American citizens of Japanese heritage were relocated to "relocation camps" far inland and basically imprisoned behind fences with barbed wire and gun towers. Please delineate the difference between these "relocation camps" and the "internment camps" and show me where American citizens of German ancestry were either interned or relocated. (And yes, I'm aware of the "voluntary internees" (what a whitewash) of spouses and children who went into internment (or relocation) with their family members.)
I'm not discussing this topic further in this thread. I'll pick this up in another thread tomorrow.
I don't think that we mean the same thing by blockade here. I am talking about a total blockade, i.e. nothing gets in or out without the approval of the blockading force, nothing. The united nations had this capacity in 1945, but not in 1944 and certainly not in 1943.
That had been going on since the ports were mined in March of 1945. Still no surrender in sight. As I noted in response to your earlier post, blockade does not end the war. No one has ever produced a scenario that leads to surrender from blockade. This is because blockade contains no mechanism or shock effect that forces Japan to end the war, nor does it render Japanese policy of resistance on Kyushu ineffective. And further, because blockade would not stop the killing in China and elsewhere outside of Asia, it would produce a far greater loss of life than nuking two cities to render Japanese strategy ineffective and end the war. Such a loss of life would stem from (1) deaths by bombardment and starvation in Japan and (2) deaths from fighting in China and elsewhere. Additionally, with no end to the war in April, the Russians would certainly have come ashore in Hokkaido, as they had planned to do, and were only stopped by fanatic japanese resistance that delayed their conquest of other places into Sept, when the WWII finally stopped.
Don't you answer your own question here? By your own admission, a handful of leaders, detached from reality, continued to labour under the illusion that victory was possible.
On the contrary, they knew they were beaten. But they did not want to give up their power, and thus fought against surrender. They chose national suicide rather than surrender, hoping to cause enough losses to invading US troops on Kyushu to make the US end the war, leaving them in power and perhaps a few of their possessions as well. The A-Bomb made that policy impossible.
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Those in contact with reality were aware that they were already defeated. Japan was effectively defeated, except for the admission of a few. How long could those few have held out against reality?
As I said, they knew they were defeated. Convincing them of defeat was not the problem. It was getting them to stop the war that the was the problem.
Yet you know that the U.S. Army Intelligence Service's Japan expert had no access to all the intelligence sources? Please enlighten me as to how you know the Japan expert for the U.S. Army Intelligence Service did not have access to this information?
Just six people had access to the MAGIC intercept summaries. Except for the record copy, all copies were destroyed after viewing by the recipient. Reichshuaer's name was not on that list, which was all high level policymakers. Hence policymakers had information that Reichshauer did not; namely, Japan had no intention of surrendering, as both MAGIC and ULTRA data proved. In any case, as you note, he thought Hiroshima was the right decision. Nagasaki
Again I ask: what was Reichshauer's position on the A-bomb during the war.
I found it interesting in that it contradicts both Vork and I.
How does it conflict with anything I said?
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Originally Posted by Vork
The Emperor and the military were pursuing ketsu-go, the defense of Kyushu, in the hope that massive losses would persuade the Americans to make peace and let them keep some of their gains.
Ienaga notes that by late June the emperor was in cahoots with the jushin to end the war.
Also, the jushin had made it explicit that they could not continue if the US did not invade and continued to firebomb the cities and the forests. Your claims of effective blockade by 1943 is bogus. Some supply lines were cut, but Manchuria, mainland China and much of Indochina was still accessible. By mid-1945, there was no question that all supply lines were cut, harbors were mined, Allied bombers with fighter escorts commanded Japanese skies and dropped percussion, shrapnel and fire at will, and Allied warships could bombard coastal cities without significant risk. It was only a matter of time before what small stockpiles there were of food, ammunition, supplies and energy were exhausted. (Ienaga notes that later, even a month after the cessation of hostilities and Allied forces in occupation, there was still only a four day supply of rice...that's with supplies coming in from the Allies.) Even the extremist militarists had admitted that they'd be "in a fix" if the Allies just continued a siege. (That's a footnoted quote, so I can provide the source, if you'd like.)
I believe you also stated that the officer corps might have been persuaded by the Russian initiative...well, it seems they weren't, because according to Ienaga, the extremists attempted a coup on the day before the surrender was actually announced by the emperor. They attempted to sieze the emperor's announcement, assassinate the premier, Admiral Suzuki, and raise a mob to force continuation of the war. Even the atomic bombs, both of them, did not change their minds.
