What are humans worth?

[viscousmemories]

Originally Posted by trendkill

The reason I value a human life more than an ant life is because I see all humans, or possibly any being that can interact on a moral level (recent talk about gorillas at a certain other forum has been quite illuminating), as part of a community that I am also a part of, and membership in which carries certain obligations. Beings that can't interact in such a way, I may still feel sympathy for, but I will not act towards them in the same way as I would toward a "person", so it would be meaningful to say I don't value them as much.

Do you mean beings who can, or for whom the potential exists or existed? In other words, can a child - or someone who is mentally impaired - be said to be able to "interact on a moral level", or do they just have the past or future potential?

[trendkill]

Children and the mentally impaired are still related to the moral community by blood, they are emotionally inextricable from that community, so I see them as members. Gorillas, on the other hand, would be more difficult to predict. Biff the Unclean says the average gorilla has enough innate intelligence to communicate with humans through language--but their society in the wild doesn't seem to have that feature. We are still forced to treat them like uncommunicative animals, for the most part, it seems. I suppose that in practice, I only really see gorillas as people if they can already talk. And even then, species prejudice interferes to a degree.

[viscousmemories]

Originally Posted by trendkill

Children and the mentally impaired are still related to the moral community by blood, they are emotionally inextricable from that community, so I see them as members.

Hmm... that doesn't make any sense to me. What correlation is there between emotions, blood, and morals?

[trendkill]

Originally Posted by viscousmemories

Hmm... that doesn't make any sense to me. What correlation is there between emotions, blood, and morals?

Let's break down that question. What is the connection between emotions and "blood"? Well, if that isn't obvious, I don't know if I'm up to the task of explaining. People have emotional attachments to those they are related to.

Now, a morality statement is basically a statement about how people should behave. If you feel a certain way about someone, that dictates ways in which you think you should behave towards them. There's the moral connection.

[viscousmemories]

Originally Posted by trendkill

Let's break down that question. What is the connection between emotions and "blood"? Well, if that isn't obvious, I don't know if I'm up to the task of explaining. People have emotional attachments to those they are related to.

Now, a morality statement is basically a statement about how people should behave. If you feel a certain way about someone, that dictates ways in which you think you should behave towards them. There's the moral connection.

Hmm... well that doesn't really answer my question at all, so I suppose I just wasn't clear. Let me try again. First, you said (emphasis mine):

The reason I value a human life more than an ant life is because I see all humans, or possibly any being that can interact on a moral level (recent talk about gorillas at a certain other forum has been quite illuminating), as part of a community that I am also a part of, and membership in which carries certain obligations.

Since I wasn't sure if you were talking about beings with the potential to "interact on a moral level" or the actual ability to do so, I said:

Originally Posted by vm

Do you mean beings who can, or for whom the potential exists or existed? In other words, can a child - or someone who is mentally impaired - be said to be able to "interact on a moral level", or do they just have the past or future potential?

To which you replied:

Children and the mentally impaired are still related to the moral community by blood, they are emotionally inextricable from that community, so I see them as members.

I asked you what the connection was not because I don't understand what 'blood', 'emotional' and 'moral' mean. So your answer didn't really help me any. What I don't understand is how you have come to the conclusion that all beings who share a common genetic makeup (humans, in this case) comprise a "moral community" which is inextricably emotionally linked. I honestly don't see any difference between that answer and saying, "Why do we value humans more? Because humans are more valuable".

Are humans all part of the "moral community"? What is the main component of the "moral community"? Is it the potential to make moral judgements, the actual ability, or something else? Can someone who is mentally impaired be said to be capable of making moral judgements? If so, how? If not, why do they still count as part of the moral community? Because they have the same genetic makeup? If the main component is something else, what is it?

I understand if that's too many questions, but that's really just a start. Perhaps I'm just obfuscating what really is a very simple and obvious point you're trying to make but if so I really am not getting it.

[trendkill]

Maybe this will help: the problem seems to be that you are trying to find a single property, that I claim the entire community shares, one property that makes me value all the beings that I value and is lacking from all the beings that I don't value as much. The problem is, I don't think there is one. There are at least two (species relationship and the ability to interact morally), and maybe more, and all are not always present in a given member of the community. In fact, the moral component is missing from every single member of the community at least some of the time (when they are unconscious, for example).

The "moral community" is actually the main thing that makes me treat some beings different from others, which is why I mentioned it. But, moral ability is not enough by itself. A community is a real, physical thing, not some philosophical abstraction, and it has to sustain itself. This means that there have to be beings in the community that aren't moral, or else there is no community, period. So what happens is, we end up treating certain non-moral beings as if they were moral beings, either because they used to be moral beings, or because they will be such beings in the future, or because they have relatives that are.

So it may seem like I'm obfuscating or changing my answer when I point first at morality and then at genetic relationships, but in reality, it's just that the thing I value is ill-defined. (As is almost everything, when you get right down to it.)

[viscousmemories]

Originally Posted by trendkill

Maybe this will help: the problem seems to be that you are trying to find a single property, that I claim the entire community shares, one property that makes me value all the beings that I value and is lacking from all the beings that I don't value as much. The problem is, I don't think there is one. There are at least two (species relationship and the ability to interact morally), and maybe more, and all are not always present in a given member of the community. In fact, the moral component is missing from every single member of the community at least some of the time (when they are unconscious, for example).

Ahhh. Yes that does help me understand where you're coming from, thanks.

The "moral community" is actually the main thing that makes me treat some beings different from others, which is why I mentioned it. But, moral ability is not enough by itself. A community is a real, physical thing, not some philosophical abstraction, and it has to sustain itself. This means that there have to be beings in the community that aren't moral, or else there is no community, period. So what happens is, we end up treating certain non-moral beings as if they were moral beings, either because they used to be moral beings, or because they will be such beings in the future, or because they have relatives that are. So it may seem like I'm obfuscating or changing my answer when I point first at morality and then at genetic relationships, but in reality, it's just that the thing I value is ill-defined. (As is almost everything, when you get right down to it.)

Fair enough. It makes a lot more sense to me now, anyway.