Free will in philosphy and science

[But]

Originally Posted by davidm

Right. The argument that God's foreknowledge of events does not cause events is formalized by modal logic -- I've already done it in this very thread.

So in that sense the centuries-old argument anticipates that which was much later formalized.

But then, I don't expect you to grasp this, because it's increasingly evident that you're not very bright.

That the argument was formalized later and that the argument anticipates modal logic are two quite different things, no?

[But]

Originally Posted by davidm

St. Anselm's ontological argument can also be modalized, though it may be a stretch to say the style of his argument anticipated its formulation in modal terms. One person who gave a modal configuration of the Anselm argument was Kurt Gödel, who must have been a very stupid man by But's "lights."

Stupid? No. Batshit insane, maybe. The God proof is probably one of the few examples of dumb shit he did, starving himself to death being another one.

[GdB]

Originally Posted by But

Why don't you try to jump to the moon? Every time you fall down, you can try to convince yourself that you weren't "forced" to do that.

It is not for nothing you put forced between quotes. You happen to have a physical body, i.e. have mass, and masses tend to move to each other. So in Swartz' vocabulary it is a 'grand physical truth' that massive bodies move as described by the law of gravitation. This is a fact about nature.

So it seems that you think free will must imply the overruling of facts. Only a definition of free will, as 'hyper-ultimate free will', that is capable of overruling grand physical truths, counts as free will for you. But this is just another form of the naive argument against free will that you cannot do something that is physically impossible. You are not free to float in the air, so you are not free.

What you also oversee is that the word forced is anthropomorphic: it can only be used where somebody intentionally forces you to do something. In general physical truths, such an intention simply does not exist. You, as a physical body, move exactly the same in gravity as any other physical body.

Originally Posted by But

And what we mean by free will in daily life is almost certainly a psychological illusion anyway; we feel we have the freedom to choose even when our brain has already made a decision.

What is the difference between you and your functioning brain? Does free will imply that for every act first there is consciousness, and then the action? I can assure you that many sport achievements would be impossible if we had to make conscious decisions first. And if you are driving your car, talking with your duo passenger, you will do many things unconsciously, like shifting gears, throttling gas when the care in front of you slows down, turn right, etc etc. Does that mean you did these things not from your free will?

You forget the context of Libet's experiments: one had to flex his hand spontaneously, for no reason at all (but only after the research subjects were extensionally instructed about what to do... Did they do this unconscious too), at some unexpected moment. Is this a good example of something you do from free will? Or is you driving to the supermarket because you want to buy beer a better example? And know what: when you drive to the supermarket I could predict your behaviour very well. But does that capability of mine says anything about the question if you drive there from your own free will? Then why does the capability of Libet to measure a 'ready-potential' in the brain before people report their conscious decision say something about my free will?

The only thing Libet's experiments prove is that we don't have a non-physical soul that interferes with the physics of my brain. for naturalists this is no surprise. On the contrary, for a naturalist it would be astonishing if Libet would have found something else.

The daily meaning of free will is simply 'being able to do what you want'. It is a purely metaphysical addition that it implies 'could have done otherwise under exactly the same circumstances, including your brain state', or that acts of will must magically appear in the brain. In practice we know very well when an action was coerced, or of somebody's free will. There is no reason to extend this meaning to 'metaphysical spheres'. Everybody knows the difference between offering somebody money, or being forced at gun point. Only when some people get philosophical they intend not to know this difference anymore, and claim that both actions are the same because everything is determined.

Philosophical ideas that one defends, but does not adhere to in daily life are bloodless lies, and just silly word games.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by Angakuk

It may be the case that I have not done my homework, whatever it is that you conceive that to be. However, it is clear that you have failed to do your homework before making sweeping statements about what Christianity has to say with regard to the freedom of the will. The nature of the human will and the extent to which it may be said to free or not free has long been a point of contention within Christian circles.

Knowing your preference for videos over actually reading books I cordially refer you to "Free Will is a Downright LIE!" - MARTIN LUTHER - On The Bondage of the Will. - Introduction. - YouTube Be warned, there are 17 videos in this series.

For a summary of the key elements of the debate between Erasmus and Luther over the freedom of the will I refer you to this wikipedia article.

I will listen to the videos, but the general tenor that most religions express is that we have the free will to choose good over evil. God is not responsible for our evil choices.

