Truth

[Zoot]

Someone give me an example of a statement that is, or could be, "just plain true".

[lady cop]

Hi Zoot...i have missed you lately! how have you been? ok, is this a 'truth'? ...(or or you seeking esoterica?) " it is hot and humid and miserable and swampy in florida most of the time". :flamingo: :lizard: :chameleon: :gecko: :snail: :starfish: :parrot: :jellyfish:

[slimshady2357]

Something is happening.

[Dingfod]

I am me.

[Dragar]

The charge on an electron is approximately 1.6022 x 10^-19 C.

[livius drusus]

I dislike cilantro.

[copiae]

This statement is true.

[Beth]

I want a cup of coffee. It is 59 degrees outside, I am shivering. My dog is a beagle. My avatar is strangely adorable.
All truths, except for my opinion of my avatar. That truth is true for me, but based upon my perception and not based solely on fact.

[Godless Wonder]

1 + 1 = 2

[Sweetie]

This statement exists.*

*even if only in a dream.
*even if this statement is only considered to be a thought as opposed to "this statement exists on a computer screen or on paper," to avoid the complication of if the computer screen doesn't actually exist and if paper does not actually exist and to avoid the complication of whether or not that this statement exists is assumed to be dependent upon language, letters and words, in this case, 3 t's, 1 h, 2 i's, 3 s's, etc.

[Dingfod]

1 + 1 = 2...for certain values of 1.

[Sweetie]

This statement exists.*

*even if only in a dream.
*even if this statement is only considered to be a thought as opposed to "this statement exists on a computer screen or on paper," to avoid the complication of if the computer screen doesn't actually exist and if paper does not actually exist and to avoid the complication of whether or not that this statement exists is assumed to be dependent upon language, letters and words, in this case, 3 t's, 1 h, 2 i's, 3 s's, etc.

I suppose I should have just said, "This thought exists."

Does it really, does this thought alone just really exist?

How much do thoughts exist without language, symbols, concepts? Lovely stuff.

I suppose that is just to ask how much the mind can think without the information that has been brought to it through the senses, perhaps we can look to Helen Keller to a point for that.

[Zoot]

My first response is that thoughts don't exist; they occur.

[Sweetie]

I remember my English teacher reading a poem and asking us to explain it. The question of it was, where is reality if you have no senses? My brain has chewed on that for quite awhile, do we still think if the external world does not exist for our senses to perceive in order to think about things.

Chesterton, in his own brilliant way, stated it thus:

"Evolution is a good example of that modern intelligence which if it destroys anything, destroys itself.....It means that there is no such thing as an ape to change, and no such thing as a man for him to change into. It means that there is no such thing as a thing. At best, there is only one thing, and that is a flux of everything and anything. This is an attack not upon faith, but upon the mind; you cannot think if there are no things to think about. You cannot think if you are not separate from the subject of thought. Descartes said, "I think; therefore I am." The philosohic evolutionist reverses and negatives the epigram. He says, "I am not; therefore I cannot think."

Orthodoxy

Do we still think if "we" are the flux of everything?

[Zoot]

Evolution is a good example of that modern intelligence which if it destroys anything, destroys itself.....It means that there is no such thing as an ape to change, and no such thing as a man for him to change into. It means that there is no such thing as a thing. At best, there is only one thing, and that is a flux of everything and anything.

Which is accurate enough.

This is an attack not upon faith, but upon the mind; you cannot think if there are no things to think about.

You don't think. There are thoughts.


You cannot think if you are not separate from the subject of thought.

You don't think. There are thoughts.


Descartes said, "I think; therefore I am."

Which is blatantly incorrect.


The philosohic evolutionist reverses and negatives the epigram. He says, "I am not; therefore I cannot think.

Descartes' line didn't follow, and this doesn't for the same reason. "I" is a function of events of cognition, not the other way around.

Chesterton was a product of his environment and cannot really be blamed for making the same mistakes that almost everyone who has ever lived has made.

[Sweetie]

My first response is that thoughts don't exist; they occur.

My first response is to ask, does something occur that does not exist? You spoke of something and nothing elsewhere.

[Sweetie]

You don't think. There are thoughts.

Ah, but that is the problem, Watson. Do thoughts exist without a thinker?

Chesterton was a product of his environment and cannot really be blamed for making the same mistakes that almost everyone who has ever lived has made.

ic, except for you of course, I gather?

[Zoot]

Ah, but that is the problem, Watson. Do thoughts exist without a thinker?

Without a what?


ic, except for you of course, I gather?

Well, not just me, no. Plenty of others have realised Descartes' mistakes.

[Sweetie]

There are thoughts.
Thoughts occur but don't exist.

We can't think if there is no "thing" to think about.
Every"thing" is merely a continual flux of occurances, therefore there are no things.

There are no things to discuss at present, and no things to discuss it with to refer to.
Therefore, we do not think, thoughts neither occur or exist.

You don't see the mindtraps in these things?

[Sweetie]

There are thoughts.

Do thoughts exist or not?

Do you see that you have said effectively nothing and you will continue to say effectively nothing until you can assert some things, either that thoughts exist or not, for instance. If you assert thoughts exist, you assert they are things seperate from the flux of everything even if they are the product of a flux.

[Zoot]

We can't think if there is no "thing" to think about.
Every"thing" is merely a continual flux of occurances, therefore there are no things.

Correct. Well, think about it. What makes a thing? What makes one thing separate from another? Only thinking itself. You might call your keyboard and the desk it's on two different things, but that's no more arbitrary than calling the whole construct a keydesk - a single thing. Distinctions between things are arbitrary conventions, invented and applied by us, not existing independently.

The same goes for the distinction between "you" and "not you". The universe is the only atom.


There are no things to discuss at present, and no things to discuss it with to refer to.
Therefore, we do not think, thoughts neither occur or exist.

You don't see the mindtraps in these things?

I see that you see them, but that's only because you're following Chesterton's backwards thinking. He says, "First things, then thoughts. No things? No thoughts." Really, it's, "First thoughts, then things. No things? No worries."

[Zoot]

Do thoughts exist or not?

Quite right. I should have said, "You don't think; thoughts occur."


Do you see that you have said effectively nothing and you will continue to say effectively nothing until you can assert some things, either that thoughts exist or not, for instance. If you assert thoughts exist, you assert they are things seperate from the flux of everything even if they are the product of a flux.

Do you think of events as "existing"?

[Sweetie]

Quite right. I should have said, "You don't think; thoughts occur."

Occur where? In the mind of a bewildered ape?

Do you think of events as "existing"?

I can't call them events unless I first assume a thing --> event.

[justaman]

Quite right. I should have said, "You don't think; thoughts occur."
This doesn't help you. When you say "there is no thinker" all you're really doing is denying the significance of subjective definition. By this logic, there aren't thoughts either, nor is there occurance.

[viscousmemories]

Zoot, how does an occurrence of thought differ from an occurrence of lightning?

Would you say lightning exists?

[Zoot]

Occur where? In the mind of a bewildered ape?

The distinction between "the brain of the bewildered ape" and "not the brain of the bewildered ape" is entirely arbitrary and constructed by our thinking. Since there is only one thing - the universe - all events of cognition are performed by the entire universe at once.

ie., asking "where does cognition occur?" is like asking "where is the universe?"


I can't call them events unless I first assume a thing --> event.