I'd like to know what Konoe's statement in 1944 and his memorial the emperor of February 1945 were.
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Last edited by godfry n. glad; 08-18-2005 at 02:07 AM.
Yet you know that the U.S. Army Intelligence Service's Japan expert had no access to all the intelligence sources? Please enlighten me as to how you know the Japan expert for the U.S. Army Intelligence Service did not have access to this information?
Just six people had access to the MAGIC intercept summaries. Except for the record copy, all copies were destroyed after viewing by the recipient. Reichshuaer's name was not on that list, which was all high level policymakers. Hence policymakers had information that Reichshauer did not; namely, Japan had no intention of surrendering, as both MAGIC and ULTRA data proved. In any case, as you note, he thought Hiroshima was the right decision. Nagasaki
Again I ask: what was Reichshauer's position on the A-bomb during the war.
Actually, I don't know. He has been erroneously credited with saving Kyoto from being an atomic bomb target, so he knew about it before it happened. He denies it and gives the credit for sparing Japan's ancient capital to Secretary Stimson, who'd spent part of his honeymoon in the city of temples and gardens. I assume he thought it part of his duty and couldn't really assess the situation until after it had occurred. I personally doubt, but have no evidence to support, that he knew the power of the weapon they were about to use. I don't think too many people had any idea of the magnitude of destruction they were to wield.
Yet you know that the U.S. Army Intelligence Service's Japan expert had no access to all the intelligence sources? Please enlighten me as to how you know the Japan expert for the U.S. Army Intelligence Service did not have access to this information?
Just six people had access to the MAGIC intercept summaries. Except for the record copy, all copies were destroyed after viewing by the recipient. Reichshuaer's name was not on that list, which was all high level policymakers. Hence policymakers had information that Reichshauer did not; namely, Japan had no intention of surrendering, as both MAGIC and ULTRA data proved. In any case, as you note, he thought Hiroshima was the right decision. Nagasaki
Okay... So, MAGIC and ULTRA were intercepts that had access to what?
Okay... So, MAGIC and ULTRA were intercepts that had access to what?
MAGIC was the code name for the intercepts of Japanese diplomatic traffic. These were decoded by an elite group of analyists Army Signals Intelligence and then summaries and transcripts, along with analysis, forwarded to policymakers. ULTRA was the code name for the intercepts of Japanese military traffic. Usually -- for example, Doug Long's site -- revisionists present only selected MAGIC data and entirely omit intelligence from ULTRA. This is because the ULTRA data showed that Japan was pursuing a policy of build-up on Kyushu, called Ketsu-Go, to cause massive losses to the invasion there and compel the Americans to give up the war. In other words, the political import of the ULTRA data is clear: there was no surrender policy.
A good source on MAGIC is Bruce Lee's _Marching Orders_. There you will find many of the intercepts from the fateful summer period, as well as the postwar strategy to exploit the atom bomb in postwar Japanese propaganda.
Ienaga notes that by late June the emperor was in cahoots with the jushin to end the war.
Yes, as I've already stated several times, the Emperor approved the truce negotiations using the Soviets as mediators. This was not, as Togo and other Japanese stated in MAGIC intercepts at the time, a move for unconditional surrender. It was rather a move to get the Soviets to broker an end to the fighting that would leave the military in power and the Emperor on the throne, as well as leave Japan in Taiwan, China, and Korea, and perhaps elsewhere. See the excellent blow by blow discussion in Toland. I have written a summary of events as well:
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To Russia, with Hope
On May 21, 1945, the new foreign minister, Togo, sent two fateful messages. First, cabled all his diplomatic posts in a circular, flatly denying that "Japan has ever made peace proposals to America and England." In his second message to Sato in Moscow, he directed the latter to sound out the glacial Molotov on Russia's intentions toward Japan. Sato met with Molotov, and then responded to Tokyo, Cassandra to Troy. "We are facing future trouble with Russia," he bluntly said, saying that it was imperative that the government clearly determine how far it would go with the Russians. It would never do that.
Japanese policy during the war was set by the Supreme War Council, consisting of six members. The Big Six from April 5 on were PM Suzuki, Foreign Minister Togo, Navy Minister Yonai, Army Minister Anami, Chief of the Naval General Staff Oikawa (quickly replaced by Toyoda in May) and Chief of the Army General Staff Umezu. At the time the only known advocate of peace was the redoubtable Togo, though after the war claims were made on behalf of Toyoda and Suzuki. Nothing in the record at the time supports this contention.