Does The Bible Teach Free Will?

By: Clark Gallagher

Bible Verses Powered by RefTagger

Introduction

Does the Bible teach free will? The importance of asking this question lies in the fact that the doctrine of free will is so widely taught by Pastors and ascribed to by their congregations. Because of this fact we are bound by Scripture to test this teaching (1 Th 5:21; 1 Cor 4:6; 2 Cor 10:5) by Scripture. We must not readily accept any teaching (regardless of who teaches it or what sense it makes to us), until it is demonstrated that it agrees with what the Bible teaches.

Several times in the Pastoral Epistles the Apostle Paul makes mention of sound doctrine. The Greek word most commonly translated as sound in the Pastoral Epistles is u`giainw (hugiaino). Sound doctrine is teaching that is free from error and that produces spiritual health and godliness. Therefore, using the Bible as our sole authoritative guide on doctrinal and moral issues, any teaching which is found in conflict with the Scriptures is in error and will lead to spiritual sickness, ungodliness, and possibly even damnable heresy.

How we answer the question of whether or not the Bible teaches free will significantly affects our view of the inspiration of Scripture, our understanding of God, man, evangelism, and salvation. This issue is not a dry academic discussion which is important only to theologians and philosophers. Rather, it is instead a vitally relevant issue which must be engaged by all who name the name of Christ. Those who neglect discussing and deciding the issue of free will (in the name that it is divisive or unspiritual), are anything but spiritual or mature, and need to get on track with what Scripture teaches.

Defining Our Terms

cont. at: Free Will

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by GdB

It is not for nothing you put forced between quotes. You happen to have a physical body, i.e. have mass, and masses tend to move to each other. So in Swartz' vocabulary it is a 'grand physical truth' that massive bodies move as described by the law of gravitation. This is a fact about nature.

So it seems that you think free will must imply the overruling of facts. Only a definition of free will, as 'hyper-ultimate free will', that is capable of overruling grand physical truths, counts as free will for you. But this is just another form of the naive argument against free will that you cannot do something that is physically impossible. You are not free to float in the air, so you are not free.

What you also oversee is that the word forced is anthropomorphic: it can only be used where somebody intentionally forces you to do something. In general physical truths, such an intention simply does not exist. You, as a physical body, move exactly the same in gravity as any other physical body.

What is the difference between you and your functioning brain? Does free will imply that for every act first there is consciousness, and then the action? I can assure you that many sport achievements would be impossible if we had to make conscious decisions first. And if you are driving your car, talking with your duo passenger, you will do many things unconsciously, like shifting gears, throttling gas when the care in front of you slows down, turn right, etc etc. Does that mean you did these things not from your free will?

You forget the context of Libet's experiments: one had to flex his hand spontaneously, for no reason at all (but only after the research subjects were extensionally instructed about what to do... Did they do this unconscious too), at some unexpected moment. Is this a good example of something you do from free will? Or is you driving to the supermarket because you want to buy beer a better example? And know what: when you drive to the supermarket I could predict your behaviour very well. But does that capability of mine says anything about the question if you drive there from your own free will? Then why does the capability of Libet to measure a 'ready-potential' in the brain before people report their conscious decision say something about my free will?

The only thing Libet's experiments prove is that we don't have a non-physical soul that interferes with the physics of my brain. for naturalists this is no surprise. On the contrary, for a naturalist it would be astonishing if Libet would have found something else.

The daily meaning of free will is simply 'being able to do what you want'.

Being able to do what you want does not grant free will even though that's what most people believe superficially. I can choose whatever I want, which is true, but this is a superficial understanding since what one wants to do is controlled by one's impulses, experiences, heredity, and predispositions. This is the program running in the background that drives one's choices.

Originally Posted by GdB

It is a purely metaphysical addition that it implies 'could have done otherwise under exactly the same circumstances, including your brain state', or that acts of will must magically appear in the brain. In practice we know very well when an action was coerced, or of somebody's free will. There is no reason to extend this meaning to 'metaphysical spheres'. Everybody knows the difference between offering somebody money, or being forced at gun point. Only when some people get philosophical they intend not to know this difference anymore, and claim that both actions are the same because everything is determined.

