Your Lawyer Is Only Good for 14 Days

[Garnet]

OK, the thread title is a misrepresentation of the article I'm about to post but it appealed to my inner 7-year old.

Anyway, the Supreme Court has handed down a ruling about how long a request for an attorney if good after a suspect is released from custody. I'm curious about what y'all think about this.

Court says inmate's lawyer request no longer valid - Yahoo! News

WASHINGTON – The Supreme Court ruled Wednesday that a suspect's request for a lawyer is good for only 14 days after the person is released from police custody, reinstating the confession of a child molester who had asked for a lawyer nearly three years before he confessed.

Michael Shatzer confessed in 2006 to abusing his own son; he had asked police for a lawyer when he was first questioned in 2003.

The decision marks the first time the court has set such a time limit. Police can now attempt to question a suspect who asked for a lawyer — if the person has been released from custody for at least two weeks — without violating the person's constitutional rights and without having to repeat the Miranda warning.

I'm not sure what to think about it. While I don't think that a request for an attorney three years after the fact should still be reasonably held as valid, the guy did waived his Miranda rights for questioning the second time around. It seems to me that the waiver should have been the crux of the case. The 14 days seems odd to me. Where did that come from?

[Stephen Maturin]

Originally Posted by Garnet

The 14 days seems odd to me. Where did that come from?

The anus of Antonin Scalia:

If Shatzer’s return to the general prison population qualified as a break in custody (a question we address in Part III, infra ), there is no doubt that it lasted long enough (2 years) to meet that durational requirement. But what about a break that has lasted only one year? Or only one week? It is impractical to leave the answer to that question for clarification in future case-by-case adjudication; law enforcement officers need to know, with certainty and beforehand, when renewed interrogation is lawful. And while it is certainly unusual for this Court to set forth precise time limits governing police action, it is not unheard-of. In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44 (1991) , we specified 48 hours as the time within which the police must comply with the requirement of And while it is certainly unusual for this Court to set forth precise time limits governing police action, it is not unheard-of. In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin , 500 U. S. 44 (1991) , we specified 48 hours as the time within which the police must comply with the requirement of Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975) , that a person arrested without a warrant be brought before a magistrate to establish probable cause for continued detention.

Like McLaughlin, this is a case in which the requisite police action (there, presentation to a magistrate; here, abstention from further interrogation) has not been prescribed by statute but has been established by opinion of this Court. We think it appropriate to specify a period of time to avoid the consequence that continuation of the Edwards presumption “will not reach the correct result most of the time.” Coleman, supra, at 737. It seems to us that period is 14 days. That provides plenty of time for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody.

The 14-day limitation meets Shatzer’s concern that a break-in-custody rule lends itself to police abuse. He envisions that once a suspect invokes his Miranda right to counsel, the police will release the suspect briefly (to end the Edwards presumption) and then promptly bring him back into custody for reinterrogation. But once the suspect has been out of custody long enough (14 days) to eliminate its coercive effect, there will be nothing to gain by such gamesmanship—nothing, that is, except the entirely appropriate gain of being able to interrogate a suspect who has made a valid waiver of his Miranda rights.

Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. ___ (2010).

The fourteen day thing seems odd to Thomas and Stevens as well. Thomas suggests that any break in custody should vitiate the presumption of involuntariness, while Stevens argues that allowing the presumption to remain for periods much longer than fourteen days may well be appropriate depending on the specific facts and circumstances ("Neither a break in custody nor the passage of time has an inherent, curative power.").

[livius drusus]

Conclusion: whenever the police ask you anything, demand a lawyer and stfu. No exceptions.

[godfry n. glad]

Aw, cripes...I thought it was common knowledge that after 14 days, lawyers begin to stink.

[California Tanker]

The fourteen day thing seems odd to Thomas and Stevens as well. Thomas suggests that any break in custody should vitiate the presumption of involuntariness, while Stevens argues that allowing the presumption to remain for periods much longer than fourteen days may well be appropriate depending on the specific facts and circumstances

It seems, then, that Scalia's 14-day limit seems to be a fair compromise between the two positions. Arbitrary, absolutely, but reflective of the concerns of both parties.

NTM

[Clutch Munny]

Does not follow.

[Garnet]

Originally Posted by livius drusus

Conclusion: whenever the police ask you anything, demand a lawyer and stfu. No exceptions.

Having some limited experience in law enforcement and watching how police handle things, this is precisely what I would should I ever get in trouble.