A revolution in thought

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

It is not off the bat nor is it a rush. We first talked about Ortega in November and at that time I read a bunch of his stuff. He runs multiple sites and has made comments on other people's sites. He rejects all definitions of free will that aren't contra causal or libertarian free will, so it's easily refuted just by saying things are caused...that's a strawman. (and no, his basic argument isn't that we are compelled to do things, his basic argument is that our actions have causes-which nobody here has denied. You are being dishonest right now.)

Those is only one type of free will LadyShea, and it's contra-causal. The compatibilist notion of free will is still a form of free will, which we do not have. You cannot have free will and be compelled at the same time. I don't understand what you don't get here. You are getting confused over definitions that do not remove this basic contradiction.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

What did you do that led to you judging him trustworthy other than seeing that he agrees with your juvenile black and white thinking on this topic?

How easy it is to condemn my knowledge on this subject and feel self-righteous. In the case of determinism, there is no gray area even though definitions that you are using make it appear that way. This is a black and white issue, and calling it such does not make it juvenile.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Those is only one type of free will LadyShea, and it's contra-causal

That's simply false, and why your arguments against it are a strawman, just like Ortega's are. Your not recognizing other definitions and understandings of the term doesn't make those alternatives non-existent. It is absolutely juvenile to assert that your narrow definition is the only one when that is clearly not the reality of the situation.

[LadyShea]

Do a Google search for "different definitions of free will", your conception is not the only one. I don't understand why you don't get this. It is not black and white, it is more a Venn Diagram or a spectrum depending on differing definitions and understandings

Originally Posted by Merriam-Webster

free will
noun

: the ability to choose how to act

: the ability to make choices that are not controlled by fate or God

Freewill and determinism are both true. This philosophical position, called compatibilism, requires a true and specific understanding of the two key concepts involved. A number of core problems and misconceptions have so far prevented this view from becoming generally accepted:

A mis-identification of what "freewill" actually refers to.
Confusion between two different aspects of determinism: mechanistic causation, and predictability.
The mistaken belief that freewill cannot be a mechanistic mental process.
Various other fallacious objections to determinism, freewill, and compatibilism, including deeply embedded beliefs, powerful intuitive misconceptions, and "cognitive illusions".

The last point raises a particularly tricky problem: many of the concepts involved in understanding compatibilism are extremely abstract and far removed from everyday experience; they requires complex conceptual models and substantial philosophical context. Because of these limitations, a good grasp of compatibilism requires solid, intuitive understanding of the core concepts involved. Unfortunately, much of our existing gut-level comprehension of freewill and determinism is based on old, mistaken ideas. From personal experience I have found that even after thoroughly understanding and working through the issues, it is easy for some old, deeply embedded misconception to produce powerful emotions of discomfort. Many of us can on occasion still intuitively fall prey to the Gambler's Fallacy, even long after we consciously understand its error.

In this article I will explore each of the core points: the true nature of freewill; how it emerges from a mechanistic brain; and how that understanding actually improves the scope and effectiveness of our self-determination. I will show how determinism and freewill intersect, and why they are not contradictory. Finally, I will touch on some implications of this theory of freewill. A scientific, non-mystical approach to the questions of mind and consciousness is assumed throughout.
The Nature of Freewill

Here are three different definitions, based on three different conceptions of free will:

"Free will is the ability to do whatever we want independently of determining factors."
"Free will is the ability to make choices based on our desires with the physical possibility of having done otherwise."
"Free will is the ability to carry out what we want without being coerced or constrained to do something different."


The first and second definitions are both types of what are called "libertarian" free will, which is a type of free will that gives us the ability to make real choices, in that we have multiple alternate possibilities that could physically be carried out. These definitions are not compatible with causal determinism, which is the idea that the state of the universe at any time is directly determined by the state at a previous time via physical laws. Causal determinism would imply that we cannot really choose our decisions in a libertarian sense because they are simply a product of our brain state and the stimuli we experience,

The third definition is "compatibilist" free will, which is compatible with causal determinism, hence the name. It posits that free will is just the ability to make choices based on what we want, and that it's okay that the physical capability to carry out alternate possibilities doesn't exist, since we are still choosing what we want. We could have done otherwise if we had wanted other wise, but we didn't want otherwise, and could not have.

