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  #101  
Old 07-26-2016, 08:16 AM
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Default Re: Free will in philosphy and science

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Arguments for Incompatibilism

First published Tue Oct 14, 2003; substantive revision Tue Mar 1, 2011

bla bla bla....

1. Definitions and Distinctions
2. Classification of Arguments for Incompatibilism
3. Arguments based on Intuition
3.1 Garden of Forking Paths Argument
3.2 Manipulation and Design Arguments
4. Self-Determination and the Causal Chain argument
5. Choice and the Consequence Argument
Bibliography
Academic Tools
Other Internet Resources
Related Entries

1. Definitions and Distinctions

cont. at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/in...ism-arguments/
f. The Regularists' Trump Card – The Dissolution of the Problem of Free Will and Determinism

In the Regularity theory, the knotted problem of free will vs. determinism is solved (or better, "dissolved") so thoroughly that it cannot coherently even be posed.

(...)

Persons who believe that there is a problem reconciling the existence of free will and determinism have turned upside down the relationship between laws of nature on the one side and events and states of affairs on the other. It is not that laws of nature govern the world. We are not "forced" to choose one action rather than another. It is quite the other way round: we choose, and the laws of nature accommodate themselves to our choice. If I choose to wear a brown shirt, then it is true that I do so; and if instead I were to choose to wear a blue shirt, then it would be true that I wear a blue shirt. In neither case would my choosing be 'forced' by the truth of the proposition that describes my action. And the same semantic principle applies even if the proposition truly describing my choice is a universal proposition rather than a singular one.

To make the claim even more pointedly: it is only because Necessitarianism tacitly adopts an anti-semantic theory of truth that the supposed problem of free will vs. determinism even arises. Adopt a thoroughgoing Regularist theory and the problem evaporates.

Laws of Nature vs. Laws of Science
The Two Principal Views
Regularity
Necessitarianism
Shared Elements in the Competing Theories
The Case for Necessitarianism
Accidental Truths vs. Laws of Nature
False Existentials
Doom vs. Failure
The Case for Regularity
Naturalizing Philosophy
Revisiting Physical Impossibility
Regularity and Explanation
Problems with Necessitarianism I – Its Inverting the Truth-making Relation
Problems with Necessitarianism II – Its Unempiricalness
The Regularists' Trump Card – The Dissolution of the Problem of Free Will and Determinism
Statistical Laws
Is the Order in the Universe a Cosmic Coincidence?
Notes
References and Further Reading


Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Laws of Nature | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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  #102  
Old 07-26-2016, 09:05 AM
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Default Re: Free will in philosphy and science

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Swartz devotes some time to explicating this idea that if the universe could somehow be “backed up” and replayed, then at some time t agent x, with an identical history and brain state, will — as he or she did in the first iteration of the world — perform act y. Swartz denies this completely. The agent might again perform act y, but he or she might perform some other act as well. It’s entirely up to the agent, and not the “laws” of nature, which have no prescriptive force whatever.
This is the point where I think Swartz is not correct. I would say that if we backup the universe, we did a bad job if not the same grand physical truths, i.e. universal timelessly true statements, hold. That still does not mean that grand physical truths force us to anything. But if not the same descriptions of the universe are true, then it is not the same universe.
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  #103  
Old 07-26-2016, 11:43 AM
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Default Re: Free will in philosphy and science

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Philosophical ideas that one defends, but does not adhere to in daily life are bloodless lies, and just silly word games.
Like defining free will in a way like that. It doesn't mean anything. In that sense an automaton that computes a sequence of prime numbers has free will.
A computer calculating prime numbers has no wishes and beliefs.
How do you know? If you knew how, you could construct a computer with wishes and beliefs, it would at every point of the algorithm wish to choose a certain number and do that. That it would be physically unable to wish anything else shouldn't be a problem, that's the same situation as with a human, assuming determinism.


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What about a robot? Can a robot force you to do anything?
Depends. In fact we are robots: very advanced robots. So if a robot is advanced enough, so that it functions as a universal future anticipating survival machine, yes, then a robot can force us, e.g. by threatening us. To threat others you need to be able to ascribe beliefs and intentions in others. Such a robot would have consciousness, and a will of its own.
To threaten others you don't need to be able to "ascribe beliefs and intentions in others", whatever that means. You just have to point a weapon at them and tell them how to move. I agree that in every meaning of the word, a robot could do that, but it doesn't need consciousness. Also, consciousness is one of the least well-defined concepts there are, so let's leave it out of the equation if possible.

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You defined free will as being able to do what you want. I see a balloon float upwards and think I should be able to do the same thing. But no, I'm forced down every single time. Of course I know all about gravity, therefore I know that all bodies, people and balloons, move exactly in the same way under gravity, that is, some move up, some down, and some do nothing at all.
You are so missing the point.