They are not different in quality, only degree. Even with a gun to one's head, a person has the choice to listen to the demands of his attacker, or not. You cannot create a free will for someone who IS NOT being threatened and one who is being forced if he IS being threatened. The one who is threatened is still contemplating which choice will be the most preferable in the difficult circumstances he is in. He still has a choice to make, and that choice still belongs to him. He may find it preferable to keep quiet if he knows his family will be hurt by giving the money, or he may find it preferable to give the money in order to save himself from getting shot. This is no different than someone contemplating whether he wants to go to college or trade school, or something as trivial as contemplating what to eat for breakfast. They seem different because some choices are so obviously superior in value that there is no hesitation to decide which is preferable, and others take more time, but it doesn't change the fact that we are always moving in the direction of what gives us greater satisfaction than the previous position. Each choice we make --- when there are meaningful differences involved --- are made through contemplation, through weighing the pros and cons of each choice, but only one choice is possible and that is the one that is determined to be the most preferable.

Originally Posted by GdB

Philosophical ideas that one defends, but does not adhere to in daily life are bloodless lies, and just silly word games.

No they're not. Just because practically we need a penal system doesn't mean this will always be the best practical solution. Sometimes we need to think outside of the box, which my father did. These are not just silly word games, like the word games you play to convince yourself that free will and determinism are compatible.

[GdB]

I would like to introduce another author: Derek Parfit. I attached chapter 11, Free Will and Desert, from his book On what Matters.

Some crucial citations:

Suppose that, while I am standing in some field during a thunderstorm, a bolt of lightning narrowly misses me. If I say that I could have been killed, I might be using ‘could’ in a categorical sense. I might mean that, even with conditions just as they actually were, it would have been causally possible for this bolt of lightning to have hit me. If we assume determinism, that is not true, since it was causally inevitable that this lightning struck the ground just where it did. I may instead be using ‘could’ in a different, hypothetical or iffy sense. When I say that I could have been killed, I may mean only that, if conditions had been in some way slightly different—if, for example, I had been standing a few yards to the West—I would have been killed. Even if we assume determinism, that claim could be true.

Italics in the original.

Kant seems here to see that, when we are deciding what to do, we can ignore the speculative or theoretical question of whether determinism is true. If we don’t yet know what we shall decide, we are free in the sense that nothing will stop us from acting in certain ways, if we decide to do so. For practical purposes, this compatibilist kind of freedom is all we need. It is irrelevant whether, given our actual state of mind, some other decision would have been causally impossible.
(...)
For some act of ours to be wrong, because we ought to have acted differently, it must be true that we could have acted differently. But the relevant sense of ‘could’ is the hypothetical, motivational sense. And this sense of ‘could’ is compatible with determinism. Even if our acts are causally determined, we could have the kind of freedom that morality requires.

Bold by me.

[GdB]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Being able to do what you want does not grant free will even though that's what most people believe superficially.

Right. It doesn't grant free will: it is free will.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I can choose whatever I want, which is true, but this is a superficial understanding since what one wants to do is controlled by one's impulses, experiences, heredity, and predispositions.

As if you are something different as the sum of your impulses, experiences, heredity, and predispositions (and a few things more...). That is what you are. Your critique is only valid if you are a dualist.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

They are not different in quality, only degree.

No. Only by describing the situation in terms where you omit what it is really about, they become 'only different in degree'. If you look at the relevant level, namely that of wishes, beliefs, of actions, of free or coerced actions, you can see the difference. Only by leaving this essential level, and describe the event in physical terms, where motives, fears, and actions do not even exist, you can formulate your critique.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

TJust because practically we need a penal system doesn't mean this will always be the best practical solution.

I am not talking about a penal system. I am talking about free will. And even you, I am sure, use this concept the same as all of us in daily life. To suppose that this daily use needs some kind of metaphysical basis is just absurd. Read above attached text of Parfit.

[But]

Originally Posted by GdB

Philosophical ideas that one defends, but does not adhere to in daily life are bloodless lies, and just silly word games.

Like defining free will in a way like that. It doesn't mean anything. In that sense an automaton that computes a sequence of prime numbers has free will.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by GdB

I would like to introduce another author: Derek Parfit. I attached chapter 11, Free Will and Desert, from his book On what Matters.

Some crucial citations:

Italics in the original.

That claim is true. It could have been a different outcome if the conditions were slightly different (i.e., you were standing a few yards to the West).

