Ukraine

[fragment]

Originally Posted by ChuckF

Was there really any need need to engage in the second- and third-order analyses of the state of friendliness between Russia and the United States...

Arguably there is a need to come up with an explanation for the provision of the "massive US subsidy and security guarantees" that you acknowledge but seem to treat as a given not in need of further analysis.

[ChuckF]

I guess the most obvious one is that the US has a huge GDP and meets its NATO defense investment guideline obligations. Of course, the US defense budget is larger than that, which amounts to further indirect subsidy. Independently of the rules of NATO, European stability is pretty important to US security, economic, and political interests everywhere. That came up a couple of times last century. NATO and the Marshall Plan were the first two elements of European integration, and an attempt to restore a Congress of Vienna-type multilateral conflict management system to an otherwise chaotic Europe. Europe has continued that economic integration to considerable success, and are the major US trading partner. US security guarantees continue to enable both of those. Security-wise, Europe gets a credible nuclear and conventional deterrent against Russia. If the question is what the US gets out of NATO, the same thing it always has: wealthy markets and stable trading partners in Europe, and enhanced global force projection capabilities. There's plenty of talk about democratic values, which is simply cant for reasonably free markets and rule of law. There's not really much in the way of morality behind it.

That's for Western Europe. Of course all of those things are also hugely appealing for former Warsaw Pact/Yugoslav NATO aspirants, perhaps especially for candidates states with memories of 1944, 1956, or 1968. (Or, in the case of Ukraine, 2014 or 2022.) But it's really a much simpler analysis for the post-Soviet space - accession to European institutions like NATO and the EU brings a shitload of security and economic benefits, simply because of access to that pool of money and security assistance. That level of security and economic support simply cannot be obtained elsewhere in Eastern Europe, so it's pretty much indisputably better to be inside of it than outside of it. For the US, more markets, and improved stability in eastern - and especially southeastern - Europe, which is a historical source of European instability. Mackinder recognized that in the early 20th century.

[fragment]

Originally Posted by ChuckF

enhanced global force projection capabilities

And yet you sneer that looking at US geopolitics with respect to Russia and Iran are "speculative fiction" when talking about Europe? OK.

[ChuckF]

Originally Posted by fragment

And yet you sneer that looking at US geopolitics with respect to Russia and Iran are "speculative fiction" when talking about Europe? OK.

Where did I do that? I see where I used that phrase in discussing the clear immediate benefits that animated the Vilnius group in seeking NATO accession - specifically about US-Iran relations, and not about Russia, so I have no idea where you're getting that. Maybe you're getting that confused with (or maybe repurposing?) my answer to your different question about what the US gets out of NATO. If so, OK.

Can you share any evidence or thinking about how the attitudes of the Vilnius group towards NATO membership were affected by US-Iran relations in 2000-2004? I haven't read about that.

[fragment]

The context of that discussion was vm stating "US has demonstrated a willingness to use military intervention to secure its interests around the globe", referring to his "claim that Europe is influenced (if not coerced) by US strategic interests" and referencing "US global military and economic primacy and escalating hostility toward Russian, China, Iran, North Korea, etc. post-WWII".

Seems like "what the US gets out of NATO" is a fairly core part of that discussion. If you did not mean for the Vilnius group to be relevant to that discussion I'm not sure why you would bring it up. Perhaps you're confusing the question of whether US geopolitical actions played a role in the development of this conflict with a different question about the decision-making of Eastern European countries.

[ChuckF]

OK, if you say so. It was pretty clearly specifically about the Baltics and the Balkan state NATO candidacies, and what motivated their desire to join NATO. Of course NATO member states consider US geopolitics - has anyone said otherwise? That is obviously and trivially true. And of course NATO membership does not obligate any member state to cleave to any particular US objective. (Diversity of NATO opinion on the disastrous invasion of Iraq, for example. Turkey didn't allow US overflights.)

My point was merely that the instant benefits of access to NATO and EU institutions were so powerful for these rounds of candidates that more abstract non-regional, global considerations were not likely relevant to them. Concerns about Russian intentions definitely were, but I think the state of US-Russian relations was probably not. I think that because each of those member states had its own relationship with Russia that was probably way, way more important. For example, Russia offered the Baltics security guarantees in 1997, before NATO accession started in earnest - all of them refused. And looked West, towards NATO.