Humans move. Some movements are intentional. Those are actions. Some of these actions are caused by your own motivations. Those are free actions. Free actions are called actions from free will. So having free will does not mean you can do everything you possibly might want. It means that a considerable subset of your actions are according your own wishes and beliefs.
So we have free will if a considerable subset of our intentional movements is caused by our own motivations.

Let's say the big bad robot prevents you from moving at all. That's not a problem then, is it? You would like to move but you can't, it's just the laws of physics at work again.
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  #104  
Old 07-26-2016, 12:14 PM
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How do you know?
How do you know that a plant has no consciousness? Your PC?

Sorry, But, but these are futile academic exercises that have nothing to do with the reality as we live in.

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If you knew how, you could construct a computer with wishes and beliefs, it would at every point of the algorithm wish to choose a certain number and do that. That it would be physically unable to wish anything else shouldn't be a problem, that's the same situation as with a human, assuming determinism.
You underestimate the task of building such a computer. If it would make a list of prime numbers, it would do with the same method as we would do, would find it more and more difficult when the numbers get bigger, and would at some time stop when he is bored. If not, his subroutine to calculate prime numbers would be like us, using a computer to let the stupid work for us. It could be built in, like a pacemaker.

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To threaten others you don't need to be able to "ascribe beliefs and intentions in others", whatever that means. You just have to point a weapon at them and tell them how to move.
If the robot does that from his own motivations, i.e. he has reasons for doing this, he is conscious. Otherwise it is just a tool in the hands of some evil programmer.

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I agree that in every meaning of the word, a robot could do that, but it doesn't need consciousness. Also, consciousness is one of the least well-defined concepts there are, so let's leave it out of the equation if possible.
Great. Leave out that what is most important. Having motivations and beliefs, reflecting on what to do next, has everything to do with consciousness. So, no, I do not leave it out.

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Let's say the big bad robot prevents you from moving at all. That's not a problem then, is it? You would like to move but you can't, it's just the laws of physics at work again.
Laws of physics do not work. Everything is always in accordance with the laws of physics, because the laws of physics describe what actually happens, in very general, timeless terms.

The laws of physic also describe what I am doing.
The laws of physic also describe what a computer is doing.

But to understand that the computer is calculating prime numbers, you must look at the symbolic meaning of what the computer is doing.
To understand that I am acting, you must understand the symbolic meaning of the neuro-storm in my brain. (the best way to do that is looking at how I act, and hear what I am saying.) A system that does stop me in doing something is just a physical burden, as is gravity if I really would like to fly.
Unless it does so intentionally, i.e. has reasons for doing so.

Your intuition pumps do not hold water.
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  #105  
Old 07-26-2016, 03:49 PM
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Default Re: Free will in philosphy and science

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How do you know?
How do you know that a plant has no consciousness? Your PC?

Sorry, But, but these are futile academic exercises that have nothing to do with the reality as we live in.
As is the whole discussion.

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If you knew how, you could construct a computer with wishes and beliefs, it would at every point of the algorithm wish to choose a certain number and do that. That it would be physically unable to wish anything else shouldn't be a problem, that's the same situation as with a human, assuming determinism.
You underestimate the task of building such a computer.
I'm not sure about that. By the way, I'm a computer scientist.

Quote:
If it would make a list of prime numbers, it would do with the same method as we would do, would find it more and more difficult when the numbers get bigger, and would at some time stop when he is bored. If not, his subroutine to calculate prime numbers would be like us, using a computer to let the stupid work for us. It could be built in, like a pacemaker.
Unnecessary. It just has to wish something as a precondition of doing it. Nothing else.

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To threaten others you don't need to be able to "ascribe beliefs and intentions in others", whatever that means. You just have to point a weapon at them and tell them how to move.
If the robot does that from his own motivations, i.e. he has reasons for doing this, he is conscious. Otherwise it is just a tool in the hands of some evil programmer.
That's a weird definition of consciousness.

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Let's say the big bad robot prevents you from moving at all. That's not a problem then, is it? You would like to move but you can't, it's just the laws of physics at work again.
Laws of physics do not work.
I didn't say they work. I could say the laws of physics are at play. That doesn't mean they play. Those are figures of speech. Ever heard of them?

Quote:
Everything is always in accordance with the laws of physics, because the laws of physics describe what actually happens, in very general, timeless terms.

The laws of physic also describe what I am doing.
The laws of physic also describe what a computer is doing.

But to understand that the computer is calculating prime numbers, you must look at the symbolic meaning of what the computer is doing.
To understand that I am acting, you must understand the symbolic meaning of the neuro-storm in my brain. (the best way to do that is looking at how I act, and hear what I am saying.) A system that does stop me in doing something is just a physical burden, as is gravity if I really would like to fly.
Unless it does so intentionally, i.e. has reasons for doing so.
That's a pretty arbitrary distinction. Also, having an intention and having a reason are quite different things.

