60th anniversary of a-bomb attack

[godfry n. glad]

This is from the beginning of chapter 11 ("Defeat") of The Pacific War, 1931-1945 by Saburo Ienaga (Pantheon Books, NY, 1978), pp. 229-232:

Ienaga/Pacific War, pp 229-232

Japan’s decision to end the war has attracted enormous scholarly interest. The earliest publications of primary historical material and academic research on the war were about the events leading to the end.1 This body of material and scholarship shows that although many different actors and initiatives were involved, surrender was achieved by the senior statesmen, the jushin, a group of former premiers, working behind the scenes and through the emperor. They ended the war. The mass of the populace was impotent. Nevertheless, rising popular dissatisfaction posed direct and indirect threats to the ruling class. And the apprehensive elite understood the danger. To that extent, demands from below, from the masses, influenced the authorities. But all planning and activities to end the war were done secretly in the highest councils of government, far removed from the ordinary citizen.

Ending the War in Order to “Protect the National Polity”

The senior statesmen led those who wished to end the war. It was apparent to everyone in the ruling circles that Japan’s fortunes could not be reversed, that the war was lost. Everyone, that is, but the military, who insisted upon a final decisive battle “to save the nation.” Their strategy called for an all-out attack when the Allies invaded the home islands.2 A massive offensive would smash enemy forces as they came ashore on the beaches. The military were asked what they would do if the Allies did not attempt a landing but “stuck to bombing and burned the whole country to the ground.” They could only reply, “We’ll really be in a fix, then.”3 It was a defense strategy worthy of little boys playing samurai; the military were as dangerous as they were ridiculous. Refusing to surrender, they demanded a great battle to bloody the Allies on the beaches, drive off the invaders, and gain better terms. The military saw the Allied approach as the “golden opportunity,” as the “divine chance” they had been waiting for. Faced with such obstinate opponents, the senior statesmen had to be extremely careful. The army might assassinate peace advocates or stage a coup d’etat. Real intentions screend by secrecy, the jushin maneuvered delicately toward ending the war.

Certain ideological differences aside, the senior statesmen shared a basic outlook: strongly pro-England and America, anti-Communist, and totally committed to the preservation of the emperor system.4 They wanted to end the war, but not because they had any doubts about its morality or about the ideology and political structure that had sustained it. Konoe’s motives were typical, and his views are well known from his statement to the jushin conference on July 18, 1944,5 his “Memorial to the Throne” of February 14, 1945,6 and other documents. Konoe charged that the Communist elements in the military had launched Japan into the war; he thought a revolution might occur if the conflict continued. Konoe believed that in order to “preserve the national polity,” Japan had to end the war as quickly as possible. He feared revolution more than surrender and defeat.

First priority, perhaps the jushin’s only moral imperative, was to preserve the national polity. Thus, moderate Yonai Mitsumata could say on May 17, 1945: “If we can just protect the imperial family, that will be sufficient. Even if it means the empire is reduced to the four home islands, we’ll have to do it.”7 The jushin shared Konoe’s dread that if the war was not ended, domestic unrest migh sweep away the throne and everything else with it. This was their reason for ending the war. Not to save the Japanese people from more Allied air raids and naval bombardment; not even to avoid a last-ditch ground battle across the crowded home islands. Japan’s leaders showed a supreme indifference to the suffering and despair of the populace to the very end. That callous determination was unshaken by two atomic bombings. The “national polity” took precedence over the people.

Negotiating an end to the war was first formally raised in an official discussion at the Imperial Conference on June 22, 1945. A plan was agreed upon to send Konoe to Moscow to request Russian good offices for peace talks. The gall of the government leaders is breathtaking. Japan has planned to attack the Soviet Union if the opportunity arose. Now they asked for assistance as if Tokyo had some claim to Russian friendship!8 It was already too late: Stalin had promised to enter the war against Japan. The twin shocks of the atomic bombings and the Soviet declaration of war broke the stalemate in Tokyo. At Imperial Conferences on August 10 and 14, Premier Suzuki Kantaro, Navy Minister Yonai, and Foreign Minister Togo advocated surrender. They were opposed by the army minister and two chiefs of staff. Tradition required unanimity, but concensus was still impossible. The emperor cut the Gordian knot by deciding to accept the Potsdam Declaration. Late on the night of August 14, the emperor recorded a surrender announcement for the next day. At noon on August 15, the imperial broadcast informed the people of Japan that “Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration.” Most of the country realized the for the first time that the war was over.9

One group of army officers rejected the imperial will. They planned a coup d’etat to seize power, establish a military government, and continue the war. After a few days of plotting, they broke into the Imperial Palace on the evening of August 14 in search of the emperor’s recording. They also intended to kill Premier Suzuki. Leaflets calling for continued resistance were distributed at Atsugi Air Base and other facilities.10 The fanatics failed to stop the imperial broadcast. Most of the military knew that further resistance was impossible and quietly complied. The wretched fifteen-year war came to an end with a whimper instead of another gory bang.

That last bit of military lunacy was a fitting postscript to the conflict. Army Minister Anami initially was sympathetic to the officers' plot; he later declined to lead it but still did nothing to check it. 11 General Anami joined the criminal conspiracy or at least was guilty of neglect of duty for not suppressing the revolt. The war started with the Kwantung Army's conspiracy at Mukden and ended with an officers' conspiracy against the Imperial Palace at Tokyo."

I found it interesting in that it contradicts both Vork and I.