If there is anything, then there is only one thing. Let's call that thing the universe.

[viscousmemories]

If there is anything, then there is only one thing. Let's call that thing the universe.
Makes it kinda difficult to tell your ass from a hole in the ground, though.

[kensloft]

That it is approximately 150 miles from San Francisco, California to New York, New York is a lie.

Thoughts are the chemical reactions within the brain. If energy can neither be created nor destroyed then it follows that it is a "thing" and not an occurence. :popcorn:

[Sweetie]

I see that you see them, but that's only because you're following Chesterton's backwards thinking. He says, "First things, then thoughts. No things? No thoughts." Really, it's, "First thoughts, then things. No things? No worries."

I see it backwards or forwards:

No thoughts no things.
No things no thoughts.
Therefore, things and thoughts.

Where do thoughts occur?

[Zoot]

Makes it kinda difficult to tell your ass from a hole in the ground, though.

Not really. Just emphasises that you're the one doing the telling.

Certain ways of carving up reality are more practical than others, and in an evolutionary sense, it makes sense that we patterns would evolve to distinguish between "itself" and "its environment", and carving up the environment in particular ways. Doesn't stop them being ultimately arbitrary, though.

There is a sense in which your ass is different from a hole in the ground. My point is just that this sense is imposed by us, and one would be no more or less correct to refer to your ass and the hole and the intervening air as a single object.

[Zoot]

Thoughts are the chemical reactions within the brain. If energy can neither be created nor destroyed then it follows that it is a "thing" and not an occurence.

"within your brain" is an arbitrary distinction.

[Sweetie]

Well, to clarify on my question "where do thoughts occur," it just highlights a problem for me.

If atheists spend a large amount of time trying to prove that an ape turned into a man and that nature could itself create the intelligence of men, does the Universe then have intelligence if the thoughts are occuring in the Universe or in the Almighty Atom?

[Zoot]

I see it backwards or forwards:

No thoughts no things.
No things no thoughts.
Therefore, things and thoughts.

Well, just one thing. Any further division is arbitrary and imposed by us.


Where do thoughts occur?

Thoughts are non-local occurences. The question is meaningless. Thoughts are events performed by the entire universe.

[Sweetie]

"within your brain" is an arbitrary distinction.

However, within the Universe is an impossible distinction, I think but that's because I think if you assert intelligence in the Universe, and all intelligence is within the Universe, then the Universe is intelligent. It is the Universe in which the thoughts are occuring and therefore the Universe is thinking.

Maybe not, just a thought.

[Zoot]

If atheists spend a large amount of time trying to prove that an ape turned into a man and that nature could itself create the intelligence of men, does the Universe then have intelligence if the thoughts are occuring in the Universe or in the Almighty Atom?

Yes. Well spotted.

[Zoot]

However, within the Universe is an impossible distinction, I think but that's because I think if you assert intelligence in the Universe, and all intelligence is within the Universe, then the Universe is intelligent.

Maybe not, just a thought.

No, no, you're quite right, if you ask me.

I'm off for a swim. Talk to you later.

[Sweetie]

Oh man, that's nasty* to contemplate. How does time work in this theory, was there intelligence in the Almighty Atom before intelligence came to be ie: ape to man?

*nasty = difficult

[justaman]

Certain ways of carving up reality are more practical than others, and in an evolutionary sense, it makes sense that we patterns would evolve to distinguish between "itself" and "its environment", and carving up the environment in particular ways. Doesn't stop them being ultimately arbitrary, though.
Subjectivity is determined. That means the resulting distinctions aren't arbitrary. We don't make the distinction of "I", evolution has done it for us.

[Zoot]

Oh man, that's nasty* to contemplate. How does time work in this theory, was there intelligence in the Almighty Atom before intelligence came to be ie: ape to man?

Well, if you adopt a four-dimensionalist perspective, then what we call "events", with past, present and future, are in fact patterns that incorporate not only the entire spacial universe at a given temporal moment, but in fact all of time "before" and "after" the event as well.


Subjectivity is determined. That means the resulting distinctions aren't arbitrary. We don't make the distinction of "I", evolution has done it for us.

They're ontologically arbitrary. I don't mean that they're random.

[justaman]

They're ontologically arbitrary. I don't mean that they're random.
Ok, but the problem is that different parts of the universe do operate differently to other parts. If everything was arbitrary, prediction would be impossible. But because we know certain universal constants, we can make predictions about those distinctions.

This is probably the point where objective truth comes in to rescue you from solipsism.

[Zoot]

Ok, but the problem is that different parts of the universe do operate differently to other parts. If everything was arbitrary, prediction would be impossible. But because we know certain universal constants, we can make predictions about those distinctions.

It's a bit much to explain here, but Kant did a pretty good job of arguing that causality is a way we interpret the world, rather than something we separately observe about the world.

[Zoot]

Even with causality, the distinctions between objects are arbitrary. "I clap" is no more or less true than "my right hand hits my left", which is no more or less true than "the room claps".

[justaman]

It's a bit much to explain here, but Kant did a pretty good job of arguing that causality is a way we interpret the world, rather than something we separately observe about the world.
Don't get me wrong, I ultimately agree that the universe is continuous rather than discrete, but this doesn't mean that distinctions are arbitrary. Distinctions are determined and necessary - because of subjectivity - and therefore the assumptions that we make about those distinctions are just as important.

And I'm no Kant expert, but given that he talked about phenomenon vs noumenon he would seem a strange champion for the argument that everything is just one.

Also he didn't know about quantum mechanics then. I struggle to find how distinction can be considered arbitrary when the wavefunction 'collapse' of quantum particles can be instigated by mere observation. That would appear to me to be a pretty hefty distinction made about observation itself.

[Zoot]

My only point is that it is just as true to say that I am clapping as it is to say that my hands are hitting each other. There are no distinctions between objects that are independent of our interpretation. The keyboard and the desk are two things. The keyboard-desk is one thing. I push the keyboard across the desk. I have altered the shape of the keyboard-desk. When I pushed the keyboard across the desk, I dislodged invisibly small molecules from the surfaces. Yet I continue to say it's the same desk and same keyboard.

All distinctions that are in my "head", not in the "world".

[justaman]

My only point is that it is just as true to say that I am clapping as it is to say that my hands are hitting each other. There are no distinctions between objects that are independent of our interpretation. The keyboard and the desk are two things. The keyboard-desk is one thing. I push the keyboard across the desk. I have altered the shape of the keyboard-desk. When I pushed the keyboard across the desk, I dislodged invisibly small molecules from the surfaces. Yet I continue to say it's the same desk and same keyboard.
And again, I agree with you here, but I think there is a danger in extrapolating this level of non-definition to the extent which you tend to. It ultimately becomes useless and demonstrably false, because at some point you need to describe "change" and without any definition available, it's sorta difficult to do that.

[Zoot]

And again, I agree with you here, but I think there is a danger in extrapolating this level of non-definition to the extent which you tend to. It ultimately becomes useless and demonstrably false, because at some point you need to describe "change" and without any definition available, it's sorta difficult to do that.

Sure, it's difficult to describe change without distinction. It's impossible to describe change without distinction. But any distinction will do - it doesn't have to be the ones we've evolved to use. There's nothing ontologically privileged about the way we've evolved and learned to carve up the world. ie., there aren't seven colours in the rainbow, unless you want there to be.