Originally Posted by ChuckF

.

Could be! Or, it could be purely rational calculation. The Vilnius group is basically divisible into two: the Baltics and the Balkans (plus Slovakia, which was already on the glide path from V4).

The Baltics are still pretty sensitive about that time that Moscow invaded and occupied them for five decades. The second Battle of Grozny happened in late 1999-early 2000, which may have been a signal that 2000 would be a good moment to re-evaluate post-Soviet policies of neutrality (keeping in mind that the last Russian troops didn't leave the Baltics until 1994ish). And the Balkans are the source of 20th century European security risks. By 2000, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia had just managed to obtain reasonable political stability after the disintegration of Yugoslavia and three major regional conflicts.

But perhaps more saliently, like I said before, security creates an opportunity for meaningful economic growth, and that growth was clearly in the transatlantic alliance and not in Russia (Russia's GDP in 2000 was only a little larger than Belgium's). So let's remember that in 2000, this region had observed (and to some extent been affected by contagion unleashed by) the 1998 ruble crisis. In brief, Russia defaulted on its public debt, rapidly devalued the ruble, and triggered banking crises in most of the former Soviet Union that was still economically integrated with Moscow.

What are the obvious conclusions? First, that security is a precondition for economic growth. Second, that NATO membership provides security and access to European institutions that invite investment and growth. And third, that Russia may be disintegrating from the periphery (Chechnya, Dagestan) and is entirely reliant on global energy prices to maintain its currency and the economic order within its near abroad (this is still true!) It's an easy question: would you rather be Poland or Belarus? Was there really any need need to engage in the second- and third-order analyses of the state of friendliness between Russia and the United States, much less higher order speculative fiction about Iran, etc.?

[fragment]

*shrug* Vilnius Group enters here, in response to claims about US global interests.

Originally Posted by ChuckF

I'm mildly fascinated by this kind of take insofar as it completely obliterates the agency of NATO member states and ignores their capacity to act in their own interests. I mean, is it really that hard to imagine why, say, Poland or Czechia or Latvia or Lithuania or Estonia might want to join NATO? Is there any evidence whatosever that these governments were coerced into joining NATO? Why did the Visegrad group exist? Why did the Vilnius Group exist? Do Finland and Sweden have any rational reason to consider joining NATO now? Are they expected to look at Georgia and just give Russia another mulligan? Ukraine?

Of course there's no need to bring up US-Russia relations to determine the motives of Eastern European states. But global geopolitics does, at least potentially, play a role in the economic and security incentives the US and Western Europe put on the table. In that sense I think it's reasonable to claim that US-Russia relations were a factor in NATO expansion. One could even say such opportunities are one influence on those countries' decision-making.

[ChuckF]

Originally Posted by fragment

Of course there's no need to bring up US-Russia relations to determine the motives of Eastern European states.

I agree!

But global geopolitics does, at least potentially, play a role in the economic and security incentives the US and Western Europe put on the table.

Of course - that's the core of Article 5. (The only time Article 5 has ever been invoked had nothing to do with US-Russian relations, for example.)

In that sense I think it's reasonable to claim that US-Russia relations were a factor in NATO expansion.

Some factor, sure, I guess. I think extrinsic information about US-Russia relations was unlikely to be particularly important to individual post-Soviet countries deciding whether or not to pursue NATO membership; whatever effect they may have had was dramatically outweighed by other considerations much closer to home (such as bilateral relations between the candidate country and Russia, for example). Individual governments evaluating perceived political and security risks, and costs and benefits of integration.

More generally, "NATO expansion" is not just an organic phenomenon, or orchestrated by the US. It's an interactive process between member states and candidates. For example, Germany effectively vetoed Georgia's and Ukraine's candidacies, over US disagreement. Countries want to join NATO for all the benefits I talked about. Obviously constitutionally-neutral Austria or Ireland have decided not to join; they're still in the EU and as far as I know have not been subject to any kind of US coercion to join NATO, though I may just be unaware of it. Finland or Sweden had also decided not to join, though it looks like they might have changed their minds very recently - for issues slightly more immediate than the state of US-Russian relations, I think.

One could even say such opportunities are one influence on those countries' decision-making.

What are some examples of how US-Russia relations influenced those countries' decision-making about NATO membership?