I think definition 1 is silly, because "whatever we want" can never be independent of determining factors. We don't exist in a complete causal vacuum. "What we want" is a determining factor, one that is encoded in our brain chemistry, and which is determined by our prior existence. For definition 1 to hold, there would need to be some kind of non-physical "ghost in the machine" not subject to causality - and that idea, while not wrong, is unverifiable, and so it's useless to really discuss in a scientific context. In any case, based on what we know about neuroscience, the role of such a dualistic "ghost in the machine" would have to be pretty limited, and even if it weren't, I question that it would resolve the problem of free will. Rather, it would just take deterministic arguments out of the physical realm and into the mental realm.

Fulfilling definition 2 is quite plausible. However, even though it is a type of libertarian free will, it's less satisfying than definition 1. It is possible for such a type of free will to hold by combining deterministic and indeterministic factors in decision-making. There have been a number of proposed "two-stage models" for decision-making that would give this kind of free will. I think these two-stage models are a cop-out; they just add a luck factor. But I think there is some reason to believe we can make physical sense of this kind of free will nevertheless. This isn't the place to talk about that; message me if you're interested.

Fulfilling definition 3 is also plausible. If causal determinism holds (or if indeterminism turns out to be insignificant), then (in theory) given certain information, we could predict someone's actions twenty-five years from now. Some people take this to mean that, if causal determinism holds, there is no such thing as free will at all. But since, under this model, people still make decisions as agents who weigh their wants and desires, some people argue that this type of free will (definition 3) is really the only type of free will worth having. This is actually widely regarded as "the solution" to the problem of free will: A sense of "It was possible for me to have done otherwise," but with a particular conception of the word "possible" that makes it compatible with determinism. For those (currently in the majority among philosophers) who believe there is no "us" other than our physical selves, this is an attractive option.

It's really up to you which definition you think best represents your conception of free will. There are other definitions out there, too; these are just some of the most common and most discussed. I fact, I think that as time goes on, all definitions of free will will have to change. Free Will: What is a good definition for free will? - Quora

[thedoc]

Free will? We have free will, we don't have free will, we have some in between version of free will? It's all a matter of belief, faith that your version is the correct one. So far I have not seen a convincing argument, with solid proof, of any of the different versions, it's all speculation. And in the end, people still act the way they do, whether we have free will or not. It has been an interesting discussion, but I have not seen where it is going to change anyone's behavior, Lessans claims notwithstanding. It all comes down to what you believe and I, for one, believe that we have free will, at least in part.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Those is only one type of free will LadyShea, and it's contra-causal. The compatibilist notion of free will is still a form of free will, which we do not have.

Is this what you meant to write? Because you are either contradicting yourself or saying that compatibilist free will is contra-causal, which would be a phenomenally ignorant and stupid thing to say, even for you.

Compatibilist free will is the ability to make and act upon choices and decisions free of external constraints. It is uncontroversially true that we do have this kind of freedom, and it is also plainly obvious to any sane person that this kind of free will need not be contra-causal.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

How easy it is to condemn my knowledge on this subject...

You don't have any knowledge on this subject.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

That's simply false,

No it is not, and your saying it is false doesn't make your refutation true.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

and why your arguments against it are a strawman, just like Ortega's are.

It is not a strawman. What people are actually trying to do is create a definition that allows them to hold people morally responsible [because the definition gives them permission to do just that] and at the same time hold that determinism is true. This is a major contradiction which cannot be rectified. It's like the elephant in the room which is being ignored.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Your not recognizing other definitions and understandings of the term doesn't make those alternatives non-existent. It is absolutely juvenile to assert that your narrow definition is the only one when that is clearly not the reality of the situation.