[John Carter]

Don't get me wrong, I ultimately agree that the universe is continuous rather than discrete, but this doesn't mean that distinctions are arbitrary.

The universe may not be continuous. According to one of the two current front runners for a theory of Quantum Gravity, spacetime is discrete. According to this theory, called Loop Quantum Gravity, the smallest possible length is the Planck Length, approximately 1.6 x 10^-35 meters. This theory also implies a shortest possible time interval.

[justaman]

There's nothing ontologically privileged about the way we've evolved and learned to carve up the world. ie., there aren't seven colours in the rainbow, unless you want there to be.
I'm just not sure about this. I think the difference between subjectivity and objectivity is ontologically privileged. Wavefunction collapse seems to indicate this.

But really, the point (as far as you and I are concerned) is simply that the (perhaps arbitrary) distinction between subjective and objective has different implications for morality, truth and meaning.
I believe your error is that you take the subjective morality vs objective morality debate cookie-cutter and want to plant it firmly over every other objective vs subjective dichotomy, when this really isn't appropriate.

[seebs]

Someone give me an example of a statement that is, or could be, "just plain true".

I'd need to know what you mean by "just plain true". As opposed to what? Contingent on definitions of words? I think any statement is contingent on those. Contingent on observers? That's more interesting!

[Dragar]

I struggle to find how distinction can be considered arbitrary when the wavefunction 'collapse' of quantum particles can be instigated by mere observation. That would appear to me to be a pretty hefty distinction made about observation itself.

Observation is interaction. You cannot measure the energy of a particle without poking it. You cannot measure the position of a particle without interacting with the wavefunction, and changing it.

In quantum mechanics, you cannot look but not touch. Because at the quantum level, our methods of finding out 'where something is' is the equivilent of trying to find out where a cat is by throwing rocks at where we think it might be, and listening for a meow.

Also he didn't know about quantum mechanics then. I struggle to find how distinction can be considered arbitrary when the wavefunction 'collapse' of quantum particles can be instigated by mere observation. That would appear to me to be a pretty hefty distinction made about observation itself.

This not only assumes the wavefunction collapse is a 'real' event (as opposed to a mathematical notion alone), but also that 'mere' observation (interaction) shouldn't be expected to change something. I'm unsure either are justified.

[justaman]

Observation is interaction. You cannot measure the energy of a particle without poking it. You cannot measure the position of a particle without interacting with the wavefunction, and changing it.

In quantum mechanics, you cannot look but not touch. Because at the quantum level, our methods of finding out 'where something is' is the equivilent of trying to find out where a cat is by throwing rocks at where we think it might be, and listening for a meow.
This isn't really what I'm talking about.

This not only assumes the wavefunction collapse is a 'real' event (as opposed to a mathematical notion alone), but also that 'mere' observation (interaction) shouldn't be expected to change something. I'm unsure either are justified.
I'm talking about the phenomena of particles acting like probability waves (for want of a better term) when no one is looking and then particles when they are. This isn't about the act of observation so much as the possession of knowledge. I'd have to get back to you with the details since it's a little while since I read it, but it is when you can "collapse" the wavefunction and then "form it again". The distinguishing factor wasn't observation so much as it was knowledge. I.e. the subjective understanding of an objective event is what caused the break down.

[Dragar]

I'm talking about the phenomena of particles acting like probability waves (for want of a better term) when no one is looking and then particles when they are.

They act precisely like quantum mechanical stuff all the time. They're neither waves nor particles. They happen to interact/produce events at particular spacetime coordinates. What you mean by 'when someone is looking' is 'when someone is throwing rocks at the cat'.

Hardly a surprise the cat acts differently when we throw stuff at it.

This isn't about the act of observation so much as the possession of knowledge.

They are the same thing.

I'd have to get back to you with the details since it's a little while since I read it, but it is when you can "collapse" the wavefunction and then "form it again". The distinguishing factor wasn't observation so much as it was knowledge. I.e. the subjective understanding of an objective event is what caused the break down.

You realise that the wavefunction collapse has never been observed, and has to be put into the mathematics 'by hand'?

I also wonder what you class as observers. Would Schrödinger's Ape work? Cat? Fish?

[justaman]

This isn't about the act of observation so much as the possession of knowledge.

They are the same thing.
Then that's all that matters*. If knowledge/observation deterministically enforces an objective distinction then distinction isn't arbitrary.

I'm actually surprised you seem to be arguing along with Zoot here. He is on the way to denying the existence of objective truth, which would be a strange thing for a physicist to believe...

*I am still fairly sure they are treated differently in the experiment. I'm going to check it out anyway.

[John Carter]

Here is a true statement for you Zoot:

The truth value of the Continuum Hypothesis is undecidable in ZFC Set Theory.

[Dragar]

Then that's all that matters*. If knowledge/observation deterministically enforces an objective distinction then distinction isn't arbitrary.

They certainly make a difference to the wavefunction, yes. The problem is that you seem to be assuming the collapse is a real, unambiguous event (tell me, what exactly is a measurment? Or an observer?), and that observation (which is interaction!) has no effect upon the system.

I don't think either of these are sensible, for a number of reasons (this is a shift in my position, quite heavily, over the last week).

But unless you want to deny anything 'really' exists until you look at it (giving some special status to events of perception), you can't go this way.

I'm actually surprised you seem to be arguing along with Zoot here. He is on the way to denying the existence of objective truth, which would be a strange thing for a physicist to believe...

Actually, you're closer than Zoot is with this sort of argument, as you're essentially denying a real world exists and asserting a superposition of possible worlds exists everywhere apart from where we look, where a single world exists (determined by probability when we do).

And I haven't seen Zoot do anything other than explore the issue; something I'm interested in exploring too.

[slimshady2357]

I'm actually surprised you seem to be arguing along with Zoot here. He is on the way to denying the existence of objective truth, which would be a strange thing for a physicist to believe...

Actually, you're closer than Zoot is with this sort of argument, as you're essentially denying a real world exists and asserting a superposition of possible worlds exists everywhere apart from where we look, where a single world exists (determined by probability when we do).

And I haven't seen Zoot do anything other than explore the issue; something I'm interested in exploring too.

Heehee, I was thinking something very similar :yup:

I haven't read anything in Zoot's posts that suggests he is rejecting objective truth, yet. He's rejecting the objective truth of somewhat arbitrary ways of labelling things, as far as I can tell.

I think you would find that any empirical investigation comparing what he would call 'truth' about a particular event and what you would call 'truth' about that event, would come to the conclusion that your 'truths' are 'true' under the same criteria. You just name things differently.

Adam

[Corona688]

At some point, one must stop searching for truth and start searching for lunch.

[Sweetie]

Well, if you adopt a four-dimensionalist perspective, then what we call "events", with past, present and future, are in fact patterns that incorporate not only the entire spacial universe at a given temporal moment, but in fact all of time "before" and "after" the event as well.

Notwithstanding that my response will be difficult to interpret because I will have difficulty communicating it, I would first say that my problem with this is ten-fold, or more. I think primarily, it is a big mistake to identify any one thing ---> an atom because by doing so you will be unable to escape imbuing this thing with God-like attributes though in the end, those attributes will be impossible to be held with this thing alone, without some strange assumptions.

