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Originally Posted by Clutch Munny
Right. Any opponent of the war was already apt to be accused of loving Saddam. This made it difficult for anyone to articulate the realpolitik view that, monstrous as he was, Hussein headed (or comprised) one of two explicitly secular Islamic governments in the region, and, through his past belligerence and expansionism, served to fracture pan-Islamist sentiments. American political influence -- ie, working by tapping into a sense of common interest -- in the Persian Gulf and Middle East was never stronger than when Kuwait, the Saudis, Iran, Jordan and Israel were all frightened of Hussein.
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And, was not Saddam largely armed by American weaponry and American money, as a "counterweight" to a radicalized Iran?
Did not the American ambassador to Iraq prior to GW1 inform the Baathist government (i.e., Saddam et al) that the U.S. would not intervene in Iraq's military venture to reclaim Kuwait?
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Conjecture: Leaving him in power after GW1 might have been an abandonment of the Iraqi people to further despotism, but it also was a way of saying to the countries around Iraq: This guy can go back to being Your Problem anytime we feel like rolling back the sanctions. And lo, many years of low, low oil prices ensued.
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...most interesting. Particularly considering we armed him.
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Anyhow, the religious radicalization of Iraq will place that much more pressure on the secularists in Turkey, I expect.
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That's what I'd expect as well. All these considerations give credence to the objections that Senior Shrub had to the renewal of hostilities and unseating of Saddam.
It certainly sounds as though American policy set the U.S. up in a "damned if we do, damned if we don't" situation. Had internal opposition toppled Saddam, couldn't they have legitimately claimed that Saddam had been propped up by the U.S. and American interests?
godfry