Free will in philosphy and science

[GdB]

In the 'Revolution in thought' thread, the topic of free will came up repeatedly, because it is one of the cornerstones of Lessans' book: the idea that determinism makes free will impossible. This is said by many more, especially scientists and science addicts, but also by some philosophers. That said, a majority of philosophers adhere to compatibilism, the view that there is no contradiction between determinism and free will, provided one gets rid of some impossible metaphysical connotations normally attached to the idea of free will, like that somebody could have done otherwise under exactly the same conditions, including his brain state.

One of the reasons to see a conflict between determinism and free will, is that the relationship 'is determined' is seen as a relation of force: our past, in the form of my biology and personal history forces us to the one thing we do. This idea is attacked by several philosophers: by Norman Swartz, by the Swiss philosopher Peter Bieri, by Daniel Dennett, by Derek Parfit.

The idea is that laws of nature are not laws that force things to behave in a certain way, but are descriptions of how things just behave. There is no causal relationship from laws of nature to the events in nature, in fact it is the other way round: events cause some descriptions to be true. If some of these descriptions contain only generic descriptions, i.e. these descriptions apply also to other similar objects in similar situations (maybe endlessly many) then we have a law of nature. Or, as Swartz prefers to say, to get rid of the idea of a law governing processes, a 'grand physical truth'. Or in my own words: laws of nature describe how causation works for different classes of objects and processes, but they cause nothing themselves. True sentences just cause nothing.

This should already take the sting out of the idea that we are forced to do what do by our past. We do what we do, and there are true descriptions for it. To judge if an action was free or not we must look at in how far a person was really acting according to his own wishes and beliefs, or that he was coerced by somebody else. Also he may lack the fundamental capabilities for reflecting on his actions: to oversee possible consequences of his actions.

Now there is one point, where I cannot follow Swartz completely is on the following point:

First he states that that the number of physical laws for all practical purposes is infinite (The Concept of Physical Law, page 127). But the later he goes on:

But note: If I had chosen otherwise, that too, would have been determined. That choice, had I made it, would have, too, been subsumable under a timelessly true physical law, and would have been deducible from that law and a statement of antecedent conditions. Clearly, I could not choose both alternatives; but I could choose either. And in choosing the one, I ‘made’ it the one that was deducible from physical laws and antecedent conditions. But in every sense in which one could possibly want, I was free to choose the other.

For me that sounds a little bit too much like that my choice makes an until the present unknown physical law true. I don't think that there are infinite many physical laws. The idea of physics is to reduce the number of entities and physical laws as much as possible. So I would think that a true physical description of what I will do possibly already exists, but it is at a lower level (closer to the level of neurons, molecules, and atoms). For me Swartz is going one step too far here.

Another problem I have with Swartz is the idea of physical necessity (see here). It seems to me that something like physical necessity exists: given some conditions, the consequences are necessary. This of course does not mean that the laws under which we are able to describe the consequences force the consequences to occur. But as I understand Swartz, he concludes from the contingency of the conditions, the consequences are also contingent. But I think they are only contingent as far as the conditions are contingent. Given the truth of a set of conditions, the consequences are physically necessary.

[davidm]

Thanks for starting this thread, GdB. I started composing a response, but I've been working all day and now I'm savoring a nice IPA or five so I will try to post tomorrow!

[GdB]

Originally Posted by davidm

Thanks for starting this thread, GdB. I started composing a response, but I've been working all day and now I'm savoring a nice IPA or five so I will try to post tomorrow!

IPA?
Isopropanol? (Does not sound healthy...)

[Angakuk]

[davidm]

Originally Posted by Angakuk

Some nice IPAs there. Though I found the best IPAs are in Seattle. They even have gluten-free IPAs! Plus they have perfectly legal marijuana stores.

