Nihilism vs. Existentialism

[Zoot]

The distinction you make between beliefs and values does not exist. At the moment of action it is true that we believe that to be the best course, else we wouldn't take it.
Ergo, we must act according to our beliefs. Beliefs aren't something which can't change with a sudden spurt of emotion, after all.

You can be right or wrong about a fact. You cannot be right or wrong about an evaluation of preferability. That is why there is a difference. Your language continues to be saturated in the notion that preferability is something you can be right or wrong about. The example in the paragraph above is, "We believe it to be the best course." We do not. We experience it as being the most preferable course. There is a difference. In the former, you could be wrong about it being preferable. In the latter, talking about right or wrong obviously does not apply.


Quote:
I value pleasure. That means that I find options that I predict will bring me pleasure are more preferable to me than options that I predict will not bring me pleasure. The prediction part refers to beliefs. I can believe that something will bring me pleasure, I can believe that something won't bring me pleasure, but without the value - valuing pleasure - the leap from "bringing me pleasure" to "being preferable" cannot be made.

You're basically taking two shovels and saying "Right this one here, that's a shovel, but this one, that's a spade, see."

You'd be quite right to say so, if we both agreed that there is objective morality. If objective morality was intelligible, preferability would be a fact about the world, existing independently of people, and there would be no real distinction between a fact about the world and an utterance about the preferability of an option. After all, the preferability of an option would be a fact about the world.

But I do not believe that objective morality is intelligible. Therefore, the preferability of an option is not a fact about the world, and the distinction between the two is important. Facts and values (criteria for evaluating preferability) are apples and oranges.


Valuing pleasure and believing something will bring you pleasure is saying exactly the same thing.

Absolutely not. To value pleasure is to evaluate as preferable those options that one predicts will bring pleasure. To believe that something will bring you pleasure is simply that - to predict that an option will bring you pleasure. Without the former, the latter gives rise to no evaluation of preferability. The latter (believing something will bring you pleasure) is a belief about which one may be incorrect - you might be wrong about how pleasurable something will be. The former (valuing pleasure/evaluating pleasure as preferable) is not something you can be right or wrong about.


Quote:
This is why I said you're talking about objective morality. You're placing "should/should not" in the realm of "true/false". Seebs takes the same stance - that preferability somehow exists independently of ourselves, that whether or not something is preferable is a true/false value. And thus, that people can be right or wrong about how they should act.

The problem is you keep trying to force my argument into this error. It just doesn't fit.

It has yet to leave that error.


Preference doesn't exist independently of ourselves, but you can convert an ought to an is the moment you introduce a system where only one option can be deterministically chosen by an individual.

Now previously you stated that beliefs could be graded as correct or incorrect. If we have no option but to act upon what we believe at any given moment (and I'd argue that if to suggest we can't is to suggest determinism is false) then actions can also be considered correct or incorrect in whatever context it was that the parent beliefs were considered as such.

No, they cannot. Beliefs can be true or false, but that truth value is a property of statements, and actions are not statements. Beliefs themselves give rise to no impetus to act. Values give rise to impetus to act. "It is hot" does not give rise to "I should find some shade" until combined with valuing the experience of a particular temperature.

You seem to be saying either that values can be right or wrong (objective morality) or that an action can be true or false when it results from applying incorrect beliefs to a value. Like, I value pleasure, I think that food will be pleasurable, so I eat it. It turns out that I was wrong about it being pleasurable; it was horrible. So because my action was based on misinformation, it is "incorrect". Is that what you're saying?

[Dragar]

Then you would hit him. I don't think there's any way out of this one

But that is my point. You cannot predict my behaviour merely from "Dragar believes the man will hit him". My behaviour is dependant upon beliefs and values/desires. Evaluations aren't belief, they're experience. We experience things as preferable. We don't believe they are. Belief comes with true/false tags, which only makes sense if preferability is objective (which is of course nonsense).

[justaman]

Originally Posted by Dragar

But that is my point. You cannot predict my behaviour merely from "Dragar believes the man will hit him".