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Your intuition pumps do not hold water.
Your concepts are incoherent.
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  #106  
Old 07-26-2016, 04:12 PM
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Default Re: Free will in philosphy and science

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The number of physical laws is for all practical purposes infinite.6
Adopt the view that laws
are nothing other than general statements of what happens, and one has the means to
accommodate free will. Human beings (and Martians) – as a sheer matter of fact – have evolved
to a sufficient degree of complexity that their behavior can be described only by a (potentially)
infinite set of laws. This situation may be as utterly determined as one could like, in the sense
that every action may be subsumable under one or more universal physical laws. But it also
allows human choice. I am presented with a difficult decision. There are strong arguments both
for and against choosing merged-gender mortality tables. I weigh the probable consequences; I
reflect on my principles of fairness; I look at previous similar, but not precisely the same,
precedents; I try to balance the cost-savings against the measures of outrage; and eventually I
decide. Nothing forced my decision, although it was completely determined in the sense of being
deducible from timelessly true physical laws and antecedent conditions. But note (and this is
perhaps my most important point and shows just how antithetical the Regularity account is to the
Autonomy account): If I had chosen otherwise, that is, had chosen instead that the sex-distinct
tables should be used, that choice, too, would have been determined. That choice, had I made it,
would have, too, been subsumable under a timelessly true physical law, and would have been
deducible from that law and a statement of antecedent conditions. Clearly, I could not choose
both alternatives; but I could choose either. And in choosing the one, I ‘made’ it the one that was
deducible from physical laws and antecedent conditions. But in every sense in which one could
possibly want, I was free to choose the other.
100% wrong! Let me correct this statement: In every sense in which you could possibly want, you were NOT free to choose the other.

Statement One:

That choice, had I made it,
would have, too, been subsumable under a timelessly true physical law, and would have been
deducible from that law and a statement of antecedent conditions. Clearly, I could not choose
both alternatives; but I could choose either...

Either option is available to you, but you could not choose either option, as if they are both equal in value. That would make meaningless any kind of reasoning to determine what is the best choice in your eyes. As long as there are meaningful differences between A and B, they do not hold equal weight otherwise it would be like choosing A or A. This natural law does not force anything on you that you yourself don't want. You are presented with certain alternatives where you make a choice based on your particular circumstances rendering the other choice impossible under those same exact circumstances. If it were a free choice you could choose one or the other equally, but this is impossible as long as there are meaningful differences between them. What is the point of contemplation if not to decide which option is the most preferable? There is no conflict with the idea that natural laws are descriptive, but that in no way means we have free will.

Conclusion:

But in every sense in which one could
possibly want, I was free to choose the other.


This is the most unscientific of all conclusions. This is done for obvious reasons (to squeeze free will in somehow, someway) but has no scientific basis to support it. :giggle:
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  #107  
Old 07-26-2016, 09:05 PM
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Default Re: Free will in philosphy and science

For Swartz, saying that the universe is “determined” is just to say that it is subsumable under physical “laws.” But these laws take their truth from what actually happens, rather than imposing what happens.

It may well be that the universe is physically “determined” in the sense that past, present and future all exist. The past and future don’t exist now, of course; they exist in their own temporal locations, just as there are a multiplicity of different “heres.” My “here” is an indexical: I call your here “there,” while you, in your own “here,” call my “here” your “there.” So temporal locations are like spatial locations: they are indexicals. The theory of relativity suggests that past, present and future all exist, because time is welded to space under the theory.

If the past, present and future all exist in this indexical sense, then every event is fixed and it is as futile to change the present or future as it is to change the past.

This fact, if it is a fact, does not obviate free will, since if the future (and present and past) are fixed and ineradicable, it was, is, and will be, fixed in part by you and what you freely did/do/will do. There is an intuition that for free will to prevail, it is necessary that we be able somehow to change at least the present or the future, if not the past. This is not necessary. We do not and cannot change the past, present or future, but by acting freely within the limits of our abilities, we contribute to making the past, present and future be what they actually were, are, and will be.
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  #108  
Old 07-27-2016, 08:26 AM
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As is the whole discussion.
Then why do you discuss?

What is your view point? Do you think that the discussion makes no sense because it is just vague from all sides, or do you think that the answer is so clear that there is no need to discuss?

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If you knew how, you could construct a computer with wishes and beliefs, it would at every point of the algorithm wish to choose a certain number and do that. That it would be physically unable to wish anything else shouldn't be a problem, that's the same situation as with a human, assuming determinism.
You underestimate the task of building such a computer.
I'm not sure about that. By the way, I'm a computer scientist.
You do as if it is easy to build a computer that has wishes and beliefs. What would you do? Define an array of wishes, and an array of beliefs, and then depending on some input set a wish? Please do tell me how you program a computer so that everybody would agree on it has wishes and beliefs the way we do.

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That's a weird definition of consciousness.
Did I imply that this is a definition of consciousness? I only wanted to say that if you could program a computer in such a way that it is able to do what you suggest, it needs consciousness.