For instance, this atom:

Is an uncaused cause.
Is timeless in a sense, has what was, what is, and what is to come within it, the Alpha and the Omega, so to speak.
Is all there is (as opposed to: God is).
Has intelligence ie: "If there is no first thinker, how can anyone think?" which ultimately means, unless there be within the original seed that which comes to be in the tree, it will not come to be especially if the past, present and future co-exist at the same time.

In the end we would echo Aquinas, "what we call God," however, on much less to go on and without any basic and reasonable assumptions, only the assertion that to ask "why" is a no-no. Why this, why that until you get to the atom when the question "why" supposedly became for no good reason, at some point, something not to be asked. Why this almighty atom, why not another? Just because and so on and so forth. Where did this atom come from?

Anyways, perhaps by taking on such a model you are in the process of reducing the supposed contradiction between a God who is outside time but acts in time, but yet, He is supposedly immutable and therefore can't act at all. It would be lovely if that is at the end of all of this. :P


Hawking, "A Brief History of Time":

"I’d like to emphasize that this idea that time and space should be finite “without boundary” is just a proposal: it cannot be deduced from some other principle. Like any other scientific theory, it may initially be put forward for aesthetic or metaphysical reasons, but the real test is whether it makes predictions that agree with observation. This, how-ever, is difficult to determine in the case of quantum gravity, for two reasons. First, as will be explained in Chapter 11, we are not yet sure exactly which theory successfully combines general relativity and quantum mechanics, though we know quite a lot about the form such a theory must have. Second, any model that described the whole universe in detail would be much too complicated mathematically for us to be able to calculate exact predictions. One therefore has to make simplifying assumptions and approximations – and even then, the problem of extracting predictions remains a formidable one."



Might I also add a dig, do all of these guys begin with a bias and an absurdity?:

"I had no desire to share the fate of Galileo, with whom I feel a strong sense of identity, partly because of the coincidence of having been born exactly 300 years after his death!"

If that isn't meant as an initial appeal to make Christians look like blind idiots, man oh man, you would question why in a scientific study he would need to say such a thing, it makes him look very bad right from the start, though it probably soothes the atheist right from the start. :doh: I truly am shocked that he felt a need to include such thoughts and in just that way, remarkable that supposedly such a brain would reduce himself to something like that, ie: The Pope said not to question the Big Bang [we're to assume this is true] and so I'm really glad he didn't hear about my previous talk so that I didn't end up like Galileo.

Dork.

Anyways, so from that what he seems to be saying to me is that he pulled this theory right out of thin air ie: it's not based on any other principle, it can't be tested really, and it can't be proven, it is not particularily a scientific theory then perhaps.

I loved the two paragraphs following the paragraph under the diagram. :D

http://newton.physics.metu.edu.tr/~fizikt/html/hawking/g.html


Anyways, let me say that I realize that what Hawkings is talking about may not be exactly what you are talking about in this instance, I am not clear at present which theory you would be trying to use to suit your model, but like I said, unless it's Hawking's, and you propose an almighty atom, you are back at square one with us and your square is a bit strange and I'm not sure it's really workable.

[Dragar]

Zoot is speaking of relativity, which makes accurate predictions and has been verified to a high degree. Hawking is speaking of his "no boundary" proposal, which is an idea that as yet, makes no predictions and so is taken as a possibility by the scientific community, but not as a valid theory (that's why it's called 'proposal' as opposed to 'theory').


Where did this atom come from?

This is a meaningless question. You're asking 'From what spacial location did the dimension in which spacial locations are located come from?"

[Clutch Munny]

At some point, one must stop searching for truth and start searching for lunch.

... which itself presupposes searching for loose change behind the couch cushions.

[Farren]

Don't get me wrong, I ultimately agree that the universe is continuous rather than discrete, but this doesn't mean that distinctions are arbitrary.

The universe may not be continuous. According to one of the two current front runners for a theory of Quantum Gravity, spacetime is discrete. According to this theory, called Loop Quantum Gravity, the smallest possible length is the Planck Length, approximately 1.6 x 10^-35 meters. This theory also implies a shortest possible time interval.

Does the theory impose the same restriction on both space and time? I realise you called it "spacetime", but from my around discussions around physics I've noticed casual use of language sometimes leads people to ascribe to spacetime things that are only qualities of one or the other, so I'm curious.

[Dragar]

Does the theory impose the same restriction on both space and time?

From the post:


This theory also implies a shortest possible time interval

So it does, if 'implies' is being used here in the formal sense. It will of course not have units of metres. ;)

[Sweetie]

Hawking is speaking of his "no boundary" proposal, which is an idea that as yet, makes no predictions and so is taken as a possibility by the scientific community, but not as a valid theory (that's why it's called 'proposal' as opposed to 'theory').

Yeah, I figured since he said so and all, :P I just have heard it brought up several times and some have used it as arguement and it's the first time I've directly looked at the subject.

This is a meaningless question. You're asking 'From what spacial location did the dimension in which spacial locations are located come from?"

Now where have I heard something like that before, :D where was God before the universe was created? ie: where was God when there wasn't any where? Where was God when there wasn't any when?

It just seems to me that it it is often the case that we are forced back into the same corners, and that is a very interesting thing. "A rose by any other name....."

[justaman]

They certainly make a difference to the wavefunction, yes. The problem is that you seem to be assuming the collapse is a real, unambiguous event (tell me, what exactly is a measurment? Or an observer?), and that observation (which is interaction!) has no effect upon the system.
Well I mean these are questions the smartest physicists in the world don't agree on so you firing them at me is grossly unfair (as you well know, you sneaky fucker :P )

Actually, you're closer than Zoot is with this sort of argument, as you're essentially denying a real world exists and asserting a superposition of possible worlds exists everywhere apart from where we look, where a single world exists (determined by probability when we do).
The problem with this assertion (to fire it straight back at you) is to assume superposition doesn't exist. That's a big call in it's own right.

And I haven't seen Zoot do anything other than explore the issue; something I'm interested in exploring too.
Oh you're always sticking up for him.

[Dragar]

Well I mean these are questions the smartest physicists in the world don't agree on so you firing them at me is grossly unfair (as you well know, you sneaky fucker :P )

That's right. But subjectivism - treating human consciousness as a trigger for a 'real' collapse - falls apart for this very reason, and one of the things most physicists do agree on is that this interpretation is...well, silly. Even if it can be made to agree with all observations.

There is no unambiguous way of stating the wavefunction has collapsed, because quantum mechanics is supposed to work for all the universe - including the measuring devices, and humans themselves.

And certainly all physicists agree making a measurement of a system changes the system. This was Heisenburg's original line of reasoning which led him to an approximate form of the Uncertainty Principle, and he later derived precisely using mathematics.

The usual - and far more defensible - Copenhagen position is to take the wavefunction as a representation of our knowledge of the system. In this case, it's not a 'real' thing that 'jumps' from a superposition of states to a single state. Instead it's our knowledge that 'jumps' when we make a measurement. Statements about reality that do not refer to measurements are treated as 'unscientific', or better yet, category errors. Asking, "What state is the system in before we look?" is supposed to be as nonsensical as "How many yellows fit into a gherkin?"

The problem with this assertion (to fire it straight back at you) is to assume superposition doesn't exist. That's a big call in it's own right.