Of course not. It is "Dragar believes the man will hit him, Dragar also believes [X], he also believes [Y], he tends to believe [Z] when he's angry, etc. All of those beliefs will be fed into the decision as to whether you swing at him or not.

[Dragar]

Of course not. It is "Dragar believes the man will hit him, Dragar also believes [X], he also believes [Y], he tends to believe [Z] when he's angry, etc. All of those beliefs will be fed into the decision as to whether you swing at him or not.

You still cannot predict my behaviour with simply beliefs.

[justaman]

Originally Posted by Zoot

[You can be right or wrong about a fact. You cannot be right or wrong about an evaluation of preferability.

Well I'm demonstrating that you can say precisely this, and thusfar your only resopnse has been to say that I can't. Why not? Why can't actions be termed right or wrong in the context of something?

That is why there is a difference. Your language continues to be saturated in the notion that preferability is something you can be right or wrong about. The example in the paragraph above is, "We believe it to be the best course." We do not. We experience it as being the most preferable course. There is a difference. In the former, you could be wrong about it being preferable. In the latter, talking about right or wrong obviously does not apply.

Exactly. I could be wrong about it being preferable. Once you have completed the action and come out with a bad result, you can then say to yourself "Gee what a bad decision. That really wasn't the most preferable course after all, though it seemed it at the time."

I think you need to explain how preference isn't a belief. I think they are precisely the same types of mental processes. They are calculations, that's all.

You'd be quite right to say so, if we both agreed that there is objective morality.

Just out of interest, what if we both agreed that the requirement to view the world as 'the world' rather than a spectrum of reality meant that we held an unconscious belief in objective morality, even if we consciously acknowledged it to be false? What it still hold then?

If objective morality was intelligible, preferability would be a fact about the world, existing independently of people, and there would be no real distinction between a fact about the world and an utterance about the preferability of an option. After all, the preferability of an option would be a fact about the world.

Preferability is a fact about subjective decision making.

But I do not believe that objective morality is intelligible. Therefore, the preferability of an option is not a fact about the world, and the distinction between the two is important. Facts and values (criteria for evaluating preferability) are apples and oranges.

I would agree with you if we weren't subjective entities. Subjectivity is all we know. Therefore, preferability has a boolean operation in our estimation. When it comes down to it, saying something is preferable or unpreferable is really just saying it is true or false in that context. The endstate is that it either happens or doesn't happen.

It's ugly to think of it like this in our language - all your preferability are belong to us - but as far as we are concerned, it's a true/false circuit.

So because my action was based on misinformation, it is "incorrect". Is that what you're saying?

It is incorrect by the standards you originally considered the problem in, absolutely.

The rest of your post largely expounded on the main point i'm trying to drive home here. The operations of preference and belief are one and the same. They are evalutations and they have a binary return.

[justaman]

Originally Posted by Dragar

You still cannot predict my behaviour with simply beliefs.

Describe a value which I won't be able to describe as being a belief.

[Dragar]

Alright. Go for pleasure. Explain 'I value pleasure' in terms of only my beliefs.

[justaman]

Originally Posted by Dragar

Alright. Go for pleasure. Explain 'I value pleasure' in terms of only my beliefs.

Heh, I knew you'd go for that one We all know each other too good.

"I believe the experience of pleasure is something worth pursuing."

I don't you can take beliefs out of values, because beliefs are required by definition in any evalutation. They are the symbols in the formula, the values themselves are the subjects.

[Zoot]

Well I'm demonstrating that you can say precisely this, and thusfar your only resopnse has been to say that I can't. Why not? Why can't actions be termed right or wrong in the context of something?

Let's be clear about words here, because right/wrong has two meanings in the English language - right/wrong in a moral sense, and true/false in a truth value sense. I am saying that actions cannot be termed true or false in the same way as statements about facts can be true or false. To say otherwise is to adopt a stance of objective morality. They can be right or wrong in the sense of good or bad according to criteria for evaluating the actions, but that "good" or "bad" is an entirely different thing from "true" and "false".

