Another case from those crazy, whackjob liberals on the 9th Circuit!
The prosecutor's statement that Juror 016 rolled her eyes is critical to this case. If someone rolls her eyes when another speaks to her, the eye-rolling implies disrespect and rejection. The panel opinion concluded, irrationally, that because the trial judge did not see the eye-rolling, the state appellate court was unreasonable in approving the prosecutor's strike. The reason this is irrational is that it does not matter whether the state trial judge noticed the eye-rolling, or even whether there actually was any eye-rolling. All that matters is whether the prosecutor intentionally lied about the eye-rolling to make an excuse for getting an African American woman off the jury. If the prosecutor was really striking Juror 016 because she thought the juror rolled her eyes and not because she was African American, she had a right to strike her, even if she was mistaken about whether the eye-rolling actually occurred. In this case, the trial judge thought the prosecutor was telling the truth, and the state appeals court saw no reason to doubt it. Collins v. Rice, 365 F.3d 667, 671 (9th Cir., 2004) (Bea, J., dissenting to denial of rehearing en banc).
At jury selection, during which prospective jurors are questioned by the attorneys, lawyers for either side can exercise a number of what are called peremptory strikes to excuse jurors without giving a reason. However if opposing counsel suspects the strike was made on, for example, racial grounds, she needs to convince the judge of at least the possibility. At that point the challenging attorney must justify the strike, giving race-neutral reasons, "based on something other than the race of the juror." The judge then rules upon whether the use of the peremptory strike is legitimate.
In other words, a limited number of prospective jurors may be excused on hunches, on what may appear to be the flimsiest of reasons, or completely arbitrarily, so long as it can't be shown there was racial bias.
In this case, Collins was on trial in California for felony possession of cocaine. He was found guilty and, since he had two previous felony convictions for robbery and forcible rape, sentenced under California's three strikes rule to 25 years to life in state prison. During jury selection Collins alleged that the prosecutor improperly excused two prospective jurors on the basis of race. The trial judge denied Collins's motion, and the state courts upheld the trial judge throughout Colllins's appeals. Ultimately Collins got his case into federal court, and a three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit reversed the state courts, over a dissent, finding that the trial judge's original disposition was unreasonable.
At Collins's trial, the prosecutor exercised peremptory strikes with respect to jurors 016 and 019, both African American women. Both strikes were challenged by Collins. The prosecutor's response to Collins's challenge was as follows:
Ms. 016 as well as Ms. 019 were both young and I was concerned with them being too tolerant of this type of case. Also, Ms. 016 made a remark when the judge made a response to her comment "uh-huh," she turned away and rolled her eyes. I don't think you asked her specifically to give a yes or no, but she went "yes," and rolled her eyes and turned away from the court. She and Mr. 006 were both single, no ties.
[Defense Counsel]: Who is 006?
[Prosecutor]: He is the white juror. That was the reason, the justification, for excusing her, rather than her being an African-American. 019, she also had a daughter having a drug problem and she talked about not knowing much about what drug it was, things like that. She was not sufficiently educated in some areas to decide a case like this. But it is beyond any of her experience. Collins v. Rice, 365 F.3d 667, 674 (9th Cir., 2004).
So the prosecutor's claim was that juror 016 was struck on account of her age and her demeanor, the latter as evidenced by the eye rolling. Generally, both grounds are permissible for peremptory strikes. However, on the age question, the 9th Circuit, given the further explanations of the prosecutor, found that the same characteristics existed among the remaining jurors, and ruled that the age justifications given by the prosecutor were overcome by clear and convincing evidence of a racial pretext, evidence that the state courts unreasonably ignored.
Even so, the state courts had ruled that even if the prosecution's reliance on juror 016's age was improper, its demeanor rationale was enough to justify the peremptory strike. But the 9th Circuit didn't buy this either. Because the trial judge didn't actually observe juror 016's eye-rolling, he had to rely on the prosecutor's good faith, so to speak. But, the 9th Circuit said, given the totality of the prosecutor's behavior, and especially the reasons given for striking jurors 016 and 019, the prosecutor failed to establish enough good faith on which the trial judge could have made such a determination:
The prosecutor's objectively unreasonable statements regarding Juror 019's age, and her attempt to use gender as a race-neutral basis for excluding Jurors 016 and 019, combined with her pretextual justifications for dismissing Juror 016 on the basis of her alleged lack of community ties, her marital status, and her purported tolerance, and the fact that nothing in the record corroborated her allegations regarding Juror 016's demeanor, provide "clear and convincing evidence" that the prosecutor did not dismiss Juror 016 on the basis of her demeanor. In light of the evidence in the record, the appellate court's determination that the prosecutor dismissed Juror 016 because of her demeanor was an unreasonable determination of the facts. Because this determination provided the basis for the appellate court's conclusion that the trial court had not clearly erred in accepting the prosecutor's justification as race-neutral, this determination also was objectively unreasonable. Id. at 684.
I'm willing to bet a week's pay that Associate Justice Roberts will
at this one.