I'm not saying it doesn't exist. Superposition of states certainly has a place in the mathematics, and it may well have a place in reality. What I'm saying is that consciousness (only human consciousness?) does not trigger a 'real' collapse of a 'real' wavefunction. Such a thing removes the mind from the rest of the universe, and pushes the whole of reality to take place 'within' the mind - away from any further inquiry.

I also very much doubt Copenhagen is correct - physics, despite Bohr's claims, is not merely about what we can say of reality. Many Worlds is a possibility (which especially makes sense when you treat the universe as a wavefunction - or rather, the multiverse as a huge superposition of states which all 'really' exist), as is the Bohm-Bell formulation, or some set up where there is an objective process that triggers the collapse of the wavefunction every so often. In the latter two cases, quantum mechanics is an incomplete theory.

My personal favourite is Feynman's null interpretation, however. And that's how I work with it day to day.

[Dragar]

Now where have I heard something like that before, where was God before the universe was created? ie: where was God when there wasn't any where? Where was God when there wasn't any when?

It just seems to me that it it is often the case that we are forced back into the same corners, and that is a very interesting thing. "A rose by any other name....."

Sure. You're saying God created the universe, and God is the thing that 'just exists'.

I'm saying that it's possible the universe 'just exists'. But I don't know, and I'm not going to claim I do. There are numerous possibilities, and God is really just one of many.

[Sweetie]

Sure. You're saying God created the universe, and God is the thing that 'just exists'.

Actually I said no such thing. I was just stating what I see as the similarity in reasoning in Zoot's case and some ideas beyond. There is a distinction, I did not say that God created the universe, I said that what Zoot is proposing says to me that the atom "created" the universe, and the atom is therefore God. ie: [I am] saying that God created the universe when in fact I was just saying that Zoot figures the atom created the universe and therefore the atom is what we call God, but yet, can it be because there are other considerations ie: does the atom have the inherent power to do everything by itself?

In my eyes he may reject a Cosmological arguement but by taking the path he is taking, he seems to more than enough adequately prove it by having to ground his philosophy in something, be it an atom in this case, the uncaused cause. Now, it is very possible that my eyes are missing something when looking at the case and so I would like to make myself more familiar with deo-atomism, "atom-as-God". I've never actually encountered an atheist who would point a finger at any one thing. It would be interesting to hear how the philosophy works.

[Sweetie]

There are numerous possibilities, and God is really just one of many.

I would love to hear about what you think are possibilities.

[justaman]

That's right. But subjectivism - treating human consciousness as a trigger for a 'real' collapse - falls apart for this very reason, and one of the things most physicists do agree on is that this interpretation is...well, silly. Even if it can be made to agree with all observations.

There is no unambiguous way of stating the wavefunction has collapsed, because quantum mechanics is supposed to work for all the universe - including the measuring devices, and humans themselves.

And certainly all physicists agree making a measurement of a system changes the system. This was Heisenburg's original line of reasoning which led him to an approximate form of the Uncertainty Principle, and he later derived precisely using mathematics.

The usual - and far more defensible - Copenhagen position is to take the wavefunction as a representation of our knowledge of the system. In this case, it's not a 'real' thing that 'jumps' from a superposition of states to a single state. Instead it's our knowledge that 'jumps' when we make a measurement. Statements about reality that do not refer to measurements are treated as 'unscientific', or better yet, category errors. Asking, "What state is the system in before we look?" is supposed to be as nonsensical as "How many yellows fit into a gherkin?"
What you are saying here is not helping the cause that there is no objective distinction between objective reality and subjective reality. Regardless of what does the 'jumping' if prior to observation reality exists differently to what it does at the point when we observe and understand it, there is an objective distinction that cannot be broached.

I'm not saying it doesn't exist. Superposition of states certainly has a place in the mathematics, and it may well have a place in reality. What I'm saying is that consciousness (only human consciousness?) does not trigger a 'real' collapse of a 'real' wavefunction. Such a thing removes the mind from the rest of the universe, and pushes the whole of reality to take place 'within' the mind - away from any further inquiry.
Regardless of whether it is real or not, that is how the process appears to operate as far as we are concerned. If we can't know something without fucking with it, then that has implications for how we consider subjective knowledge. It is a process with a visible boundary between itself and reality. That boundary would appear to be unearthed in QM (in whatever form you choose to regard it).

Regardless, would the charge of an electron change if no one were around to measure it? The weak anthropic principle gives us a roadmap of what we've found ourselves in. Perhaps that roadmap is not able to zoom into the detail of quantum mechanics - though I think it does a pretty good job - but it is certainly able to show us some rules that must be in place if we are to exist. They can then be defined as objective truths which Zoot might argue against.

[Dragar]

I would love to hear about what you think are possibilities.

All of them, or just the serious scientific ones? Hawking's no boundary proposal is one, the good old 'universe as a wavefunction', a pair of colliding membranes from string theory, and goodness knows what twistor theory and quantum loop gravity are positing.

[Dragar]

Regardless of what does the 'jumping' if prior to observation reality exists differently to what it does at the point when we observe and understand it, there is an objective distinction that cannot be broached.

Under Copenhagen interpretation, the wavefunction is a representation of our knowledge alone. Statements about reality without reference to a measurement - like this one:

"prior to observation reality exists"

- are meaningless.

See why I don't like it?

As I said before, there are interpretations (such as Many Worlds, and Broglie-Bohm theory) which do not involve a collapse. Or a collapse may happen due to some unknown, objective process (making QM incomplete).

Regardless, would the charge of an electron change if no one were around to measure it?

Different people will give you different answers. Some may say your question is a non-question; that the notion of charge on an electron is only related to the outcome of experiments, and so asking what the charge would be without an experiment is to talk nonsense.

They can then be defined as objective truths which Zoot might argue against.

If and when Zoot puts down a premise I disagree with, or draws a conclusion I do not think follows from the premises, rest assured I will voice my disagreement.

[Sweetie]

All of them, or just the serious scientific ones?

Serious scientific ones, ie: not ones that aren't grounded.

Honestly though, if you're interested in starting a seperate thread these things would be fun to explore, implications, what is necessary for these things to work, their meaning for philosophy, etc.

[Dragar]

Serious scientific ones, ie: not ones that aren't grounded.

Honestly though, if you're interested in starting a seperate thread these things would be fun to explore, implications, what is necessary for these things to work, their meaning for philosophy, etc.

Well, I don't know the details of most of them. Even the ones I mentioned I'm hazy on. The problem is that for serious, mathematically based theories - like those - it's probably impossible to talk seriously about them without a high level of mathematics, which is something I don't claim to have.

[xouper]

Godless Wonder: 1 + 1 = 2
There are 10 kinds of people, those who understand binary and those who don't.

:shrug:

[xouper]

Sorry I came late to this conversation (back on page one):

Sweetie: Descartes said, "I think; therefore I am."

Zoot: Which is blatantly incorrect.
How so? Are you saying you can deny your own existence? Is that not the one truth you cannot deny, that you exist?

[Dragar]

How so? Are you saying you can deny your own existence? Is that not the one truth you cannot deny, that you exist?

The conclusion ('I exist') is already included in the the premise ('I am thinking'). The premise could equally read, "There is thinking," from which "I exist" does not follow.

In other words, Rene put Descartes before the horse. :giggles:

[livius drusus]

Groan. Huge, huge groan. Naughty Dragar. :spank:

[slimshady2357]

How so? Are you saying you can deny your own existence? Is that not the one truth you cannot deny, that you exist?