[fragment]

I think we mostly agree on a lot of this, are we just disputing semantics?

Originally Posted by ChuckF

What are some examples of how US-Russia relations influenced those countries' decision-making about NATO membership?

I don't get the point of this. You agree that US-Russia relations were "some factor" in NATO putting expansion on the table. I'm saying having an option to join NATO factors into decisions countries make. What's the issue?

Mostly I'm of the view that "the geopolitical context around NATO expansion is irrelevant to Russian aggression" is as simplistic as "Russia is only legitimately responding to security threats".

[ChuckF]

Originally Posted by fragment

I think we mostly agree on a lot of this, are we just disputing semantics?

Could be - and yet you sneer at what I had hoped was a reasonably thoughtful and informed analysis of the East European political and security environment during 2000-2004!

I don't get the point of this. You agree that US-Russia relations were "some factor" in NATO putting expansion on the table. I'm saying having an option to join NATO factors into decisions countries make. What's the issue?

The point is to ask for examples of how US-Russia relations influenced post-1992 candidate countries' decision-making about NATO membership. What kind of influence did it have? How was that influence manifested? Where do we see it?

I agree that having the option to join NATO factors in to the decision to join NATO, as a condition precedent.

Mostly I'm of the view that "the geopolitical context around NATO expansion is irrelevant to Russian aggression" is as simplistic as "Russia is only legitimately responding to security threats".

I agree that NATO is a transatlantic alliance with dozens of members that includes the US and important secondary powers like Germany and France, so everything it does necessarily occurs in a geopolitical context. NATO expansion is relevant, but I think primarily in the context of Russian legitimacy-seeking for its atavistic irredentism. The problem for Russia is not simply that NATO is expanding (like Article 10 has provided since 1949), but that countries formerly under Soviet domination have the sovereign capacity to enter into defensive arrangements like NATO without the consent of Moscow. (For example, Russia has always and continues to insist that the Soviet occupation of the Baltics was legitimate and lawful - the clear implication being that those countries have no real right to exist, at least not within their current borders).

[erimir]

Originally Posted by ChuckF

Obviously constitutionally-neutral Austria or Ireland have decided not to join; they're still in the EU and as far as I know have not been subject to any kind of US coercion to join NATO, though I may just be unaware of it. Finland or Sweden had also decided not to join, though it looks like they might have changed their minds very recently - for issues slightly more immediate than the state of US-Russian relations, I think.

My grandfather was in the Swedish military, and he fought with Finland against the Soviet invasion. My mom says they were always aware of how close the USSR was and that Swedish military preparedness was largely about the potential of a Soviet/Russian attack.

And it's not exactly a new thing for there to be conflicts in that region! What with the Great Northern War being between Sweden and Russia, Russia taking Finland from Sweden, the Soviet invasion of Finland and so on.

Until 2010, there was universal male conscription in the Swedish military. They've since reversed course and re-implemented some level of (gender-neutral) conscription. In recent years, in fact, Russia has made a handful of provocations - sailing submarines into Swedish waters, things of that nature.

It seems obvious to me that Sweden wanting to join NATO at this point isn't based on US exerting control over them (Sweden has successfully resisted that for quite some time until now, obviously) rather than previously not considering the poke in Russia's eye to be worth it relative to the threat. But the cost-benefit calculation has changed.

[ChuckF]

Originally Posted by erimir

Until 2010, there was universal male conscription in the Swedish military. They've since reversed course and re-implemented some level of (gender-neutral) conscription. In recent years, in fact, Russia has made a handful of provocations - sailing submarines into Swedish waters, things of that nature.

It seems obvious to me that Sweden wanting to join NATO at this point isn't based on US exerting control over them (Sweden has successfully resisted that for quite some time until now, obviously) rather than previously not considering the poke in Russia's eye to be worth it relative to the threat. But the cost-benefit calculation has changed.

Or a convenient figleaf for Swedish expansionist ambitions! It’s clear that Carl XVI Gustaf has dreams of restoring the empire.

[Miisa]

Originally Posted by erimir

It seems obvious to me that Sweden wanting to join NATO at this point isn't based on US exerting control over them (Sweden has successfully resisted that for quite some time until now, obviously) rather than previously not considering the poke in Russia's eye to be worth it relative to the threat. But the cost-benefit calculation has changed.