There are several things that must be noted at this juncture, for they formed the background to all "peace" discussions held by the Big Six and other officials. First, the law stipulated that the Army Minister must be a serving officer. Since the government could not function without all the ministerial posts filled, this meant that if the military did not like a governmental decision, it could bring down the government simply by having the Army Minister resign (which is exactly what happened when Japan surrendered). Thus, no peace agreement could take place without the military's say-so. Since Anami did not support peace -- even after two A-Bombs and Soviet entry, he still argued that the war was not necessarily lost -- there was no question of any peace agreement being made. It could not have been made without his approval, and there was no hint that any such thing would ever occur.
The second vital problem faced by peace advocates (and war advocates as well) was "government by assassination." Japanese politics was restrained by fear of assassination by rightist junior military officers. Anyone who openly advocated peace was in danger. In fact, there was little discussion of it until May, when Togo prevailed upon the Big Six to meet without their staff, so that no military underlings would be present to make implicit threats. Assassination attempts were common throughout the war; Tojo was the object of several plots, including one by more than 50 officers.
The third problem was that Japan was a totalitarian state in which thought and information were strictly controlled. This meant that discussions that sought ways to end the war could only take place in secret, and much communication consisted of circumlocutions, euphemisms, and unspoken agreements, to avoid discovery by the secret police. Most high officials did not have a clear idea of the progress of the war, nor did they understand how completely the Japanese military had been overwhelmed by superior US numbers, equipment, tactics, firepower, and technology. Many Japanese leaders argued that the Japanese possessed sufficient resources in territory and troops (about 4 million men under arms) that the US could be brought to the negotiating table. They did not conceive of Japan as a nation totally outclassed by its opponents. Thus, the thinking among Japanese leaders was founded on fantasies of Japanese strength. Those men who had realistic appraisals of the situation, such as staff officers in Imperial General HQ in Tokyo, or Kase and Sato in their embassies abroad, either had no clout or were ignored.
The ultimate fantasy of Imperial Japan was the Russian "peace" initiative of the summer of 1945. This was an attempt to get the Russians to mediate an end to the war that would leave Japan and most of its holdings intact, forestall a forced disarmament, and enable Japan to continue its adventure in China, while using Russia to compel the US to the negotiating table. Sato, Japan's man in Moscow, put this entire initiative into perspective with a series of telegrams fired off in July and read by the US. Responding to Togo's suggestion that as a bargaining counter, Japan would give up territories it had taken since the beginning of the war, Sato scathingly replied:
How much of an effect do you expect our statements regarding the non-annexation and non-possession of territories which we have already lost or are about to lose will have on Soviet authorities?
As you are well aware, the Soviet authorities are extremely realistic and it is extremely difficult to persuade them with abstract arguments. We certainly will not convince them with pretty little phrases devoid of all connection with reality.
If the Japanese Empire is really faced with the necessity of terminating the war, we must first of all make up our own minds to terminate the war. Unless we make up our own minds, there is absolutely no point in sounding out the views of the Soviet Government.
Sato urged the government to end the war, saying that Japan would have to accept "virtually the equivalent of unconditional surrender."
The Russian "peace" initiative began in May. Togo gradually realized that the Army would never negotiate directly with the US. The Army had long envisioned war against Russia, however, a sound whipping at Nomohan prior to WWII in what was probably history's first true combined arms battle resulted in hasty revisions to this plan, as it was obvious Japan's army would never be able to face a real opponent (as WWII revealed). The focus on Russia remained (few top Army leaders knew anything about the US), and Togo, who was the only one among the Big Six who advocated an end to the war, finally realized that the Army would only negotiate through Russia.
On May 14, 1945, Togo drafted a memorandum outlining the proposed plan in the vaguest terms imaginable, after Suzuki gave his blessing in meetings held from May 11 to the 14th. He wrote, fantastically:
It should be clearly made known to Russia that she owes her victory over Germany to Japan, since we remained nuetral, and that it would be to the advantage of the Soviets to help Japan maintain her international position, since they have the United States as an enemy in the future.
The memorandum warned that Russia might demand a high price for this, and said that Japan might have to give up Port Arthur, Dairen, railways in Manchuria, and the northern portions of the Kuriles. Stalin had been promised much of this at Yalta anyway.
