Watser?
08-19-2007, 02:28 AM
Check out this story (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070818/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_mahdi_s_turf) on the Mahdi Army's increasing control on a neighborhood in Baghdad. This reminds me an awful lot of the Lebanon war, where the civil war and sectarian cleansing went on right under the noses of the Syrian troops and then later the Israeli army and the various multinational forces. As long as the government or outside forces cannot provide security there is no way to stop militias from stepping in.
Until late 2005, Hurriyah was a relatively safe, working-class community of Sunnis and Shiites. The first signs of trouble began that year, when gunmen from a Sunni extremist group began abducting and killing Shiites. In early 2006, Mahdi Army militiamen from their base in nearby Sadr City — about seven miles to the east — set up an office in Hurriyah's main outdoor market, promising Shiites protection.
Last fall, fliers went up, warning that 10 Sunnis would die for every Shiite killed. As a wave of Sunni car bomb attacks on Shiites killed hundreds across Baghdad, reprisal attacks on Sunnis steadily escalated.
Throughout the fall, dozens of bodies turned up each day in Hurriyah and other neighborhoods. By late November, Sunni mosques in Hurriyah were being attacked, never yet to reopen. U.S. troops came under frequent sniper fire. Schools closed.
By early December, almost all Sunnis had fled Hurriyah, except for a handful of elderly Sunnis, and the Mahdi Army was running several checkpoints. By March, Shiites who had been displaced elsewhere were moving into Hurriyah, taking the shops and apartments of Sunnis who had fled.
By May, the murder rate in Hurriyah fell from more than 200 a week in December to about 10 a week, according to U.S. military forces then.
When the surge of American troops gathered steam in late spring, the Mahdi Army generally stood down from confrontation, on the orders of its leader, the firebrand Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
Yet behind the scenes, the group stepped even more strongly into the "government's authority vacuum," said Abu Mustafa, 37, a government employee and father of three. "People began to rely on the Mahdi Army and Sadr's office in everything — even in family affairs."
Until late 2005, Hurriyah was a relatively safe, working-class community of Sunnis and Shiites. The first signs of trouble began that year, when gunmen from a Sunni extremist group began abducting and killing Shiites. In early 2006, Mahdi Army militiamen from their base in nearby Sadr City — about seven miles to the east — set up an office in Hurriyah's main outdoor market, promising Shiites protection.
Last fall, fliers went up, warning that 10 Sunnis would die for every Shiite killed. As a wave of Sunni car bomb attacks on Shiites killed hundreds across Baghdad, reprisal attacks on Sunnis steadily escalated.
Throughout the fall, dozens of bodies turned up each day in Hurriyah and other neighborhoods. By late November, Sunni mosques in Hurriyah were being attacked, never yet to reopen. U.S. troops came under frequent sniper fire. Schools closed.
By early December, almost all Sunnis had fled Hurriyah, except for a handful of elderly Sunnis, and the Mahdi Army was running several checkpoints. By March, Shiites who had been displaced elsewhere were moving into Hurriyah, taking the shops and apartments of Sunnis who had fled.
By May, the murder rate in Hurriyah fell from more than 200 a week in December to about 10 a week, according to U.S. military forces then.
When the surge of American troops gathered steam in late spring, the Mahdi Army generally stood down from confrontation, on the orders of its leader, the firebrand Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
Yet behind the scenes, the group stepped even more strongly into the "government's authority vacuum," said Abu Mustafa, 37, a government employee and father of three. "People began to rely on the Mahdi Army and Sadr's office in everything — even in family affairs."