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I didn't say they work. I could say the laws of physics are at play. That doesn't mean they play. Those are figures of speech. Ever heard of them?
Yes. It is also a figure of speech to say that the law of gravity forces the earth in an orbit around the sun. It is also a figure of speech to say that the laws of nature force us to choose something.

One could also say that the earth wants to move in the way it does. Just as silly as to say that it is forced.

Events just happen. And there are regularities in how they happen. And we can describe these regularities.

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That's a pretty arbitrary distinction.
It is not arbitrary. It gives a consistent view on free will and determinism, that covers the ways we use the term free will in daily life: the reasons why we think somebody is responsible, or why not.

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Your concepts are incoherent.
Yes? then show me.
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  #109  
Old 07-27-2016, 09:12 AM
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That choice, had I made it,
would have, too, been subsumable under a timelessly true physical law, and would have been
deducible from that law and a statement of antecedent conditions. Clearly, I could not choose
both alternatives; but I could choose either. And in choosing the one, I ‘made’ it the one that was
deducible from physical laws and antecedent conditions. But in every sense in which one could
possibly want, I was free to choose the other.
I agree this is difficult to understand. And also, as I read it, it might be wrong.

Davidm: what do you think. Do you agree, or do you think, as I do, that Swartz goes one step too far?
One reading of course could be to rigorously apply the idea that the 'woulds' and 'coulds' are to be read in the hypothetical sense. Then it would mean that we have to imagine that another set of 'grand physical truths' would be the case.


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Either option is available to you, but you could not choose either option, as if they are both equal in value. That would make meaningless any kind of reasoning to determine what is the best choice in your eyes. As long as there are meaningful differences between A and B, they do not hold equal weight otherwise it would be like choosing A or A. This natural law does not force anything on you that you yourself don't want. You are presented with certain alternatives where you make a choice based on your particular circumstances rendering the other choice impossible under those same exact circumstances.
Sorry, this is a straw man: I never, never, NEVER defended that under exactly the same circumstances, with the same brain state, I possibly would do something else. You cannot attack compatibilism in this way, because it doesn't say that. Compatbilism says that the the 'could have done otherwise' must be read in the hypothetical sense, and then claims:
- that this reading is completely consistent with determinism
- that this reading is a sufficient pillar of assigning free will to people

Only when you can show that at least one of these is wrong, you are seriously attacking the idea of compatibilist free will.

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This is the most unscientific of all conclusions. This is done for obvious reasons (to squeeze free will in somehow, someway) but has no scientific basis to support it. :giggle:
Any thought based on the idea that we could replay the universe with exactly the same conditions and 'grand physical truths' is unscientific. So is yours, because it is also based on this idea.
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  #110  
Old 07-27-2016, 03:16 PM
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That choice, had I made it,
would have, too, been subsumable under a timelessly true physical law, and would have been
deducible from that law and a statement of antecedent conditions. Clearly, I could not choose
both alternatives; but I could choose either. And in choosing the one, I ‘made’ it the one that was
deducible from physical laws and antecedent conditions. But in every sense in which one could
possibly want, I was free to choose the other.
I agree this is difficult to understand. And also, as I read it, it might be wrong.

Davidm: what do you think. Do you agree, or do you think, as I do, that Swartz goes one step too far?
One reading of course could be to rigorously apply the idea that the 'woulds' and 'coulds' are to be read in the hypothetical sense. Then it would mean that we have to imagine that another set of 'grand physical truths' would be the case.
That is why the problem doesn't evaporate by a change of definition.


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Originally Posted by peacegirl View Post
Either option is available to you, but you could not choose either option, as if they are both equal in value. That would make meaningless any kind of reasoning to determine what is the best choice in your eyes. As long as there are meaningful differences between A and B, they do not hold equal weight otherwise it would be like choosing A or A. This natural law does not force anything on you that you yourself don't want. You are presented with certain alternatives where you make a choice based on your particular circumstances rendering the other choice impossible under those same exact circumstances.
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Originally Posted by GdB
Sorry, this is a straw man: I never, never, NEVER defended that under exactly the same circumstances, with the same brain state, I possibly would do something else. You cannot attack compatibilism in this way, because it doesn't say that. Compatbilism says that the 'could have done otherwise' must be read in the hypothetical sense, and then claims:
- that this reading is completely consistent with determinism
- that this reading is a sufficient pillar of assigning free will to people

Only when you can show that at least one of these is wrong, you are seriously attacking the idea of compatibilist free will.
You are talking gobbledygook. Hypothetical imaginings cannot claim:

-that this reading is completely consistent with determinism...or
-that this reading is a sufficient pillar of assigning free will to people.


Let's stick with the universal facts GdB. You cannot fit free will into this logic anywhere. It's like trying to fit a square into a hole.