The draft was approved by all six of the Big Six, and Togo sent an experienced Russian specialist, Koki Hirota, to sound out Yakov Malik, the Russian ambassador. The devastating May 25 firebombing of Tokyo delayed his mission, and it was not until June 3 that he finally reached Malik in his home two hours from Tokyo. Preliminary talks yielded nothing but vague friendly comments.
Meanwhile, the military had not been idle. On June 6 there was another meeting of the Big Six. Far from seeking peace, in a new document from Supreme Command entitled The Fundamental Policy to be Followed Henceforth in the Conduct of the War, the military demanded an official confirmation of:
With a faith born of eternal loyalty as our inspiration, we shall -- thanks to the advantages of our terrain and the unity of our nation, prosecute the war to the bitter end in order to uphold our national essence, protect the Imperial land and achieve our goals of conquest.
A list of steps followed, including preparations for homeland defense and the formation of a national volunteer army. It called for the "honorable death of the hundred million" -- national suicide. The resolution passed over Togo's horrified objections. The resolution was then forwarded to the emperor for approval. In meeting with a number of top leaders, the motion was approved without objections.
Kido, as shocked by this as Togo was, memorialized His Majesty on the Ninth, arguing that Japan must begin negotiations with an intermediary power to get the US to end the war before Japan was destroyed. Kido, like all Japanese statesman, knew that "the enemy's main object is the overthrow of the so-called military clique" and that if Japan threw down its weapons and withdrew from occupied areas in the Pacific (no one was willing to contemplate withdrawal from China) then perhaps it could end the war. Disarmament would also have to be accepted. On the 13th Suzuki made a speech to the Diet calling for peace, and was shouted down.
Finally, on June 22 the Emperor abruptly summoned the Big Six to his side. "This is not an imperial command," he said, "but merely a discussion." There he broached the idea of sending a special envoy to Russia to negotiate for peace. Togo had been keeping the Emperor informed of progress with Malik, and the Emperor asked when an envoy could be sent. "Probably mid-July," Togo estimated. Togo warned that Japan would have to give up much.
Hirota went back to Malik and bluntly asked Russia to renew the Nuetrality Pact (it was set to expire in April of 1946; the Russians had given one year notice as the Treaty stipulated; when they invaded in August they did so by breaking this Treaty). Malik was evasive. Hirota offered Japan's resources from the South Pacific, rubber, tin, lead, tungsten. "if the Soviet Army and the Japanese Navy joined forces," he argued, "Japan and the USSR would become the strong force in the world!" Inasmuch as the Japanese Navy rested on the ocean bottom, Malik was not impressed by this offer. He replied that a concrete plan would be necessary, echoing language Sato would later use.
In less than a week, Hirota came back. In return for a new non-aggression treaty and oil, Japan would give Manchuria her independence (which it already nominally had!) and fishing concessions in Japanese waters. This was wired to Molotov through Sato in Moscow.
A week passed with no reply from Moscow to this generous offers (during this time the Okamoto affair in Switzerland began). On July 7 the Emperor lost patience and sent for Suzuki. Why not dispatch a special envoy with a personal message from the Throne?
The obvious choice for this was Konoye, and he was summoned on July 12. Recall that, as background, US planes are bombing Japan everyday, the Imperial Japanese Navy is almost gone, civilians are suffering from starvation, Japan is cut off from its garrisons and possessions, and interested readers may wonder at the absurd lack of urgency in these affairs. Yet there is was. Weeks went by with no progress. The Soviets also informed the US of these manuevers, keeping us abreast of developments, and of course, the diplomatic traffic between Moscow and Tokyo is being read by the US. Finally, ULTRA was revealing the extent of the Japanese build-up in Kyushu.
Sato was informed by telegram to expect an envoy and to ask the Russians to smooth his place. With his usual bluntness, he replied with wonder how the USSR would profit from an early end to the war. Familiar with the real situation (unlike Tokyo) Sato watched troop trains transferring troops to the Far East and knew that Russia would move against Manchuria and the Japanese Far East. He also noted that Russia had shown no interest in the Hirota-Malik talks, so why would they now accept an envoy? Common sense, however, was out of fashion in Tokyo.