[Vivisectus]

The number of physical laws is for all practical purposes infinite.6
Adopt the view that laws
are nothing other than general statements of what happens, and one has the means to
accommodate free will. Human beings (and Martians) – as a sheer matter of fact – have evolved
to a sufficient degree of complexity that their behavior can be described only by a (potentially)
infinite set of laws. This situation may be as utterly determined as one could like, in the sense
that every action may be subsumable under one or more universal physical laws. But it also
allows human choice. I am presented with a difficult decision. There are strong arguments both
for and against choosing merged-gender mortality tables. I weigh the probable consequences; I
reflect on my principles of fairness; I look at previous similar, but not precisely the same,
precedents; I try to balance the cost-savings against the measures of outrage; and eventually I
decide. Nothing forced my decision, although it was completely determined in the sense of being
deducible from timelessly true physical laws and antecedent conditions. But note (and this is
perhaps my most important point and shows just how antithetical the Regularity account is to the
Autonomy account): If I had chosen otherwise, that is, had chosen instead that the sex-distinct
tables should be used, that choice, too, would have been determined. That choice, had I made it,
would have, too, been subsumable under a timelessly true physical law, and would have been
deducible from that law and a statement of antecedent conditions. Clearly, I could not choose
both alternatives; but I could choose either. And in choosing the one, I ‘made’ it the one that was
deducible from physical laws and antecedent conditions. But in every sense in which one could
possibly want, I was free to choose the other. I think Schwarz has a point though:

This guy is good fun I like his approach and I find this idea refreshing. It deals with the nagging feeling you sometimes get with some hard determinists, namely that they are just pushing a modal fallacy one step ahead of them at all times.

[GdB]

Originally Posted by Vivisectus

This guy is good fun I like his approach and I find this idea refreshing. It deals with the nagging feeling you sometimes get with some hard determinists, namely that they are just pushing a modal fallacy one step ahead of them at all times.

Nice you like him.

But also he is surely not the first to present this idea. But he is the most rigorous defender of this idea I know.

The same idea you can find e.g. in Raymond Smullyan's funny dialogue Is God a Taoist?

Mortal:
(...) Do I have free will?

God:
Yes.

Mortal:
Then why did you say I shouldn't have taken it for granted?

God:
Because you shouldn't. Just because something happens to be true, it does not follow that it should be taken for granted.

Mortal:
Anyway, it is reassuring to know that my natural intuition about having free will is correct. Sometimes I have been worried that determinists are correct.

God:
They are correct.

Mortal:
Wait a minute now, do I have free will or don't I?

God:
I already told you you do. But that does not mean that determinism is incorrect.

Mortal:
Well, are my acts determined by the laws of nature or aren't they?

God:
The word determined here is subtly but powerfully misleading and has contributed so much to the confusions of the free will versus determinism controversies. Your acts are certainly in accordance with the laws of nature, but to say they are determined by the laws of nature creates a totally misleading psychological image which is that your will could somehow be in conflict with the laws of nature and that the latter is somehow more powerful than you, and could "determine" your acts whether you liked it or not. But it is simply impossible for your will to ever conflict with natural law. You and natural law are really one and the same.

[thedoc]

The question of free will rests on where you draw the line. By this I mean which influences negate free will and which do not. If one claims that any influence negates free will, then that person in on the side of determinism. I all influences are allowed, and claimed that they do not effect free will, then that person is claiming complete free will. Neither side is completely correct and the actual position is somewhere in the middle, but the exact position is what is really being debated. Christianity claims that God has granted us free will to choose good or evil, but it is also claimed that God knows our decisions in advance. This is my only problem so far, that if our decisions are knowable, then how can those decisions be free? I have heard many arguments in support of this position, but I am not yet convinced, it just doesn't feel right, and I don't have any actual arguments either way.

I believe I'll need to find and read some of the material from the authors that have been referenced in this thread.

[GdB]

Originally Posted by thedoc

Christianity claims that God has granted us free will to choose good or evil, but it is also claimed that God knows our decisions in advance. This is my only problem so far, that if our decisions are knowable, then how can those decisions be free?