Kant seems here to see that, when we are deciding what to do, we can ignore the speculative or theoretical question of whether determinism is true. If we don’t yet know what we shall decide, we are free in the sense that nothing will stop us from acting in certain ways, if we decide to do so.

What does he even mean? Nothing will stop us from acting in certain ways is true if we find those ways preferable. He is in agreement.

Originally Posted by GdB

For practical purposes, this compatibilist kind of freedom is all we need. It is irrelevant whether, given our actual state of mind, some other decision would have been causally impossible.
(...)

You're skirting the most important issue, and that is we cannot hold someone responsible if he could not have done differently; if there was no other decision he could have made because it would have been causally impossible. Don't you see the contradiction AT ALL?

Originally Posted by GdB

For some act of ours to be wrong, because we ought to have acted differently, it must be true that we could have acted differently. But the relevant sense of ‘could’ is the hypothetical, motivational sense. And this sense of ‘could’ is compatible with determinism. Even if our acts are causally determined, we could have the kind of freedom that morality requires.

Originally Posted by GdB

Bold by me.

I see the conflict. I see why people are trying to define free will in such a way that it justifies holding people accountable for doing what "they didn't have to do." Being true to determinism, there is no way we can talk ourselves out of the fact that if a choice is causally impossible, there is no way we can then say a person was free to act differently. This sounds depressing but actually it's the beginning of a new way of thinking; of understanding how, with the knowledge of our true nature, we can prevent those very acts of evil for which punishment was previously necessary. This is not the end of the story GdB, but you won't listen.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Being able to do what you want does not grant free will even though that's what most people believe superficially.

Originally Posted by GdB

Right. It doesn't grant free will: it is free will.

Only due to an arbitrary definition, but arbitrary definitions hardly define what is true.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I can choose whatever I want, which is true, but this is a superficial understanding since what one wants to do is controlled by one's impulses, experiences, heredity, and predispositions.

Originally Posted by GdB

As if you are something different as the sum of your impulses, experiences, heredity, and predispositions (and a few things more...). That is what you are. Your critique is only valid if you are a dualist.

Our minds and bodies act together. Our brain acts in accordance with the input it receives and tells our bodies what to do. This is a naturalistic non-dualistic approach.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

They are not different in quality, only degree.

Originally Posted by GdB

No. Only by describing the situation in terms where you omit what it is really about, they become 'only different in degree'. If you look at the relevant level, namely that of wishes, beliefs, of actions, of free or coerced actions, you can see the difference. Only by leaving this essential level, and describe the event in physical terms, where motives, fears, and actions do not even exist, you can formulate your critique.

What level? What do you mean by your last statement?

There is only a difference in type of force if you are being held down and people are putting poison down your throat. That is a forced action where you have no say. Threatening you at gunpoint still gives you a choice to make. It is a difficult choice, but a choice nevertheless. And you are still making a choice by what gives you greater satisfaction. Most people would find greater satisfaction in giving the perpetrator what he wants unless a worse consequence could take place.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

TJust because practically we need a penal system doesn't mean this will always be the best practical solution.

Originally Posted by GdB

I am not talking about a penal system. I am talking about free will.

You are talking about free will because of the ramifications which involve the justification to punish and hold people accountable. That's what this entire discussion is about, or it wouldn't matter.

Originally Posted by GdB

And even you, I am sure, use this concept the same as all of us in daily life. To suppose that this daily use needs some kind of metaphysical basis is just absurd. Read above attached text of Parfit.

I don't use the term "free will" in my every day life, as if to say I need "a free will worth having", as Dennett espouses. I may react to someone by saying, you didn't have to do that, but I would only be saying that rhetorically. I know he had to do that. What I am really saying is that he doesn't have to do it again, which is true, if he sees a reason not to. This would be based on a new set of antecedent conditions as he weighs the pros and cons of each choice.

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by GdB

Right. It doesn't grant free will: it is free will.

As if you are something different as the sum of your impulses, experiences, heredity, and predispositions (and a few things more...). That is what you are. Your critique is only valid if you are a dualist.

You need to understand that Peacegirl is working with idiosyncratic definitions of free will (among other things) that states that "free will is not free will", much like Lessans definition that whatever we choose is towards greater satisfaction, even if it isn't.

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Only due to an arbitrary definition, but arbitrary definitions hardly define what is true.