On July 11 Togo notified Sato that he was to find out the intent of the Russia government toward Japan and whether it could be used to end the war. On the 12th he cabled Sato again, notifying him of Konoye's expected arrival and asking for the conference to place after Potsdam (the Japanese were aware that the Big Three were meeting there). Togo again cabled Sato on the 17th, a famous cable often deliberately misquoted by revisionist propagandists. After describing the Russia initiative, Togo noted:
The Emperor himself has deigned to express his determination and we have therefore made this request of the Russians. Please bear particularly in mind, however that we are not seeking the Russians' mediation for anything like unconditional surrender.
Although it looks to the ignorant western reader that the Emperor has given an order and all are leaping to obey, in fact it was the opposite. Sato had already sent a telegram to Togo the previous day, asking for clarification on a vital issue:
I would like to point out that even on the basis of your various messages I have obtained no clear idea of the recent situation. Nor am I clear about the views of the Government and Military with regard to the termination of the war.
Sato had, in polite diplomatic language, asked the 64 thousand dollar question: did the military and other government leaders support ending the war? Togo had cabled him back an evasive no, saying with elaborate circumlocution, that only the Emperor suported this initiative. Togo could not say that there was broad support because no such support existed. As both Toyoda and Suzuki said after the war (Anami killed himself), there was no agreement on terms or even on the initiative itself from the Big Six. Indeed on the 14th they had a heated confrontation in which Anami, speaking for the military, said bluntly that he would never accept any document which concluded peace on terms of Japan's defeat. Togo's message, far from establishing that the government wanted peace, in fact establishes that there was no agreement among top leaders.
The use of this cable by revisionists highlights the extent to which the revisionist argument hinges on the ignorance of westerners of the realities of Japanese politics, and why revisionist writers spend so little time on what was going on in Tokyo. The only reason that anyone could think Japan was willing to surrender is if they didn't know anything about Japanese politics or the situation in 1945. In order to support their claim, revisionists must keep the audience in ignorance.
On July 19 Sato again cabled Tokyo. He said that the Soviets had challenged the purpose of the envoy, and warned that it was hard for him to "deny that Japanese authorities are out of touch with the prevailing atmosphere here."
On July 21 Togo summarized the situation in a cable back, saying that Sato believed that unconditional surrender with the sole proviso of the preservation of the Emperor would be acceptable to the Allies (as it later proved to be). Togo explained:
* With regard to unconditional surrender we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. Even if the war drags on and it becomes that it will take much more than bloodshed, the whole country as one man will pit itself against the enemy in accordance with the Imperial Will so long as the enemy demands unconditional surrender. It is in order to avoid such a state of affairs that we are seeking a peace, which is not so-called unconditional surrender, through the good offices of Russia.
Togo ended by saying that this was the Cabinet's will. In other words, in black and white, Togo completely rejected the position that Sato was arguing for -- we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever -- an offer of unconditional surrender with retention of the Emperor -- and said that this would never be acceptable. US leaders, reading this, had Togo's assurance that Japan would never surrender on terms acceptable to the US. The US had monitored many messages from Japanese abroad asking the government to accept unconditional surrender, but none from Tokyo going out. as US intelligence analyzed it, "until the Japanese leaders realize that an invasion cannot be repelled, there is little likelihood that they will accept any peace terms satisfactory to the Allies."
On July 25 Sato met again with USSR rep Alexander Lozovsky, but having no concrete plans to show the Russians, danced diplomatically and promised that Konoye would have such plans when he replied. Interested readers may note that the month of July passed without any results, yet Japan showed no urgency on the peace score. The Soviets, who had informed the US that they had no interest in such negotiations, were simply spinning things out while they got their forces ready to invade Manchuria.
In sum, the Japanese move for "peace" through Russia was simply a fantasy born of desperation. It was never a real peace initiative, never contained concrete offers, and never went anywhere. It certainly was not a move to end the war on terms acceptable to the US and its allies.
Also, the jushin had made it explicit that they could not continue if the US did not invade and continued to firebomb the cities and the forests. Your claims of effective blockade by 1943 is bogus.
"Effective blockade" and "total sealing" are two different things. You are arguing against a strawman. Anyone could do the math and see that in September of 1943 Japan was finished (as many junior officers actually did; 50 of them formed a cabal to overthrow Tojo because he was losing the war and becoming a dictator).
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Some supply lines were cut, but Manchuria, mainland China and much of Indochina was still accessible.
A point that has never been argued.