Why would there be a conflict? Let's look at 3 cases:

Case 1: Somebody (e.g. your spouse?) knows you very well. Somebody else asks some decision of yours, you weigh the arguments pro and contra, and then, when you tell what you have decided, your spouse says to you 'I knew you would decide that!'
Case 2: An astronomer counts down the moment for a total solar eclipse exactly '10...,4, 3, 2, 1, Totality!'. how did he do this: does this imply that he has power of the sun and the moon? Or does it imply that he has a perfect insight in how moon and sun move? Did his countdown have any influence on what is happening?
Case 3: A neurologist has a perfect neuro-imaging device, attached to a supercomputer. The same person as in case 1 asks your decision, but before you can do this, the neurologist writes down your decision. You say what you decided, and the neurologist shows what you have decided: he knew it in advance!

My idea, is that, as in case 2, there is an illusion of power. But in reality there is no power at all, you just decide what you otherwise would have done, if your spouse of the neurologist would not have been there.

The problem is that foresight seems to imply fatalism: but that is not the case. Say, God has perfect foresight, and knows exactly what you will do. What then? Can you lean back, and say to yourself, 'Well, when everything is fixed, then I must not care about anything'. The error is to think 'Whatever will happen, will happen whatever I decide'. and that is wrong of course. If God knows everything, he also knows how your thoughts develop and lead to your decision. Foresight is no denial of free will. Your thoughts and feelings are the causal prelude to what you decide, and your decision determines what you will do, and so has influence on what happens in the world. The possibility of foresight doesn't change that a bit.

'Trick Slattery however makes this error. I might look later again in his argument, and see where he takes a wrong turn. He is fully aware that determinism does not lead to fatalism, but I have to look up why he thinks foresight precludes free will.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by GdB

Why would there be a conflict? Let's look at 3 cases:

Case 1: Somebody (e.g. your spouse?) knows you very well. Somebody else asks some decision of yours, you weigh the arguments pro and contra, and then, when you tell what you have decided, your spouse says to you 'I knew you would decide that!'
Case 2: An astronomer counts down the moment for a total solar eclipse exactly '10...,4, 3, 2, 1, Totality!'. how did he do this: does this imply that he has power of the sun and the moon? Or does it imply that he has a perfect insight in how moon and sun move? Did his countdown have any influence on what is happening?
Case 3: A neurologist has a perfect neuro-imaging device, attached to a supercomputer. The same person as in case 1 asks your decision, but before you can do this, the neurologist writes down your decision. You say what you decided, and the neurologist shows what you have decided: he knew it in advance!

My idea, is that, as in case 2, there is an illusion of power. But in reality there is no power at all, you just decide what you otherwise would have done, if your spouse of the neurologist would not have been there.

The problem is that foresight seems to imply fatalism: but that is not the case. Say, God has perfect foresight, and knows exactly what you will do. What then? Can you lean back, and say to yourself, 'Well, when everything is fixed, then I must not care about anything'. The error is to think 'Whatever will happen, will happen whatever I decide'. and that is wrong of course. If God knows everything, he also knows how your thoughts develop and lead to your decision. Foresight is no denial of free will. Your thoughts and feelings are the causal prelude to what you decide, and your decision determines what you will do, and so has influence on what happens in the world. The possibility of foresight doesn't change that a bit.

'Trick Slattery however makes this error. I might look later again in his argument, and see where he takes a wrong turn. He is fully aware that determinism does not lead to fatalism, but I have to look up why he thinks foresight precludes free will.

I'll help you out.

Determinism vs. Fatalism - InfoGraphic (a comparison)

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by GdB

Why would there be a conflict? Let's look at 3 cases:

Case 1: Somebody (e.g. your spouse?) knows you very well. Somebody else asks some decision of yours, you weigh the arguments pro and contra, and then, when you tell what you have decided, your spouse says to you 'I knew you would decide that!'
Case 2: An astronomer counts down the moment for a total solar eclipse exactly '10...,4, 3, 2, 1, Totality!'. how did he do this: does this imply that he has power of the sun and the moon? Or does it imply that he has a perfect insight in how moon and sun move? Did his countdown have any influence on what is happening?
Case 3: A neurologist has a perfect neuro-imaging device, attached to a supercomputer. The same person as in case 1 asks your decision, but before you can do this, the neurologist writes down your decision. You say what you decided, and the neurologist shows what you have decided: he knew it in advance!

