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Spacemonkey · #**11076** 01-11-2013, 01:07 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Quote:

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Quote:

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It is true that whatever one happens to choose is what he chooses, but if what he chooses is in the direction of greater satisfaction, as Lessans states, then it can be said that there is only one choice that can be made. There are no other logical possibilities. You are making it sound like he can choose this or that equally, which is not possible when comparing meaningful differences. It is possible to have no compulsion to choose milk over juice because either of them quenches your thirst, so you may just grab for whichever is in front of you. That is like choosing between A and A. If the choice that you make has important consequences, you are compelled to choose the one that you consider better for yourself, not worse. This is not a free choice whatsoever.

The problem isn't just that it is true that we always choose what we choose, but rather that Lessans' satisfaction principle doesn't SAY or MEAN anything other than this. If that is all it means or says, then it DOESN'T say ANYTHING about any kind of compulsion, so it doesn't say ANYTHING about free choice.

Quote:

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But you can infer empirical conclusions from this principle; that's where you're wrong. I don't know what else to tell you.

No, you CAN'T infer empirical conclusions from this principle IF it is unfalsifiable. That's what the passage you just replied to explains and PROVES. If you think otherwise then you have to address that explanation instead of just denying it. Here it is again:

An inference from unfalsifiable principle S to some empirical conclusion E is only sound if E is true in every possible world in which S is true. (A possible world is some conceivable global way that things might have been.) But if E is an empirical truth, then it is true in some worlds (including the actual one) yet false in some other counterfactual possible worlds. But S, being an unfalsifiable necessary truth, is true in all possible worlds. So if S is true in all worlds, and E is false in some, then E cannot be true in all worlds where S is true. There will be at least one possible world where S is true but E is false. And that renders the inference from S to E invalid and unsound.

Quote:

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But there is no counterfactual logically possible world where he chooses Y Spacemonkey. You're all confused here.

The confusion is yours. Counterfactual logical possibilities are completely unconstrained by causality. There are logically possible worlds where causal determinism is true, and others where it is false, and even possible worlds where sneezes cause earthquakes. So both choices X and Y ARE counterfactual logical (but not necessarily causal) possibilities, and that is all my point requires. Remember this has nothing to do with harm or with prediction. Here it is again:

On being able to choose otherwise, consider the situation where a person does X after considering doing Y instead. You said that in all possible and all counterfactual situations, his satisfaction principle remains true. That means in the actual world where he does X he was moving in his direction of greater satisfaction. And it also means that in the counterfactual logically possible world where he instead does Y, he would also have been moving in his direction of greater satisfaction. That means the truth of this principle does NOTHING AT ALL to prevent him from having chosen Y over X, as there was no particular direction of satisfaction in which he was compelled to move.

I give up. Your logic may be valid but it's not sound. Sorry.

Bump.