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This is the most unscientific of all conclusions. This is done for obvious reasons (to squeeze free will in somehow, someway) but has no scientific basis to support it. :giggle:
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Originally Posted by GdB
Any thought based on the idea that we could replay the universe with exactly the same conditions and 'grand physical truths' is unscientific. So is yours, because it is also based on this idea.
We cannot replay the universe which requires going back in time. Therefore, free will will always remain a theory. There is no scientific data to prove that the free will defined by compatibilists is anything more than a play on words to try and justify holding people morally accountable.
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  #111  
Old 07-27-2016, 04:29 PM
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That is why the problem doesn't evaporate by a change of definition.
Really? Why? Explain!

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You are talking gobbledygook. Hypothetical imaginings cannot claim:

-that this reading is completely consistent with determinism...or
-that this reading is a sufficient pillar of assigning free will to people.
You are too stupid to:
- understand counterfactual analysis of causation
- understand the difference between categorical and hypothetical. Did you read the text of Parfit? If so, then please explain. If not, then please stop posting here about things you do not understand anything about.

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We cannot replay the universe which requires going back in time.
Exactly. Therefore we will never know if we have exactly the same conditions, exactly the same will happen. It is a two sided sword, PG.
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  #112  
Old 07-27-2016, 06:21 PM
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You're skirting the most important issue, and that is we cannot hold someone responsible if he could not have done differently; if there was no other decision he could have made because it would have been causally impossible. Don't you see the contradiction AT ALL?
In no way you show that you have understood Parfit's point that there is a difference between a the categorical meaning of 'could have done otherwise' and the hypothetical one.

So tell me what does this have to do with the knowledge that man does not have free will? The categorical imperative seems to be a statement of what a person should do irrespective of his desires because that would be conditional. The moral imperative says: do not steal. But what about the person who has no job and no access to food? Does the moral imperative apply when this person steals food from a grocery store to feed his family and prevent starvation? :chin:

Hypothetical and Categorical Imperatives

Imperatives are instructions; they tell us what to do. Kant distinguished between two types of imperative: hypothetical and categorical.
Hypothetical imperatives tell you what to do in order to achieve a particular goal: “If you want to have enough money to buy a new phone, then get a job”; “If you don’t want to go to prison, then don’t steal cars”.
Hypothetical imperatives only apply to people who want to achieve the goal to which they refer. If I don’t care about having enough money for a new phone, then “If you want to have enough money to buy a new phone, then get a job” doesn’t apply to me; it gives me no reason to get a job. If I don’t mind going to prison, then “If you don’t want to go to prison, then don’t steal cars” doesn’t apply to me; it gives me no reason not to steal cars.
Morality, according to Kant, isn’t like this. Morality doesn’t tell us what to do on the assumption that we want to achieve a particular goal, e.g. staying out of prison, or being well-liked. Moral behaviour isn’t about staying out of prison, or being well-liked. Morality consists of categorical imperatives.
Categorical imperatives, unlike hypothetical imperatives, tell us what to do irrespective of our desires. Morality doesn’t say “If you want to stay out of prison, then don’t steal cars”; it says “Don’t steal cars!” We ought not to steal cars whether we want to stay out of prison or not.

Moral Philosophy » Hypothetical and Categorical Imperatives


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Being true to determinism, there is no way we can talk ourselves out of the fact that if a choice is causally impossible, there is no way we can then say a person was free to act differently. This sounds depressing but actually it's the beginning of a new way of thinking; of understanding how, with the knowledge of our true nature, we can prevent those very acts of evil for which punishment was previously necessary. This is not the end of the story GdB, but you won't listen.
To criticise the compatiblist concept of free will, you must show that the hypothetical meaning of 'could have done otherwise' does not suffice to take and assign responsibility. It is no use to say that the categorical meaning of 'could have done otherwise' cannot be true in a deterministic universe (which I agree with you!). And that is the only thing you do.
The categorical imperative does nothing to prevent the choosing of "immoral" behavior if a person feels that an immoral behavior provides a better pay-off than a moral one. So how good can the moral imperative be if it doesn't actually change behavior for the better? It's just another set of rules.

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Our minds and bodies act together. Our brain acts in accordance with the input it receives and tells our bodies what to do. This is a naturalistic non-dualistic approach.
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Originally Posted by GdB
Calling it non-dualistic doesn't make it none-dualistic. Read your sentence again: "Our minds and bodies act together". Our minds and bodies do not work together. Our minds are our functioning bodies, mostly the brain. Incompatibilists (both libertarians and hard determinists) have not fully seen through the Cartesian illusion.
I am not sure how dualistic versus nondualistic is relevant. I'll have to read up on the Cartesian illusion.

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There is only a difference in type of force if you are being held down and people are putting poison down your throat. That is a forced action where you have no say. Threatening you at gunpoint still gives you a choice to make. It is a difficult choice, but a choice nevertheless. And you are still making a choice by what gives you greater satisfaction. Most people would find greater satisfaction in giving the perpetrator what he wants unless a worse consequence could take place.
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Originally Posted by GdB
You do realise that you make my definition of free will broader, don't you?
I don't see how I make your definition of free will broader, but even if it does, it's just another utilitarian definition added to the many other definitions in use which serve the purpose of placing blame.