My idea, is that, as in case 2, there is an illusion of power. But in reality there is no power at all, you just decide what you otherwise would have done, if your spouse of the neurologist would not have been there.

The problem is that foresight seems to imply fatalism: but that is not the case. Say, God has perfect foresight, and knows exactly what you will do. What then? Can you lean back, and say to yourself, 'Well, when everything is fixed, then I must not care about anything'. The error is to think 'Whatever will happen, will happen whatever I decide'. and that is wrong of course. If God knows everything, he also knows how your thoughts develop and lead to your decision. Foresight is no denial of free will. Your thoughts and feelings are the causal prelude to what you decide, and your decision determines what you will do, and so has influence on what happens in the world. The possibility of foresight doesn't change that a bit.

'Trick Slattery however makes this error. I might look later again in his argument, and see where he takes a wrong turn. He is fully aware that determinism does not lead to fatalism, but I have to look up why he thinks foresight precludes free will.

As I have stated, I have heard most of the arguments before, and I understand them intellectually, but the idea just doesn't feel right and I can't quite yet define what is bothering me. I'll read your examples again, and if you could expound a bit more, perhaps something will click and I'll be able to state just what I find to be the problem. There have been many times when I have had a poorly defined and stated idea in mind, and then I read something that clearly stated what I was thinking. Either I'm not thinking clearly about it, or I have too many other distractions to focus on it as much as needed. I'm reminded of a Sherlock Holmes story "The Hound Of the Baskervilles" where Sir Henry says, "This puzzle takes more thinking than I can give it".

[peacegirl]

The number of physical laws is for all practical purposes infinite.6
Adopt the view that laws
are nothing other than general statements of what happens, and one has the means to
accommodate free will. Human beings (and Martians) – as a sheer matter of fact – have evolved
to a sufficient degree of complexity that their behavior can be described only by a (potentially)
infinite set of laws. This situation may be as utterly determined as one could like, in the sense
that every action may be subsumable under one or more universal physical laws. But it also
allows human choice. I am presented with a difficult decision. There are strong arguments both
for and against choosing merged-gender mortality tables. I weigh the probable consequences; I
reflect on my principles of fairness; I look at previous similar, but not precisely the same,
precedents; I try to balance the cost-savings against the measures of outrage; and eventually I
decide. Nothing forced my decision, although it was completely determined in the sense of being
deducible from timelessly true physical laws and antecedent conditions. But note (and this is
perhaps my most important point and shows just how antithetical the Regularity account is to the
Autonomy account): If I had chosen otherwise, that is, had chosen instead that the sex-distinct
tables should be used, that choice, too, would have been determined. That choice, had I made it,
would have, too, been subsumable under a timelessly true physical law, and would have been
deducible from that law and a statement of antecedent conditions. Clearly, I could not choose
both alternatives; but I could choose either. And in choosing the one, I ‘made’ it the one that was
deducible from physical laws and antecedent conditions. But in every sense in which one could
possibly want, I was free to choose the other.

100% wrong! Let me correct this statement: In every sense in which you could possibly want, you were NOT free to choose the other.

Statement One:

That choice, had I made it,
would have, too, been subsumable under a timelessly true physical law, and would have been
deducible from that law and a statement of antecedent conditions. Clearly, I could not choose
both alternatives; but I could choose either...

