A different X, or different claims about the same X?

[seebs]

This is a topic that comes up frequently in theological discussions. Do two people who make different claims about God believe in the same God, but hold to different claims about God, or do they believe in different gods?

This has impacts on a number of fields of inquiry. For instance, many EoG arguments start with "you must define God correctly, and then we can test to see whether this thing you've described exists." This is an unusual approach. When we discuss "the external world", we don't say "you must define the world, and then we will test whether or not it exists". Instead, when a given claim produces problems, we say "we must have misunderstood the world", and we revise our theories; we don't abandon them entirely.

As noted, there is sometimes some debate about, for instance, whether two Christian groups really worship the same god, or whether Christians and Muslims are talking about the same god.

My current theory is that we can't always be sure whether two descriptions refer to the same thing, although we can look for common traits and guess some.

[Zoot]

Any definition has to allow for some variation if it is not to become entirely singular. That's not so much a problem when one is trying to define a monotheistic God, of which there would only be one, but it becomes a problem when one is trying to define the conceptions of God held by various religious groups.

There is a traditionally recognisable collection of beliefs called Christianity, each called Christian because they include certain elements essential to the definition. Someone said that the Catholic God is demonstrably different from the Calvinist God. True, but then, Johnny Catholic's God is demonstrably different from Billy Catholic's God. Where to draw the line is a question, but that these lines are drawn in our definitions is not.

So I think that there is such a thing as a Christian God, a definition that would draw primarily on tradition and partly on consensus.

God, a person. All powerful. All knowing. All benevolent. Etc.

[seebs]

I generally assume anyone who talks about the creator of all things seen and unseen is presumptively talking about the same entity, and arguing over qualities. I figure that's a sufficiently clear term of identity to say "yes, these are all the same".

[Zoot]

Is "the creator" part of the definition, or a statement about an act performed?

[seebs]

Is "the creator" part of the definition, or a statement about an act performed?

A good question! I think it's generally seen as part of the definition, although... I think the problem we run into is that we have a whole lot of qualities associated with the word, and anything with enough of them in common is probably a common referent. I am not sure any one quality is necessary...

[justaman]

I tend to think of God as being one god, and then everyone defines him in their particular way. And certainly, all of the different definitions and perceptions make for exclusive entities, but it'd be more in the sense of Bill knows all the good things about John and when Bob tells Bill all the bad things about John, Bill says, "Well that's not the John, I know." Two conceptually different entities, and yet only one subject.

I'm not sure if that's true for all though. I think it's a fitting analogy for denominational distinctions of God, but I'm hesitating to say the same of the Christian God and Allah.