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I don't use the term "free will" in my every day life, ...
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No, me neither. But I live according the fact that most people, and I, have a considerable degree of free will, enough to assign them and myself responsibility.
Just because you don't have free will does not strip you of responsibility. This is what you still don't understand.
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  #113  
Old 07-27-2016, 06:37 PM
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That is why the problem doesn't evaporate by a change of definition.
Really? Why? Explain!
A change of definition just adds another definition, but the problem still remains. It doesn't evaporate; it just hides the problem in a novel way. All smoke and mirrors. :poof!:

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You are talking gobbledygook. Hypothetical imaginings cannot claim:

-that this reading is completely consistent with determinism...or
-that this reading is a sufficient pillar of assigning free will to people.
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Originally Posted by GdB
You are too stupid to:
- understand counterfactual analysis of causation
- understand the difference between categorical and hypothetical. Did you read the text of Parfit? If so, then please explain. If not, then please stop posting here about things you do not understand anything about.
Please stop patronizing me GdB. I'm not going to let you play the "I'm smarter than you" card, okay? If I am not familiar with something I will read up on it. I downloaded the article by Parfit but didn't get to read it yet. Counterfactual theories do nothing to prove that compatibilism is true.

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We cannot replay the universe which requires going back in time.
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Exactly. Therefore we will never know if we have exactly the same conditions, exactly the same will happen. It is a two sided sword, PG.
No, because although we can't prove free will true, and therefore determinism false, we can prove determinism true, and free will false. :yup:
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Old 07-27-2016, 09:01 PM
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Default Re: Free will in philosphy and science

You know what, GdB? I suggest you email Norman Swartz and ask him to join this discussion. His email is public, and I'm not giving anything away: swartz@sfu.ca

I would love to have him participate in this discussion. Several years ago, at the The Galilean Library, a forum that is still online but mostly a ghost town now, I emailed him to join a similar discussion and he did, for a time. Maybe he would be amenable to doing so again. He's a great guy, too.

I suggest linking him to samples of your posts so he will know that you are legit. I don't think he suffers fools gladly.
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Old 07-27-2016, 10:22 PM
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As is the whole discussion.
Then why do you discuss?

What is your view point? Do you think that the discussion makes no sense because it is just vague from all sides, or do you think that the answer is so clear that there is no need to discuss?
It's equivalent to discussing how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.
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  #116  
Old 07-28-2016, 12:10 AM
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I have always felt that that sort of discussion was pretty pointless unless one first specified what music they were dancing to and what dance they were doing.
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  #117  
Old 07-28-2016, 07:14 AM
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In no way you show that you have understood Parfit's point that there is a difference between a the categorical meaning of 'could have done otherwise' and the hypothetical one.
So tell me what does this have to do with the knowledge that man does not have free will? The categorical imperative seems to be a statement of what a person should do irrespective of his desires because that would be conditional. The moral imperative says: do not steal. But what about the person who has no job and no access to food? Does the moral imperative apply when this person steals food from a grocery store to feed his family and prevent starvation? :chin:
Can you just first read the text, before you react? Parfit's text is not about the categorical or any hypothetical imperative. So all your pasting and arguing here was a waste of time.

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I am not sure how dualistic versus nondualistic is relevant.
Because if you would understand it, it would free you of the illusion that grand physical truths can force us. You can only be forced by something that is not you. So 'hard-determinists' do as if 'I' am forced by my body: it is the body that is 'subject to the power of the laws of nature'. But if you see that you are your functioning body, this argument drops away.

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I don't see how I make your definition of free will broader, but even if it does, it's just another utilitarian definition added to the many other definitions in use which serve the purpose of placing blame.
Because you still see free will, where I would say that it is not free will anymore: normally I do not give money away to strangers. But when I am forced on gun point I possible will do. So where I see that the robber artificially reduces my autonomy, and so my possibility of expressing my free will, you do as if there is no difference.

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Just because you don't have free will does not strip you of responsibility. This is what you still don't understand.
Ah! Another compatibilist in disguise! Explain what responsibility is, when an agent has no free choice! (Be sure you distinguish between merely 'choice' and 'free choice'.)

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  #118  
Old 07-28-2016, 07:35 AM
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A change of definition just adds another definition, but the problem still remains. It doesn't evaporate; it just hides the problem in a novel way. All smoke and mirrors.
Maybe the whole free will problem is a pseudo-problem, due to our misunderstanding of what free will and laws of nature really are. Swartz and (other?) compabibilists are sure it is a pseudo-problem. There is no 'real problem': there is only a problem in understanding. The 'free will problem' is an intelligibility problem, a philosophical problem, not a scientific problem.