This is not about definition LadyShea. That is what makes this observation an accurate one because it is not relying on a definition. Remember; definitions mean NOTHING where reality is concerned, and you are placing all your trust in a definition that may be useful for those who want to hold people blameworthy, which is a free will position.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Is this what you meant to write? Because you are either contradicting yourself or saying that compatibilist free will is contra-causal, which would be a phenomenally ignorant and stupid thing to say, even for you.

Compatibilist free will is the ability to make and act upon choices and decisions free of external constraints. It is uncontroversially true that we do have this kind of freedom, and it is also plainly obvious to any sane person that this kind of free will need not be contra-causal.

Being free of external constraints does not give one free will Spacemonkey. That's your warped logic coming to the surface again.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

How easy it is to condemn my knowledge on this subject...

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You don't have any knowledge on this subject.

If you think I don't have any knowledge on this subject, you have less, so you are not in the position to judge.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Do a Google search for "different definitions of free will", your conception is not the only one. I don't understand why you don't get this. It is not black and white, it is more a Venn Diagram or a spectrum depending on differing definitions and understandings

The ability to make choices does not render one's will free. That is the conventional definition of free will which does not hold weight when you delve deeper.

"Free will is the ability to carry out what we want without being coerced or constrained to do something different."

That is not free will. That is the compatibilist definition of free will in order to be able to blame and yet hold that we are deterministic. It also allows people to feel that they are the authors of their own life (self-determined) and, as such, can take all the credit for their accomplishments, and all the blame for their failures. This is done in an effort to reduce the cognitive/dissonance that is obvious to those who see it for what it is.


The first and second definitions are both types of what are called "libertarian" free will, which is a type of free will that gives us the ability to make real choices, in that we have multiple alternate possibilities that could physically be carried out. These definitions are not compatible with causal determinism, which is the idea that the state of the universe at any time is directly determined by the state at a previous time via physical laws. Causal determinism would imply that we cannot really choose our decisions in a libertarian sense because they are simply a product of our brain state and the stimuli we experience,

This is where a lot of confusion resides. The false notion that we have multiple alternate possibilities that could be carried out is a realistic mirage; we are fooled into believing that we are free because we are not being constrained by external forces. In other words, because there is an agent (us), and because there appears to be more than one choice at our disposal, gives us the illusion that we are free to choose whatever we want; we can choose one or the other equally, but this is a huge misconception and one that is taking centuries to correct. Another cause for confusion is the fact that our choices are not a direct cause and effect event; it involves the decision making process. But this does not change the fact that our heredity and environment are pushing us to choose that which is the most preferable which means that the choice is not equal, or free, in any sense of the word.

The third definition is "compatibilist" free will, which is compatible with causal determinism, hence the name. It posits that free will is just the ability to make choices based on what we want, and that it's okay that the physical capability to carry out alternate possibilities doesn't exist, since we are still choosing what we want. We could have done otherwise if we had wanted other wise, but we didn't want otherwise, and could not have.

I think definition 1 is silly, because "whatever we want" can never be independent of determining factors. We don't exist in a complete causal vacuum. "What we want" is a determining factor, one that is encoded in our brain chemistry, and which is determined by our prior existence. For definition 1 to hold, there would need to be some kind of non-physical "ghost in the machine" not subject to causality - and that idea, while not wrong, is unverifiable, and so it's useless to really discuss in a scientific context. In any case, based on what we know about neuroscience, the role of such a dualistic "ghost in the machine" would have to be pretty limited, and even if it weren't, I question that it would resolve the problem of free will. Rather, it would just take deterministic arguments out of the physical realm and into the mental realm.

There is no ghost in the machine, which is a silly notion. And, yes, what we want is a determining factor which is based on our prior experiences and our brain chemistry (our heredity). There is no third option that would make free will remotely possible. Compatibilism is a dualistic notion that has no place in science.


