Gawen
09-18-2004, 09:13 PM
The Wiemar Republik, German Unrest, and current Parallels to American Policy.
The prequel…a beginning for the end.
On 30 Sept. 1918 Ludendorff and Hindenburg told the Kaiser the war was lost. It was more than a century since Germany had suffered a military defeat. The Kaiser was not familiar with the procedure adopted in such circumstances. The Kaiser hung on, hoping that something would turn up which would make abdication unnecessary; at the least, something less than bowing out in a more or less undignified fashion. Thinking about the future was a not responsibility the Kaiser took on. Foresight had not been the outstanding characteristics of Wilhelm II and his courtiers. Under his rule “Prussianism’ had become a synonym for aggressiveness and arrogance, for a society in which the military caste enjoyed the highest social prestige. The landed aristocracy was still the ruling class although it had outlived whatever social, political and economic functions it had once possessed. In other words, Germany itself had become an intolerable anachronism.
Before the capitulation, the Prussian spirit had different connotations; service, selfless work, incorruptibility and other upstanding qualities. Germany before 1918 exuded confidence and optimism to a remarkable degree even though the great majority of the people inherited nothing, had no investments, enjoyed no security and a substantial part lived in poverty. But it was improving. These classes also shared the general mood of optimism.
Marx, after all, had demonstrated that as the socio-economic basis changed, the legal-ideological superstructure was bound to follow. The belief in progress, enlightenment and reason was deeply anchored in both the middle and working classes. Technological innovations justified their expectations. Happiness was the goal and apart from a few extremists, no one thought violence would be needed to achieve it. There had been no major war in Europe for more than 4 decades, nor had there been any large-scale civil disorder. Imperial Germany was not a free country, but it was not an oppressive cruel dictatorship. In comparing the dictatorships that emerged after WWI, Imperial Germany was a permissive country to an almost bewildering degree. There was very little weakness of character as Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg seemed to believe.
There had been at one time a fairly strong democratic tradition in Germany, but in recent generations it had grown progressively weaker. In 1918 the republic came to Germany as a foreign importation. Parliamentary democracy was considered un-German in right-wing circles, suitable perhaps for the French, but not for a nation which had always striven for wholeness and unity. Political parties were regarded at best as a necessary evil because they expressed only part of the popular will, had a divisive effect, and restricted the operations of a strong executive (without which few could envisage a state functioning). And even if it did manage to muddle through, it certainly could not pursue and manage a determined, purposeful foreign policy which, according to Bismarkian tradition, should always have primacy over domestic affairs.
What distressed the enemies of the new political system is that they had no faith in parliamentarism, in the popular will. They were unhappy about the absence of a central idea and a strong authority. Many Germans were romantic in their attitude towards the State. They longed for the good old days and since the Republik was so unromantic, it was considered malignant.
Certain ideas had been axiomatic in Germany before 1918. These concerned the civilizing mission of the German people, the evil intentions of its rivals, the need to secure a place in the sun. Above all, there was a deep seated belief in German military superiority. Astounding victories had been won against ‘a world of enemies’; the fact that the last decisive battle was lost, with all its implications, was impossible to accept. Hence the readiness to believe the invincible German army was stabbed in the back by its own domestic enemy. This allegation, made by Hindenburg (the future president) among others was factually untrue and even the grossest slander. The home front for more than four years accepted without grumbling countless sacrifices simply because it had been told to by military leaders of indifferent quality. Nevertheless, the ‘stab in the back’ legend was to part a central role in anti-republican propaganda during the Weimar years.
There were other myths concerning the ‘November criminals’- the men who signed the shameful Versailles treaty. Many were only too willing to believe in the existence of a ‘hidden hand’, of all powerful forces which had brought about Germany’s ruin. Millions had been killed and wounded in the war. Many more were killed during the blockade and embargos after the war. Such suffering gave rise to a great deal of brooding and political speculation. They searched for the cause. They searched for a scapegoat.
How does one explain the fact that institutions which had existed and thought to exist forever disappeared overnight, with barely a trace? How is it the old masters were suddenly replaced by new men with unfamiliar names? What foreign interests did they serve? How could they take the place once filled by Bismark, Gneisnau, Scharnhorst, or von Stein? Wide credence was given to ‘documents’ such as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that it was not the Germans who were to blame for the apocalyptic events in their country, but foreign plotters and agents who for a long time had been at work to bring about its downfall.
The armistice was signed on 11 November 1918 not by Hindenburg and Ludendorff, but by a man named Erzberger, a Catholic civilian creating a convenient alibi for the High Command. The new Republic was off to a bad start in more ways than one. The war was over but peace had not returned. Political, social and economic unrest, coups and assassinations were to mark the next five years.
One can see certain parallels of what happened in a few short years in Germany and what has happened and happening in America. None of the written above or what is yet to come denotes a consistency-like parallel. Change the names from Jews to Arabs, National Socialist to Religious-Right Republicans, Social Democrats to Ultra Liberals. America in recent times did not have the socio-economic collapse as Weimar Germany did. Nor are there coups d’ etats or political assassinations in recent American politics. America is taking its time. Germany back then was in a hurry. But it had no choice.