Either option is available to you, but you could not choose either option, as if they are both equal in value. That would make meaningless any kind of reasoning to determine what is the best choice in your eyes. As long as there are meaningful differences between A and B, they do not hold equal weight otherwise it would be like choosing A or A. This natural law does not force anything on you that you yourself don't want. You are presented with certain alternatives where you make a choice based on your particular circumstances rendering the other choice impossible under those same exact circumstances. If it were a free choice you could choose one or the other equally, but this is impossible as long as there are meaningful differences between them. What is the point of contemplation if not to decide which option is the most preferable? There is no conflict with the idea that natural laws are descriptive, but that in no way means we have free will.

Conclusion:

But in every sense in which one could
possibly want, I was free to choose the other.

This is the most unscientific of all conclusions. This is done for obvious reasons (to squeeze free will in somehow, someway) but has no scientific basis to support it.

[davidm]

For Swartz, saying that the universe is “determined” is just to say that it is subsumable under physical “laws.” But these laws take their truth from what actually happens, rather than imposing what happens.

It may well be that the universe is physically “determined” in the sense that past, present and future all exist. The past and future don’t exist now, of course; they exist in their own temporal locations, just as there are a multiplicity of different “heres.” My “here” is an indexical: I call your here “there,” while you, in your own “here,” call my “here” your “there.” So temporal locations are like spatial locations: they are indexicals. The theory of relativity suggests that past, present and future all exist, because time is welded to space under the theory.

If the past, present and future all exist in this indexical sense, then every event is fixed and it is as futile to change the present or future as it is to change the past.

This fact, if it is a fact, does not obviate free will, since if the future (and present and past) are fixed and ineradicable, it was, is, and will be, fixed in part by you and what you freely did/do/will do. There is an intuition that for free will to prevail, it is necessary that we be able somehow to change at least the present or the future, if not the past. This is not necessary. We do not and cannot change the past, present or future, but by acting freely within the limits of our abilities, we contribute to making the past, present and future be what they actually were, are, and will be.

[GdB]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I agree this is difficult to understand. And also, as I read it, it might be wrong.

Davidm: what do you think. Do you agree, or do you think, as I do, that Swartz goes one step too far?
One reading of course could be to rigorously apply the idea that the 'woulds' and 'coulds' are to be read in the hypothetical sense. Then it would mean that we have to imagine that another set of 'grand physical truths' would be the case.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Either option is available to you, but you could not choose either option, as if they are both equal in value. That would make meaningless any kind of reasoning to determine what is the best choice in your eyes. As long as there are meaningful differences between A and B, they do not hold equal weight otherwise it would be like choosing A or A. This natural law does not force anything on you that you yourself don't want. You are presented with certain alternatives where you make a choice based on your particular circumstances rendering the other choice impossible under those same exact circumstances.

Sorry, this is a straw man: I never, never, NEVER defended that under exactly the same circumstances, with the same brain state, I possibly would do something else. You cannot attack compatibilism in this way, because it doesn't say that. Compatbilism says that the the 'could have done otherwise' must be read in the hypothetical sense, and then claims:
- that this reading is completely consistent with determinism
- that this reading is a sufficient pillar of assigning free will to people

Only when you can show that at least one of these is wrong, you are seriously attacking the idea of compatibilist free will.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

This is the most unscientific of all conclusions. This is done for obvious reasons (to squeeze free will in somehow, someway) but has no scientific basis to support it.

Any thought based on the idea that we could replay the universe with exactly the same conditions and 'grand physical truths' is unscientific. So is yours, because it is also based on this idea.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by GdB

I agree this is difficult to understand. And also, as I read it, it might be wrong.

Davidm: what do you think. Do you agree, or do you think, as I do, that Swartz goes one step too far?
One reading of course could be to rigorously apply the idea that the 'woulds' and 'coulds' are to be read in the hypothetical sense. Then it would mean that we have to imagine that another set of 'grand physical truths' would be the case.

That is why the problem doesn't evaporate by a change of definition.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Either option is available to you, but you could not choose either option, as if they are both equal in value. That would make meaningless any kind of reasoning to determine what is the best choice in your eyes. As long as there are meaningful differences between A and B, they do not hold equal weight otherwise it would be like choosing A or A. This natural law does not force anything on you that you yourself don't want. You are presented with certain alternatives where you make a choice based on your particular circumstances rendering the other choice impossible under those same exact circumstances.