Fulfilling definition 2 is quite plausible. However, even though it is a type of libertarian free will, it's less satisfying than definition 1. It is possible for such a type of free will to hold by combining deterministic and indeterministic factors in decision-making. There have been a number of proposed "two-stage models" for decision-making that would give this kind of free will. I think these two-stage models are a cop-out; they just add a luck factor. But I think there is some reason to believe we can make physical sense of this kind of free will nevertheless. This isn't the place to talk about that; message me if you're interested.

Fulfilling definition 3 is also plausible. If causal determinism holds (or if indeterminism turns out to be insignificant), then (in theory) given certain information, we could predict someone's actions twenty-five years from now. Some people take this to mean that, if causal determinism holds, there is no such thing as free will at all. But since, under this model, people still make decisions as agents who weigh their wants and desires, some people argue that this type of free will (definition 3) is really the only type of free will worth having. This is actually widely regarded as "the solution" to the problem of free will: A sense of "It was possible for me to have done otherwise," but with a particular conception of the word "possible" that makes it compatible with determinism. For those (currently in the majority among philosophers) who believe there is no "us" other than our physical selves, this is an attractive option.

It's really up to you which definition you think best represents your conception of free will. There are other definitions out there, too; these are just some of the most common and most discussed. I fact, I think that as time goes on, all definitions of free will will have to change. Free Will: What is a good definition for free will? - Quora

All these definitions confuse the matter since you cannot have a little bit of determinism and a little bit of freedom of the will. Having choices that are free from force or OCD does not translate to freedom of the will. These two concepts are mutually exclusive, and no matter how many definitions someone uses to try to make it appear that this is a gray issue, it is not. It is a black and white issue, and it is not juvenile to think in these terms.

[Vivisectus]

That is what makes this observation an accurate one because it is not relying on a definition.

So if I observe that you are a complete Murkwhittle, then the fact that this statement does not rely on any definition makes it accurate? Surely this is a new breakthrough in Lessanism!

[Dragar]

Vivesectus is a great man, and his observations Spot On!

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

This is not about definition LadyShea. That is what makes this observation an accurate one because it is not relying on a definition.

Of course you are relying on definitions, because you are using language to express immaterial concepts. Without definitions you need to be able to point to an actual object...which you cannot point to free will or determinism to show the object you are referring to. There is no "reality", no objective thing you are describing with these terms.

In this case, you are relying on a narrow, very specific definition of free will to argue against, and without that narrow and specific definition your strawman argument fails.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by Dragar

Vivesectus is a great man, and his observations Spot On!

I hope you're not being serious Dragar. You never know.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Of course you are relying on definitions, because you are using language to express immaterial concepts. Without definitions you need to be able to point to an actual object...which you cannot point to free will or determinism to show the object you are referring to. There is no "reality", no objective thing you are describing with these terms.

In this case, you are relying on a narrow, very specific definition of free will to argue against, and without that narrow and specific definition your strawman argument fails.

You are confused over observation and definition. It's as simple as that. I am relying on observation, not definition. If you don't get that, you will continue to tell me I'm wrong because the definition is just one of many. That is your problem, not mine. I want to help you, but I can't if you are steadfast in your belief that you run your own life. You will fight me tooth and nail and be on Spacemonkey's side. It's okay, but there is nothing I can do to correct it because you will defy anything I say in defense.

[Vivisectus]

Peacegirl, since you claim to know what free will is, you should be able to define it.

What is the definition of what you believe is "real" free will?

And why do you believe that is the "real" one, bearing in mind that we are talking about an abstract concept?

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You are confused over observation and definition. It's as simple as that. I am relying on observation, not definition.

You are relying on an idiosyncratic definition of the word observation here. What you are actually describing, the reality, would be better labeled an idea, conclusion, or opinion...not an observation.

If you don't get that, you will continue to tell me I'm wrong because the definition is just one of many.

You are absolutely wrong when you say that the term "free will" only and exclusively refers to the concept of contra-causal free will, as that is demonstrably false. You may hold that opinion, but others hold different opinions, and yours holds no special weight, nor is it any more supported by actual observation or reality.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

you cannot have a little bit of determinism and a little bit of freedom of the will

Of course you can. You can weigh circumstances and options and make decisions while accepting and working in the framework of causality. Voila!

