Quote:
Originally Posted by Vivisectus
Another fun thought occurs to me:
If the return of a consciousness can happen after a "gap" independent of memory or the sensation of continuity, then how do we know that the same consciousness returns after any gap in consciousness? Do you also argue that once a person becomes unconscious, the first person to wake up after that can be said to be the continuation of the consciousness of the person who fell asleep?
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You'll find that Wayne addresses these points at the end of Chapter 11, I believe, and I think he even says existential passage can happen without death.
We can come up with all kinds of interesting thought experiments. But, for me, I just want to cut to the chase. We can compare what I shall call "standard physicalism" (SP) with "existential passage" (EP). Let SP stand for the usual idea of non-religious materialists, that when we die we die and that's it, though future people are born.
What I want to say is this: For both those who have subjective experiences, and for those who are objective observers,
there is no difference at all between what is felt and observed under SP, and what is felt and observed under EP. It therefore follows that EP is superfluous.
Let us consider: x dies, and y is born.
Under SP, x fades out, loses consciousness
but does not feel or experience any "passage" to a later person, or later point of view. EP
agrees with this. Under both SP and EP, x is
well and truly gone, forever. There is no "felt passage."
Under SP, y comes into existence,
but does not feel that his subjective perspective has "passed" from any prior person. EP
agrees with this. Under both SP and EP, y,
qua y, emerged from a blank void, with no prior memories of another point of view possible even in principle.
Under SP, outside observers witness x dying, and y being born. They do not note anything "passing" from one to the other: No soul, no body or brain, and no passage of subjective continuity. Under EP
the same thing is true. No soul, nothing phyiscal, and no way in principle even to observe any generic subjective continuity or existential passage, since these things, being subjective, cannot be objectively observed even in principle.
Thus, under both SP and EP,
everything looks exactly alike, both to subjective persons and objective observers.
Since there is no experiential or observational difference between SP and EP
even in principle, it seems that like the aether with respect to light, EP is a superfluous idea.