The prequel…a beginning for the end.
On 30 Sept. 1918 Ludendorff and Hindenburg told the Kaiser the war was lost. It was more than a century since Germany had suffered a military defeat. The Kaiser was not familiar with the procedure adopted in such circumstances. The Kaiser hung on, hoping that something would turn up which would make abdication unnecessary; at the least, something less than bowing out in a more or less undignified fashion. Thinking about the future was a not responsibility the Kaiser took on. Foresight had not been the outstanding characteristics of Wilhelm II and his courtiers. Under his rule “Prussianism’ had become a synonym for aggressiveness and arrogance, for a society in which the military caste enjoyed the highest social prestige. The landed aristocracy was still the ruling class although it had outlived whatever social, political and economic functions it had once possessed. In other words, Germany itself had become an intolerable anachronism.
Before the capitulation, the Prussian spirit had different connotations; service, selfless work, incorruptibility and other upstanding qualities. Germany before 1918 exuded confidence and optimism to a remarkable degree even though the great majority of the people inherited nothing, had no investments, enjoyed no security and a substantial part lived in poverty. But it was improving. These classes also shared the general mood of optimism.
Marx, after all, had demonstrated that as the socio-economic basis changed, the legal-ideological superstructure was bound to follow. The belief in progress, enlightenment and reason was deeply anchored in both the middle and working classes. Technological innovations justified their expectations. Happiness was the goal and apart from a few extremists, no one thought violence would be needed to achieve it. There had been no major war in Europe for more than 4 decades, nor had there been any large-scale civil disorder. Imperial Germany was not a free country, but it was not an oppressive cruel dictatorship. In comparing the dictatorships that emerged after WWI, Imperial Germany was a permissive country to an almost bewildering degree. There was very little weakness of character as Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg seemed to believe.
There had been at one time a fairly strong democratic tradition in Germany, but in recent generations it had grown progressively weaker. In 1918 the republic came to Germany as a foreign importation. Parliamentary democracy was considered un-German in right-wing circles, suitable perhaps for the French, but not for a nation which had always striven for wholeness and unity. Political parties were regarded at best as a necessary evil because they expressed only part of the popular will, had a divisive effect, and restricted the operations of a strong executive (without which few could envisage a state functioning). And even if it did manage to muddle through, it certainly could not pursue and manage a determined, purposeful foreign policy which, according to Bismarkian tradition, should always have primacy over domestic affairs.
What distressed the enemies of the new political system is that they had no faith in parliamentarism, in the popular will. They were unhappy about the absence of a central idea and a strong authority. Many Germans were romantic in their attitude towards the State. They longed for the good old days and since the Republik was so unromantic, it was considered malignant.
Certain ideas had been axiomatic in Germany before 1918. These concerned the civilizing mission of the German people, the evil intentions of its rivals, the need to secure a place in the sun. Above all, there was a deep seated belief in German military superiority. Astounding victories had been won against ‘a world of enemies’; the fact that the last decisive battle was lost, with all its implications, was impossible to accept. Hence the readiness to believe the invincible German army was stabbed in the back by its own domestic enemy. This allegation, made by Hindenburg (the future president) among others was factually untrue and even the grossest slander. The home front for more than four years accepted without grumbling countless sacrifices simply because it had been told to by military leaders of indifferent quality. Nevertheless, the ‘stab in the back’ legend was to part a central role in anti-republican propaganda during the Weimar years.
There were other myths concerning the ‘November criminals’- the men who signed the shameful Versailles treaty. Many were only too willing to believe in the existence of a ‘hidden hand’, of all powerful forces which had brought about Germany’s ruin. Millions had been killed and wounded in the war. Many more were killed during the blockade and embargos after the war. Such suffering gave rise to a great deal of brooding and political speculation. They searched for the cause. They searched for a scapegoat.
How does one explain the fact that institutions which had existed and thought to exist forever disappeared overnight, with barely a trace? How is it the old masters were suddenly replaced by new men with unfamiliar names? What foreign interests did they serve? How could they take the place once filled by Bismark, Gneisnau, Scharnhorst, or von Stein? Wide credence was given to ‘documents’ such as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that it was not the Germans who were to blame for the apocalyptic events in their country, but foreign plotters and agents who for a long time had been at work to bring about its downfall.
The armistice was signed on 11 November 1918 not by Hindenburg and Ludendorff, but by a man named Erzberger, a Catholic civilian creating a convenient alibi for the High Command. The new Republic was off to a bad start in more ways than one. The war was over but peace had not returned. Political, social and economic unrest, coups and assassinations were to mark the next five years.
One can see certain parallels of what happened in a few short years in Germany and what has happened and happening in America. None of the written above or what is yet to come denotes a consistency-like parallel. Change the names from Jews to Arabs, National Socialist to Religious-Right Republicans, Social Democrats to Ultra Liberals. America in recent times did not have the socio-economic collapse as Weimar Germany did. Nor are there coups d’ etats or political assassinations in recent American politics. America is taking its time. Germany back then was in a hurry. But it had no choice.