Another case from the Supreme Court Fall '05 docket is
Maryland v. Blake, which has to do with a defendant's rights against interrogation after he's been read the Miranda warning and asked for a lawyer. At that point the police aren't allowed to interrogate a suspect further, or make statements that they know might coerce the suspect into talking.
On October 26, 2002, at about 5 a.m., Blake was arrested at his home and taken into custody wearing nothing but boxer shorts and a wifebeater. He and another suspect were charged with, among other things, first degree murder for the death of a man that was shot in the head and his body run over with his own car. Blake was read his Miranda rights.
There were two police officers involved with Blake at this point. At around 6 a.m. the first officer, Johns, came to Blake's cell and served him a copy of the documents outlining the charges against him, including the potential penalties. The documents contained, in all capital letters, the word "DEATH," despite the fact that Blake was 17 years old and not eligible for the death penalty under Maryland law.
Immediately thereafter the second officer, Reese, appeared and asked of Blake, in what Johns characterized as a "loud and confrontational" manner, "I bet you want to talk now, huh!" Johns, surprised at Reese's outburst, replied, "No, he doesn't want to talk to us. He already asked for a lawyer. We cannot talk to him now."
In reflecting on all this, Blake decided soon thereafter to make additional, self-incriminating statements to the police. Blake subsequently filed a pre-trial motion to have this evidence suppressed, maintaining that Reese's statement, in conjunction with the erroneous notation of "DEATH," "constituted the functional equivalent of interrogation following petitioner's invocation of his Miranda rights, thereby violating petitioner's right against compelled self-incrimination."
The trial court granted Blake's motion, and suppressed the evidence. Maryland appealed, and had the trial court reversed. On further appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the intermediate appellate court and upheld the original ruling of the trial court. The state's argument, which the Supreme Court has accepted for review, is summarized in the latter opinion as follows:
... Officer Reese's remark to petitioner was not interrogation--that petitioner initiated contact with the police after he read the charging documents and then voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before making incriminating statements. The State contends that Officer Reese's remark was not the functional equivalent of interrogation--that it was nothing more than a comment on the seriousness of the charges and, in a sense, a rhetorical question. Even if Officer Reese's remark is viewed as interrogatory or as an invitation to talk, the State maintains that Detective Johns removed any alleged taint from the remark when he admonished Officer Reese immediately that they could not talk to petitioner because he had invoked his right to counsel. Blake v. State, 381 Md. 218, 230 (Md., 2004).
That court also makes much of the fact that the 17-year-old Blake was practically naked while being held in a cell in Maryland at the end of October, and clearly takes that into consideration in determining that Officer Reese's question constituted impermissible coercion.