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by Vivisectus

Peacegirl, since you claim to know what free will is, you should be able to define it.

What is the definition of what you believe is "real" free will?

And why do you believe that is the "real" one, bearing in mind that we are talking about an abstract concept?

Free will is the ability to choose independently of all antecedent events or circumstances; self-initiating. All definitions of free will are just a variation of this theme, even the one that was used in the book.

The dictionary states that free will is the power of
self-determination regarded as a special faculty of choosing good and
evil without compulsion or necessity. Made, done, or given of one’s
own free choice; voluntary.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Of course you can. You can weigh circumstances and options and make decisions while accepting and working in the framework of causality. Voila!

But that's not free will LadyShea. The whole point of this discussion is to show that weighing options does not translate to free will. That is a very superficial childlike observation that has no bearing on the truth of determinism.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But that's not free will LadyShea. The whole point of this discussion is to show that weighing options does not translate to free will.

It is free will, though, according to the great many people who understand and define it differently than you do.

In your opinion it is not free will, but as you love to say, opinions are like assholes, everyone has one!

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Of course you are relying on definitions, because you are using language to express immaterial concepts. Without definitions you need to be able to point to an actual object...which you cannot point to free will or determinism to show the object you are referring to. There is no "reality", no objective thing you are describing with these terms.

You can try to dismiss this truth by saying we cannot observe this phenomenon directly, but that does not prove its non-existence, nor does it take away from the solid inferences drawn from direct observation.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

In this case, you are relying on a narrow, very specific definition of free will to argue against, and without that narrow and specific definition your strawman argument fails.

As I said, all of the definitions of free will are just variations of the same theme. They all fall into one basic category, just as determinism does. These subsets are trying to make it appear that you can have one kind of free will and not another, which is a fallacy.

You are confused over observation and definition. It's as simple as that. I am relying on observation, not definition.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

You are relying on an idiosyncratic definition of the word observation here. What you are actually describing, the reality, would be better labeled an idea, conclusion, or opinion...not an observation.

You are completely wrong here. This is not just an idea or an opinion. These conclusions are based on observation, although the conclusions are inferred because we all know that no one can observe "greater satisfaction".

If you don't get that, you will continue to tell me I'm wrong because the definition is just one of many.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

You are absolutely wrong when you say that the term "free will" only and exclusively refers to the concept of contra-causal free will, as that is demonstrably false. You may hold that opinion, but others hold different opinions, and yours holds no special weight, nor is it any more supported by actual observation or reality.

In actuality it does hold more weight. It is supported by accurate observation and the inferences drawn. If this was just an opinion, yours would hold just as much weight, but this is not an opinion. The concept of free will is, by definition, contra-causal. If you are free to do something, you are not compelled to do it. So any effort to attribute free will to an action automatically cancels out determinism. You can't have both without it being contradictory.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

It is free will, though, according to the great many people who understand and define it differently than you do.

In your opinion it is not free will, but as you love to say, opinions are like assholes, everyone has one!

This has nothing whatsoever to do with my opinion. Moreover, you are assuming as fact the very premise we are disputing. The whole point of this discussion is to show that being able to compare options and make choices, which is the standard definition of free will, does not mean we actually have free will.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

In actuality it does hold more weight. It is supported by accurate observation and the inferences drawn. If this was just an opinion, yours would hold just as much weight, but this is not an opinion.

LOL, it holds more weight in your opinion. In your opinion it is supported by accurate observation and inferences. In your opinion it is not an opinion. Nice one!

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

This has nothing whatsoever to do with my opinion. Moreover, you are assuming as fact the very premise we are disputing. The whole point of this discussion is to show that being able to compare options and make choices, which is the standard definition of free will, does not mean we actually have free will.

