Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
Quote:
Originally Posted by Spacemonkey
Where in the first chapter? What is the definition that he provided?
|
He couldn't narrow it down to one measley sentence. Just because he didn't define it in one sentence doesnt mean greater satisfaction isn't defined. |
Quote:
|
Originally Posted by Spacemonkey
A chapter isn't a definition. He didn't provide any explicit definition of the term at all, did he?
|
I already answered this in the other thread.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Spacemonkey
Was your answer Yes?
|
Quote:
|
I guess it is. Whatever choice is made is in the direction of greater satisfaction, so it's always true.
|
Quote:
|
Originally Posted by Spacemonkey
Then there's no compulsion because nothing has been ruled out.
|
Not true Spacemonkey. There is a definite compulsion, and there's no denying it no matter what you do to try to discount it.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Spacemonkey
What isn't a contingent conclusion? (Please state the conclusion you have in mind.)
|
Quote:
This is what I gathered:
A contingent proposition is neither necessarily true nor necessarily false. Propositions that are contingent may be so because they contain logical connectives which, along with the truth value of any of its atomic parts, determine the truth value of the proposition. This is to say that the truth value of the proposition is contingent upon the truth values of the sentences which comprise it. Contingent propositions depend on the facts, whereas analytic propositions are true without regard to any facts about which they speak.
Contingency (philosophy - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia)
|
Quote:
|
Originally Posted by Spacemonkey
What the hell? I wasn't asking you to look up and define what a contingent proposition is. I was asking you to tell me which specific conclusion of Lessans you were denying to be a contingent one when you said "It is not a contingent conclusion, that's why."
|
I thought when you said contingent you meant accidental. Wrong definition. It is contingent based on the facts, but this law is not predicting the conclusion. That doesn't mean it's an empty tautology because there is still compulsion involved. If you can't get past this, we can't move on.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Spacemonkey
Do you agree that you cannot validly infer a contingent conclusion from a necessary or tautological premise?
|
Quote:
|
I am not inferring a contingent conclusion from a necessary or tautological premise.
|
Quote:
|
Originally Posted by Spacemonkey
You've admitted you are starting with a tautological premise, and you just failed to tell me what conclusion you think is not contingent. But in any case, you haven't actually answered the question here, which was a general one: Do you agree that you cannot validly infer a contingent conclusion from a necessary or tautological premise? [Y/N]
No, I never said you could. We cannot predict that Obama is going to be president, although we can say there will be a president elected.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
No, you keep saying that he presupposes that there is a level of perfection, but that's not the case. It is shown, through his demonstration, that conscience works in a very predictable way and when the conditions change (for the better), conscience will be able to express itself at full throttle (which cannot happen in a world of blame and punishment) by not permitting behaviors that hurt others without justification.
|
Quote:
|
Originally Posted by Spacemonkey
You've just done it again. You are assuming there is some full throttle state of conscience that only blame and punishment are preventing it from reaching. That is the assumption you are being asked to support. Lessans never once shows this or provides support for it. He merely states that it is so.
|
Nooooooooo, there are no assumptions Spacemonkey. He has supported it and the fact that you won't take the time to study these chapters shows me that you are either afraid of what you might find, or you are too proud. I don't know what it is, but I know one thing; it's not good. 
Quote:
|
Originally Posted by Spacemonkey
So where did Lessans support his idea that there is a level of perfection at which conscience would operate in the absence of blame?
|
Quote:
|
Chapter Two: pp. 59-91. He explains this throughout this chapter. This IS the most important chapter because it explains the two-sided equation.
|
Quote:
|
Originally Posted by Spacemonkey
His explanations presuppose the point you are being asked to support. That's why even after years of having been asked, you still can't actually quote anything he says which supports this assumption about the innate potential perfection of conscience. All you can do is point to the chapter and assert that the support is in there somewhere. But it isn't.
|
No no no, there are no presuppositions here. He has supported his claims more than enough times, and in more detail than anyone could ask for.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
Because we don't have free will, that's why. There is nothing to consider. There is nothing wrong with trying to reconcile these two opposite principles, in order to justify blame and punishment which is necessary at this point in our development. But there is a better way, and if you're not willing to listen because you're so positive you're right, then there's nowhere for me to go.
|
Quote:
|
Originally Posted by Spacemonkey
So there's nothing at all wrong with compatibilism, and the the kind of free will we don't have isn't the kind compatabilism is concerned with. So why does Lessans fail to even consider it in his arguments?
|
When you say wrong, it doesn't make sense. This isn't about right or wrong. It was necessary that we find a way to justify blame and punishment, but if there's a better way, we need to consider the value of it before throwing it out.
Quote:
|
Originally Posted by Spacemonkey
Firstly, and most importantly, what support do you have for this claim that facial recognition involves language?
|
Quote:
|
His observations regarding the eyes and the projecting function of the brain. We learn to see differences in faces due to language. He explains this in detail in this chapter.
|
Quote:
|
Originally Posted by Spacemonkey
That's where he claims this, but he doesn't support those claims in any way. He merely asserts that things work the way that he says.
|
Again, his observations are spot on. They count for something. People can tell me until the cows come home that his observations weren't supported and they were mere assertions, but they were demonstrated in a way that shows their validity. If you can't see that, or even entertain the possibility that his observations were right, then you will dismiss this knowledge as if it's meaningless. And that is very sad.
Quote:
|
Originally Posted by Spacemonkey
Secondly, if it's primarily a matter of language, then what does the efferent or afferent nature of vision have to do with facial recognition?
|
It has everything to do with it, because of how the brain is able to project values onto substance that don't exist, and we wouldn't be able to do this if the eyes were afferent. |
Quote:
|
Originally Posted by Spacemonkey
That's completely false. The projection of values is a well understood psychological process that has nothing to do with the mechanics of vision. Lessans has yet again merely assumed that his own account of something is the only possible one, due to his own complete ignorance of existing knowledge on the subject. And this oversight completely undermines his grounds for thinking that his false and unsupported claims about canine facial recognition would be evidence for efferent vision even if they were correct.
|
He was not ignorant, you are for saying that. There were no oversights, as much as you wish there were. His claims are not undermined in the least. The very fact that we are able to be conditioned visually, and we cannot be conditioned with any the other senses, indicates, once again, that the eyes work differently than hearing, sight, smell, or touch.