[davidm]

Originally Posted by Kael

I've been wanting to hear more about determinism and the possibilities of free will from a naturalist perspective, since a lot of the material on the topic involves the theological side, especially the reconciliation of free will with a perfectly omniscient deity.

Anyone know any good sources or books, or have any thoughts on the matter?

Here is one possible definition of free will: That I have the genuine ability to choose among genuinely available alternatives, in any given situation.

Here are some possible objections, running the gamut from theistic to naturalistic:

1. Today it is true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle. If it’s true today that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, nobody can do anything to prevent the sea battle from happening. So the participants in the battle have no option to refrain from doing battle.

2. Today God knows that tomorrow I will kill x. In fact, God knew this fact before I was ever born, indeed an eternity ago. Therefore I must kill x because I cannot do other than what the omniscient God infallibly foreknows, and have no genuine ability to refrain from killing x.

3. When he made the world, God knew all counterfactual worlds. There were worlds in which I kill x and worlds in which I don’t. God chose to make the world in which I kill x, and not the world in which I refrain from killing x. Therefore I have no choice but to kill x.

4. The world is causally deterministic. It is governed by physical law. If one could trace all the workings of cause and effect, one could predict in advance what I would do. Therefore I must do as the laws of physics dictate and have no genuine option to do otherwise.

5. The future exists, along with the past and present (indicated by relativity theory.) This means the future, just as much as the past, is fixed and unchangeable. I can no more change or affect the future than I can the past. So I have no free will.

6. The “I” does not exist. The Cartesian “I” is a convenient illusion cobbled up by brain states. What I choose to do, is decided by my subconscious even before I am aware of my choice. Free will presupposes a free agent, an “I”. If the “I” does not exist, then neither does free will.

And from here, one could start by wondering whether the definition of free will is a good one, and whether any of the arguments presented above against that definition, or perhaps against some modified definition, are successful arguments against free will.