The conclusion ('I exist') is already included in the the premise ('I am thinking'). The premise could equally read, "There is thinking," from which "I exist" does not follow.

In other words, Rene put Descartes before the horse. :giggles:

I'd say that was very well put, even with the terrible pun :giggle:

For more on this, see Sartre's Transcendence of the Ego

Here is someone else discussing the idea and quoting Russell on Descartes:Russell also identifies the fundamental problem in Descartes' cogito. Descartes committed a logical fallacy. When he said "I think, therefore, I am," he assumed the existence of what he was trying to prove. The "I" of the conclusion, "I am," was already included in the assertion "I think." If Descartes was really doubting his own existence, where did the "I" come from in the words "I think"? Following the method of systematic doubt more carefully, Descartes should have asserted only that he cannot doubt that "there is thinking." But to get from that proposition to the conclusion of his own existence would have been an impossible, task.

The result of Descartes' approach brought with it other problems as well. Again, in Russell's words:

'I think, therefore I am' makes mind more certain than matter, and my mind (for me) more certain than the minds of others. There is, thus, in all philosophy derived from Descartes, a tendency to subjectivism, and to regarding matter as something only knowable, if at all, by inference from what is known of mind. These two tendencies exist both in Continental idealism and in British empiricism -- in the former triumphantly, in the latter regretfully.[4]

Russell went on to say: "[M]odern philosophy has very largely accepted the formulation of its problems from Descartes, while not accepting his solutions."[5]

From this website (http://www.berith.org/essays/apol/apol01.html).

Adam

[xouper]

Sweetie: Descartes said, "I think; therefore I am."

Zoot: Which is blatantly incorrect

xouper: How so? Are you saying you can deny your own existence? Is that not the one truth you cannot deny, that you exist?

Dragar: The conclusion ('I exist') is already included in the the premise ('I am thinking'). The premise could equally read, "There is thinking," from which "I exist" does not follow.
How so? Descartes did not assume the conclusion when he said "cogito ergo sum." That is not the full extent of his logical argument, it is only the bumper sticker version of it, so if you only consider that short version, you are arguing against a straw man.

Here's the challenge. Try doubting your own existence. I mean really. Try it. If you can say, "I doubt my own existence," then who is doing the doubting? Descartes' original argument is that since someone (or something) is doing the mental activity of "doubting", then that someone (or something) exists. It is the one certainty you cannot deny.

Descartes was not wrong. If you disagree, then you are telling me that you can legitimately doubt your own existence. And if so, then please present your flawless argument that you might not exist.

[Dragar]

Here's the challenge. Try doubting your own existence. I mean really. Try it. If you can say, "I doubt my own existence," then who is doing the doubting?

I'm challenging the assumption a doubter is required to doubt, a runner to run, and thinker to think.

There is doubting, there is running, there is thinking. We are verbs, not nouns.


For more on this, see Sartre's Transcendence of the Ego

This isn't the first time I've heard of Sartre in relation to his. Hume, as well, sometimes crops up. Western thought, however, rarely failed to assume what I outlined above.

[xouper]

Dragar: I'm challenging the assumption a doubter is required to doubt, a runner to run, and thinker to think.
That's fine. Please present your argument that you might not exist.

[Dragar]

That's fine. Please present your argument that you might not exist.

Oh, I don't have an argument. I just don't make the assumption I do, in the same way I don't make the assumption I have a soul. I do seem to remember an influential paper by Thomas Nagel, I think it was, talking about the failure of positing any whole number of 'minds' to explain split brain experiment. Maybe that would be a good argument?

If you really mean the 'might not' part, I suppose, 'it yields no contradiction to say I do not exist' is a good defense that I might not exist.

[xouper]

xouper: Please present your argument that you might not exist.

Dragar: Oh, I don't have an argument.
Fair enough. Then I do not accept your bare assertion that Descartes's argument is invalid.

[Dragar]

Fair enough. Then I do not accept your bare assertion that Descartes's argument is invalid.

Um...

You think it's a necessary requirement that thinking requires a thinker? To deny this leads to a contradiction?

[xouper]

Dragar: 'it yields no contradiction to say I do not exist'
Who then is doing the 'saying'?

[Dragar]

Who then is doing the 'saying'?

Nobody. Again, if you do not assume you need a speaker to speak, this is not a problem.

[xouper]

Dragar: You think it's a necessary requirement that thinking requires a thinker?
What is your argument that thinking does not require a thinker?

[Dragar]

What is your argument that thinking does not require a thinker?

My argument is that there is no reason to think it is true that a thinking requires a thinker. It may be the case that it does, but I have yet to see reason to think so.

[viscousmemories]

I believe thinking is an occurence that requires a thinker to exist. In other words, if there were no one who thinks, "to think" would be meaningless.

[slimshady2357]

My main problem with "I think, therefore I am" (and, as I understand it, Sartre's) is that the "I" is learned about in the same way we learn about anything else. It is learned about post experience. It is formed post experience. The "I" is no more than a collection of some of the various thoughts which are occuring. That is the whole story behind Transendence of the Ego, that the "I" is no more special a collection of thoughts than any other collection.

Adam

[Dragar]

I believe thinking is an occurence that requires a thinker to exist. In other words, if there were no one who thinks, "to think" would be meaningless.

Okay. Why?

I'm not trying to tell you guys, "No, nobody exists,". I wouldn't even know where to begin to prove such a thing, even if it's possible.

But I'm not in the habit of counting things impossible because they go against my intuition.

[slimshady2357]

I believe thinking is an occurence that requires a thinker to exist. In other words, if there were no one who thinks, "to think" would be meaningless.

That's right, it wouldn't be "to think", it would be "thinking". Or perhaps, "thoughts".

Adam

[Dragar]

You'll often hear the term 'gives rise to [verb]' if you read around in a lot of the Eastern philosophies/relgions.

[viscousmemories]

See I think "to think", 'thinking' and 'thoughts' all describe actions that occur in the brain that could not occur if brains didn't exist.

Just as I don't think "to rain", 'raining', or 'rain' would have any meaning if water didn't exist.

[Dragar]

See I think "to think", 'thinking' and 'thoughts' all describe actions that occur in the brain that could not occur if brains didn't exist.

Well, I think 'thinking' is a process. I think that process is a physical process, which is the (process known as) brain.

[slimshady2357]

See I think "to think", 'thinking' and 'thoughts' all describe actions that occur in the brain that could not occur if brains didn't exist.

Just as I don't think "to rain", 'raining', or 'rain' would have any meaning if water didn't exist.

Quite understandable. But this is not a possible response for Descartes, he has already doubted the entire material existence. He cannot, at this time, fall back onto the brain as his thinker.

Remember, his plan is to doubt all that is possible to doubt, so as to hopefully reach a totally undoubtable truth from which he can build his philosophy.

Russell, Sartre and others are pointing out that pre-supposing the "I" in "I think" is cheating.

Adam

[viscousmemories]

Thanks for the input, guys. My process known as "brain" has been discussing this with my roommate's process known as "brain". Hopefully I'll have something brilliant to add after dinner, but the odds are slim.

[John Carter]

Here is a true statement for you Zoot:

The truth value of the Continuum Hypothesis is undecidable in ZFC Set Theory.