Originally Posted by GdB

Sorry, this is a straw man: I never, never, NEVER defended that under exactly the same circumstances, with the same brain state, I possibly would do something else. You cannot attack compatibilism in this way, because it doesn't say that. Compatbilism says that the 'could have done otherwise' must be read in the hypothetical sense, and then claims:
- that this reading is completely consistent with determinism
- that this reading is a sufficient pillar of assigning free will to people

Only when you can show that at least one of these is wrong, you are seriously attacking the idea of compatibilist free will.

You are talking gobbledygook. Hypothetical imaginings cannot claim:

-that this reading is completely consistent with determinism...or
-that this reading is a sufficient pillar of assigning free will to people.

Let's stick with the universal facts GdB. You cannot fit free will into this logic anywhere. It's like trying to fit a square into a hole.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

This is the most unscientific of all conclusions. This is done for obvious reasons (to squeeze free will in somehow, someway) but has no scientific basis to support it.

Originally Posted by GdB

Any thought based on the idea that we could replay the universe with exactly the same conditions and 'grand physical truths' is unscientific. So is yours, because it is also based on this idea.

We cannot replay the universe which requires going back in time. Therefore, free will will always remain a theory. There is no scientific data to prove that the free will defined by compatibilists is anything more than a play on words to try and justify holding people morally accountable.

[GdB]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That is why the problem doesn't evaporate by a change of definition.

Really? Why? Explain!

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You are talking gobbledygook. Hypothetical imaginings cannot claim:

-that this reading is completely consistent with determinism...or
-that this reading is a sufficient pillar of assigning free will to people.

You are too stupid to:
- understand counterfactual analysis of causation
- understand the difference between categorical and hypothetical. Did you read the text of Parfit? If so, then please explain. If not, then please stop posting here about things you do not understand anything about.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

We cannot replay the universe which requires going back in time.

Exactly. Therefore we will never know if we have exactly the same conditions, exactly the same will happen. It is a two sided sword, PG.

[But]

That assumes a compatibilist meaning of free will, doesn't it?

[davidm]

Originally Posted by But

That assumes a compatibilist meaning of free will, doesn't it?

It doesn’t actually assume compatibilism; it’s simply a logical demonstration that there can be no conflict between what we call determinism and what we style free will. Swartz himself writes that while the solution can be seen as “compatibilist” in a certain sense, this sense seems kind of superfluous, like saying that “doubts and itches should co-exist.” Why shouldn’t doubts and itches co-exist? I think the Swartzian logical reconstruction of the age-old problem is best described as eliminativist, rather than compatibilist: There is no threat of incompatibilism in the first place, any more than one should worry about incompatibilism between doubts and itches.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by davidm

It doesn’t actually assume compatibilism; it’s simply a logical demonstration that there can be no conflict between what we call determinism and what we style free will. Swartz himself writes that while the solution can be seen as “compatibilist” in a certain sense, this sense seems kind of superfluous, like saying that “doubts and itches should co-exist.” Why shouldn’t doubts and itches co-exist? I think the Swartzian logical reconstruction of the age-old problem is best described as eliminativist, rather than compatibilist: There is no threat of incompatibilism in the first place, any more than one should worry about incompatibilism between doubts and itches.

No one is saying we don't have a choice given our ability to pick among a number of options every minute of the day. No incompatibilist or hard determinist is taking this human ability away as if to say we necessarily must choose a certain option in advance of that choice, which is no choice at all. Moreover, no one is denying God's foreknowledge as to what those choices will be whether you choose x or y. Again, being able to choose x or y does not give you a free will that co-exists with determinism. You have conveniently conflated the meaning of "choice" that we all have whenever we consider between two or more alternatives, with "free" choice, which none of us have because we cannot choose that which gives us lesser satisfaction under those exact circumstances. You then conclude that the entire free will/determinism debate is solved by Swartzian logical reconstruction of an age-old problem. Unfortunately, it doesn't solve anything. It just helps us to see that we are not pre-programmed robots; that we do have choices. Who is arguing with that? Not the determinists I know. What a silly strawman!