Exactly. I could be wrong about it being preferable.

Once again, this statement only makes sense if you believe in objective morality (objective preferability).

Once you have completed the action and come out with a bad result, you can then say to yourself "Gee what a bad decision. That really wasn't the most preferable course after all, though it seemed it at the time."

Sure. The action turned out not to be preferable. But you're saying that the action turned out to be "false".

I think you need to explain how preference isn't a belief. I think they are precisely the same types of mental processes. They are calculations, that's all.

Preference isn't a belief because beliefs are statements about the world one considers true when held up to an objective standard, while preferability is an evaluation of an action being preferable when held up to a subjective standard.

Just out of interest, what if we both agreed that the requirement to view the world as 'the world' rather than a spectrum of reality meant that we held an unconscious belief in objective morality, even if we consciously acknowledged it to be false? What it still hold then?

The term "objective morality" is just word play. Grammatically, the two fit together - an adjective and a noun. But it's not even an intelligible concept. What I mean when I say "that would only be intelligible if objective morality were intelligible" is "that notion is unintelligible for the same reasons as objective morality is unintelligible." You can't believe in objective morality - it's an incoherent non-concept.

Preferability is a fact about subjective decision making.

Sure, it can be true or false that something is preferable-to-someone-in-terms-of-some-value. But the value cannot be true or false. They can't be incorrect to prefer a value. They can only be incorrect in their application of beliefs to the value. I can be wrong about whether or not the cake will taste good, but I can't be wrong about whether or not tasting good is preferable.

I would agree with you if we weren't subjective entities. Subjectivity is all we know. Therefore, preferability has a boolean operation in our estimation. When it comes down to it, saying something is preferable or unpreferable is really just saying it is true or false in that context.

Evaluations of preferability do not return "true" or "false". They return varying degrees of preferability. You can be wrong about a true or false statement. You can't be wrong about an experience of preferability. The only way "I find that preferable" can be false is if I am consciously lying.

It's ugly to think of it like this in our language - all your preferability are belong to us - but as far as we are concerned, it's a true/false circuit.

I'll try to think of an analogy. Try this. Is the sun true? Well, it's bright. It's true that it's bright. "The sun is bright" is true. But does that mean the sun is true? No.

Is sex true? Well, it's pleasurable. It's true that it's pleasurable. "Sex is pleasurable" is true. But does that mean that sex is true? No.

Is pleasure true? Well, it's preferable-to-me. It's true that it's preferable-to-me. "Pleasure is preferable-to-me" is true. But does that mean that pleasure is true? No.

It is incorrect by the standards you originally considered the problem in, absolutely.

The rest of your post largely expounded on the main point i'm trying to drive home here. The operations of preference and belief are one and the same. They are evalutations and they have a binary return.

They have a binary return?

You don't think it's intelligible to talk of something being more preferable or less preferable, rather than simply preferable or unpreferable? All true statements are equally true - truth value is binary. Evaluation of preferability is not binary. It returns varying comparable degrees, which is what makes decision possible - varying degrees of preferability make prioritisation and selection possible.

[Zoot]

I believe the experience of pleasure is something worth pursuing.

Anyone who thinks like this still, basically, believes in God.

[justaman]

Originally Posted by Zoot

Anyone who thinks like this still, basically, believes in God.

So you don't believe the experience of pleasure is something worth pursuing?
Or you don't have a belief that the experience of pleasure is something worth purusing?

You'd have to justify this, I think.

[justaman]

Sorry for cutting out so much stuff, but I think we'll just get bogged down if we don't focus on the important bits, and you know how fucking bad I am when I start waffling

Originally Posted by Zoot

The term "objective morality" is just word play. Grammatically, the two fit together - an adjective and a noun. But it's not even an intelligible concept. What I mean when I say "that would only be intelligible if objective morality were intelligible" is "that notion is unintelligible for the same reasons as objective morality is unintelligible." You can't believe in objective morality - it's an incoherent non-concept.