/me taps the microphone.

Hello? Testing, testing, is this thing on?

Zoot, care to comment on my example of an indisputably true statement? I can come up with many more if you like.

[viscousmemories]

Well, I think 'thinking' is a process. I think that process is a physical process, which is the (process known as) brain.
I understand what you mean when you say 'thinking' is a physical process. I don't know what you mean when you refer to the brain, which I think I would call an organic material substance, a process. But I'm no physicist. :)

Quite understandable. But this is not a possible response for Descartes, he has already doubted the entire material existence. He cannot, at this time, fall back onto the brain as his thinker.

Remember, his plan is to doubt all that is possible to doubt, so as to hopefully reach a totally undoubtable truth from which he can build his philosophy.

Russell, Sartre and others are pointing out that pre-supposing the "I" in "I think" is cheating.
Thanks for the clarification, Adam. I didn't know the context in which he said "cogito ergo sum". Now that I do I think I'm beginning to understand the argument that it begs the question, even though I'm not entirely convinced that it's problematic.

Metaphysics is kind of annoying. Hmph.

[Dragar]

I understand what you mean when you say 'thinking' is a physical process. I don't know what you mean when you refer to the brain, which I think I would call an organic material substance, a process. But I'm no physicist.

I agree the brain is organic and material, but (even from a high level, biological perspective - and certainly a chemical and physical one!) the brain is not static. My brain now is different to how it was before I composed this post. And our notions of 'objects' - of 'things', of 'substances' - do not survive this sort of analysis. We'd be required to specify a different brain for every moment in time, each subtly different from the last, and to say all of them together are responsible for the process of thinking.

This is horrible and clumsy. The word 'process' captures the meaning without having to sum over every single different arrangement of matter in time.

[xouper]

viscousmemories: Thanks for the clarification, Adam. I didn't know the context in which he said "cogito ergo sum". Now that I do I think I'm beginning to understand the argument that it begs the question, even though I'm not entirely convinced that it's problematic.
Once you understand the objection by Russell (et al) you can then move on to the objections to Russell's objection. In one sense, Russell's objection is a straw man in that it assigns a meaning to the word "I" that Descartes did not intend.

[viscousmemories]

Okay I've just re-read this entire thread. Aside from being completely lost during some of the exchange re: Quantum Mechanics between Justaman and Dragar, I think I have a much better grasp of where everyone is coming from here.

Just thought I'd share. :)

Now, moving on...

Well, I think 'thinking' is a process. I think that process is a physical process, which is the (process known as) brain.
Okay, now I think I understand better what you mean by calling the brain a process. But if I accept that reasoning, then it seems like I'd have to accept that all that I previously referred to as 'things' are really 'processes'. But if no 'things' exist, only processes, then what is a process?

[Dragar]

Okay I've just re-read this entire thread. Aside from being completely lost during some of the exchange re: Quantum Mechanics between Justaman and Dragar, I think I have a much better grasp of where everyone is coming from here.

I guarantee you that right now I'm more confused about quantum mechanics than you are about that exchange.

Okay, now I think I understand better what you mean by calling the brain a process. But if I accept that reasoning, then it seems like I'd have to accept that all that I previously referred to as 'things' are really 'processes'. But if no 'things' exist, only processes, then what is a process?

You know, I'm not really sure? But then, I could really answer 'what is a thing?' either, so I'm not exactly in a worse spot.

Hmm.

It's tricky. I don't really think there are 'things' - because the edges we create between 'things' are functions of our perception, not parts of reality. The atoms on my desk don't have little labels saying 'desk', as opposed the atoms on my mouse saying 'mouse'. Disitinctions between things are more like borders of a country than anything else. They even become impossible to locate, it turns out, at the quantum level (as I found out today in my quantum lecture).

Then again, maybe there are 'things', at a very, very small level, and these make up the rest of the processes? I suppose we could say a process is changes in states of affairs over time.

[Dragar]

Goodness, this thread has everything! From 'what is truth?' to the origins of the universe and speculations of divine intervention, to quantum mechanics and subjectivism versus objectivism, and realism versus positivism (I think those are the right words), and then to Descartes meditations, the existence of the 'self' and the nature of reality and our perceptions. What next, I wonder?

[justaman]

Something about lizards, I should suspect. Or watermellon maybe.

[justaman]

Being less facetious, I'd be curious to hear if Zoot has made any conclusions about objective truth here as a result of these discussions...

For that matter I'm curious about how you view objective truth - Dragar aka Sheriff aka Dags (from Snatch, I love that movie) - given that you haven't really expounded on it, and it must surely be difficult to define if the universe cannot even be considered without someone measuring it...?

[Dragar]

For that matter I'm curious about how you view objective truth - Dragar aka Sheriff aka Dags (from Snatch, I love that movie) - given that you haven't really expounded on it, and it must surely be difficult to define if the universe cannot even be considered without someone measuring it...?

Right now? Damned if I know.

A Copehagen type-response would be 'such questions are uncientific. Now, shut up and calculate'.

A Many-Worlds type respnse would be, 'there are a vast number of possible worlds, each as real as the one we are in'.

A hidden variables response would be, 'objective truth exists, we just presently cannot access it'.

A quantum logic response would be, 'statements have three values; true, false and indeterminate'.

And so on.

You can see why I'm confused.

[justaman]

I'm still curious about your "if we aren't measuring forget about it" philosophy. I mean that's not really an answer, that's just Copenhagen saying "leave philosophy to the philosophers." Well you're both, so you don't get that luxury :P

Most physicists - as I understood it - do believe in an objective reality that exists apart from observation. I'm having a difficult time formalising how one can believe this and also believe that reality is not able to be considered if a human isn't around looking at it.

[Dragar]

I'm still curious about your "if we aren't measuring forget about it" philosophy. I mean that's not really an answer, that's just Copenhagen saying "leave philosophy to the philosophers." Well you're both, so you don't get that luxury

I know. There are two Copenhagen interpretations, I should add (yes, this is confusing). One is a reality where the wavefunction is real (which falls prey to Shrödinger's cat, and all the problems assoicated with collapse of the wavefunction).

The other has the wavefunction as merely representational of our knowledge. Which makes us ask: what's reality really like?

To which Bohr (one of the founders of the theory) responds:

"It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how Nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about Nature."

And under this scheme, what we can say is very little at all.

Most physicists - as I understood it - do believe in an objective reality that exists apart from observation.

You'd think so.

I'm having a difficult time formalising how one can believe this and also believe that reality is not able to be considered if a human isn't around looking at it.

Me too. I think they basically take the stance that it's not that reality doesn't exist - after all, mass and charge are still well defined. It's just that speaking of reality is meaningless, because we can't understand the quantum realm.

To me, this is one big dodge.

I asked my quantum physics lecturer, yesterday, about all this. He basically commented he took the view of the Copenhagen (wavefunction real varient) interpretation, but couldn't answer about Schrödinger's cat, wavefunction collapse or 'what constitutes a measurement'. Though he did acknowledge the problems. I pressed him a bit more, and he basically told me that this is a problem that has bugged people for ages, and there isn't any accepted answer on the issue.

[John Carter]

I think that there probably is an objective reality that is independent of human experience or observation, though I can't prove it. OTOH, I do not think it is possible to formulate any truly objective truths about that reality. The best we can do is reach some intersubjective consensus that hopefully is a close approximation.