An arbitrary definition is what the majority have agreed to, and that definition is true for the majority. There is no right or wrong with a definition because the term means what the definition states that it means, to say otherwise is nonsense.

[But]

Originally Posted by GdB

It is not for nothing you put forced between quotes. You happen to have a physical body, i.e. have mass, and masses tend to move to each other. So in Swartz' vocabulary it is a 'grand physical truth' that massive bodies move as described by the law of gravitation. This is a fact about nature.

So it seems that you think free will must imply the overruling of facts. Only a definition of free will, as 'hyper-ultimate free will', that is capable of overruling grand physical truths, counts as free will for you. But this is just another form of the naive argument against free will that you cannot do something that is physically impossible. You are not free to float in the air, so you are not free.

What you also oversee is that the word forced is anthropomorphic: it can only be used where somebody intentionally forces you to do something. In general physical truths, such an intention simply does not exist. You, as a physical body, move exactly the same in gravity as any other physical body.

What about a robot? Can a robot force you to do anything?

You defined free will as being able to do what you want. I see a balloon float upwards and think I should be able to do the same thing. But no, I'm forced down every single time. Of course I know all about gravity, therefore I know that all bodies, people and balloons, move exactly in the same way under gravity, that is, some move up, some down, and some do nothing at all.

What's the difference between that and an incredibly powerful robot preventing me from jumping off a cliff?

[thedoc]

Free will does not negate physics, free will works within the laws of physics. To propose some test that violates the laws of physics, as proof of the lack of free will, is ludicrous.

[ceptimus]

It seems to me that you are defining "free will" and "decide" to mean something different to their normal usage.

The driver of a road vehicle can decide to drive on the left or right side of the road (and it would be a good decision to choose the same side as everyone else in whatever country you're driving).

But it's ridiculous to suggest that a railroad locomotive driver decides to drive along the centre of the rail track. There is no choice in the matter - if the driver chooses to make the locomotive move then it is constrained to move along the track.

I think it's the same with determinism and free will. I believe that the atoms that make up our brains are constrained by the laws of physics. If a supercomputer knew the exact configuration of the atoms in my brain (maybe it would need to know quantum states too - which introduces problems, but lets ignore those for now) then it could predict my 'free will' decisions with certainty.

I might believe that I've made a free will decision to have cornflakes for breakfast rather than bacon and eggs, but the supercomputer predicted that I'd make that decision hours previously.

You may say that I still made the free will decision I thought I made - after all I am eating the cornflakes - but I think it would be more correct to say that I was constrained to "make the cornflake decision" - and so it wasn't what an ordinary English speaker would call "an act of free will" and not really even a "decision".

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by ceptimus

It seems to me that you are defining "free will" and "decide" to mean something different to their normal usage.

The driver of a road vehicle can decide to drive on the left or right side of the road (and it would be a good decision to choose the same side as everyone else in whatever country you're driving).

But it's ridiculous to suggest that a railroad locomotive driver decides to drive along the centre of the rail track. There is no choice in the matter - if the driver chooses to make the locomotive move then it is constrained to move along the track.

I think it's the same with determinism and free will. I believe that the atoms that make up our brains are constrained by the laws of physics. If a supercomputer knew the exact configuration of the atoms in my brain (maybe it would need to know quantum states too - which introduces problems, but lets ignore those for now) then it could predict my 'free will' decisions with certainty.

I might believe that I've made a free will decision to have cornflakes for breakfast rather than bacon and eggs, but the supercomputer predicted that I'd make that decision hours previously.

You may say that I still made the free will decision I thought I made - after all I am eating the cornflakes - but I think it would be more correct to say that I was constrained to "make the cornflake decision" - and so it wasn't what an ordinary English speaker would call "an act of free will" and not really even a "decision".

It only becomes a decision when we are contemplating two or more options. If we just go for the cornflakes, then there is no need to contemplate at all. We just open the cabinet and pull out the cornflakes without giving it any thought. This is a movement away from the previous position of dissatisfaction (being hungry) toward a more satisfying position (relieving that hunger). Davidm, Maturin, thedoc, and others have actually ruined my thread. They have convinced people that they are right and that Lessans is a loon. This would be humorous if there wasn't so much at stake. Davidm has made me look like a fool; someone who is irrelevant and can't keep up with what he calls "my intellectual betters." His sources do nothing to show he is correct in regard to free will. I will say, once again, that my father knew what he was talking about. How does the greatest discovery of all time get thrown into a scrap heap with such callous disregard? It helps to look back at history to see the "genuine" discoveries that weren't given the time of day until years, sometimes centuries, later. What gives me hope is there is ALWAYS light at the end of every tunnel. Call it the God given desire within us that won't let us stop until we know the truth. History has a way of making wrong things right. I'm eagerly waiting for that day.