We've discussed this before. God is an incoherent non-concept yet people believe in him, ergo the same possibility must also be true for objective morality.

Sure, it can be true or false that something is preferable-to-someone-in-terms-of-some-value.

Something which is preferable is always preferable-to-someone-in-terms-of-some-value.

So preference is subject to a true/false critique.

Evaluations of preferability do not return "true" or "false". They return varying degrees of preferability.

No. We are talking about decisions. In that case it is only ever "do it" or "don't do it" based on preference/belief. You cannot have varying degrees of preferability in this system.

Saying "I want X but I REALLY want Y" is just multiple binary systems.

Preference X against nothing - yes

Preference Y against nothing - yes

Preference X against preference Y - no

Preference Y against preference X - yes

I'll try to think of an analogy. Try this. Is the sun true? Well, it's bright. It's true that it's bright. "The sun is bright" is true. But does that mean the sun is true? No.

This analogy fails because there are not multiple options. For action there is always an option of "act" and "don't act". Saying "sun" doesn't provide such a scenario, so it is nonsensical to call it 'true'.

Is pleasure true? Well, it's preferable-to-me. It's true that it's preferable-to-me. "Pleasure is preferable-to-me" is true. But does that mean that plesure is true? No.

This doesn't work. Pleasure isn't 'preferable-to-me' it is 'preferable-to-me-against-some-other-value', probably that of pain.

The point is, the moment you start talking about belief, preference, action, whatever, you are introducing an evaluation which can then be judged to have a true or false outcome in relation to what it predicted and what occurred.

[Dragar]

Heh, I knew you'd go for that one We all know each other too good.

"I believe the experience of pleasure is something worth pursuing."

This is objective morality. Beliefs can be true or false. If I believe (correctly) that pleasure is worth pursuing, than pleasure is worth pursuing. Full stop. Doesn't matter who the individual is.

Or perhaps you mean 'I believe pleasure is worth pursuing to me'? In that case, while it is subjective, all I'm doing is stating a fact about me, probably attained through introspection. I'm stating that 'Pleasure is worth pursuing to me' and that I believe that fact to be true. Could I be wrong? Only if I screwed up my introspection (is that even possible?!). But it's the fact 'pleasure is worth persuing to me' that drives me, not that I believe it is. I'd still pursue pleasure (assuming I did in fact find it worth pursuing) even if I'd never carried out any introspection, and thus had no belief on the matter.

I don't you can take beliefs out of values, because beliefs are required by definition in any evalutation. They are the symbols in the formula, the values themselves are the subjects.

I don't understand this at all.

[justaman]

Originally Posted by Dragar

Or perhaps you mean 'I believe pleasure is worth persuing to me'?

That's what I mean.

In that case, while it is subjective, all I'm doing is stating a fact about me, probably attained through introspection. I'm stating that 'Pleasure is worth persuing to me' and that I believe that fact to be true. Could I be wrong? Only if I screwed up my introspection. But it's the fact 'pleasure is worth persuing to me' that drives me, not that I believe it is. I'd still persue pleasure even if I'd never carried out any introspection.

I don't think you're understanding. I'm suggesting beliefs and 'valuing things' are exactly the same. It is hardly surprising, then, that the belief isn't going to be 'wrong', or independant of the evaluation since it's a description of the same process.

I'm suggesting that when you say "pleasure is worth pursuing to me" you are also saying "I believe pleasure is worth pursuing to me" by implication.

They are the same and, therefore, subject to the same critiques, which is the point.

[Zoot]

So you don't believe the experience of pleasure is something worth pursuing?
Or you don't have a belief that the experience of pleasure is something worth purusing?

You'd have to justify this, I think.

To say that one believes that something is worth pursuing is to imply that pursue-worth (preferability) exists as a fact about the world, a fact about which one could be mistaken.

That's fine for someone like Seebs, who believes that preferability does exist in the world independently of people. For example, he agreed that something could be preferable despite no one in the world finding it remotely preferable. To him, because he believes that value is an objective fact about the world, one can be correct or incorrect about what is preferable.