I haven't kept up with this thread, as who has that sort of time, but THIS also for Finland. The NATO membership debate in Finland has absolutely nothing to do with the US and everything to do with standing with a group of others when an absolute lunatic is raving next door. It used to be that we don't provoke ANYONE ("bowing West means mooning the East and vice-versa"), but Russia's actions and stability are the things that have changed here. There are discussions like "what about the actions of some of the other members", but they also, as far as I have seen, are not referring to the US at all.

Maybe we have misunderstood the role of the US in NATO, but we took it to be a member. One with more interests in preserving the peace of others than relying on help for its own defense for sure, but still just a member.

[fragment]

Originally Posted by ChuckF

Could be - and yet you sneer at what I had hoped was a reasonably thoughtful and informed analysis of the East European political and security environment during 2000-2004!

It was a reasonably thoughtful and informed analysis of the East European political and security environment during 2000-2004! I thank you for it!

Any snark on my part was responding to what seemed to me to be an unwarrantedly uncharitable reading of the types of arguments vm was making.

[fragment]

I live in a country that is a partially suspended member of a cold war era US-led security alliance - ANZUS. In the 80s we decided to make a largely symbolic declaration of being nuclear free. This made little strategic difference to the US, but we were suspended from the alliance nonetheless, among other types of diplomatic pressure.

Funnily enough the actually useful-to-the-US intelligence gathering and sharing relationship was unaffected by this brouhaha, and even upgraded.

Anyway, this history probably colours my views around dominant partners in security alliances throwing their weight around.

[viscousmemories]

Originally Posted by ChuckF

More generally, "NATO expansion" is not just an organic phenomenon, or orchestrated by the US. It's an interactive process between member states and candidates.

I spent some time reading (a fraction of) this transcript on Saturday morning so I have a hard time accepting that NATO expansion wasn't orchestrated by the US. As then-Senator Joe Biden put it:

Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, welcome. It is always a pleasure to have
you here.
Mr. Chairman, I have stated my support for NATO enlargement
many times on the floor of the U.S. Senate and in private
forums. So, today I will only summarize my rationale for this
policy.
Europe remains a vital interest for the United States.
Other than North America, no other region can match Europe's
combination of political, economic, military, and cultural
power and significance to the United States. The European
Union, for example, has a population one-third larger than ours
and a combined GDP slightly greater than ours.
A large percentage of the world's democracies are in
Europe. By any geopolitical standard, it would be a catastrophe
for American interests if instability were to alter the current
situation in Europe.
After the cold war, there are new threats to Europe: Ethnic
and religious conflicts, one nation crossing the borders of
another as Yugoslavia did in Bosnia, international crime and
drugs; also I might note a possible future threat to Mideast
oil supplies.
For this reason, enlargement is being combined with a new
strategic doctrine and a force posture that provides a more
mobile and capable force projection capability in event of any
of those crises.

[Miisa]

Just because the US is happy to have more members join doesn't mean that invitation is taken as more than just that, an invitation*. We have certainly felt free to accept or decline.
If, however, the US - or any other already-NATO country for that matter - was opposed to new members it would a problem.



*and an "American invitation" at that, which might just be a type of courtesy not to be taken literally in their culture; Americans tend to be oddly weirded out when you actually accept their offer to "come over for dinner some time". I only learned of this *after* I spent an entire summer in California after just such an invite.

[ChuckF]

Accept or don't accept whatever pleases you, I guess. Biden's 1997 remarks seem pretty on-point. Where's the orchestration bit?

These particular hearings occurred months after the Madrid Summit where the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were invited to join NATO. There were 12 applicants in all: Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Only 3 were invited to join. The main surprise of the summit was that the US blocked the candidacies of Romania and Slovenia, which were supported by Europe and mainly France (reasonably concise summary here). If the US was orchestrating NATO expansion, why did it refuse Romania and Slovenia entry in 1997 - when other NATO members in Europe wanted more rapid enlargement?

[JoeP]

Originally Posted by Miisa

If, however, the US - or any other already-NATO country for that matter - was opposed to new members it would a problem.

Hungary is going to be the problem here, right? Orban being a big Putin fan.

[Miisa]

Quite possibly. The very, very worst case scenario would be to publicly apply with all the Russian wrath that comes with that and then be turned down. Which is why some assurances of being a) greenlit and b) at least partially protected during the application/joining phase are absolutely critical.