[xouper]

John Carter: Here is a true statement for you Zoot:

The truth value of the Continuum Hypothesis is undecidable in ZFC Set Theory.
Well, if no one else will comment, I will. :)

Just goes to show that ZFC isn't sufficient to decide the CH. In other words, it may well be that the CH is decidable given other axioms.

On a related note, what do you think of Bukovsky's proof that Luzin's Hypothesis is also undecidable? I haven't actually seen it yet. Do you know where I can get a copy of that proof?

[Sweetie]

Here's the challenge. Try doubting your own existence. I mean really. Try it. If you can say, "I doubt my own existence," then who is doing the doubting? Descartes' original argument is that since someone (or something) is doing the mental activity of "doubting", then that someone (or something) exists. It is the one certainty you cannot deny.

I assume that that which doesn't exist cannot question it's own existence.

Perhaps further, but I haven't thought this through, that which doesn't think cannot question it's own existence.

[Sweetie]

I'm challenging the assumption a doubter is required to doubt, a runner to run, and thinker to think.

Square-circles? :chin:

[Sweetie]

But if I accept that reasoning, then it seems like I'd have to accept that all that I previously referred to as 'things' are really 'processes'. But if no 'things' exist, only processes, then what is a process?

Good one.

[Sweetie]

A hidden variables response would be, 'objective truth exists, we just presently cannot access it'.

I have a question though it may have little to do with what you are speaking of here.

Is this a valid possibility?

Objective truth may exist and we may already know something that is objectively true, but we have no way to prove it, that we know it or that it's objectively true.

This I think, would be consistent with what we call First Principles.

[Dragar]

I have a question though it may have little to do with what you are speaking of here.

Is this a valid possibility?

It's both a logical possibility, as well one unfalsified by experiment. The only thing going against it is that it appears to violate locality. This contradicts relativity. But then, so do a great many interpretations of quantum mechanics.

This I think, would be consistent with what we call First Principles.

I'm wary of placing too much confidence in what I think I know, but cannot prove (or provide good reasons to think are true). Such a thing often is called 'common sense' or 'intuition', neither of which seem to be terribly good standards to hold up models of reality to. Experiment is our only guideline.

[Zoot]

I think it's worth considering the origin of our very notion of "truth". For various reasons, I'm not a big fan of Kantianism (that there is a Truth behind our experiences that we can never know directly).

Consider this: "Any intelligible utterance is intelligible as an answer to a question, and the question sets the criteria for the truth value of the utterance."

[Dragar]

Sounds like quantum logic, Zoot.

I have no idea if that's correct, mind.

[Zoot]

It's just bringing back the dialogical, practical sense of truth that has been obscured by the focus on one particular flavour: propositional logic. It goes back to Heidegger's point that we see the world first as a collection of tools for us in our personal projects, and only secondarily as objects of scientific investigation. That's a reversal of modernity's characterisation of everything as things and material which we later reason can be used as tools.

My point is, we don't live in a world of propositional logic. We live in a world of "I'm tired, where's my coffee?" and "I wanna go up so I'll take the stairs".

[Dragar]

And the sucess of propositional logic in predicting the results of experiments is attributed to...?

[Zoot]

Well, that's the thing. It's not that propositional logic is wrong. It just doesn't necessarily have a monopoly.

[Dragar]

It certainly appears to have a monopoly when we look at the sciences, Zoot, all of which are founded on the notion of there being statements about an objective reality which are either true or false.

Then again, maybe this is what we're seeing in quantum mechanics; a break down of this true/false dichotomy. I really couldn't say.

[Zoot]

Certainly on the sciences, yes. But does science have a monopoly on truth?

[Dragar]

Heh. And how do I know if:

a) That question is an intelligible question?
b) What the truth values of statements which answer that question are?

[Zoot]

Exactly.

How about, "Science is one set of criteria for evaluating truth."

[Dragar]

How about, "Science is one set of criteria for evaluating truth."

I think we'd need to refine this a great deal. Science isn't a criteria so much as a method (though we might say that method contains certain assumptions about how to make evaluations), and we don't evaluate truth, we evaluate statements.

[Zoot]

I think we'd need to refine this a great deal. Science isn't a criteria so much as a method, and we don't evaluate truth, we evaluate statements.

I think that this is the crux of the matter. What if you're wrong about both those things? "Science isn't a set of criteria so much as a method" and "we don't evaluate truth, we evaluate statements"?

[Dragar]

I think that this is the crux of the matter. What if you're wrong about both those things? "Science isn't a set of criteria so much as a method" and "we don't evaluate truth, we evaluate statements"?

Alright. What alternative model do you propose? I'm unsure as to what 'truth' means outside of the context of an evaluation of a statement.

Edit: By 'what if you're wrong', were you asking 'what if those statements had the truth value 'false'?

[Zoot]

Well, let me rephrase what I said before:

"Science is a set of criteria for evaluating the truth value of a statement."

[Dragar]

"Science is a set of criteria for evaluating the truth value of a statement."

No, I'd still disagree, but only with your use of the word science.

I think that, for instance, we might be able to say 'Ockham's Razor is a criteria used in science for evaluating the truth value of a theory', where a thoery is a set of inter-related statements.

However, we often question the validity of such criteria for returning 'true' or 'false' correctly. Ockham's razor is something of a minefield.

I'd suggest science is a method which works partly by providing criteria to evaluate statements by using induction to evaluate earlier statements. For instance, we evaluate statements like 'bodies fall toward the ground at the same velocities, irrespective of mass', and we can then rule out theories which include the converse.

The criteria used in experiment is whether or not observations contradict or verify statements.

But now I need to sleep.

[Zoot]

I don't think that's quite what I meant by criteria, but I'll give the matter more thought.

[justaman]

What is truth in your estimation, Zoot? Perhaps this was covered somewhere, but your recent attempts at formalising science and truth seem to be assuming an accepted definition of truth.

Surely it truth must be something if not objective, at least relating to it?

[Zoot]

What is truth in your estimation, Zoot? Perhaps this was covered somewhere, but your recent attempts at formalising science and truth seem to be assuming an accepted definition of truth.

Surely it truth must be something if not objective, at least relating to it?

The problem with formulating a definition of truth, or even discussions regarding it, is that any intelligible utterance presupposes a notion of truth for its very intelligibility. So any argument about truth begs the question necessarily. I can say "truth is..." but the notion "is" refers back to an assumed notion of truth for its own meaning. You can't say "truth is X" without implicitly saying "in terms of X, truth is X". That's particularly obvious in one old definition of truth: "correspondence to the facts". Very handy.

I'm giving more thought to the matter.

[John Carter]

John Carter: Here is a true statement for you Zoot:

The truth value of the Continuum Hypothesis is undecidable in ZFC Set Theory.
Well, if no one else will comment, I will. :)

Just goes to show that ZFC isn't sufficient to decide the CH. In other words, it may well be that the CH is decidable given other axioms.


Of course. A lot of work has been done in recent years by set theorists to come up with just such a set of axioms. Woodin, for example, has proposed a new axiom that when added to ZFC would make the CH false.


On a related note, what do you think of Bukovsky's proof that Luzin's Hypothesis is also undecidable? I haven't actually seen it yet. Do you know where I can get a copy of that proof?

Sorry, I can't help you with that. I'm not familiar with that particular result.