My contention is that preferability is an experience, and as such cannot be "correct" or "incorrect".

It's vaguely analogous to an illusion or hallucination. I see a child sitting in the middle of the room, but there's actually no child there. I can say, "I see a child in the middle of the room." I can say, "There is a child in the middle of the room." The latter statement can be true or false. The former statement can only be false if I'm lying about it.

That's only vaguely analogous. The point is that someone who believes in objective morality/preferability will use the terminology in your statement above: "I believe it is preferable/worth pursuing". It will make sense to them that they could be wrong about that thing being worth pursuing. But someone who has linguistically internalised the understanding that preferability is always a preferable-to-me, will not use your terminology here. They will say, rather, "I experience pleasure as preferable." And the only way that statement can be false is if they're lying.

[justaman]

Originally Posted by Zoot

To say that one believes that something is worth pursuing is to imply that pursue-worth (preferability) exists as a fact about the world, a fact about which one could be mistaken.

No, it is a fact about themselves, and if the prediction turns out to be inaccurate, they can then said to have been mistaken.

This is the error with suggesting I am relying on objective morality. Subjective morality is more than sufficient in this context.

That's only vaguely analogous. The point is that someone who believes in objective morality/preferability will use the terminology in your statement above: "I believe it is preferable/worth pursuing". It will make sense to them that they could be wrong about that thing being worth pursuing. But someone who has linguistically internalised the understanding that preferability is always a preferable-to-me, will not use your terminology here. They will say, rather, "I experience pleasure as preferable." And the only way that statement can be false is if they're lying.

When you say "I experience pleasure as preferable" I see a stark implication of "and I believe it will continue to be so."

I cannot see how you can absolutely divorce belief from evaluation of preferability. You are relying upon your past experiences and a prediction that said experiences will return a similar value in the future. That is something you cannot know implicitly, it is something you must believe.

[Zoot]

We've discussed this before. God is an incoherent non-concept yet people believe in him, ergo the same possibility must also be true for objective morality.

Not meaningful discussion, no.

Something which is preferable is always preferable-to-someone-in-terms-of-some-value.

So preference is subject to a true/false critique.

It can be true that something is preferable-to-someone. But that value is a varying degree, not true/false. Otherwise comparison of preference could not take place, and decision would not be possible. To say "it is true that I prefer that" is not telling the whole story, because preference comes in varying strengths.

This is besides the actual point, however, because your statement was, "Valuing pleasure and believing something will bring you pleasure is saying exactly the same thing." My point was that the latter can be true or false, and the former cannot be true or false in the same way.

Quote:
Evaluations of preferability do not return "true" or "false". They return varying degrees of preferability.

No. We are talking about decisions. In that case it is only ever "do it" or "don't do it" based on preference/belief. You cannot have varying degrees of preferability in this system.

How do you choose between two preferable things, if not as a result of different degrees of preferability?

Saying "I want X but I REALLY want Y" is just multiple binary systems.

Preference X against nothing - yes

Preference Y against nothing - yes

Preference X against preference Y - no

Preference Y against preference X - yes

That "yes" at the end is "yes, one is a greater degree than the other".

This doesn't work. Pleasure isn't 'preferable-to-me' it is 'preferable-to-me-against-some-other-value', probably that of pain.

The point is, the moment you start talking about belief, preference, action, whatever, you are introducing an evaluation which can then be judged to have a true or false outcome in relation to what it predicted and what occurred.

No. Preferability must be a varying degree in order for prioritisation of options to occur.

It may be useful to start distinguishing between two different meanings of "preferable" that we've been using interchangeably. One is the evaluation of an option as preferable in terms of some value, and the other is the value that provides the criteria for preferability.

I will start (well, go back to) using "preferable" to refer to that quality possessed by options in varying degrees in terms of criteria set by a value, and using "valuable" to refer to those bases of criteria.