[davidm]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

This will one day be considered the biggest witch hunt of the 21st century.

That would be so awesome.

Unfortunately, no one ever links to us, so it will never happen.

[davidm]

Originally Posted by ceptimus

It seems to me that you are defining "free will" and "decide" to mean something different to their normal usage.

The driver of a road vehicle can decide to drive on the left or right side of the road (and it would be a good decision to choose the same side as everyone else in whatever country you're driving).

But it's ridiculous to suggest that a railroad locomotive driver decides to drive along the centre of the rail track. There is no choice in the matter - if the driver chooses to make the locomotive move then it is constrained to move along the track.

I think it's the same with determinism and free will. I believe that the atoms that make up our brains are constrained by the laws of physics. If a supercomputer knew the exact configuration of the atoms in my brain (maybe it would need to know quantum states too - which introduces problems, but lets ignore those for now) then it could predict my 'free will' decisions with certainty.

I might believe that I've made a free will decision to have cornflakes for breakfast rather than bacon and eggs, but the supercomputer predicted that I'd make that decision hours previously.

You may say that I still made the free will decision I thought I made - after all I am eating the cornflakes - but I think it would be more correct to say that I was constrained to "make the cornflake decision" - and so it wasn't what an ordinary English speaker would call "an act of free will" and not really even a "decision".

This is the way the matter is usually presented. Swartz disputes this claim in its entirety -- even without invoking quantum indeterminism, which by itself makes the above false. But Swartz argues that the above reasoning is false even if quantum indeterminism is false.

[Angakuk]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I will listen to the videos, but the general tenor that most religions express is that we have the free will to choose good over evil. God is not responsible for our evil choices.

I am reasonably certain that you are as knowledgeable about the teachings of most religions as you are about physics, optics, biology, philosophy, etc.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

This will one day be considered the biggest witch hunt of the 21st century.

Exaggerate much?

[davidm]

Originally Posted by ceptimus

It seems to me that you are defining "free will" and "decide" to mean something different to their normal usage.

The driver of a road vehicle can decide to drive on the left or right side of the road (and it would be a good decision to choose the same side as everyone else in whatever country you're driving).

But it's ridiculous to suggest that a railroad locomotive driver decides to drive along the centre of the rail track. There is no choice in the matter - if the driver chooses to make the locomotive move then it is constrained to move along the track.

I think it's the same with determinism and free will. I believe that the atoms that make up our brains are constrained by the laws of physics. If a supercomputer knew the exact configuration of the atoms in my brain (maybe it would need to know quantum states too - which introduces problems, but lets ignore those for now) then it could predict my 'free will' decisions with certainty.

I might believe that I've made a free will decision to have cornflakes for breakfast rather than bacon and eggs, but the supercomputer predicted that I'd make that decision hours previously.

You may say that I still made the free will decision I thought I made - after all I am eating the cornflakes - but I think it would be more correct to say that I was constrained to "make the cornflake decision" - and so it wasn't what an ordinary English speaker would call "an act of free will" and not really even a "decision".

This statement is an example of Laplacean or hard determinism. In addition to being factually impossible because of quantum indeterminism, one can challenge it on other grounds that do not involve QM at all.

In his book the Concept of Physical Law, Norman Swartz devotes two chapters to free will and determinism. Swartz argues that the alleged incompatibility between determinism and free will arises because of a fundamental misconception of the nature of physical law.

Most theorists, Swartz says, implicitly adopt a “necessitarian” view of physical law. On this view, physical laws govern the universe. Gravity “obeys” an inverse-square “law.” There is a “law” that massy objects “obey” that prevents them from traveling at the speed of light. And so on.

Whence the power of these mysterious laws? Swartz argues that such a conception of “law” is thoroughly non-empirical and is in fact a hangover of theism: the notion of a law giver. Modern philosophers and scientists disposed of the need for a law giver, but failed to similarly evict the concept of a law. In order to fully naturalize physics and metaphysics, the author maintains, it is necessary to abandon the notion of law.