Again, you are simply stating your opinion and asserting that it is not an opinion. You are funny.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

The concept of free will is, by definition, contra-causal.

Which definition? There are many, remember? Why should the one you use be considered the one and only definition?

If you are free to do something, you are not compelled to do it.

You are using compelled rather than caused. Why?

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

LOL, it holds more weight in your opinion. In your opinion it is supported by accurate observation and inferences. In your opinion it is not an opinion. Nice one!

If this was just an opinion, I would not be so driven to share these findings. If this was just an opinion, this topic would not count for much, but the implications of where this knowledge leads are huge, and why this discovery is worth pursuing. I found this article. Maybe one day you'll come around.

WHERE'S THE FREE WILL?
An Exploration of This Elusive Concept


Most of us don't question the notion of "free will." In some ways, the existence of "free will" just seems to be plain old common sense. I want to write this sentence; thus I place my fingers on the keypad and will them to type. There you go, done! However, most people have not tried to define precisely what free will is. And they haven't even considered the complexities underlying those two short words. This essay will seek to understand the meaning of free will and to explore whether or not it exists.

Some Working Definitions

I shall start by examining exactly what is implied when the term "free will" is used. First, although free will is often used in connection with one taking an action, an act itself does not offer proof of free will. Acts can be caused by external forces (someone pushing you so you fall) or can be unconscious (talking in your sleep, or snoring). Secondly, consciousness, memory, and the capacity to learn are also often associated with the notion of free will. However, many animals, that are not normally viewed as having free will, can learn, have memory, and are conscious; thus none of these attributes equates with the common distinctions free will supposedly provides. Here is a tougher distinction to make: voluntary activity. I want to sign this document, or have steak for dinner, and voila. I choose steak for dinner instead of the herb-stuffed porkchop. Yet, what voluntary activity means is simply that I am doing what I want to do, without physical coercion. To put a finer point on it: I "choose" something I'd rather do or have instead of something I personally feel is less appealing. That is, unless a peer is at hand who may be disappointed or offended with my choice. Of course, that would make the choice less appealing, wouldn't it? For example, I may be having dinner with a dear friend, who happens to be an Orthodox Jew. And that fact would influence my decision as whether to have the porkchop or not. The important thing to note when it comes to choosing a course of action is, the fact an animal makes a choice does not explain why he made it. The term free will implies choices are free from the laws of cause and effect. The question this essay addresses is whether our choices are caused completely by internal and external forces or whether we are free to choose a course of action regardless of those forces.

A final few definitions are important before moving on. A causal factor and a determinant are synonymous. And a determinant is something that either directly or indirectly causes or influences the outcome of a particular phenomena. For example, Betty buying her husband a new cue stick for his birthday and stimulating him into trying it out is an indirect determinant of the cue ball knocking the eight ball into the side pocket. And even though the cue ball would be directly responsible for the eight ball ending up in the side pocket, the cue ball would never have acted as it did had it not been for the direct and indirect influence of a whole network of causal factors. Another example: the sun and moon directly and indirectly influence rivers, lakes, and oceans to result in the phenomena that is referred to as the tides of the earth. Newton's third law that every action has an equal and opposite reaction is, in essence, a statement of determinism.

One who views all things, including human actions, as resulting solely and exclusively from factors or determinants is known as a "naturalist" or a "determinist." Put another way, a naturalist and a determinist believe that, although one makes voluntary, "conscious" decisions, various processes – physical, biological, psychological, and social - have established the mindset that the individual bears at any given moment. We may deny but we cannot escape the consequence of the circumstances that precede us and surround us and which have made us into the individuals that we are. On the other hand, one who believes in the existence of free will holds that a person's choices are self-determined. In other words, one can make a choice to act a certain way regardless of, or despite his (or her) determinants. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1975) defines "free will" as "the power asserted of moral beings of choosing within limitations or with respect to some matters without restraint of physical or divine necessity or causal law." (Emphasis mine.) I call one who believes in free will a "me-ist," because this view is about the triumph of "me" over all causes. Others term this view "libertarian," because it promotes the idea that one is at liberty to act as he will.