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By mid-1945, there was no question that all supply lines were cut, harbors were mined, Allied bombers with fighter escorts commanded Japanese skies and dropped percussion, shrapnel and fire at will, and Allied warships could bombard coastal cities without significant risk. It was only a matter of time before what small stockpiles there were of food, ammunition, supplies and energy were exhausted. (Ienaga notes that later, even a month after the cessation of hostilities and Allied forces in occupation, there was still only a four day supply of rice...that's with supplies coming in from the Allies.) Even the extremist militarists had admitted that they'd be "in a fix" if the Allies just continued a siege. (That's a footnoted quote, so I can provide the source, if you'd like.)
Yes, I've noted all this. Several times! The militarists were quite clear on Japan's plight. The problem was getting them to quit fighting not showing that the cause was lost.
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I believe you also stated that the officer corps might have been persuaded by the Russian initiative...well, it seems they weren't, because according to Ienaga, the extremists attempted a coup on the day before the surrender was actually announced by the emperor. They attempted to sieze the emperor's announcement, assassinate the premier, Admiral Suzuki, and raise a mob to force continuation of the war. Even the atomic bombs, both of them, did not change their minds.
Godfrey, it's simply delightful the way you imagine that you are 'refuting ' me when you simply repost the points I've made. I pointed out earlier that after the war Japanese army officers made claims after the war that Soviet entry may have been a factor in forcing the military to accept surrender. You seem to have bollixed that up.
BTW, are you aware of Bergamini's arguments that the coup was political theatre staged by the Emperor?
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I'd like to know what Konoe's statement in 1944 and his memorial the emperor of February 1945 were.
Konoye memorialized the Throne in Feb arguing that the war was lost and Japan must have peace right away. The position of the jushin is not so clear-cut as Ienaga would make it. Many supported the war (Tojo, for example), and when the Koiso government fell they would not appoint Konoye to the post of PM because he was a peacemonger.
Ienaga is a great source, though, for the political structure of the government. It's a good book. I used him extensively, but like any source, you have to balance him with other stuff.
As for your claims of my falling under the sway of the propaganda of the Japanese Rightists...all I have to say is that I think you are ignoring the 50 years of propaganda eminating from the US military-industrial complex, which is far more likely to have affected me, and you, than anything the Japanese Right could, and had a far better motive, as well as opportunity, to seek to absolve themselves of something they knew they needn't have done.
Nonsense, as most of sources are anti-bomb (Ienaga, Skates, Toland, to name only a few) and I am well-aware of the propaganda effort from the US side, as I have already stated. In this very thread.
At that I will concede. I am obviously outclassed in terms of evidence, unless others here have more information that contravenes what Vork has offered up here.
I was aware of the ULTRA and MAGIC intercepts, but had never taken the time to familiarize myself with their content. Thanks for offering up that.
Then, I was less intent on "refuting" you than I was in the midst of changing my opinion when offering up Ienaga's material.
As for the necessity of the use of the atomic weapons, I remain convinced that other avenues were available, but that the costs were potentially as horrific as those of using the weapons. Indeed, mass starvation of an entire nation could have been far more devestating....and I see that as the most credible alternative to the bombings and invasion.
I still believe that there were shifts away from the fantasies that would have led to acknowledgment of the realities and eventual surrender, even without use of the bombs. The problem was the footdragging, seemingly on the part of both the Japanese Council and the Soviets. (You used the term "glacial" for Molotov...I'm assuming this meant his speed, as well as demeanor. It was in the interests of the Soviets to delay surrender until after they got into the fray.) The longer things dragged on, the greater the costs were.
And I still have problems with the three-day delay between the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. It seems far too short to have allowed the stunned Japanese to adequately assess the situation. As for the storm moving up the time of the deployment of the second bomb, why not wait until the typhoon exhausted itself?
Was there any communication from the Allied forces to the Imperial command after Hiroshima? One to the effect of, "That was one bomb. We have more. Capitulate unconditionally now or we will use them?"
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Last edited by godfry n. glad; 08-18-2005 at 06:25 PM.
I'm not sure of the appropriate label to apply to Frank, so maybe Vork can accomodate us with the appropriate one, considering he seems to have the Dramatis Personae with all the roles sketched out. I'd say that Frank was denying the "traditionalist" viewpoint and engaging in "revisionist" opinion. I found the whole description of MacArthur to be quite humorous and heartened that if the conditions on Kyushu were as the intercepts described, that he was the only one left supporting invasion, and the invasion would likely have been postponed or cancelled.
Re: 60th anniversary of a-bomb attack
Linear Mode