Swartz urges what he calls a neo-Humean or regularity account of physical “law.” On this reading, events do not take their truth from “laws,” but rather precisely the opposite: “Laws” take their truth from events; i.e., so-called “laws” are fully descriptive and never prescriptive. The inverse-square “law” is merely a description of a natural regularity; “laws” of physics are then all like Gresham’s Law. All “laws” are a subclass of timelessly true descriptions of the world. On this reading, humans make their own “physical laws” (timelessly true descriptions of the world) simply by (freely) doing, whatever they in fact do. Thus there can be no validity to Lapeacean determinism, because human behavior is unpredictable in principle; no God-like computer can predict your future behavior because in most cases the covering “law” (the description of what you actually do) has never yet been instantiated.

Swartz devotes some time to explicating this idea that if the universe could somehow be “backed up” and replayed, then at some time t agent x, with an identical history and brain state, will — as he or she did in the first iteration of the world — perform act y. Swartz denies this completely. The agent might again perform act y, but he or she might perform some other act as well. It’s entirely up to the agent, and not the “laws” of nature, which have no prescriptive force whatever.

Swartz maintains that worries about determinism obviating free will arise not only from a misconceived idea of the nature of physical “law,” but also from illegitimately conflating the principle of determinism with the principle of the uniformity of nature. A world with too few uniformities or regularities would threaten free will because it would be chaotic. A world with too many uniformities or regularities would also threaten free will because it would admit of too few degrees of freedom. Our world (an anthropic effect?) is neither too chaotic nor too orderly to circumscribe our free choices. You don't get to “choose” the “laws” like Gresham’s “law” or the inverse-square “law” of gravity. You don’t get to choose to jump to the moon. But you do get to choose, freely, a great many other “laws,” simply by freely doing what you do, and what you are physically and mentally able to do. Since free will is logically independent of the principle of determinism, there is no need to invoke compatibilist free will, since there is nothing that needs to be made compatible, any more than there is — to use the author’s own example — a need to find some way to make compatible doubts and itches.

The Concept of Physical Law (the whole book)

Chapter 10: Free Will and Determinism

Chapter 11: Predictability and Uniformity

[peacegirl]

Arguments for Incompatibilism

First published Tue Oct 14, 2003; substantive revision Tue Mar 1, 2011

Determinism is a claim about the laws of nature: very roughly, it is the claim that everything that happens is determined by antecedent conditions together with the natural laws. Incompatibilism is a philosophical thesis about the relevance of determinism to free will: that the truth of determinism rules out the existence of free will. The incompatibilist believes that if determinism turned out to be true, it would also be true that we don't have, and have never had, free will. The compatibilist denies that determinism has the consequences the incompatibilist thinks it has. According to the compatibilist, the truth of determinism does not preclude the existence of free will. (Even if we learned tomorrow that determinism is true, it might still be true that we have free will.) The philosophical problem of free will and determinism is the problem of understanding, how, if at all, the truth of determinism might be compatible with the truth of our belief that we have free will. That is, it's the problem of deciding who is right: the compatibilist or the incompatibilist.

Why an encyclopedia entry on arguments for incompatibilism? (Why not an entry on the problem of free will and determinism?) Perhaps for this reason: until fairly recently, compatibilism was the received view and it was widely believed that arguments for incompatibilism rest on a modal fallacy or fairly obvious mistake (e.g., the mistake of confusing causation with compulsion, or the mistake of confusing descriptive with prescriptive laws) (Ayer 1954, Dennett 1984). Compatibilists have also tended to dismiss incompatibilism because of its guilt by association with a metaphysical worldview that P. F. Strawson famously dismissed as “obscure and panicky” — dualism, agent-causation (Strawson 1962). Indeed, thanks to Strawson's seminal paper, many compatibilists are convinced that the free will/determinism problem is not a metaphysical problem at all (as opposed to a problem about moral responsibility which arises within normative ethics or metaethics) (Wallace 1994). And even those compatibilists who regard the problem as a metaphysical problem have, for the most part, been pre-occupied with defending free will against those who argue that free will is either impossible or empirically implausible regardless of whether determinism is true or false (Wolf 1990). And so the literature on the problem of free will and determinism has come to be dominated by incompatibilists.