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Please stop patronizing me GdB.
No. I find it perfectly fine that people do not agree with me. But if people show that they do not even understand the most fundamental ideas (if they agree or not), the fundamental concepts that first make the discussion possible, then I have no patience or respect, when they do as if they have so much to say. Your hammering on that 'could have happened/done otherwise' is inconsistent with determinism when you read it in the hypothetical way, ('If it would have rained yesterday, the streets would have been wet') shows you still have not understood the fundamentals. Your 'determinism contradicts all possible definitions of free will' is another blunder of the highest order, as 'definitions mean nothing when reality is concerned'.

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Counterfactual theories do nothing to prove that compatibilism is true.
No, but they are an essential cornerstone of it. If you would understand that, you would give other kind of arguments against my position.

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No, because although we can't prove free will true, and therefore determinism false, we can prove determinism true, and free will false.
Wrong as wrong can be.

You cannot prove determinism true by saying that we (categorical reading!) could not have done otherwise under exactly the same circumstances, including my brain state, because we cannot replay the universe until this point. And your definition of free will is false anyway: being forced by your own satisfaction, and not being able to choose what you not want. Such a bullshit.

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  #119  
Old 07-28-2016, 07:57 AM
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It's equivalent to discussing how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.
So why did you chime in? And you do not have an opinion about if we should lock criminals away, or should give them medical treatment (as some neurologists suggest)?
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  #120  
Old 07-28-2016, 02:04 PM
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In no way you show that you have understood Parfit's point that there is a difference between a the categorical meaning of 'could have done otherwise' and the hypothetical one.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
So tell me what does this have to do with the knowledge that man does not have free will? The categorical imperative seems to be a statement of what a person should do irrespective of his desires because that would be conditional. The moral imperative says: do not steal. But what about the person who has no job and no access to food? Does the moral imperative apply when this person steals food from a grocery store to feed his family and prevent starvation? :chin:
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Originally Posted by GdB
Can you just first read the text, before you react? Parfit's text is not about the categorical or any hypothetical imperative. So all your pasting and arguing here was a waste of time.
So explain it in a way that doesn't make me want to scream "foul".

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I am not sure how dualistic versus nondualistic is relevant.
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Originally Posted by GdB
Because if you would understand it, it would free you of the illusion that grand physical truths can force us.
Who is saying that GdB? This is another strawman. I never said that physical laws force anything, but you and David keep arguing the same point as if to prove that if we are not forced by something external, we are free. This is gobbledygook.

Quote:
Originally Posted by GdB" ]You can only be forced by something that is not you. So 'hard-determinists' do as if 'I' am forced by my body: it is the body that is 'subject to the power of the laws of nature'. But if you see that you are your functioning body, this argument drops away.[/quote]

You are not forced by your body because your body is you and is simply following the demands of your mind. Show me where this changes the argument?

Quote:
I don't see how I make your definition of free will broader, but even if it does, it's just another utilitarian definition added to the many other definitions in use which serve the purpose of placing blame.
[quote="GdB
Because you still see free will, where I would say that it is not free will anymore: normally I do not give money away to strangers. But when I am forced on gun point I possible will do. So where I see that the robber artificially reduces my autonomy, and so my possibility of expressing my free will, you do as if there is no difference.
This is not free will. Just because we have a choice does not change the fact that we can't make both choices equally. Why are you so resistant to this fact? You are misinterpreting the word choice to equate that with "free". Having a choice doesn't reduce your ability to say "NO" if that choice is not your preference. You are autonomous in that the choice is yours to make, but this does not translate to "free" will. Where does any of this contradict the definition of determinism?

Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
Just because you don't have free will does not strip you of responsibility. This is what you still don't understand.
Quote:
Originally Posted by GdB
Ah! Another compatibilist in disguise! Explain what responsibility is, when an agent has no free choice! (Be sure you distinguish between merely 'choice' and 'free choice'.)
Your choice is not a free one. I am not a compatibilist. What a joke! There is no way you can say it's free if your choice is compelled by antecedent events that drive your choice in only one direction. :crazy:
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  #121  
Old 07-28-2016, 03:27 PM
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As is the whole discussion.
Then why do you discuss?

What is your view point? Do you think that the discussion makes no sense because it is just vague from all sides, or do you think that the answer is so clear that there is no need to discuss?
It's equivalent to discussing how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.
Easy answer, - All of them.
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  #122  
Old 07-28-2016, 08:31 PM
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Swartz devotes some time to explicating this idea that if the universe could somehow be “backed up” and replayed, then at some time t agent x, with an identical history and brain state, will — as he or she did in the first iteration of the world — perform act y. Swartz denies this completely. The agent might again perform act y, but he or she might perform some other act as well. It’s entirely up to the agent, and not the “laws” of nature, which have no prescriptive force whatever.
This is the point where I think Swartz is not correct. I would say that if we backup the universe, we did a bad job if not the same grand physical truths, i.e. universal timelessly true statements, hold. That still does not mean that grand physical truths force us to anything. But if not the same descriptions of the universe are true, then it is not the same universe.
I think Swartz would explain it like this: the standard idea is that physical laws, in conjunction with antecedent events, entail determinism. But this standard account is necessitarian as to physical law; under the regularity account he champions, to say that an action or event is subsumed under, or is subsumable under, a physical law, is just to say that the “law” is a true description of what we do. Under his account, the logical priority runs from what we do to physical law, rather than from physical law to what we do, as it is under the necessitarian account.