For example, I find sex preferable because it gives me sensual pleasure. I value sensual pleasure. I find sex preferable when evaluated in terms of the pleasure value. Values are irreducible, while preferability is evaluated in terms of values.


Do you still agree with your statement:

Valuing pleasure and believing something will bring you pleasure is saying exactly the same thing.

[Zoot]

No, it is a fact about themselves, and if the prediction turns out to be inaccurate, they can then said to have been mistaken.

Using the distinction I mentioned in the above post, I'll word this carefully:

They can be mistaken about the prediction that something will provide a result they value. They can't be mistaken about what is valuable.

This is the error with suggesting I am relying on objective morality. Subjective morality is more than sufficient in this context.

I think my concern is you bleeding the correct/incorrect thing over from preferability to value (based on that distinction above).

When you say "I experience pleasure as preferable" I see a stark implication of "and I believe it will continue to be so."

It's only really a statement of right now. But I would now reword that as "I value pleasure" and "I experience as preferable those things that I predict will bring me pleasure".

I cannot see how you can absolutely divorce belief from evaluation of preferability. You are relying upon your past experiences and a prediction that said experiences will return a similar value in the future. That is something you cannot know implicitly, it is something you must believe.

I've said plenty of times, including my spider example and the cake example, that one can be mistaken about what will bring one something valued. My point is that one cannot be mistaken about values. It can be true or false that something will bring a result that is valued. It can be true or false that someone values something. It cannot be true or false that a value is valuable.

I'm hoping that the new distinction between preferability (of options) and values will help end the confusion.

[Zoot]

Again, reason and logic only comes into consideration when combining values and beliefs to evaluate preferability of options, as I said here:

http://www.freethought-forum.com/for...ders#post33310

Originally Posted by Zoot

Aversion to a spider can be rational or irrational only in so far as one is judging the consistency of the aversion with the values to which it refers. For example, I am afraid of poisonous spiders because I have an aversion to pain. That is a reasonable application of aversion to pain to a particular instance of something that could cause me pain.

If I am afraid of all spiders because I am under the impression that they all have the capacity to cause me pain, that too is rational, though operating on mistaken information regarding the nature of the spiders.

If I am afraid of a poisonous spider in a glass cage, one that I perceive is incapable of causing me pain, that is irrational, because it is not a consistent application of the value to the situation.

However, all of these instances are rational or irrational in terms of their consistency with the value to which they refer - the aversion to pain. The aversion to pain itself, however, cannot be evaluated as rational or irrational. Applications of values can be rational or irrational, but values themselves cannot.

[Dragar]

I don't think you're understanding. I'm suggesting beliefs and 'valuing things' are exactly the same. It is hardly surprising, then, that the belief isn't going to be 'wrong', or independant of the evaluation since it's a description of the same process.

I'm suggesting that when you say "pleasure is worth pursuing to me" you are also saying "I believe pleasure is worth pursuing to me" by implication.

I asked you to explain 'I value pleasure' in terms of belief. You responded that this was the same thing as 'I believe pleasure is valuable'. Albeit with a slight word change.

I value X = I believe I value X

Or even more perplexing: Y = I believe Y

I agree one statement suggests the other. I do not agree these statements are equivalent, or logically imply one another. One is a statement about what I value. One is about my beliefs (which happen to be about what I value).

This discussion started when you said that my valuing X was an irrational belief.

Premise: "I value pleasure" suggests "I believe I value pleasure".
Premise: Beliefs can be false.
Conclusion: Therefore it is possible that valuing pleasure is false.

To you see the error? The correct conclusion is:

"Therefore it is possible that the belief I value pleasure is false."

While logically possible, I'm not sure it ever really happens that we believe we value things we don't value, or vice-versa. But I'm open to the possibility. Regardless, those statements are not the same thing. They refer to different things (what I value and what I believe I value).

In fact, I can make this even stronger. If you assume that:

I value chocolate = I believe I value chocolate*

then if one statement is true so must the other be.

But (assuming the logical possibility about being mistaken about what I value) there is no contradiction in believing I value chocolate while actually not valuing chocolate. Thus one side can be false while the other is true. This is a contradiction, therefore the equality is false.