1. Definitions and Distinctions
2. Classification of Arguments for Incompatibilism
3. Arguments based on Intuition
3.1 Garden of Forking Paths Argument
3.2 Manipulation and Design Arguments
4. Self-Determination and the Causal Chain argument
5. Choice and the Consequence Argument
Bibliography
Academic Tools
Other Internet Resources
Related Entries

1. Definitions and Distinctions

cont. at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/in...ism-arguments/

[But]

Originally Posted by davidm

Swartz devotes some time to explicating this idea that if the universe could somehow be “backed up” and replayed, then at some time t agent x, with an identical history and brain state, will — as he or she did in the first iteration of the world — perform act y. Swartz denies this completely. The agent might again perform act y, but he or she might perform some other act as well.

That means he's ruling out determinism.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by But

That means he's ruling out determinism.

He believes the laws of nature don't prescribe, they only describe, so they can have no influence over our choices. Whatever we choose is up to us and is independent of all causal constraints. On the other hand, the compatibilists believe that without determinism we wouldn't have the free will (their definition) to make rational choices. Sound confusing?

[GdB]

Originally Posted by But

Like defining free will in a way like that. It doesn't mean anything. In that sense an automaton that computes a sequence of prime numbers has free will.

A computer calculating prime numbers has no wishes and beliefs.

Originally Posted by But

What about a robot? Can a robot force you to do anything?

Depends. In fact we are robots: very advanced robots. So if a robot is advanced enough, so that it functions as a universal future anticipating survival machine, yes, then a robot can force us, e.g. by threatening us. To threat others you need to be able to ascribe beliefs and intentions in others. Such a robot would have consciousness, and a will of its own.

Originally Posted by But

You defined free will as being able to do what you want. I see a balloon float upwards and think I should be able to do the same thing. But no, I'm forced down every single time. Of course I know all about gravity, therefore I know that all bodies, people and balloons, move exactly in the same way under gravity, that is, some move up, some down, and some do nothing at all.

You are so missing the point.

Humans move. Some movements are intentional. Those are actions. Some of these actions are caused by your own motivations. Those are free actions. Free actions are called actions from free will. So having free will does not mean you can do everything you possibly might want. It means that a considerable subset of your actions are according your own wishes and beliefs.

[GdB]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You're skirting the most important issue, and that is we cannot hold someone responsible if he could not have done differently; if there was no other decision he could have made because it would have been causally impossible. Don't you see the contradiction AT ALL?

In no way you show that you have understood Parfit's point that there is a difference between a the categorical meaning of 'could have done otherwise' and the hypothetical one.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Being true to determinism, there is no way we can talk ourselves out of the fact that if a choice is causally impossible, there is no way we can then say a person was free to act differently. This sounds depressing but actually it's the beginning of a new way of thinking; of understanding how, with the knowledge of our true nature, we can prevent those very acts of evil for which punishment was previously necessary. This is not the end of the story GdB, but you won't listen.

To criticise the compatiblist concept of free will, you must show that the hypothetical meaning of 'could have done otherwise' does not suffice to take and assign responsibility. It is no use to say that the categorical meaning of 'could have done otherwise' cannot be true in a deterministic universe (which I agree with you!). And that is the only thing you do.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Our minds and bodies act together. Our brain acts in accordance with the input it receives and tells our bodies what to do. This is a naturalistic non-dualistic approach.

Calling it non-dualistic doesn't make it none-dualistic. Read your sentence again: "Our minds and bodies act together". Our minds and bodies do not work together. Our minds are our functioning bodies, mostly the brain. Incompatibilists (both libertarians and hard determinists) have not fully seen through the Cartesian illusion.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

There is only a difference in type of force if you are being held down and people are putting poison down your throat. That is a forced action where you have no say. Threatening you at gunpoint still gives you a choice to make. It is a difficult choice, but a choice nevertheless. And you are still making a choice by what gives you greater satisfaction. Most people would find greater satisfaction in giving the perpetrator what he wants unless a worse consequence could take place.

You do realise that you make my definition of free will broader, don't you?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I don't use the term "free will" in my every day life, ...

No, me neither. But I live according the fact that most people, and I, have a considerable degree of free will, enough to assign them and myself responsibility.