On With the Hunt

On the most basic level, what goes into making you act? The search begins with the premise that all of your faculties, senses and perceptive powers reside in your brain and nervous system. This seems a safe premise, since we are no longer capable of making choices or taking actions that could be considered by anyone an expression of our will when our brains no longer function. We are inert when dead.

Each of us is born with a brain that has its unique and innate natural tendencies, capacities, strengths, and weaknesses. The brain has an unconscious portion that regulates at the least such things as digestion, heartbeat and respiration. It also regulates hormone production. The chemicals and electricity in the primitive part of our brains react to sensory experiences, both on an instinctive level (suck nipple) and as our instincts are modified by experience (biting leads to an unpleasant response). It is likely that childhood traumas have a lasting effect on the unconscious, and even on brain chemistry. Factors such as brain chemistry, hormones, and unconscious memories, that may be stirred up by present day situations, all have an effect on our feelings, thoughts, and behaviors - effects that in many (perhaps most) cases may be unknown to the person experiencing them. These factors are not within our control and certainly are not the result of our own deliberate making.

Unconscious factors affect our decision making process in both large and small ways. How many times do we think we could have made a better decision but for the strong emotions or stress we were feeling in the moment? On a simpler level, the phone number we forget today but remember tomorrow is in our brain, but unconscious for the time being. This fact may play a role in forcing us to take the time to pick up a phone book, or to simply skip a call we otherwise would have made.

Personal experience and other environmental circumstances further adapt and develop our brain into the unique state and functionality it has at any given moment. Just as any animal learns what works to its benefit and what does not under certain conditions, so much of our repertoire of behavior and our sense of what aspects of it are acceptable is learned (and refined) as we experience both the conduct of others and feedback to our own acts.

I assume that none of this reads as particularly revolutionary. But here is where the rubber meets the road. When we are faced with a situation our brain processes the sensory information it receives - perhaps a sexy glance from an attractive member of the opposite sex - we will react to this information on many levels. The most basic part of our brain may react with lust. The part of us that has learned lust is a sin may feel guilt. We may also feel disloyal to our own mate. If one's self concept is not very sexy, he or she may feel self conscious and bad. If his or her self-concept is gay, then a whole different reaction may result. Sooner or later we may actually start to imagine one or more courses of action. Do I want to flirt? Do more? Calm things down? Avoid? Experiment? Plan a seduction, or maybe slip into a daydream and let fantasy satisfy my desire?

Ultimately, we will make a decision on how to act in response to the stimulation. This decision may or may not be conscious, and it might not take into account consciously any of the above. Neither whether all or any of the process is conscious, nor the weight we place on each of these factors (and likely others) is a matter of choice. Our values and beliefs, our self-concept and sense of morality, our orientation to the opposite sex, and our level of satisfaction with our current mate all already exist. These and other preexisting components of ourselves, all of which have been formed by factors outside of our control, will determine the relative strength of our various reactions and the outcome.

In sum, when we act voluntarily, it is the result of our conscious mindset, as well as unconscious mental activity, which play a role we do not always experience simultaneously (perhaps the role may be inferred in hind-sight). In this way, our behavior is always determined by prior events and the resultant beliefs we hold, and our genes. The reasons we think and act a certain way are beyond our control. As Shopenhauer put it, "a man can surely do what he wills to do, but cannot determine what he wills." A deterministic understanding of humans does not equate with a view that our lives are predetermined, or fated by some outside being. It means only that, despite our feeling that we have a choice and can act as we please, each of our thoughts, feelings and decisions are the inevitable result of causality.

Do You Believe in Magic?

Is it credible that some part of us (our free will) permits us to act free of our determinants in at least some instances? If so, how and why doesn't everything in the universe - atoms, cells, dogs, cars - possess this unnatural quality? Free will is unnatural, or perhaps more accurately, supernatural or magical since its existence would violate the law of causation. A belief that the individual has free will is a belief the individual has magical or supernatural powers.