[But]

Originally Posted by davidm

It doesn’t actually assume compatibilism; it’s simply a logical demonstration that there can be no conflict between what we call determinism and what we style free will. Swartz himself writes that while the solution can be seen as “compatibilist” in a certain sense, this sense seems kind of superfluous, like saying that “doubts and itches should co-exist.” Why shouldn’t doubts and itches co-exist? I think the Swartzian logical reconstruction of the age-old problem is best described as eliminativist, rather than compatibilist: There is no threat of incompatibilism in the first place, any more than one should worry about incompatibilism between doubts and itches.

It should very much depend on what we mean by "free will"; I don't see how it could be independent from that. The whole thing invoking an omniscient God is basically time travel and equivalent to assuming determinism. If the result isn't predetermined by an earlier state, there is nothing for any God to foreknow. The time travel is a constraint that ensures determinism, assuming a unique history.

[davidm]

Originally Posted by But

It should very much depend on what we mean by "free will"; I don't see how it could be independent from that. The whole thing invoking an omniscient God is basically time travel and equivalent to assuming determinism. If the result isn't predetermined by an earlier state, there is nothing for any God to foreknow. The time travel is a constraint that ensures determinism, assuming a unique history.

I’m not quite sure I grasp your objection here, but look: Whether the future is pre-determined, or determined, or just open, I think is off the point. Regardless of how we regard the future — existent or just potential yet open — the point stands.

We don’t need to invoke God at all; God is just a special (epistemic) thought experiment that is a subset of Aristotle’s problem of future contingents, also known as logical determinism.

The question is: Can there be true statements today, about future contingent events? And if so, what, if anything, does that imply?

Suppose today I utter the following statement: “Tomorrow, there will be a sea battle.” And then tomorrow comes and a sea battle indeed takes place, so my statement today was true about an event tomorrow.

Does that mean the sea battle had to happen?

[But]

Originally Posted by davidm

I’m not quite sure I grasp your objection here, but look: Whether the future is pre-determined, or determined, or just open, I think is off the point. Regardless of how we regard the future — existent or just potential yet open — the point stands.

We don’t need to invoke God at all; God is just a special (epistemic) thought experiment that is a subset of Aristotle’s problem of future contingents, also known as logical determinism.

The question is: Can there be true statements today, about future contingent events? And if so, what, if anything, does that imply?

Suppose today I utter the following statement: “Tomorrow, there will be a sea battle.” And then tomorrow comes and a sea battle indeed takes place, so my statement today was true about an event tomorrow.

Does that mean the sea battle had to happen?

Whether the statement is true today depends on whether the world is deterministic or not. If it isn't, the truth value of that statement isn't defined the moment it's made. If you bring an omniscient God into the picture, you assume the statement has to be true ahead of time, thereby ensuring determinism.

[But]

I just remembered why I don't usually get into these discussions. All I see is endless meandering semantic games that people have been playing for centuries.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by But

I just remembered why I don't usually get into these discussions. All I see is endless meandering semantic games that people have been playing for centuries.

Compatibilism is a semantic game. It says we are not free because we could not do otherwise, and in the same breath it says we are free because we have choices. What they are saying is that we can squeeze free will in if the choice made is not a responsible one, because they could have chosen otherwise given their ability for rational thought. This completely negates determinism. It cancels it out yet they try to say this kind of free will is not the libertarian kind, so it doesn't cancel anything out. No wonder it makes your head spin.

[JoeP]

Originally Posted by But

I just remembered why I don't usually get into these discussions. All I see is endless meandering semantic games that people have been playing for centuries.

And yet you still visited this thread. What does that tell you about free will?