*Note that "I believe I value X" is the same as your previous terminology "I believe X is valuable-to-me". I just think this makes things more explicit.

[justaman]

[QUOTE=Zoot]

To say "it is true that I prefer that" is not telling the whole story, because preference comes in varying strengths.

No you say, "It is true I prefer that to X". You need something to prefer it to, even if it's nothing, preference is a relationship.

The 'strength' of that preference relates directly to the numeber of relationships that come out in favour of that element.

X beats Y
X beats Z

Y does not beat X
Y beats Z

Z does not beat X
Z does not beat Y

So in order of strength you have X, Y, Z, but that description is based on multiple, fundamental dichotomies. Each of those dichotomies is subject to a positive/negative return.

This is besides the actual point, however, because your statement was, "Valuing pleasure and believing something will bring you pleasure is saying exactly the same thing." My point was that the latter can be true or false, and the former cannot be true or false in the same way.

The former can be true and false. Valuing requires action. Action requires decision, decision requires prediction, prediction requires preference, preference requires belief, belief is graded true/false.

It can sometimes be that to value pleasure is in error by some other standard - taking drugs for example.

How do you choose between two preferable things, if not as a result of different degrees of preferability?

What I'm saying is that preferability itself can be deconstructed into constituent parts which themselves operate in a boolean fashion.

That "yes" at the end is "yes, one is a greater degree than the other".

Ah, but my true/false system interacts before we make that subsequent conclusion.

I'll get back to the rest.

[justaman]

Originally Posted by Zoot
No. Preferability [i

must[/i] be a varying degree in order for prioritisation of options to occur.

But this doesn't stop a true/false evaluation happening before the process of the prioritisation occurs. For this reason, preference is still subject to a true/false critique.

It may be useful to start distinguishing between two different meanings of "preferable" that we've been using interchangeably. One is the evaluation of an option as preferable in terms of some value, and the other is the value that provides the criteria for preferability.

I will start (well, go back to) using "preferable" to refer to that quality possessed by options in varying degrees in terms of criteria set by a value, and using "valuable" to refer to those bases of criteria.

For example, I find sex preferable because it gives me sensual pleasure. I value sensual pleasure. I find sex preferable when evaluated in terms of the pleasure value. Values are irreducible, while preferability is evaluated in terms of values.

Sex preferable to what? There is a step here which you are skipping over.

And as I stated earlier, values are not necessarily irreducible, other values can impact upon them. The only one which this doesn't work for is that which you call 'easevalue', which I still don't like calling a value, given that it isn't dynamic like pleasure, but yeah.

Valuing pleasure and believing something will bring you pleasure is saying exactly the same thing.

Yes, in this context. We are talking about two evaluations, the processes of which are identical.

Valuing pleasure - to me - is a conscious acknowledgement that pleasure is a state you want to pursue.

Let me qualify this though: This stuff holds true if it is possible to not value the particular value you are talking about. If you are valuing it, there must be an evaluation.

Easevalue doesn't agree with this, since it is impossible to not value/prefer/act in accordance with it.

[justaman]

Originally Posted by Zoot

They can be mistaken about the prediction that something will provide a result they value. They can't be mistaken about what is valuable.

Ok, I see the distinction you are making, but I'm not convinced that it really exists. It would seem that if it were so, value would require objectivity. For mine, every instance of describing something as 'valuable' is making a prediction about a result they value. You seem to be suggesting that things can be considered to be implicitly valuable, which works necessarily for easevalue, but not anything else, I think.

It's only really a statement of right now. But I would now reword that as "I value pleasure" and "I experience as preferable those things that I predict will bring me pleasure".

Even these are making implicit predictions about the future. When you say "I value pleasure/ I experience" you are saying "In X situation, I value/I experience".

