times in discussions about morality when you can persuade someone that something is not-good through reason. For instance, let's take a chap who enjoys dropping bricks off buildings.

You tell him, it's not-good to do that. He tells you it is. You start arguing.

You point out that dropping things off buildings may hurt people. And he says, "Yes."

And you say, "And hurting people is not-good."

And he says, "Oh. You're right. I hadn't thought of that. I guess dropping bricks off buildings is not-good after all."

Or at least, you'd assume that would happen. But what if he just stared at you, and said, "So?"

Where do you take the argument from there? I can't prove - via empirical means or a logical arugment - that hurting people is not-good. The only way I can ever hope to change someone's position is by linking their activities with things they already consider to be not-good. Or perhaps, emotional appeals. "Have you no compassion?!"

Read him a story, maybe. Show him a victim. Try to get his feelings of empathy working.

If this man were a Christian, perhaps I could persuade him that it was against God's will to drop bricks off buildings, and going against God's will was not-good. But note I haven't actually changed his morality - the part he was deriving everything from. He already believed that going against God's will was not-good. If he didn't believe that, how would my argument have helped? Only his beliefs about God's will have changed.

In a similar way, if this man were someone who considered suffering of others to be not-good, I could offer him arguments that persuaded him dropping bricks off buildings caused suffering. But only his beliefs about what falling bricks did changed. Others suffering was something he already considered not-good. And so on.

But I have never, by logical argument or empirical evidence, changed my position on the core of what was good and not-good. I've never seen how such an argument could possibly work! If you think it's possible, at least show me an example. Logic and science is about how things are, not about how things should be. Only emotional appeals, especially those good old 80s cartoons of my childhood Zoot keeps talking about, or various emotionally charged books or poetry, and just generally growing older has changed the core. And it has changed very little.

What has changed are my beliefs about how one action can lead to another - like the man on the roof. And subsequently, what I've derived from my core experiences of good and not-good.

[livius drusus]

(As an aside, I adore the greek characters all over the place here! The little 'psi' symbol that appears on the thread icons...I don't know what it means yet, but a physicist feels right at home!)

That's high praise indeed, Dragar. Thank you kindly. :thankee: You'll be glad to hear that they don't necessarily mean anything at all. Our designer (http://www.freethought-forum.com/forum/member.php?u=8) thought they looked cool with the whole classical antiquity theme and we enthusiastically agreed.

Welcome to FF. :welcome2:

[Dragar]

That's high praise indeed, Dragar. Thank you kindly.

:)

You'll be glad to hear that they don't necessarily mean anything at all.

This will be a fun game to figure them out... ;)

Our designer thought they looked cool with the whole classical antiquity theme and we enthusiastically agreed.

I love your designer's work. :) I love the little 'nu' next to 'quick reply', and the little 'phi' on the quick reply panel...and a 'theta' next to quote!

Ah, I'm in heaven! :pleased:

[livius drusus]

I love the little 'nu' next to 'quick reply', and the little 'phi' on the quick reply panel...and a 'theta' next to quote!

Ah, I'm in heaven! :pleased:

I love a man with a keen eye for detail. The phi you noticed on the quick reply panel is actually a functioning button, btw. It's the expand and collapse button and it changes shape depending on whether the box is expanded or collapsed. :wriggle:

[Dragar]

I love a man with a keen eye for detail.

They're amazingly important things, are details. Devil's in the details, as they say.

Well, not literally.

Probably not literally, anyway.

The phi you noticed on the quick reply panel is actually a functioning button, btw. It's the expand and collapse button and it changes shape depending on whether the box is expanded or collapsed.

Aw, so cute! It capitalises all by itself!

If only my physics notes did this!

[justaman]

Out of curiosity, Just, riddle me this. When one person says that what is good is whatever produces the most happiness and another person says that what is good is whatever produces the most freedom and another person says that what is good is whatever God wills...

What would you say is the agreed meaning of "good" amongst all this disagreement of what constitutes it? They're all using the same concept. They're not defining "good" differently; they are disagreeing what is good.

I think I disagree with your last sentence in that you make a distinction between the two. I'd argue that both of those clauses are true.

I don't believe 'good' is in and of itself a definable 'thing'. It is an approximation between two things, action and our emotional reaction to that action. To be extremely simplistic, if we feel that emotional reaction to be positive, the action becomes 'good'.

Now what decides that particular reaction is not the action itself, I don't think. The reaction is decided by whatever processing our brains do as a result of the action occuring. That particular process will obviously be affected by our history of experiences such that an ultimately religious person may find a higher value of good in in a certain action than a non-religious person. This makes no commentary on the action itself, they are simply different equations calculating the same input data and coming to predictably different conclusions.

So if we assume this is correct, two people define good differently because their particular equations which decide what 'is' good are different. The criteria for what constitutes 'good' are different, therefore their definitions of 'good' must necessarily be different also. They also, of course, then disagree with what is good.

This is also why I saw objective morality in terms of flexibility (though that probably wasn' t the best word choice. If good is not static - which I don't think it is - and objectivity requires stasis, you get a logical impossibility.

[Zoot]

So if we assume this is correct, two people define good differently because their particular equations which decide what 'is' good are different. The criteria for what constitutes 'good' are different, therefore their definitions of 'good' must necessarily be different also.

So they're not even talking about the same thing when one says happiness is the measure of good and the other says God's will is the measure of good?


They also, of course, then disagree with what is good.

If they're not using the same definition of "good", then they can't possibly be disagreeing about what can be described as good.

[justaman]

So they're not even talking about the same thing when one says happiness is the measure of good and the other says God's will is the measure of good?
It's the wrong way of talking about it, I think. Those measurements may differ, but those measurements are in turn measured by a superior observation. There is an extra element in this equation, I think. We are talking, in one sense, about apples and oranges, but apples and oranges are also both fruit.

In the same way that there is really no such thing as an absolute 'fruit' there is no such thing as an absolute 'good'. They are approximate measures of subordinate process measurements.

If they're not using the same definition of "good", then they can't possibly be disagreeing about what can be described as good.
I see what you're saying, but I disagree mostly because this argument has the necessary implication that good requires an absolute standard in order to be of any use. Clearly this isn't the case because good is an approximation and so its meaning - while imprecise - is still enough to be practical.

Perhaps I need you to (re)explain your position again, because it seems to me this anomoly you are highlighting could be removed by simply assuming every one means good to me. I.e. 'My criteria of good is satisfied by this action.' If they then want to project that criteria on the rest of the world and claim it is the absolute standard and nothing else matters, that's marvellous, but it's hardly worth arguing. It's like moral solipsism or something.

[seebs]

I think the problem is that the arrogance of asserting "not only is there an absolute moral standard, but I understand it" tends to get conflated with the more rational position of believing that one exists and trying to find it.

The experience I have had of having to revise my moral values to correspond better to, uhm, well, whatevern it is I'm perceiving, suggests to me an external standard by which I can judge my own moral values.

[Zoot]

Perhaps I need you to (re)explain your position again, because it seems to me this anomoly you are highlighting could be removed by simply assuming every one means good to me. I.e. 'My criteria of good is satisfied by this action.'

Yes, that would remove it. That's my point. But to someone who thinks that "good" means something independent of "to me", it's a problem. Those people who argue over what "is good" generally do not mean "to me", and believe themselves to be arguing over a matter of objective reality rather than a matter of taste. They believe they're talking about the same, independent thing when they argue over what is good.

Really, we're not disagreeing here.