Another interesting question is when does free will develop? We all accept that babies don't have it. Does a one year old beginning to talk have it? A two year old who can say "no"? And if we don't have it as a baby, then where does it come from? Does it just appear in different people at different times, and perhaps never appear in others such as the severely retarded? What if it misses and lands on a comatose person, but not on a Ph.D. candidate?

If we are left with free will as form of magic or supernatural power, then we are on a slippery slope. How do we ever know the truth about something unprovable, regardless of how logical it may seem? It could be that when I feel as if I am doing something I want to do out of my free will, in reality maybe it is my karma, my fate, the planetary alignment or my parent's sin that requires me to decide to act in a certain way. Or maybe that which we call one's free will is in reality someone else's will - how many people explain behavior as reflecting "God's will?" Maybe He, or maybe the neighborhood witch is the puppeteer pulling our strings? Of course, the bottom line is that any magical or supernatural explanation of human behavior and feelings is equally defensible or believable, depending on your bias. Free will is no more intrinsically credible than what we had for breakfast as a basis for explaining human actions. Providing any of these theories are true, how can science work with respect to humans (for example, medicine) or anywhere else, if there is undetectable factors afoot? The only rational and non-magical explanation of human behavior is determinism. In other words, there is no extra-physical part of us that governs our physical (including the feelings and thoughts in our brains) activities.

But What About …

Why do some people fear or dislike naturalism and determinism? Some argue that free will gives one moral accountability. Similarly, it necessitates guilt, seen by some free will proponents as a healthy, controlling emotion. The lack of free will also makes pride a myth, for how can we have pride when our behavior is inevitable under existing circumstances? This may trouble some individuals. However, these arguments miss the point. These arguments are what philosophers call a logical fallacy; they address only the desirability of a belief in free will, not whether it exists.

Interestingly, the me-ist who likes guilt because it limits negative behavior is conceding that things we are taught do have an impact on our behavior - and that guilt acts as a determinant. Where we differ is that the me-ist assumes one can simply ignore guilt and all else, and choose to behave a particular way in any given situation. In other words, the me-ist thinks others have exactly the same mindset as himself (or herself); and the me-ist assumes he knows what he (or she) would decide or do in any situation. In contrast, a determinist believes we will decide to do something that we know will cause us to feel guilt only when we want to do it more than we don't want to do it - and that the reasons for wanting to do it, and the strength of the desire we experience isn't something we create for ourselves. If, again for reasons beyond our control, we cannot bear the guilt we anticipate, then we might be forced to act differently.

Someone may claim that the laws of causation do not seem applicable to quantum mechanics, and random theory instead appears to be at work there. However, quantum mechanics has been misinterpreted, and the idea of "randomness" has wrongly been interpreted to mean the occurrence of something entirely uncaused by prior events. The "random" movements of sub-atomic particles are random in the sense that no human measurement can account for or predict them. They are not random in the sense that they have no prior cause. These events occur according to probability and may have an as-of-yet-unknown cause. (Still, underlying causes, if they existed, would have effects that can be measured.) Besides, it has also been observed that nature has different rules for sub-atomic objects than it does for larger objects. We humans are much larger than sub-atomic structures and, like other things in the larger physical world, are subject to different principles. Quantum mechanics does not advance the argument in favor of free will.

Conclusion

So the answer to the question of "where is free will" appears to be that it is in the imagination of almost all of us, born out of what we have been taught and reinforced by our experience of the world. We feel many things are true, but this does not make them so. We need to look outside our feelings for evidence that they are based on reality. In the case of free will, there is no such evidence to place on the scale. On the other hand and with apologies to those who believe life is all a dream, the fact that we are physical creatures in a physical world is pretty well established. This fact subjects us to well established natural laws, including those of cause and effect. This evidence tips the scales in favor of the conclusion that all human behavior is determined and that there is in fact no such thing as free will.

© 2005 Edited from an essay written by Gordon M. Orloff