Really you are saying two things. You are first saying:

"I have valued pleasure to date"/"I have experienced as preferable those things that I have predicted will bring me pleasure"

A statement about the past, you see. My criticism has no claim here, because you aren't actually predicting anything. There is no true/false possibility, it has been actualised. But then you are saying:

"Therefore I expect this trend to continue."

You see here the evaluation where it must therefore become possible to assess the prediction versus the outcome.

I've said plenty of times, including my spider example and the cake example, that one can be mistaken about what will bring one something valued. My point is that one cannot be mistaken about values. It can be true or false that something will bring a result that is valued. It can be true or false that someone values something. It cannot be true or false that a value is valuable.

I'll agree with the last statement only if it makes no reference whatever to the future. But that means, of course, that any given instant in time, we must not actually 'value' anything, since by this allowance, past values are not allowed to be compared to the future.

I'm hoping that the new distinction between preferability (of options) and values will help end the confusion.

The confusion is that I don't think you believe that 'valuing' something requires a prediction, where as I believe it does.

I do see the distinction you are making, but it is ignoring that the two constructs we are considering - preference and value - can themselves be deconstructed, and when we do this, we find their constituent parts are made up of predictive dichotomies. It is these fundamental parts which are subject to a true/false evaluation.

[justaman]

Originally Posted by Dragar

I asked you to explain 'I value pleasure' in terms of belief. You responded that this was the same thing as 'I believe pleasure is valuable'. Albeit with a slight word change.

I value X = I believe I value X

Or even more perplexing: Y = I believe Y

I agree one statement suggests the other. I do not agree these statements are equivalent, or logically imply one another. One is a statement about what I value. One is about my beliefs (which happen to be about what I value).

Ok. When you say "I value X" you are making a conscious acknowledgement of what you value, correct? Is it possible to consciously acknowledge that you value something and also not believe you value it? Surely not.

I have come to a point here, however, that I haven't really thought about it. I have been talking exclusively about values one consciously refers to. I have not considered unconscious values which we don't believe we possess.

I'm fairly sure it holds true, for while in that situation it isn't true to say "I value X" and "I believe I value X" the process of unconsciously valuing something still operates the same as consciously valuing something, or consciously believing something. It still requires an evaluation, it just occurs unconsciously. It can also be described as an unconscious belief.

So "Dragar values X but he doesn't believe it" = "Sheriff believes in X but doesn't think he does"

Yes, I think that works.

Premise: "I value pleasure" suggests "I believe I value pleasure".
Premise: Beliefs can be false.
Conclusion: Therefore it is possible that valuing pleasure is false.

This isn't quite right. The first premise should be "valuing X is equivalent to believing X is valuable"

I think I've used some bad wording in comparing the two.

I value chocolate = I believe I value chocolate

then if one statement is true so must the other be.

But (assuming the logical possibility about being mistaken about what I value) there is no contradiction in believing I value chocolate while actually not valuing chocolate. Thus one side can be false while the other is true. This is a contradiction, therefore the equality is false.

This is the inappropriateness of my initial wording coming through. Let me use my new improved version 2.0 wording:

I value chocolate = I believe chocolate is valuable

This shouldn't inspire any such contradiction.

[Dragar]

I value chocolate = I believe chocolate is valuable

This shouldn't inspire any such contradiction.

It wouldn't, if 'valuable' was a property of chocolate. It's not. Saying chocolate is valuable is a statement about what I value, not about what is valuable. You're confusing objective values and subjective values.

Version1: I value chocolate = I believe I value chocolate
Version 2: I value chocolate = I believe chocolate is valuable

These are equivalent.

Proof:


Under subjective values,

I believe chocolate is valuable = I believe chocolate is valuable-to-me = I believeve I value chocolate

Note this isn't true for objective values. In that scheme, if something is valuable, it doesn't mean someone values it. But under subjective values, if something is valuable, it must be valuable-to-someone. And if it is valuable-to-someone, it is valued by them.

Substituting in your Version 2.0 wording:

Version 2: I value chocolate = I believe chocolate is valuable

I value chocolate = I believe I value chocolate

This is identical to Version 1, thus the contradiction remains.

QED