Suppose we could somehow “back up” the universe and replay it from scratch, up to and including an agent’s identical brain state before some time t when he is faced with a choice. Then we ask whether the agent would do the same thing at time t in the backed-up world that he did in the original world, or whether he could or would do something different. I don’t think very much turns on this question. In the first place, we obviously cannot do this experiment. But more important, I don’t think it means very much with respect to free will. If we were able to back up the universe identically to what it was, including an agent’s brain state at time t when faced with a choice, why should we expect him to do something different from what he originally did? It seems I should no more expect this than, if I were to videotape a TV program, I should expect the videotaped program to show an ending that is different from the original program. That would be a miracle!
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  #123  
Old 07-28-2016, 11:26 PM
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If we were able to back up the universe identically to what it was, including an agent’s brain state at time t when faced with a choice, why should we expect him to do something different from what he originally did?
Because given a particular state, there are necessarily observables involving any system that have no sharp value. If you prepare the agent in a state where she does something with probability one, there will be other observables that obey a probability distribution and give different values at different times.
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  #124  
Old 07-29-2016, 06:57 AM
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Swartz devotes some time to explicating this idea that if the universe could somehow be “backed up” and replayed, then at some time t agent x, with an identical history and brain state, will — as he or she did in the first iteration of the world — perform act y. Swartz denies this completely. The agent might again perform act y, but he or she might perform some other act as well. It’s entirely up to the agent, and not the “laws” of nature, which have no prescriptive force whatever.
If we were able to back up the universe identically to what it was, including an agent’s brain state at time t when faced with a choice, why should we expect him to do something different from what he originally did? It seems I should no more expect this than, if I were to videotape a TV program, I should expect the videotaped program to show an ending that is different from the original program. That would be a miracle!
So what do you think? The bold sentences contradict each other. The first time you are explaining Swartz' position. The second time your own. So you also do not agree with Swartz on this point?
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Old 07-29-2016, 07:26 AM
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So explain it in a way that doesn't make me want to scream "foul".
Why should I be able to that better than Parfit? I cited that already, but here it is again:

Quote:
Suppose that, while I am standing in some field during a thunderstorm, a bolt of lightning narrowly misses me. If I say that I could have been killed, I might be using ‘could’ in a categorical sense. I might mean that, even with conditions just as they actually were, it would have been causally possible for this bolt of lightning to have hit me. If we assume determinism, that is not true, since it was causally inevitable that this lightning struck the ground just where it did. I may instead be using ‘could’ in a different, hypothetical or iffy sense. When I say that I could have been killed, I may mean only that, if conditions had been in some way slightly different—if, for example, I had been standing a few yards to the West—I would have been killed. Even if we assume determinism, that claim could be true.
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Who is saying that GdB? This is another strawman. I never said that physical laws force anything, but you and David keep arguing the same point as if to prove that if we are not forced by something external, we are free.
Because you implicitly use it all the time. If laws of nature do not force, then they do not force us either. If we are not forced, we are free. So laws of nature are no thread to our free will. The whole free will problem is nothing else than a spell of our language, of using wrong concepts that lure us into false pictures and definitions of what really is going on.

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You are not forced by your body because your body is you and is simply following the demands of your mind. Show me where this changes the argument?
Again such a hypnotising concept: 'demands of the mind'. You mean 'motivations of the mind'. You see? By using certain definitions or concepts you are summoning up the free will problem!

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Just because we have a choice does not change the fact that we can't make both choices equally.
Again, you are using a weird definition of free will: that I have no preference. What is a will that has no preferences? Will is the intention to have something, to reach something. A will that equally prefers anything is no will at all. Why are you so resistant to this fact?

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You are misinterpreting the word choice to equate that with "free".
No, I don't. If a robber forces me to give him my money, it is my choice to give it, but it was not a free choice, because the alternative, being shot is not viable to me. The robber intentionally brings me in this situation, so that I will do something that I normally would not do. Without the idea of free will, forcing somebody to do something, is an empty concept.

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Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
Just because you don't have free will does not strip you of responsibility. This is what you still don't understand.
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Originally Posted by GdB
Ah! Another compatibilist in disguise! Explain what responsibility is, when an agent has no free choice! (Be sure you distinguish between merely 'choice' and 'free choice'.)
Your choice is not a free one. I am not a compatibilist. What a joke! There is no way you can say it's free if your choice is compelled by antecedent events that drive your choice in only one direction.
Sorry, but you said 'Just because you don't have free will does not strip you of responsibility'. So now I want to know what responsibility is in your view. How can you distinguish between an action where the actor is not responsible, and an action where he is?

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