[viscousmemories]

Originally Posted by ChuckF

Accept or don't accept whatever pleases you, I guess. Biden's 1997 remarks seem pretty on-point. Where's the orchestration bit?

I read Biden's comments as a clear statement of opinion that the US should have it as a strategic objective to expand NATO. An opinion even more explicitly stated in Jesse Helms' opening remarks:

Together we must explain to the American people that NATO enlargement is vital precisely because it will secure peace and security into the next century and ensure, at the same time, that America will not be called upon once again to save Europe from the advance of tyranny.

You seem to be saying that the US does not have, and has not had, the goal of expanding NATO. I don't know how to reconcile that view with comments like the above.

Originally Posted by ChuckF

These particular hearings occurred months after the Madrid Summit where the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were invited to join NATO. There were 12 applicants in all: Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Only 3 were invited to join. The main surprise of the summit was that the US blocked the candidacies of Romania and Slovenia, which were supported by Europe and mainly France (reasonably concise summary here).

Thanks, I'll check out that link.

Originally Posted by ChuckF

If the US was orchestrating NATO expansion, why did it refuse Romania and Slovenia entry in 1997 - when other NATO members in Europe wanted more rapid enlargement?

That's a great question. Why would the US do that when then Secretary of State Albright and the Committee on Foreign Relations were so vociferously in favor of expanding NATO? I don't know but it doesn't seem like the answer is "because the US didn't have any interest in expanding NATO".

Anyway I agree with fragment; I respect your knowledge of the subject and I appreciate you sharing your analysis.

[fragment]

Originally Posted by viscousmemories

That's a great question. Why would the US do that when then Secretary of State Albright and the Committee on Foreign Relations were so vociferously in favor of expanding NATO? I don't know but it doesn't seem like the answer is "because the US didn't have any interest in expanding NATO".

A quick and dirty search suggests the Clinton admin wanted to expand but was also trying to steer past opposition in the Senate. Looks like a compromise position.

e.g. Attention Required! | Cloudflare

[ChuckF]

Originally Posted by viscousmemories

You seem to be saying that the US does not have, and has not had, the goal of expanding NATO.

Where did I say that?

[viscousmemories]

Originally Posted by ChuckF

Where did I say that?

You asked for evidence that the US orchestrated NATO expansion. I provided evidence that the US has had NATO expansion as a goal for decades, and NATO has obviously expanded. I know correlation doesn't equal causation, but it seems like a pretty reasonable inference that the dominant member of NATO having a strong preference for expansion is the cause of NATO expansion.

[ChuckF]

Originally Posted by viscousmemories

You asked for evidence that the US orchestrated NATO expansion.

Right - did I say somewhere that the US does not have and has not had the goal of expanding NATO?

I provided evidence that the US has had NATO expansion as a goal for decades, and NATO has obviously expanded. I know correlation doesn't equal causation, but it seems like a pretty reasonable inference that the dominant member of NATO having a strong preference for expansion is the cause of NATO expansion.

So what is the evidence for that? Like, why isn't Georgia a NATO member? The United States backed its candidacy. (It's because Germany vetoed it in 2008! Same for Ukraine. Greece blocked Macedonia's candidacy at the same meeting, and delayed it for 12 years over a long-running name dispute.) If the US had the capacity simply to orchestrate NATO expansion, why did the US simply not impose its will and forcibly expand NATO to achieve its preferences?

I guess my point is that I don't think it's necessary to rely on inferences about the causes of NATO expansion, because they're right there in Article 10: NATO members can decide to admit any other country they agree to admit, and any member can block any candidate. The membership of NATO is determined by NATO member states. As noted, NATO is constituted of sovereign member states with individual strategic interests, of which the United States is one. The reason that NATO has expanded is that, well, NATO is one of the pillars of European stability, and European stability is critical to both European and American economic and strategic interests. Put differently, NATO expansion into the post-Soviet space was highly rational for (a) NATO members and (b) post-Soviet NATO candidates, and there were many incentives for those groups to cooperate to maximize the mutual benefits. That's why so many post-Soviet candidates rushed to join NATO, and why NATO (mostly) welcomed them, at least eventually.

Equally importantly, Russia does not decide who is in NATO, any more than the US makes decisions about CSTO membership.