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View Full Version : Mahdi Army increases grip on Baghdad neighborhood


Watser?
08-19-2007, 02:28 AM
Check out this story (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070818/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_mahdi_s_turf) on the Mahdi Army's increasing control on a neighborhood in Baghdad. This reminds me an awful lot of the Lebanon war, where the civil war and sectarian cleansing went on right under the noses of the Syrian troops and then later the Israeli army and the various multinational forces. As long as the government or outside forces cannot provide security there is no way to stop militias from stepping in.
Until late 2005, Hurriyah was a relatively safe, working-class community of Sunnis and Shiites. The first signs of trouble began that year, when gunmen from a Sunni extremist group began abducting and killing Shiites. In early 2006, Mahdi Army militiamen from their base in nearby Sadr City — about seven miles to the east — set up an office in Hurriyah's main outdoor market, promising Shiites protection.

Last fall, fliers went up, warning that 10 Sunnis would die for every Shiite killed. As a wave of Sunni car bomb attacks on Shiites killed hundreds across Baghdad, reprisal attacks on Sunnis steadily escalated.

Throughout the fall, dozens of bodies turned up each day in Hurriyah and other neighborhoods. By late November, Sunni mosques in Hurriyah were being attacked, never yet to reopen. U.S. troops came under frequent sniper fire. Schools closed.

By early December, almost all Sunnis had fled Hurriyah, except for a handful of elderly Sunnis, and the Mahdi Army was running several checkpoints. By March, Shiites who had been displaced elsewhere were moving into Hurriyah, taking the shops and apartments of Sunnis who had fled.

By May, the murder rate in Hurriyah fell from more than 200 a week in December to about 10 a week, according to U.S. military forces then.

When the surge of American troops gathered steam in late spring, the Mahdi Army generally stood down from confrontation, on the orders of its leader, the firebrand Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

Yet behind the scenes, the group stepped even more strongly into the "government's authority vacuum," said Abu Mustafa, 37, a government employee and father of three. "People began to rely on the Mahdi Army and Sadr's office in everything — even in family affairs."

Nullifidian
08-19-2007, 02:41 AM
It looks like the same process which has led to the rise of the Taliban in Somalia. Daniel Davies (http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/daniel_davies/2006/06/doing_business_with_the_taliba.html) had an interesting article about the economics of the Taliban.

What we are seeing in Mogadishu is exactly the same competitive equilibrium that developed in Afghanistan pre-2001. It's the maturing of the market for law and order, the period when it settles down from a competitive to a monopoly equilibrium. And as in Afghanistan, after trying the various warlords on offer, the winning product offering was the Taliban.

There were actually quite a few (http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=libertarian+somalia&btnG=Google+Search) libertarian tracts (http://www.mises.org/story/2066) flying around not so long ago pointing to Somalia as potentially a developmental success story (http://libertariannation.org/a/n030d1.html) (there is even a blog (http://www.somalianarchy.com/)). It is actually true that during the warlord era, the Somalis managed to install a rather better mobile phone (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4020259.stm) network than a lot of non-"failed" African states. However, the competition between warlords was really quite wasteful, and since the main product characteristic along which the warlords competed was violence, they tended to ignore other product dimensions which law and order consumers also valued, like competence, fairness and even the semblance of sanity.

As in Afghanistan, the Taliban have the big advantage that because they are devout Muslims they do not drink alcohol or tell lies. The Mennonites and Quakers prospered in Europe in the past based on the same commercial proposition. As in Afghanistan, the Taliban appear to have been swept to power on a wave of popular disgust (http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=1150672506547&call_pageid=968332188854&col=968350060724) with a rape epidemic which was the natural result of the warlords' inability or unwillingness to control their own troops. People are prepared to put up with quite a lot in the way of repression, banning football, etc etc if it means that they don't have to put up with the kind of thing the warlords used to do, which is why our tentative attempts to put some logistic support into the anti-Taliban forces have foundered on the fact that they have no real popular support.

Because the United States simply didn't have the means to scuttle any planned violence of any sort in the occupation, let alone along ethnic or sectarian lines, there's good reason to think that these powerful sectarian militias are here to stay, and will have to be negotiated with at the very least.